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Abstract
In this thesis I explore the life of philosophical images through the work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, by reading his commentary on the imagination in light of his imaginative 
techniques. In particular, I focus on Wittgenstein’s illustrations of the nonsensical 
fantasy-pictures of philosophy. I argue that the operations of the philosophical 
imagination that he unmasks through his commentary are appropriated to form part of 
his rhetorical practice. Rather than interpreting his technique of illustrating nonsense as 
a dismissive gesture, I draw attention to the open-ended quality of his imaginative 
engagements with nonsense, an open-endedness that helps inaugurate his aspectival 
vision of language and life. To make my argument I bring Wittgenstein’s ethical 
preoccupations to bear on his linguistic practice. I propose that for Wittgenstein, 
nonsense marks an ethical space of relation between and within beings. In the course of 
the thesis I investigate this space of relation, firstly in terms of the attempt to express an 
attitude to life as a whole, secondly in terms of a therapeutic encounter with fantasy and 
finally in the context of debates about community and difference. To explicate my 
argument, I place Wittgenstein’s thought in conversation with the work of Jacques 
Derrida, Sigmund Freud and Stanely Cavell and with the literature of Samuel Beckett 
and J.M. Coetzee.
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Introduction
This thesis began as an investigation of the life of images in philosophy, but soon 
became focused on their special importance in the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In 
his first published work, the Tractatus, Wittgenstein proposes that pictures are the secret 
tie between language and the world. From the point of view of the Tractatus, language 
is comprised of propositions and these propositions picture true and false facts of the 
world. The sum of all the true propositions produces a ‘picture of the world. ’ 1
In Wittgenstein’s second major published work, the Investigations, he adopts a 
somewhat different approach. Here he tells us that expressions like: ‘language pictures 
the world’ or ‘every word has its own inner picture,’ are themselves pictures. As 
pictures they may sometimes be the ‘convincing expression of a conviction, ’2 but they 
do not explain this conviction; they do not tell us, for example, what it is to make an 
illustration, to communicate with others, to view the world as a whole or to mean 
something by our words.
In the Investigations, Wittgenstein also makes a further claim: he says that pictures 
compel us because they are suggested by analogies embedded in the form of our 
language, by the arbitrary resemblances between words and by our idioms of speech. 
The form of our language, however, does not accurately reflect the varied way we use 
words. When we do philosophy, Wittgenstein says, we are often struck by a picture of 
how things must be. We lose sight of the multitude of possibilities opened up by 
language and produce ‘a full-blown pictorial presentation of our grammar. Not facts; 
but as it were illustrated turns of speech. ’3 In the Investigations, Wittgenstein vividly 
illustrates the philosopher’s ‘illustrated turns of speech,’ in order to make the 
‘disguised’ nonsense of what is said ‘patent. ’4 ‘You interpret a grammatical movement 
made by yourself as a quasi-physical phenomenon which you are observing,’ he tells 
the philosopher.5
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, rev. ed., trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness 
(London: Routledge, 1974), §3.01.
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1958), 223.
3 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §295.
4 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §464.
Wittgenstein, Investigations, §401.
3On the basis of this account it would seem that Wittgenstein’s main intention is to 
unmask philosophy’s ‘shameful face,’ its lust for illustration, its failure to make any 
genuine discovery about the world.6 But just when one expects the final dissolution of 
image, Wittgenstein heralds a transformation. For ‘there is an objection to my saying 
that you have made a “grammatical” movement. What you primarily discovered is a 
new way of looking at things. As if you had invented a new way of painting or again, a 
new meter, or a new kind of song.’ Here Wittgenstein suggests that the philosopher’s 
‘illustrated turns of speech,’ might be reconceived as an aesthetic practice, ‘a new way 
of speaking, a new comparison . . .  a new sensation. ’ 7
In the preface of the Investigations, Wittgenstein describes what such an aesthetic 
practice might entail. ‘The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number 
of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of . . . long and involved 
journeyings. The same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh 
from different directions, and new sketches made. ’8 Arranged together, these ‘sketches’ 
form an ‘album’ which reveals the landscape in its many aspects, the ‘criss-cross’ 
journey across the details of everyday life.
In this thesis I propose that the pictures that hold the philosopher captive, also form 
the liberating material of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic practice. So by illustrating the 
philosopher’s ‘illustrated turns of speech,’ by opening to the nonsensicality of their 
words, Wittgenstein produces a landscape which, by virtue of its ambiguity, its 
incompletion, must forever be drawn and redrawn. Each chapter of this thesis reflects, 
in its own terms, on this process of illustration. To emphasise this idea I have chosen a 
series of actual drawings by Udo Sellbach, to accompany Wittgenstein’s word-pictures. 9
To make my argument I will depart from an idea prevalent in the analytic tradition of 
reading of Wittgenstein: namely that making philosophical nonsense ‘patent’ is an act
6 ‘The Shameful Face of Philosophy’ is the title of Michele Le Doeuffs introductory essay to her book 
The Philosophical Imaginary. Through this term she alerts us to the operation of imagery in philosophical 
systems of thought that purport to be purely conceptual. Michele Le Doeuff, ‘Preface: The Shameful face 
of Philosophy,’ The Philosophical Imaginary, trans. Colin Gordon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1989). Although Wittgenstein’s account of imagery in philosophy is by no means the same as Le 
Doeuff’s, I will point out some important affinities in the course of the thesis.
This particular comment is originally made in the context of ‘the visual room,’ one of Wittgenstein’s 
pictures of solipsism, but I will argue that it bears on an understanding of Wittgenstein’s project more 
broadly. Wittgenstein, Investigations, §400.
8 Wittgenstein, ‘Preface,’ Investigations.
9 My father, Udo Sellbach, was bom Köln in 1927 and moved to Australia in the 1950’s where he still 
lives and works as an artist. I grew up surrounded by his prints, paintings and drawings. During the years 
I spent writing this thesis I would from time to time read one of Wittgenstein’s remarks and be reminded 
of his images, but I had many other thoughts in the forefront of my mind. However in the final stages of 
writing, as the themes in my thesis were drawn together, I was struck by the affinity between Udo’s 
drawings and my own preoccupations with Wittgenstein’s work, so I have selected one of his drawings to 
open each of my chapters.
4of dismissal, intended to return us to the task of mapping the ordinary ways we use 
words.10 By contrast I will emphasise the enigmatic, open-ended aspect of nonsense; an 
open-endedness which, I believe, ultimately makes nonsense the source of new 
possibilities. To illustrate philosophical nonsense, in my view, is already to imagine 
nonsense as part of a scene from life, and this in turn entails both the invention of 
various contexts to make sense of the nonsensical fragment, and an opening to the 
enigmatic dimension of the everyday. Here I intend to suggest two things. Firstly that 
philosophy, as Wittgenstein presents it, is not simply an academic pursuit; instead the 
philosophical and the ordinary are intimately intertwined. So while philosophy might be 
thought of as a phantasmic exile from the details of everyday life (which can take a 
specific academic form), this exile is also a potential we each carry, by virtue of the 
fantasy-pictures embedded in our language. Secondly, the dissolution of fantasy and the 
turn to everyday life that Wittgenstein promises, entail the activity of sketching and re­
sketching, so the nonsensical core of fantasy is transformed from within.
By arguing that nonsense plays a generative as well as a dissolving role, I do not 
want to downplay Wittgenstein’s detailed descriptions of the everyday - the criteria he 
proposes for what we say when. But I do intend to show that that Wittgenstein’s open- 
ended notion of nonsense has its correlate in the fragmentary, open-textured nature of 
his descriptions of everyday language.* 11 Indeed 1 will claim that Wittgenstein’s 
imaginative engagements with nonsense help open up the truly aspectival vision of life, 
language and thought that he envisages in the Investigations.12
The account of nonsense I am proposing ties in with something that motivated me 
from the start -  a sense that the precise function of imaging in Wittgenstein’s work 
cannot be pinned down. In particular, I am thinking of the readings of Wittgenstein that 
emphasise the therapeutic dimension of his engagement with images. Like a therapist, 
so the argument goes, Wittgenstein attempts to illustrate, as vividly as possible, the 
picture underpinning the philosopher’s words, but through this process internal 
incoherencies are revealed and the picture self-implodes.13 My reading does not deny
10 See for example P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986).
11 In a certain sense, to argue this is to say that there is nothing beyond or outside everyday language, that 
the term ‘everyday language’ designates both our delusions and the multitude of possibilities open to us.
12 As the above discussion suggests, this thesis will address nonsense and the imagination in the 
Tractatus and the Investigations - two texts which are often read as exemplary of Wittgenstein’s early 
and late periods. It will not be possible in the scope of this thesis to make a comprehensive reading of all 
his work, however in addition to these two texts I will focus on some of Wittgenstein’s work on ethics, 
psychoanalysis, aesthetics and culture.
13 See for example, David Pears ‘Literalism and Imagination: Wittgenstein’s Deconstruction of 
Traditional Philosophy,’ International Journal of Philosophical Studies vol. 1, no. 1,2002, pp. 3-16.
5that Wittgenstein’s therapeutic engagement with fantasy-pictures has a powerful 
dissolving effect, however I do not want to limit therapy to this effect.
In a sense, my reading reverses one of the conventional notions of the relation 
between philosophical idea and image; for rather than viewing Wittgenstein’s images of 
philosophy as textual illustrations of a predetermined therapeutic outcome, I argue that 
images affect the very passage of therapy, so that the outcome of this engagement 
cannot be prescribed in advance. To help unpack the possibilities opened up by 
Wittgenstein’s engagement with imagery I first turned to the work of Michele Le Doeuff 
and Jacques Derrida, two theorists who insist that textual imagery should never be read 
as merely pedagogical, decorative or exemplary of the author’s intentions.
Henry Staten’s groundbreaking book, Wittgenstein and Derrida, and the 
deconstructive readings of Wittgenstein that followed, were of particular importance 
when I began my research because they represented an alternative approach to 
Wittgenstein’s work largely unexplored by the analytic tradition. This new way of 
reading Wittgenstein emphasised the fragmentary, open natured quality of his later 
work, his resistance to a self-present ideal of meaning and his concern for linguistic 
ambiguities. By establishing an allegiance between Wittgenstein and deconstruction (an 
allegiance which Derrida, by the way, did little to explore) the deconstructive readers of 
Wittgenstein have also helped bridge the gap between the Anglo-American and 
Continental traditions of philosophy.
In this thesis I will argue that there are many important points of contact between the 
two authors opened up by these readings. For example, both Wittgenstein and Derrida 
target the philosophical ideal of self-present meaning; both reveal the ‘unplaceable’ 
nature of this idea - its manifestation as a general cultural mythology. 14 They both pull 
apart and rearrange (or deconstruct) the components of the philosophical mythology, 
and they both pay careful attention to changes in context, drawing attention to the 
openness of meaning the new possibilities this can give rise to. In the course of my 
argument I will also draw on a series of key Derridian ideas to help explicate my 
understanding of Wittgenstein, for example: Derrida’s account of ‘dream-writing,’ and 
‘iterability,’ and the law in force without signification.
I will argue that the affinities between the two authors that deconstructive readings 
help bring to the fore should not eclipse the distinctiveness of Wittgenstein’s work, a 
distinctiveness which is, of course, not surprising given that both authors formed their
14 Simon Glendinning, On Being with Others: Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein, (London: Routledge, 
1998) ,  85 .
6ideas in quite separate intellectual contexts. The purpose of my discussion, however, is 
not simply to make a list of similarities and differences, but to understand what is really 
at stake in the debates for and against a comparative reading. In particular, I will 
identify those textual elements focused upon in deconstructive readings of Wittgenstein, 
and those that are neglected. In this regard the analysis of the continuities and 
discontinuities of Wittgenstein and Derrida’s work was for me a necessary undertaking 
on the path to a clearer understanding of Wittgenstein’s rhetorical practice.
I also want to establish at the outset that my engagement with Derrida’s work has 
been refracted, to a large extent by the concerns and interests of the authors such as 
Staten and Simon Glendinning, who have used Derrida’s work to open up an alternative 
reading of Wittgenstein. So, for example, I have focused on the texts from Derrida’s 
early post-structuralist period such as Margins o f Philosophy, Writing and Difference 
and Limited Inc, that are prominent in deconstructive readings of Wittgenstein, and I 
only engage briefly with ideas from his later period. Nor do I claim to propose a 
comprehensive interpretation of these early texts. Instead I draw on Derrida, and on the 
deconstructive readings of Wittgenstein he has inspired, as a starting point from which 
to elaborate Wittgenstein’s imaginative engagement with philosophical images and the 
tenor of his work more broadly. So although I do engage with key Derridian ideas, my 
focus is often on the deconstructive account of Wittgenstein, on the portrait of his work 
that these readings suggest.
In the thesis I draw attention to various aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought not 
adequately accounted for by a deconstructive reading. In particular I focus on 
Wittgenstein’s wariness of general theoretical elaborations, his great emphasis on the 
symptomatic and lived dimension of philosophy, 15 his appetite for the literal, local and 
everyday sense of a word and his argument with certain conventions of academia. Each 
element shapes his distinctive rhetorical style. To explore these ideas in full I will 
address the relation between Wittgenstein and Sigmund Freud, beginning with the 
encounter Wittgenstein imagines between himself and Freud in ‘Conversations on 
Freud,’ then turning to the work of Stanely Cavell, Antonia Soulez and Eric Santner - 
three authors who borrow from a psychoanalytic vocabulary to help open up an 
understanding of Wittgenstein’s project.
For the moment, however, I want to focus on the discontinuity between Wittgenstein 
and Derrida that concerned me when I began my research. While it is true that in his
15 Derrida increasingly comes to emphasize the symptomatic nature of philosophy in the course of his 
writings. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, I believe that a discussion of Wittgenstein and 
Derrida’s later work in this regard would be fruitful.
7early writings Derrida says a lot about the mythological dimension of philosophy and 
about the play of metaphor internal to the concept, it does not seem to me that he has the 
philosophical image in mind, at least the image as Wittgenstein conceives of it.
Initially this particular disparity drew me to the work of Le Doeuff, who demonstrates 
a commitment to the particular case, a wariness of general theoretical claims and a 
desire to carefully spell out the philosophical image, which seemed to match 
Wittgenstein’s own. In her book of collected essays The Philosophical Imaginary, she 
proposes that images in philosophy often express the dreams or fantasies of a system of 
thought - those elements that cannot be established by argument alone. Although Le 
Doeuff’s ideas arise out of her close readings of texts from the history of philosophy, 16 
while Wittgenstein emphasises the dynamic between philosophy and everyday language 
and only occasionally mentions specific authors or texts, they nevertheless both 
characterise philosophy as a practice that tends to draw on imagery which it is not 
willing to fully avow.
For example, Le Doeuff’s essay ‘Daydream in Utopia,’ analyses the ‘imaginary 
material’ in book II of Thomas More’s Utopia, especially More’s description of the 
island’s geography. She argues that More’s description of the geography of Utopia - a 
crescent landmass, surrounding a calm inland sea -  is suggestive of an amphitheatre, a 
space of performance closed off from the rest of the world, an image in keeping with 
More’s account of the insular nature of the island. ‘The island lake,’ she writes, ‘is not 
a harbour but a mirror, and what is performed on the stage is the life of the island: the 
adjoining land overhangs the pool and gazes at itself therein, like the moon in the 
water. ’ 17
Le Doeuff ties this ‘imaginary’ ‘geography’ to a debate between the Utopians. 18 The 
Utopian’s separate bodily pleasures into two quite distinct states, the outer, voluptuous 
pleasure of the senses; and an inner wellbeing, where the body enjoys a tranquil state of 
equilibrium or good health. Le Doeuff writes:
A few Utopians claimed that this second, autarchic pleasure did not exist, because 
it could not be perceived. Some claimed that a steadfast and quiet health should not be 
deemed a pleasure, since it does not cause a present and distinct enjoyment to be 
perceived. The crux of the discussion is the question of whether the healthy man is
16 In this regard Le Doeuff and Derrida are similar.
17 Michele Le Doeuff, ‘Daydream in Utopia' in The Philosophical Imaginary, tr. Colin Gordon (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1989), 23.
18 Le Doeuff, ‘Daydream in Utopia,' 21 ,23 .
8aware of his state. The answer is yes, but the psychological proof is weak: ‘There is no 
man insensitive enough not to find health delectable.’
My interpretation of this would be as follows. What More is unable to read where 
it is written in the minute characters of the individual soul, he reads instead in the 
large characters of the commonwealth. For the definition of health as a stable, perfect 
equilibrium of all the parts of the body has its equivalent in the political harmony of 
the island. The question thus becomes: is an island with the best possible constitution, 
an island living in political harmony, aware of its state? To this question, which is 
never explicitly formulated, imaginary geography gives a positive, if indirect answer: 
the island is aware of its harmony because the island is a theatre, the state of which is 
a lake, and reflected in this lake it perceives its state. It has a mirror . . .  in its belly.19
However, as Le Doeuff goes on to point out, this self-spectacle remains an implicit part 
of the text since More also openly criticises the indulgent display of foreigners. She 
concludes: ‘More uses the image of the theatre to think something: political perfection 
can be perceived; but what he borrows from it is immediately denied, and the theatrical 
model is rejected through the condemnation of exhibitionism. Thus the theatre is 
diverted from its direct meaning, to become a metaphor; it is accepted as a model only 
after it has been crossed out and corrected. ’ 20 Through this metaphor or ‘crossed out’ 
image, the text alludes to the self-aware, self-sufficient nature of the state and subject, 
without needing to submit these allusions to careful scrutiny. But by taking the theatre 
metaphor literally, by inserting its meaning into the text, Le Doeuff reveals the tensions 
and anxieties of More’s philosophical system.
Le Doeuff’s reading helps to pinpoint a somewhat similar strategy at work in 
Wittgenstein’s writing. Although Wittgenstein famously critiques the philosopher’s 
overly literal relation to language, the philosopher’s ‘illustrated turns of speech,’ he also 
suggests that this mode of illustration is something philosophy at once deploys and 
disavows. So, in Le Doeuff’s terms, the philosophical image is drawn upon then crossed 
out, diverted into a metaphor. In such a situation Derrida might draw attention to the 
open play of metaphor, its resistance to any pre-defined role and it is true that, in very 
broad terms, Wittgenstein also affirms the open-textured quality of language. However, 
as I suggested earlier, Wittgenstein’s particular rhetorical response is to illustrate the 
philosophers ‘illustrated turns of speech,’ to take the images of philosophy more 
literally than the philosopher him or herself. One cannot make this kind of argument it
19 Le Doeuff, ‘Daydream in U top ia24.
20 Le Doeuff, ‘Daydream in Utopia, ’ 25.
9seems to me, without at least provisionally distinguishing between the literal and the 
metaphorical sense of an image, a distinction Le Dceuff’s work helps bring to the fore.
However, there is something about the tenor of Le Doeuff’s analysis that I wanted to 
resist in my reading of Wittgenstein: the apparent finality of the act of unmasking, her 
tendency to assign the image a determinate meaning when she re-inserts it into the text. 
In my view the remarkable thing about Wittgenstein’s technique of literalism is 
precisely that no single resolute meaning is forthcoming, that in its place a series of 
possible literalisations are proposed. To explore the possibilities opened up by this 
technique, I will draw on two writers of fiction who also have an appetite for literality. 
In my first chapter I will read Wittgenstein in conjunction with Samuel Beckett’s works 
Watt and Endgame and in the final chapter I will turn to J.M. Coetzee’s novella The 
Lives of Animals.
There is also a second reason why I mentioned Le Doeuff’s essay ‘Daydream in 
Utopia,' by way of introduction. For I believe that her reading of More draws attention 
to two interrelated themes from the history of philosophy that Wittgenstein also 
addresses: on the one hand the dream of self-sufficiency and self enclosure, and on the 
other hand a peaceful self-awareness of equilibrium - a state of bodily health. Le Doeuff 
suggests that what More is unable to establish in a convincing manner at the level of the 
subject, he transposes to the level of community; so the imaginary geography of the 
island stages the harmonious well being of a self-enclosed state.
The image or ideal of harmonious self-sufficiency is an important target for 
Wittgenstein both at the level of the individual and the community, as is the strict 
delineation of sensory and non-sensory pleasures. Still something of More’s day-dream 
is sustained in Wittgenstein’s work: the desire for a peaceful, harmonious state of 
health; the manifestation of feeling in absence of any determinate physical or 
psychological condition; and the need to think this state both at the level of the subject 
and the community. Wittgenstein diverges from More, however, by presenting the 
subject always in relation to another, so that subjectivity and community ultimately 
intertwine.
By bringing the notions of ‘community’ ‘health’ and ‘relationality ’ to bear on my 
previous discussion of Wittgenstein’s techniques of literalisation and illustration, a 
central theme of the thesis emerges. My proposal is that Wittgenstein’s imaginative 
engagement with the nonsensical pictures of philosophy goes hand in hand with the 
opening of a space of encounter between subjects and that together these two notions 
help make possible Wittgenstein’s wondrous vision of everyday life - a way of seeing
10
that draws attention to changes in aspect which Wittgenstein correlates with a state of 
well-being. I will argue that the experience of this vision cannot be tied down to a 
determinate psychological state, for it is manifest in language and practice.
These last remarks draw attention to the ethical dimension of Wittgenstein’s thought 
- his focus on the relation between self and other, and his concern for the health of 
community to which we belong. This ethical dimension is played out in what one might 
call the therapeutic situation of the Investigations - where Wittgenstein imaginatively 
opens himself to a person in the thrall of fantasy by illustrating the nonsensical picture 
that drives his or her thought. On the one hand, the therapeutic situation is ethical in the 
sense that it tries to effect a conversion of life, to replace a singular fantasy order with 
an aspectival vision of language. Ethics, Wittgenstein tells us as early as the Tractatus, 
should not be thought of as this or that event in the world but an orientation to life as a 
whole.21 On the other hand, the therapeutic situation is ethical because it is an 
‘acknowledgement,’ as Stanley Cavell might say,22 of the crisis of meaning suffered by 
a person in the thrall of fantasy, rather than a claim to know the true significance of the 
nonsense expressed.
In this thesis I will argue that the ethical terms I have just outlined have their origins 
in Wittgenstein’s earliest writings - a body of work which is not conventionally 
considered to constructively inform his therapeutic practice - and bear upon questions of 
community and difference well beyond the context of the therapeutic encounter 
described in Investigations. To make my argument I will address Wittgenstein’s 
imaginative engagement with nonsense in three different but overlapping settings, 
firstly in the context of the attempt to express an attitude to life as a whole, later in 
terms of therapy, and lastly in relation to the encounter between different forms of life. 
Hence my exploration of nonsense as a space of open encounter begins with a quite 
narrow analysis of the textual particularities of Wittgenstein’s writings, early and late, 
and moves to a much broader discussion of the relevance of Wittgenstein’s work to 
current debates about self and other. The final chapter in particular, brings my 
proceeding analysis of the ethical and therapeutic dimension of Wittgenstein thought to 
bear on a more general discussion of community and difference.
The thesis as a whole turns round a series of separate but interconnected questions to 
do with ethics, imagination, feeling and therapy: what do our ethical feelings about life 
as a whole entail? How do these feelings manifest? Who is captivated by fantasy-
21 See Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §6.43.
22 Stanley Cavell, ‘Knowing and Acknowledging,’ Must We Mean What We Say: A Book of Essays, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 115-163.
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pictures? What is at stake in Wittgenstein’s therapeutic engagement with fantasy? What 
is the relation between image and feeling? What place does the subject have in therapy? 
How does Wittgenstein transform our notions of ‘subject’ and ‘community?’ Does 
Wittgenstein conceive of the community always in relation to another?
My response to these questions will unfold across six chapters. Chapter 1 will touch 
broadly on many of the important themes of the thesis, focusing on Wittgenstein’s later 
work. Here I draw on Samuel Beckett’s work to help investigate the possible 
implications of Wittgenstein’s technique of imaginative literalism and the vision of 
language and life it gives rise to.
Chapter 2 explores the ethical dimension of this linguistic practice by tracing 
continuities in Wittgenstein’s approach to nonsense, imagination, feeling and the will. 
Focusing on the explicitly ethical reflections from his early and middle periods, I 
explore two ideas that inform Wittgenstein’s later work, the notion that an attitude to 
life as a whole can be manifest through language and practice and the idea that nonsense 
marks the space of encounter between and within subjects.
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I bring these reflections on language and ethics to bear on an 
understanding of therapy: firstly by tracing the various affinities and discontinuities 
between Wittgenstein and deconstruction; secondly by building on the conversation 
Wittgenstein imaginatively embarks on with Freud. Here 1 will explore the link between 
Wittgenstein’s imaginative encounter with nonsense and the psychoanalytic notion of 
therapy and the unconscious. I will argue that by acknowledging the nonsensical heart 
of fantasy, by sketching and re-sketching its existential effects, Wittgenstein loosens the 
fantasy order of the unconscious, dispersing its mood, image and feeling across the 
details of everyday life. In this therapeutic encounter the unconscious is transformed 
from the captivating stuff of fantasy into an open-ended space of possibility and 
encounter.
In my final chapter I will explore how the ideas I have developed in the context of 
the explicitly therapeutic situation of the Investigations, inform an understanding of 
community, ethics and difference more broadly. To do so I will read Wittgenstein’s 
account of ‘form of life’ in the context of Coetzee’s novel, The Lives of Animals.
There are a few additional remarks I would like to make about the form of the thesis 
and the conversations I establish within it. Firstly, I believe it is important to address 
Wittgenstein’s writing not only in the context of philosophical debates but also in 
relation to literature and art - to understand Wittgenstein as an aesthetic practitioner 
working with the material of words and thought. This approach has enabled me to read
12
his account of the imagination alongside his imaginative techniques, and to investigate 
these techniques without determining in advance the possibilities that might unfold.
Secondly, I would like to reflect on my own technique. As the introduction suggests, 
the thesis as a whole sets various ideas, images and thoughts in relation to one another. 
One might say that the dialogue between Wittgenstein and myself is opened up by the 
much broader discussion I set in motion between various readers and non-readers of 
Wittgenstein. This conversation - part exchange, part altercation -  is in an important 
regard inspired by the careful attention Wittgenstein pays to the effect of changes in 
aspect. However, it is also true to say that the various perspectives and readings of this 
thesis are arranged with a very particular series of distinctions in mind.23
It may seem to a reader familiar with Wittgenstein’s work that by focusing on his 
scenes of illustrated nonsense, I neglect the most important themes of his work- the 
description of ordinary language use, the proposal of criteria for what we say when, and 
the elaboration of a shared form of life. But while it is true that these themes do at times 
retreat to the background of my discussion, they do not disappear. Instead, my intention 
is to trace in Wittgenstein’s writing a particular series of distinctions concerning the 
imagination, literality, nonsense, ethics and the unconscious, that I will then bring to 
bear on a broader understanding of his project, so that the most famous themes of his 
work re-appear, refracted through the medium of these concerns.
23 Wittgenstein writes: ‘The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular 
purpose.’ Wittgenstein, Investigations, §127.
Chapter One
The Imaginative Literalist
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Chapter 1
The Imaginative Literalist
Introduction
‘For a second he felt violent pain.’ —Why does it sound queer to say: ‘for a second he 
felt deep grief? Only because it so seldom happens?’1
We measure pain for distinct segments of time so surely it is possible to feel deep grief 
for only a second or even to alternate between the feelings of ‘sorrow’ and ‘joy’ with 
the ‘tick of the clock.’ What is it that makes these thoughts seem so strange? Is it simply 
that they describe empirically uncommon experiences?
These questions raised by Wittgenstein in the Investigations, might equally be asked 
of Mr Hackett in Beckett’s novel Watt. Upon first seeing the novel’s main character, 
Watt, Mr Hackett says: ‘Here there is nothing in the least unusual, that I can see, and yet 
I bum with curiosity, and with wonder. The sensation is not disagreeable, I must say, 
and yet I do not think I could bear it for more than twenty minutes, or half an hour.’ 2 
According to the Investigations, expressions such as ‘wonder borne for twenty 
minutes’ or ‘deep grief felt for a second,’ are not descriptions of logically possible but 
empirically rare phenomena; rather they are nonsensical expressions that transgress the 
everyday ‘implications’3 of our words. For even if it were true that wonder can be borne 
for no more than thirty minutes, it still seems ridiculous for Mr Hackett to make these 
calculations while in the grip of wonder. Mr Hackett’s whole approach to language is 
overly pedantic, his speculations seem beside the point, for he fails to grasp the complex 
and varied roles that words and feelings play in our lives.
In her book, Wittgenstein’s Ladder, Marjorie Perloff argues that all the characters in 
Watt are suffering from a ‘crisis of language’ which in ‘Wittgensteinian terms’ might be
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edition, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, 
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1958), 174.
2 Samuel Beckett, Watt (London: Pan Books, 1998), 15. For example, a sunbather may think it agreeable 
to bum in the sun for twenty minutes, so why not measure burning curiosity in a similar way?
3 Stanley Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), 123.
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called a ‘use or context deficiency.’ 4 Mr Hackett, for example, knows that wonder is a 
feeling and that it is possible to time the duration of feelings, he even knows that 
wonder can become unbearable, but he does not understand the role played by wonder 
in our lives. He fails to see that the overwhelming quality of wonder (even its 
unbearableness) is what makes it difficult for us to predict its end, or indeed to bring it 
to an end.
In the Investigations Wittgenstein ties this context disorder to philosophy: to its love 
of denotative or literal meaning and its disregard for the contextual life of words. When 
the philosopher separates words such as wonder, grief, joy, fear and pain from their 
place in the weave of life, a picture of how things must be takes hold, a fantasy-picture. 
For suddenly it seems that each word must represent a non-verbal essence different in 
kind from other sensations but still measurable in equivalent ways. 5 Although this 
picture of meaning does not reflect the complexity of language use, it is still suggested 
to us by language - by the shape of our grammar, by our idioms of speech and forms of 
expression.6 For example, we describe both pain and grief as feelings, and we speak of 
them both temporally, and for these reasons it seems natural to suppose that, at least in 
principle, pain and grief can be measured in the same way. Beneath the mess and 
ambiguity of everyday language there must be meanings which are fully present, literal 
and exact, for otherwise, it seems, communication itself would be impossible. But what 
if such a picture were really true? Would the private meanings parade themselves before 
my mind’s eye as I speak? Are these private meanings or feelings or images, or a 
different kind of phenomena entirely? How can I possibly hope to speak meaningfully 
in their absence?
As Wittgenstein shows throughout the Investigations, the strange yet compelling 
nature of fantasy pictures, can provoke within us an insatiable wonder. In our 
impatience to satisfy this feeling we put aside context and practice and inquire into the 
very nature of things, we search for the precise measurement of wonder, its non-verbal 
essence, its source. But in so doing we misunderstand something about the very nature
4 Marjorie Perloff, Wittgenstein’s Ladder (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 117.
5 Wittgenstein questions that grief is a sensation on page 174 of the Investigations, but in this situation he 
is thinking of the difference between grief and a sensation such as pain. Further down the page he gives a 
different account of sensation, in the context of the sensation of shuddering. He writes: ‘the words “it 
makes me shiver” are themselves such a shuddering reaction; and if I hear and feel them as I utter them, 
this belongs among the rest of those sensations. Now why should the wordless shudder be the ground of 
the verbal one?’ I believe that grief might resemble this latter notion of sensation, in so far as grief can be 
manifest through practice and words, instead of being a psychological state that continues for a 
determinate state of time.
6 For example, in § 115 of the Investigations Wittgenstein writes: ‘A picture held us captive. And we 
could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.’
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of wonder and also sensation more broadly, namely that some words themselves are 
feelings and that these verbal feelings need not be grounded on the ‘wordless’ one but 
rather the verbal and nonverbal expression might sit side by side.7 Sensation, mood and 
feeling need not always be states of mind, but can be manifest in language itself.
But in our desire to resolve the feeling of wonder, we separate ourselves from 
everyday language and the stream of life.8 We search for a realm ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ 
the world which might give it foundation; hence the desire to resolve wonder by 
stepping outside life and getting to the essence of things. Only for Wittgenstein, wonder 
cannot be ended in this way. The philosopher resembles Mr Hackett and his friends, 
who are all deeply fascinated with Watt. In order to satisfy their curiosity they ask many 
questions and posit many answers, but ultimately all that is said remains beside the 
point for the character Watt is no less enigmatic at the end of their inquiry. Indeed their 
words are nonsensical, their speculations border on madness. Is it possible to intervene 
in some way and bring this insatiable wonder to an end?
Wittgenstein’s hope in the Investigations is to loosen the hold of fantasy through a 
series of therapeutic techniques - not to refute fantasy pictures, but to question their 
appeal. His most famous technique, the proposal of ‘criteria’ for what we say and do in 
particular circumstances, is summarised in section 116 of the Investigations.
When philosophers use a word—’knowledge,’ ‘being,’ ‘object,’ T,’
‘proposition,’ ‘name’ and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask 
oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its 
original home? -
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.
By contrast, Beckett does not share Wittgenstein’s conviction that it is possible to 
return to the everyday contexts that give language life and meaning. None of the 
characters in Watt, for example, successfully overcome their ‘context disorder.’ But 
Beckett does express a different kind of hope. In a 1937 letter to his friend Axel Kaun 
he writes: ‘Let us hope that the time will come . . . when language is being most
7 Wittgenstein, Investigations, 174. See also §244.
8 For Wittgenstein the term ‘everyday language,’ does not indicate a particular field of language to be 
distinguished from other areas, but entails the whole range of possibilities open to language users. As I 
will argue, the attempt to evade the commitments of everyday language is itself a possibility of everyday 
language.
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efficiently used and where it is being most efficiently misused.’ 9 What should we make 
of this suggestion? Does it mean that there is no escape from language’s powerful 
pictures and the madness they induce? Or might the path out of fantasy into the middle 
of everyday life entail a certain willingness to misuse words, to speak nonsense? To 
respond to this question, I will draw attention to Wittgenstein’s suggestion that: ‘one of 
the most important tasks is to express all false thought processes so characteristically 
that the reader says, “Yes that’s exactly how I meant it.” To trace the physiognomy of 
every error ' 10 This chapter explores the ramifications of these words. I will argue that 
in addition to the recollection of criteria, * 11 literalism itself is a therapeutic procedure for 
Wittgenstein.
Hacker on Wittgenstein’s therapeutic practice
In many standard interpretations of Wittgenstein’s later work, the illnesses treated are 
identified as the intellectual stances of metaphysics and scepticism, and the patient as 
the philosopher, or ‘would be’ philosopher. P.M.S. Hacker puts forward the argument 
that the sickness that interests Wittgenstein is a specifically philosophical one, but that 
his therapeutic treatments may also be used to rein in the metaphysical impulse within 
the sciences. Hacker suggests that Wittgenstein offers a methodology aimed at
9 Samuel Beckett, Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic Fragment, ed. Ruby Cohn (New 
York: Grove Press, 1984), 171-172.
10 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Philosophy,’ Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951, ed. J. Klagge and A. 
Nordmann (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), #87, 165 [slightly amended translation].
11 I am using the term ‘criteria’ here and throughout this thesis in Wittgenstein’s sense of the word. 
According to Wittgenstein the act of recalling criteria entails descriptions of the linguistic and 
behavioural circumstances for our use of concepts. As Cavell points out in The Claim o f Reason, 
Wittgensteinian criteria are not to be understood as rules that determine how a word must be applied, 
rather they are proposals of what we say, which others may affirm or reject. The activity of recalling 
criteria is hence tied up with an exploration of the extent of community and/or difference. Importantly, 
however, for Wittgenstein the very act of agreeing or disagreeing over the use of a word in given 
circumstances, presupposes a certain underpinning agreement in our concept of what it is to use a word, 
to agree or disagree etc. See especially ‘Criteria and Judgment’ in Stanley Cavell, The Claim o f Reason: 
Wittgenstein, Scepticism, Morality and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
In the majority of cases I will deploy the term ‘criteria’ to refer to the general strategy of testing the 
breadth of community by proposing what we say when, and to the related idea that our ability to use 
words rests on certain broad underlying agreements.
If, on the other hand, I am referring to particular criteria for a given word, this will be made clear from 
the context.
As I stated in the introduction, my intention is not to disregard Wittgenstein’s appeal to criteria, but 
rather to demonstrate how the less examined strategies of literalism he deploys shed light on an 
understanding of what is at stake in this appeal. I will address this relation in Chapters 3 & 6.
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dissolving the philosopher’s ‘entanglement in the web of language’ and exposing the 
‘metaphysical mystery-mongering,’ that inevitably produces doubt and confusion. 12
To help illustrate his point he draws on an idea put forward by Wittgenstein in the 
Investigations, namely that conceptual confusions can be produced by the discrepancy 
between our ‘surface grammar’ - the part of language that can be ‘taken in at a glance’ 
and our ‘depth grammar’ - the actual network of interconnected language use. 13 This 
account ties in with some of the ideas we have already discussed, especially the notion 
that our idioms of speech and forms of expression fail to clearly represent the 
complexity of language use. We speak (for example) of the world as if it is something 
we can observe as a whole, of meaning as something definitive, of the mind as a secret 
place, of images appearing to the mind’s eye, of feelings as something I have and of 
other minds as a mystery to us. According to Hacker, this ‘ancient verbal iconography’ 
is not exactly ‘false’ in the sense that Wittgenstein does not expect us to abandon the 
traditional idioms we use to describe the world or mind. Indeed, as Hacker proposes, 
our idioms of expression are generally not problematic, for as ‘native speakers’ we tend 
not to take them figuratively. The philosopher’s job, however, is to reflect on the nature 
of language and meaning, and so they are left particularly susceptible to these traps laid 
out in our surface grammar. When philosophers theorise that meaning must be a special 
mental phenomena, or when the failure of this account leads them to sceptical doubt, 
they are like foreigners or savages taking the ‘mythology’ embedded in our language 
too literally.
In Hacker’s view, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic response to the philosopher’s delusions 
has both a positive and a negative aspect. In a negative sense Wittgenstein ‘delves into’ 
the ‘myths,’ ‘superstitions’ and ‘habits of thought’ that are ‘the source of the confusion’ 
to reveal that ‘most of metaphysics is dross, to be discarded as nonsense. ’ 14 According 
to Hacker, Wittgenstein shows that ‘to abandon certain combinations of words as 
senseless,’ a resignation of feeling rather than intellect is required. 15 Hacker takes 
Wittgenstein to show that in order to give up certain words as senseless, the philosopher 
must also relinquish their appetite for wonder and mystery. ‘For the human craving for 
the arcane is present in philosophy no less than in other walks of life, manifesting itself 
in the desire for hitherto undreamt-of mysteries about the mind, thought and language.
12 P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: On Human Nature (London: Phoenix, 1997), 10. P.M.S. Hacker, 
Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986),
123.
13 Hacker, Wittgenstein, 9-12. See also Wittgenstein, Investigations, §664.
14 Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Analytic Philosophy, 113, 118.
15 Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Analytic Philosophy, 112.
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But in philosophy there are no mysteries, only the mesmerizing confusions engendered 
inter alia by our entanglement in grammar. ’ 16
In place of the feelings these ‘mesmerizing confusions’ engender, Hacker believes 
that Wittgenstein offers a ‘perspicuous representation’ 17 of our ‘depth grammar’ - a 
descriptive map of our language use. Hacker argues that Wittgenstein does not provide 
a homogenous theory of language or a set of principles outlining our agreements and 
disagreements; rather language is made up of a series of language games or practices 
which interconnect with each other but which are also, at points, incommensurable. In 
our use of language we agree about where the limits of language lie. This map consists 
of what Hacker calls a ‘connective analysis,’ not an essential definition of concepts, but 
an account of the many different ways that the concept operates. 18 The account amounts 
to a map or chart of the rules of our language showing ‘the different transformations of 
which the sentence admits, the kinds of consequences it implies, the manner of its 
context dependence, its role in the language-game, the various combinatorial 
possibilities of the word and so forth.’ 19 However, Hacker emphasises that ‘depth 
grammar’ should not be understood as ‘deep rules’ or ‘hypothesis which explain the 
surface rules. ’ 20 Referring to the ‘perspicuous representation’ Wittgenstein aims to give, 
Hacker says that ‘ [t]his vast panorama is not a theory of meaning, but it gives us an 
overview of the conceptual network which theorists of meaning misguidedly attempt to 
capture by way of axiomatic theory constructions. ’ 21
For this reason, in his revised version of Insight and Illusion, Hacker rejects his 
previous view that the Investigations puts forward a form of ‘truth conditional 
semantics or realism’ to counter the ‘anti-realism or assertion-condition semantics’ of 
the Tractatus. 22 Wittgenstein’s work, Hacker tells us, cannot be situated on the 
traditional map of philosophical positions. He points out that Wittgenstein’s resistance 
to traditional philosophical theory can be seen in the way that the claim that a word’s
ib Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Analytic Philosophy, 112.
17 Wittgenstein, Investigations, § 122.
18 Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Analytic Philosophy, 107. Hacker admits that Wittgenstein rarely 
pursues a connective analysis in a systematic way, but he argues that one can assemble such an analysis 
out of the many remarks that comprise the Investigations.
19 Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Analytic Philosophy, 241.
20 Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Analytic Philosophy, 241. On page 240 Hacker writes: ‘what may 
appear to be ‘theses’ in Wittgenstein’s writings are either grammatical propositions or synopses thereof. 
They are not empirical theses. Nor do they claim to be metaphysical truths. They are, rather, expressions 
of rules (‘conventions governing our use of language’) for the use of their constituent expressions is 
sometimes expressed synoptically at a high level of generality. ’
21 Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Analytic Philosophy, 242.
22 Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, rev. edition (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986), vii, viii.
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meaning is determined by its use never functions as a formula independent of the actual 
process of describing the complexities of language usage.23 Nevertheless, Hacker still 
holds that Wittgenstein’s map of language usage does assure us that the philosophical 
stances of scepticism or anti-realism are illusory, for central to Hacker’s account is his 
assumption that when Wittgenstein reveals the nonsensicality of the philosopher’s 
words his intention is to reject, deride or dismiss them. Hacker’s reading gives voice to 
an important aspect of the Investigations, for it is true that at points Wittgenstein does 
ridicule our desire for enigma, or chide the philosopher for speaking nonsense. 
However, the account Hacker gives does not capture all that is entailed by 
Wittgenstein’s approach to nonsense and feeling. In particular, Hacker’s work does not 
capture what one might call the ethical spirit of Wittgenstein’s work, the transformation 
he calls for, not only in academic practice but in our culture more broadly.
On the question of whether Wittgenstein’s therapeutic techniques have any bearing 
on a discussion of ethics, aesthetics, value, law, politics or the state of culture, Hacker 
tells us that Wittgenstein ‘wrote next to nothing after 1929 on ethics or value theory, 
and never wrote anything on political or legal philosophy. It is far from obvious,’ he 
concludes, ‘how to extend his methodological principles to the domains of ‘practical 
philosophy,’ or indeed whether they should be extended without modification.24 As we 
will see in Chapter 2, Hacker’s summary of Wittgenstein’s later work ignores both 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion and his 1930 ‘Lecture on Ethics.’25The lecture in 
particular is of considerable significance to us, for not only does Wittgenstein liken 
expressions of morality or absolute value to nonsense, hence suggesting a certain 
analogy between metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics, but he also expresses great respect 
for ‘the human tendency’ to speak ethically and thus ‘to run up against the limits of 
language.’ This leads me to suggest that there might be more at stake in the 
philosopher’s nonsense than Hacker realises.
23 In section 43 of the Investigations Wittgenstein writes: ‘For a large class of cases—though not for 
all—in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in 
the language.’
24 Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Analytic Philosophy, 117.
25 Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture on Ethics’ was prepared between September 1929 and December 1930. The 
text we have today is a transcript of the shorthand notes made by Friedrich Waismann during and after his 
conversations with Wittgenstein and Moritz Schlick about the lecture. I will discuss the lecture in detail in 
chapter 2. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ The Philosophical Review vol. 74, (1965). See 
also Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Lectures on Religious Belief,’ Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations on 
Aesthetics, Psychology & Religious Belief,' ed. C. Barrett, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966.
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An alternative account of literality
By treating nonsense as a term of derision, I believe that Hacker does not pay enough 
attention to the imaginative techniques that Wittgenstein deploys in the staging of 
nonsense. In particular he fails to see that Wittgenstein responds to the philosopher’s 
desire for private idealised meaning, with his own version of literality. In section 295 of 
the Investigations, for example, Wittgenstein asks his reader to imagine a truly private 
sensation - pain known only from one’s own case. This imaginative gesture, he 
suggests, might help us realise what it is that we find in ourselves when we do 
philosophy.
Suppose everyone does say about himself that he knows what pain is only from his 
own pain. —Not that people really say that, or are prepared to say it. But i f  everybody 
said it—it might be a kind of exclamation. And even if it gives no information, still it 
is a picture, and why should we not want to call up such a picture? Imagine an 
allegorical painting taking the place of those words.
When we look into ourselves when we do philosophy, we often get to see just such 
a picture. A full-blown pictorial presentation of our grammar. Not facts; but as it were 
illustrated turns of speech.26
Wittgenstein’s insistence that the philosopher illustrates turns of speech instead of 
discovering new facts, may at first seem to re-enforce Hacker’s idea that by making 
philosophical nonsense ‘patent’ Wittgenstein intends to dismiss it. But notice 
that when Wittgenstein tells us to replace the philosopher’s words with an ‘allegorical 
painting,’ he does not explain to the non-philosopher what it is like to do philosophy, 
rather he restages something that we already do but without necessarily realising. 
‘When we look into ourselves when we do philosophy, we often get to see just such a 
picture,’ he tells us, as if to say that the potential for philosophy is something we all 
carry within us. By insisting that feelings must be private and self-contained, we take an 
idiom of speech literally, but, as Wittgenstein also suggests, we do not recognise that 
this is what we do, for it seems all the time that we are inquiring into something of great 
importance. Philosophy depends on an ideal of literality which, at another level, it must
26 L Wittgenstein, Investigations, § 295.
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disavow. It is as if the dream of a literal language is plausible so long as its wish is 
never fulfilled. By dramatically re-staging philosophy’s ‘illustrated turns of speech,’ by 
literalising them, so to speak, Wittgenstein helps us recognise the nonsensical fantasy 
pictures at the heart of our metaphysical speculations. For it is only by tracing as 
carefully as possible the ‘physiognomy of every error,’ that the spell of certain powerful 
pictures might be undone.
Hence illustrating ‘turns o f speech’ turns out to be as much part of Wittgenstein’s 
own procedure as it is part of the metaphysician’s. Indeed, remark 295 points the way to 
a different understanding of Wittgenstein’s second o f deep grief ox Beckett’s wonder 
bourne for twenty minutes. These descriptions can also be understood as ‘allegorical 
paintings’ or philosophical portraits.27 Through them Wittgenstein invites us to spell 
out what a commitment to literal meaning might actually entail; a task which academic 
practice28 does not perhaps take seriously enough.
Pears on Wittgenstein’s strategies of ‘literalism and imagination’
A reading similar to the one I am developing here is put forward by David Pears in his 
books Wittgenstein and The False Prison, and especially in his 2002 article: ‘Literalism 
and Imagination: Wittgenstein’s Deconstruction of Traditional Philosophy.’ Unlike 
many readers of Wittgenstein’s later work, Pears recognises that Wittgenstein himself 
practices a form of literalism: spelling out the implicit images and scenes of philosophy 
more precisely than conventional philosophy ever would. For Pears this mixture of 
literalism and imagination is as central to Wittgenstein’s procedure as descriptions of 
actual language usage. While Hacker argues that Wittgenstein’s main philosophical 
contribution (or reform) is to correct our metaphysical illusions with ‘a non-theoretical 
map’ of ordinary language uses, Pears insists it is only by re-staging philosophy’s 
‘imaginative misunderstandings’ that we come to see our linguistic practices as the
2' What would this ‘allegorical painting’ depict? Perhaps it would contain a picture of private, self- 
contained pain. But do we even know what such a picture would look like? Perhaps it would show the 
arbitrary shape of our grammar suggesting that feelings are inner. Perhaps it would depict a world where 
people are unable to share their pain w ith their neighbour. Perhaps it would show a person emphatically 
saying that they only felt pain from their own case. Such a person might have some grasp of the word 
pain (that pain is something one feels, that it is unpleasant etc.) but they would use the word oddly, 
w ithout reference to the contexts in which the pain is ordinarily used. Like the person who speaks of a 
moment of deep grief or a half hour of bearable wonder, the person who knows pain only from their own 
situation seems to suffer from a ‘context disorder,’ and it is difficult to decide whether they actually 
understand the words they deploy.
28 This idea ties in with my discussion in the introduction of Michele Le Doeuff’s book The Philosophical 
Imaginary. She outlines the tendency of intellectual texts to drawing on images which are then crossed 
out or disavowed.
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‘whole truth,’ rather than something in need of further objective foundation .29 The 
‘map’ Wittgenstein draws ‘must be read against a deep background of dream and 
illusion, but all that it actually shows it the pattern of our linguistic practices . ’ 30 It is as if 
the philosopher must first work through the fantasy element of their thought in order to 
fully appreciate life as it is.
According to Pears, Wittgenstein’s attempt to account for the imaginary dimension 
of philosophy makes him unique among ordinary language philosophers. For while both 
Wittgenstein and Austin share a commitment to the ‘collective wisdom’ of language 
use, only Wittgenstein tries to explain why ‘so many philosophers have neglected 
ordinary language, which does, after all, express the infra-structure of all our thinking -  
even our most abstract and refined speculations. ’ 31
In the Blue Book Wittgenstein links this ‘neglect’ to the philosopher’s appetite for 
theory and their fascination with the methods of science and mathematics which reduce 
‘the explanations of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive 
natural laws’ and unify ‘the treatment of different topics by using a generalisation . ’ 32 In 
Wittgenstein’s view, ‘[philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way that science 
does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.’ 33
Pears argues that W ittgenstein also shows us the philosopher’s ‘craving for 
generality’ and their ‘contemptuous attitude towards the particular case ,’ 34 results from 
the way knowledge evolved.
At first [knowledge] was shaped by common sense and practical exigencies. Then 
came the elaborations of science, which offered theories to explain the phenomena 
through which people had previously treaded their way by the dim light of natural 
sagacity. The scientific construal of the world then forced people to raise questions 
about their place in it as observers and assume that these questions too would be 
answered by theories of greater generality -  metaphysics after physics. If a certain
29 David Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination: Wittgenstein’s Deconstruction of Traditional Philosophy,’ 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, no.l (2002), 4. David Pears, Wittgenstein (London: 
Fontana Press, 1997), 171.
30 Pears, Wittgenstein, 171.
31 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 7.
32 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 7.
33 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue Book in The Blue and Brown Books (London: Blackwell, 1958), 18.
34 Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 18.
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technique had enabled you to climb half way up a mountain, you naturally expect the 
same technique to take you to the top35
Pears emphasises two aspects of scientific thought that structure philosophical 
speculation. The first, as the above account of the evolution of knowledge suggests, is 
wonder, for the same sense of wonderment that drives scientists to propose new 
explanations for our natural phenomena inspires the philosopher to offer explanations 
and theories about the meaning of language and life. The difficulty, however, is that 
many scientific questions can be answered or at least tested for falsity, whereas 
philosophical wonder, as Wittgenstein describes it, seems unable to find resolution in 
the empirical world.
While Pears alludes to wonder in passing in his article, he focuses on a second 
dimension of scientific thought - the imagination.
Some of the most notable advances in science started as quite extraordinary fears of 
imagination. But in philosophy there is no agreement about what counts as a test of 
theory, and, if Wittgenstein is right, there are no genuine theories. That leaves 
imagination out on a limb: it offers us pictures of the structure of our thought which 
influence us in ways that are not controlled by reason or experience.36
These remarks should not be taken to suggest that all pictures must confirm to scientific 
norms of testability, but rather to reveal that philosophy purports to make new 
discoveries about the world but in fact illustrates the shape of our thoughts or our 
‘surface grammar.’ Such pictures have not apparent application yet they still have a 
powerful affective charge. Indeed, rational and empirical principles of argumentation 
are unable to dispel their influence. This is why Pears suggests that Wittgenstein 
counters philosophy’s ‘imaginative misunderstandings’ with his own techniques of 
imagination and literalism.
35 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 7. As Pears goes on to say, for Wittgenstein the tme philosophical 
development ‘is not to be achieved by mimicking science and elaborating theories, but rather by 
returning to base and asking oneself how one ever got into a position in which a theory seemed to be 
needed.’
36 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 8.
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Dispelling philosophy’s ‘imaginative misunderstandings’
In ‘Literalism and Imagination’ Pears’ aim is to show that the devices of literalism and 
imagination that he identifies in Wittgenstein’s practice are the very techniques 
Wittgenstein interpreters have always brought to the fore, whether they realise it or not. 
To do so he considers Wittgenstein’s treatment of two traditional philosophical claims: 
the solipsist construal of the self as a singular and private entity; and the idea that we 
can only perceive the physical world indirectly, for the direct objects of our perception 
are sense-data. Both stances presume that the physical and phenomenal worlds mirror 
each other, and both give primacy to the phenomenal world as that which we most truly 
know.
As Pears points out, Wittgenstein’s critique of the philosophical stance of solipsism 
begins in his Notebooks 1914-1916, and develops in the mid 1930’s in The Blue Book, 
where he demonstrates that the self as solipsism conceives of it, has no ‘criterion of 
identity as an independent object.’37 Central to Wittgenstein’s critique is the idea that 
the above definition of solipsism makes it impossible to imagine a context where one 
could point to the phenomenal self as a determinate entity. In chapter 2 I will discuss 
Wittgenstein’s own re-conception of solipsism in detail. For the moment, however, I 
simply want to indicate that in Pears view when Wittgenstein challenges the solipsist’s 
claim to have discovered a new self-sufficient entity in his earlier work he pre-empts his 
later ‘private language argument.’
According to Pears, the Investigations contests the notion that a person could 
develop a language for describing sense-data, from an original position in which there 
were no links at all between his/her sense-data and the physical world. ‘The language 
would be a private language and its privacy would not be the contingent privacy of a 
secret code, but the necessary privacy of unteachability.’38 Pears observes that many 
traditional philosophical theories of perception (including the cognitivism of logical 
positivism and Russel’s ‘argument from illusion’) assume that there is such an ‘original 
position.’ Furthermore, they presume that everyday speakers can be made to accept this 
position as the foundation of their world.
37 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 15.
38 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 8-9.
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The idea was that the plain man can be forced back into that position by the arguments 
from illusion and the argument from the location of sense-data at the near end of 
causal chains which start far out in the physical world. After that, the process of re­
construction could begin and there were various forms that it might take. Once 
possibility would be phenomenalism, which reduced the whole physical scene to the 
sense-data of the original position. Another possibility would be a more judicious 
realism. But Wittgenstein was not concerned with these later developments. What 
interested him was the original position itself, and he argued that it was an incoherent 
myth.39
Hence, in Pears’ view, Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument,’ tries to show that 
a fully private language, spoken from the original position, is illusory. In order to 
illustrate the rhetorical techniques Wittgenstein deploys in his demonstration, Pears 
compares the ‘old’ interpretation of the private language argument (which he personally 
champions), to Barry Stroud’s alternate interpretation.40 He argues that in spite of the 
differences between them, both interpretations take Wittgenstein to employ the same 
basic techniques to demonstrate the incoherency of ‘the original position’.
In Stroud’s reading, Wittgenstein takes the emergence of a language from the 
original position to be impossible because the speaker’s sensory vocabulary would have 
to depend on isolated ostensive definitions. However, as Wittgenstein points out, no 
single ostensive act is capable of tying a sensation to a word because a long-lasting 
sequence of applications is always required to determine the speaker’s meaning.
Pears points out that this interpretation of the ‘private language argument’ is open to 
an important objection, for a speaker in ‘the original position’ need not necessarily rely 
on singular ostensive definitions, they may instead use the physical world to help check 
that their words have been correctly applied, since the appeal to the physical world is 
not ruled out by Stroud’s formulation of the original position. Nevertheless, although 
Stroud is unable to rule out the possibility of a private language entirely, he is still able 
to show that the ‘plain man’ is not ‘forced back’ into ‘the original position’. For 
according to Stroud’s account most people do not speak a private language because they 
already communicate with others and depend on shared public criteria for the correct 
application of their words. For a person to speak a private language, in Stroud’s sense of 
the term, a series of very unusual circumstances would have to occur. The person would
39 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 9.
40 Exact source is not given by Pears, but see for example Barry Stroud, ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Mind,’ Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey vol 4, ed. G. Fldistad (the Hague: Nijhoff), 1983,319- 
41.
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need to be isolated from others from birth yet somehow manage to repeat their words 
with a regularity unaided by contact with other public speakers.
According to the ‘old’ interpretation of the ‘private language argument,’ on the other 
hand, Wittgenstein is asking us to imagine that there are absolutely no ties between 
phenomenal experience and the physical world, a situation which undermines the idea 
of a private language from the very beginning . In such a scenario, Pears points out, if 
you had a phenomenal language you would not be able to check your sense-data against 
the physical conditions around you.
But that is an under-statement of your predicament because in fact you could not have 
a phenomenal language. For you would never have been in the only situation that 
would have made it possible for you to develop such a language: there would never 
have been any connections between your phenomenal world and the physical world 41
Indeed as Wittgenstein vividly illustrates, in the Investigations, the attempt to invent 
a private language is invariably dependant on the public language and physical world 
we share. For example, Wittgenstein imagines putting the sign ‘S’ in a private diary, 
whenever a particular sensation occurs:
What reason have we for calling ‘S’ the sign for a sensation? For ‘sensation’ is a word 
of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word 
stands in need of a justification which everybody understands.— And it would not help 
either to say that it need not be a sensation', that when he writes ‘S’, he has 
something—and that is all that can be said. ‘Has’ and ‘something’ also belong to our 
common language. —So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point 
where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound. —But such a sound is an 
expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game, which should now be 
described.42
As the story of the private diary suggests, one of Wittgenstein’s ongoing 
preoccupations in the Investigations is description or invention of ‘language games’ to 
fit the philosopher’s dream of a private language. The example of the private diary 
clearly demonstrates the difficulty and frustration entailed by such a task. However, 
later in the Investigations, Wittgenstein goes on to suggest a context where the words
41 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 12.
42 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §261.
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‘private language’ might be ‘appropriately’ used. In section 269 Wittgenstein says that 
although the words ‘private language’ do not refer to understanding a word, or to 
scenarios where a word is not understood since it ‘means nothing’ to the speaker, the 
expression could refer to ‘sounds which no one else understands but which I “appear to 
understand.’”43 In this private language game the speaker is under the illusion that what 
they say makes sense. They are under the spell of what Pears calls an ‘imaginative 
misunderstanding.’
In Pears view, despite differences between the old and new interpretation of the 
private language argument, both versions take Wittgenstein to utilize ‘a remarkable 
combination of literalism and imagination.’44 The imagination can be seen in the way 
that Wittgenstein ‘traces philosophical theories back to their origin in misleading 
pictures of the human predicament.’45 In this case the picture of sense-data as objects of 
a new kind, objects that are similar to physical objects because they are independent and 
self-contained, but different because they are more fundamental (in some strange way). 
The literalism can be seen in the way that Wittgenstein ‘spells out the details of the 
original position.’46 If the phenomenal world is a duplicate of the physical world and 
sense-data are, like physical objects autonomous ‘targets of reference’ then it would 
seem that the phenomenal world can be reached simply by taking away the physical 
world.47 But as Wittgenstein tries to show, our ‘construal of the phenomenal world’ is 
always tied in some way to the physical public world, so ‘this simple subtraction will 
not work.’48
Here I want to draw attention to the way that Pears offers two slightly different 
formulations of the literalism at work. To begin with he suggests that literalism consists 
of giving the words in philosophical theories ‘the meanings they have in daily life.’49 
This can be seen in the way that Wittgenstein dramatises the philosophical search for 
the original position in terms of an actual (or everyday) subtraction, or when he tries to 
describe mental objects which are actual duplicates of physical objects. But these 
(overly) literal interpretations of philosophical theory are clearly themselves acts of 
imagination. Pears observes that the “‘private language argument” explores in detail the 
real effect of the subtraction on the residue’ and ‘asks what it would really be like to be
43 Wittgenstein’s italics.
44 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 13.
45 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 8.
46 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,T3.
47 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,T3.
48 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 13.
49 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 8.
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in the original position, a question that had not been explored by traditional 
philosophers of perception.’ 50 So although Pears tends to characterise literalism and 
imagination as separate rhetorical strategies, these strategies intertwine even in his own 
account. We might say that in Wittgenstein’s later work he deploys a form of 
imaginative literalism.
Imaginative literalism read as deconstructive therapy
Pears’ article is of particular interest for us, because he compares Wittgenstein’s ‘unique 
blend of literalism and imagination’ to both deconstruction and psycho-therapy; 
deconstruction because Wittgenstein takes ‘to pieces’ the pictures that ground 
metaphysical theory; and psycho-therapy because he recognises that there is a fantasy 
dimension to thought that cannot be factually refuted but must be treated 
therapeutically. 51 I will begin by outlining the comparison Pears makes between 
Wittgenstein’s imaginative literalism and deconstruction, and then consider why Pears 
characterises this as a form of therapy analogous to psychotherapy.
According to Pears, Wittgenstein ‘deconstructs’ the idea that ‘the direct objects of 
perception are always sense-data, describable in a radically private language’ by ‘taking 
to pieces’ the pictures that ground these theories. 52 In this case, he takes apart the 
picture of sense data as physical objects. The purpose of Wittgenstein’s deconstruction, 
as Pears conceives of it, is to show that the picture ‘pieces are not what the author takes 
them to be, and so that they do not fit together in the way that he intended them to fit 
together in his theory. ’ 53 Wittgenstein’s techniques of literalism and imagination help 
the ‘traditional’ philosopher see that their theories of mind are based on ‘caricatures’ of 
perception or ‘involuntary misunderstandings. ’ 54
These remarks suggest a certain allegiance between Wittgenstein and 
deconstruction’s most famous proponent, Jaques Derrida. Both authors critique the 
philosophical ideal of fully present private meaning by pulling apart and rearranging 
philosophy. Both are concerned with the ways that the life of words exceeds the 
meaning they have in any given context. I will say more about the relation between 
Wittgenstein and Derrida’s work in a moment. For the time being, I want to point out
50 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,T3.
51 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 3.
52 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 3.
53 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 3.
54 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 3.
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that although there are certain parallels between Derridian deconstruction and Pear’s 
account, the aim of Pears article is not to make a comparative discussion of the two 
authors.
Indeed, the distinctive feature of Wittgensteinian deconstruction (as Pears depicts it) 
is its therapeutic aspect.55 According to Pears: ‘there is an obvious analogy between the 
origin and correction of these involuntary misunderstandings and the origin of 
emotional disorders and their cure by psychotherapy. ’ 56 Wittgenstein also shares with 
psycho-therapy an emphasis on the feelings and images tied up with fantasy and their 
manifestation in our lives. In Pears’ view, the purpose of deconstructive therapy is not 
to answer philosophy’s questions or falsify its theories since the fantasy dimension to 
thought is often immune to these ‘knock-down refutation[s] . ’ 57 Rather, like Freud, 
Wittgenstein wants to trace a philosopher’s ‘mistake back to its origin, and its origin, 
according to Wittgenstein, will usually turn out to have been an imaginative 
misunderstanding. He will be cured when he feels its charm and at the same time sees 
that it is false. The two experiences must be simultaneous: fantasy and fact must be 
brought into direct confrontation with one another. ’ 58 For example, as we have already 
seen, Wittgenstein invites the philosopher to imagine the pictures underpinning various 
influential theories of mind, pictures such as the ‘original position,’ a ‘private language’ 
and ‘independent phenomenal objects.’ In order to dissolve the grip of fantasy, the 
philosopher must recognise not only the incoherence of these pictures but also their 
attraction. They must accept the fantasy as their fantasy, so to speak. This is why 
imaginative literalism is part of Wittgenstein’s procedure as well as the 
metaphysician’s.
One ramification of Pears reading is that Wittgenstein deconstructs the pictures 
underpinning the ideal of literal meaning by using a technique of literalism that 
resembles but also transforms this ideal. Pears himself does not emphasise that 
Wittgenstein undoes metaphysical literalism by mimicking or repeating it, perhaps 
because he wants to establish Wittgenstein’s literalism as a legitimate technique 
separate from the philosopher’s demand for literal meaning which manifests itself as a
55 Wittgenstein characterises his philosophical practice as a series of therapies in the Investigations.
‘There is not a philosophical method,’ he writes in section 133, ‘though there are indeed methods, like 
different therapies.’ But while Hacker emphasises the way Wittgenstein’s descriptions of language use 
operate as an antidote for philosophical error or confusion, Pears directly ties therapy to the 
deconstructive element of Wittgenstein’s work: the way it pulls apart pictures underpinning philosophical 
theory.
56 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 4.
57 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 4.
58 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 4.
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mistakenly literal relation to language.59 However as the opening remarks of this chapter 
show, the distinction is impossible to maintain for there is always a certain ambiguity as 
to where the literalism of ‘traditional’ philosophy ends, and Wittgenstein’s own 
literalism begins.
Wittgenstein and Derrida
As we will explore at much greater length later in the thesis, Wittgenstein’s mimicry 
of the philosopher’s literalism brings him both closer to and further from deconstruction 
as Derrida conceives of it. Closer, in the sense that Derrida also mimics certain 
philosophical procedures and further away because Wittgenstein’s imaginative 
literalism is not one of Derrida’s procedures. Let me sketch the possible terms of such a 
comparison.
To get a sense of the rhetorical procedures that Derrida deploys I will turn briefly to 
his essay ‘White Mythology.’ In this essay Derrida draws on resemblances at the level 
of the signifier (puns, homonyms, metaphors, word play) to deconstruct ‘conceptual 
ideality,’ the dream of a purely literal language. Derrida’s aim is to show that 
‘conceptual ideality’ is at once generated by and disrupted by a more general state of 
metaphorical play.90 According to Alan Bass, Derrida:
wishes to demonstrate both the generalisation of metaphor, its infinitely reflective 
capacity, and the necessity of this (hidden) generalisation of metaphor, its infinitely 
reflective capacity, in the production of so-called ‘non-metaphoric’ concepts, by 
means of the ‘ruination,’ the ‘plunging into the abyss’ of a particular metaphor. ’61
An important consequence of the ‘generalisation of metaphoricity,’ according to 
Derrida, is that no strict boundary can be maintained between ordinary, philosophical or 
literary language, rather in each case concept and metaphor intertwine. At a certain level 
Derrida’s article has close affinities with the Investigations, for Wittgenstein also
59 In his article Pears does not explain philosophy’s imaginative misunderstanding by appealing, as 
Hacker does, to the arbitrary shapes of our ’surface grammar.’ Instead he emphasises philosophy’s 
adoption of scientific ideals. However in other more lengthy studies, he ties philosophy’s desire to imitate 
science directly with its tendency to picture the arbitrary forms of our language. See David Pears The 
False Prison: A Study in the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy vol.2. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 211-225.
60 Jacques Derrida ‘White Mythology,’ Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 262-63.
bl Alan Bass in Derrida, ‘White Mythology,’ 262n.
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affirms the open play of meaning, and he too blurs the distinction between ordinary 
language, philosophy and aesthetics.
But significant tensions between Derridian deconstruction and Pears’ account of 
Wittgenstein’s deconstructive therapy also emerge here. Firstly, it seems that by 
appealing to the straightforward or literal connotations of the philosophical Wittgenstein 
evokes the very binary between philosophical and ordinary words that Derrida 
challenges. Secondly, the arbitrary resemblances at the level of the signifier, that Hacker 
identifies as the source of philosophical confusion, are deployed by Derrida in his 
deconstruction of metaphysics. Thirdly, Wittgenstein’s effort to spell out the implicit 
images of philosophy seems at odds with Derrida’s insistence that the metaphor is 
capable of ‘unfolding [a philosopheme] without limit, and wresting its borders of 
propriety from it.’ 62
Indeed it seems that Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical images might be better 
understood along side the work of Derrida’s contemporary Michele Le Doeuff, whose 
book, The Philosophical Imaginary, investigates differences between learned and 
everyday imaginaries and ties this fantasy element of thought to ‘abstract intellectual 
structures which are, perhaps, profound through their very abstraction. ’ 63 In Le Doeuff s 
view: ‘while opinions may go out of fashion or be refuted, their underlying structure is 
liable to outlive debate as long as it is not itself clearly established and objectified.’M By 
‘decoding’ the philosophical imaginary, ‘and reintroducing into the discourse its latent 
meaning,’ the tensions or contradictions within a given theoretical system become 
plain.65 In Pears’ reading of Wittgenstein, for example, the paradoxical nature of the 
original position becomes obvious only when it is imagined or literalised, something 
that ‘traditional’ philosophy, in his view, tends not to do.66
The difference between Derrida’s work and Pears’ reading of Wittgenstein is perhaps 
most clearly illustrated if we compare Derrida’s reading of Freud in ‘Freud and the 
Scene of Writing,’ to Pears’ account of the effects of deconstructive therapy. In Pears’ 
view the strategies of literalism and imagination enable Wittgenstein to unmask the
62 Derrida ‘White Mythology,’ 270. My italics.
63 Michele Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ The Philosophical Imaginary, trans. Colin Gordon 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 139.
64 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 140.
65 Le Doeuff, ‘Preface: The Shameful Face of Philosophy,’ The Philosophical Imaginary, trans. Colin 
Gordon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 17.
** In The Philosophical Imagimry Le Doeuff’s argues that philosophy images are often treated as 
heterogeneous to theory, or else they are dismissed as mere illustrations. In either case, she suggests that 
there is an implicit agreement within the discipline that images need not be interrogated too closely.
While this is by no means tme of all philosophical texts (Wittgenstein’s use of imagery, for example, is 
quite self-conscious), she does help explicate the ‘traditional’ philosophical convention to which Pears is 
referring.
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unconscious ‘pathology of metaphysical thinking. ’ 67 According to Pears, the myths and 
fantasises that make up this pathology cannot be understood (if by this we mean 
logically comprehended) from the perspective of ordinary language, but they can be 
understood as mistakes or imaginative misunderstandings. Indeed, in Pears’ mind the 
sole function of the techniques of literalism and imagination, is to dissolve the grip of 
fantasy, so that we are left with the task of understanding ‘life as it is actually lived. ’ 68 
Wittgenstein’s ‘second of deep grief,’ his ‘private language’ are the necessary surrender 
to temptation along the way to the overcoming of temptation.69 So ultimately in Pears’ 
account Wittgenstein’s portraits of philosophy play a negative role.70 They direct us 
away from themselves and back to ordinary language. But by casting therapy as a 
technique that unmasks the unconscious imaginary dimension of philosophy, Pears 
misses what Derrida takes to be Freud’s most important discovery, the capacity of the 
unconscious to defy full comprehension or translation.
In light of this we might conclude that by repeating the metaphysician’s gesture of 
literality, Wittgenstein risks reinstating the ideals that he also wants to undo. A similar 
criticism, however, has also been directed at Derrida, only in Derrida’s case, the risk is 
reinstating the philosophical text he extensively quotes, or imposing a new ‘general 
theory’ of language (even if it is a ‘generalised metaphoricity’ or an openness internal to 
all concepts) . 71 These criticisms levelled at Wittgenstein and Derrida help bring to the 
fore a strong similarity between them, namely the conviction that by repeating or 
mimicking certain ‘classical norms of philosophy,’ these norms might be undone and 
not merely reinstated. We have already seen how Wittgenstein indulges in the 
philosopher’s appetite for literal meaning and exact definitions, in order to ultimately 
question this philosophical norm. A parallel process is described by Derrida in Limited 
Inc. Derrida describes his book as a form of ‘duel writing,’ where he repeats as fully as 
possible the particular text under discussion.
On the one hand, I try to submit myself to the most demanding norms of classical
philosophical discussion. I try in fact to respond point by point, in the most honest and
67 Pears, The False Prison, vol 1, 16. As Pears points out, Wittgenstein borrows this idea from Immanuel 
Kant.
68 Pears ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 7.
69 See for example, Pears The False Prison vol. 2, 211-225.
70 One might also say that they show what Le Doeuff calls ‘the shameful face’ of philosophy, the 
imaginary dimension of a discourse that considers itself rational, literal and scientific.
1 The ‘generalisation of metaphoricity’ in ‘White Mythology’ and the law of iteration in Limited Inc, are 
in Derrida’s words, ‘general theories’ that paradoxically announce ‘the impossibility of concluding . . .  a 
“general theory.”’ See Jacques Derrida Limited Inc, trans. S. Weber (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1988), 117.
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rational way possible, to Searle’s argument as it is, the text of which is cited almost in 
its entirety. On the other hand in doing so I multiply statements, discursive gestures, 
forms of writing, the structure of which reinforces my demonstration in something like 
a practical manner: that is, by providing instances of ‘speech acts’ which by 
themselves render impracticable and theoretically insufficient the conceptual 
oppositions upon which speech act theory in general, and Searle’s version of it in 
particular, relies (serious/non-serious; literal/metaphoric or ironic; normal 
forms/parasitical forms; use/mention; intentional/non-intentional; etc) 72
In their own ways, we might say that Wittgenstein and Derrida both reveal the inability 
of classical norms such as literal meaning, intentionality, conceptual ideality to 
determine the logic of their own repetition, let alone account for the operations of 
language in general.
But yet again a difference emerges, for whereas Derrida focuses primarily on the 
failure of literality (all concepts including the concept of literal or intentional meaning 
are generated by a certain openness or play), Wittgenstein is equally concerned with its 
success -  its manifestation as a lived reality. As we have already seen in this chapter, 
Wittgenstein continually insists on staging metaphysical fantasies existentially. The 
scene of insatiable wonder and yearning, the fantasy escape from the demands of 
everyday life, the lonely people who know pain only from their own case and the crisis 
of meaning are portraits o f the philosophical way o f life, which Wittgenstein asks us to 
consider. In Limited Inc Derrida does briefly ask what metaphysics would be like if it 
were to be realised as a way of life when he writes that literal or intentional meaning 
‘necessarily can and should not attain the plenitude towards which it nonetheless 
inevitably tends. Plenitude is its telos, but the structure of this telos is such that if  it is 
attained, it as well as intention both disappear, are paralysed, immobilized, or die ' 13 
Nevertheless Derrida does not dwell on his thought experiment, he warns that by 
presenting the ‘longing for metaphysical plenitude’ that emerges from the ‘telos of 
fulfilment’ in existential terms we risk obscuring metaphysics as it manifests itself 
independently of subjective imagination and emotion.74
So although both writers mimic or reiterate philosophical procedures, their individual 
techniques or style are far removed - Derrida rarely asks what a philosophical theory 
would be like if it were ‘true,’ he does not stage metaphysics in terms of feeling, and he
72Derrida Limited Inc, 114.
73 Derrida, Limited Inc, 121. My italics.
74 Derrida, Limited Inc, 121.
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is suspicious of Wittgenstein’s appeal to the literal and ordinary connotations of words. 
Derrida’s work helps raise important questions about Wittgenstein’s therapeutic 
deconstruction as Pears conceives of it: are these movements compatible? Can the 
philosophical unconscious be unmasked? Indeed tensions remain not only between the 
distinctive styles of Wittgenstein and Derrida but also, potentially, from within the 
Investigations itself, between its deconstructive and therapeutic voices. In chapters 3 
and 4 I will explore the affinities and tensions between deconstruction and therapy, and 
Wittgenstein and Derrida in detail. But for the moment I simply want to make two brief 
points. Firstly, Pears’ account of the way Wittgenstein unmasks philosophy’s 
unconscious ‘imaginative misunderstandings’ seems to suggest that Wittgenstein’s aim 
is to dispel unconscious energies. Secondly, Pears’ account as it has been outlined so far 
seems to turn away from the extraordinary and enigmatic to the ordinary.
The extraordinary ordinary
In his book The False Prison, Pears acknowledges that Wittgenstein’s strategy of 
literalism may seem reductive: ‘When the metaphysician tries to find the right words to 
express his vision of reality, Wittgenstein reminds him, rather meanly, of the ordinary 
use of those words and of their place in human life. Worse, he points out that, when 
they are transplanted, they will not necessarily take their meanings with them and may 
even end up without any meanings at all.’75 The difficulty, Pears admits, is that 
Wittgenstein seems to do away with the extraordinary and return us to a life that is flat 
and conventional.
However, Pears argues that although Wittgenstein’s aim is to dissolve the 
philosopher’s ‘imaginative misunderstandings,’ the feeling of wonder does not likewise 
disappear, but instead is ‘diffused over the whole range of human life and 
consciousness.’76 For Wittgenstein the feeling of wonder
is the original source of all philosophy and in the Tractatus it finds an attenuated 
traditional expression in the precarious metaphysics of independent objects. The 
exposition of this ontology is notoriously difficult to follow, a last message from a 
vanishing world, barely articulate, because it is opened in such a strangled voice. In
75 Pears, The False Prison, vol.l, 16-17. 
lb Pears, The False Prison, vol.l, 17.
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the later writings the feeling has been liberated and it is diffused over all the ordinary 
modes o f human thought and activity.77
In Pears view, it is only once the philosopher has worked through his or her 
‘imaginative misunderstandings,’ that he or she is able to look with new eyes at what is 
most familiar. The Investigations shows us, not the wondrous foundations to the world 
but ‘the strangeness of the ordinary. ’ 78 For Pears ‘the strangeness of the ordinary’ can be 
seen in Wittgenstein’s ‘careful juxtaposition of familiar things’ in order to bring out a 
‘new understanding of them.’ 79
A somewhat similar idea is proposed by Steven Mulhall in his essay ‘Wittgenstein 
and Deconstruction.’ Mulhall points out that in the opening passages of the 
Investigations Wittgenstein reveals the ‘extraordinariness’ of ordinary language. ’ 80 The 
ability to see familiar words and objects from different points of view, in new and 
sometimes remarkable ways, is tied to what Wittgenstein what calls capacity to see 
‘something as something,’ to view the world aspectivally. In Inheritance and 
Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Mulhall argues that the vision of 
language Wittgenstein put forward in the Investigations should be thought of as a form 
of ‘continuous aspect perception, ’ 81 an opening to what Wittgenstein calls ‘the
77 Pears, The False Prison, vol.l, 17.
78 Pears, The False Prison, vol. 1, 18
79 Pears, The False Prison, vol.l, 18.
80 Mulhall is referring to the following passage from section 1 of the Investigations: ‘Now think of the 
following use oflanguage: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked ‘five red apples.’ He takes 
the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked ‘apples’; then he looks up the word ‘red’ in a 
table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers - 1 assume he 
knows them by heart -  up to the word ‘five’ and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as 
the sample out of the drawer. -  It is in these and other ways that one operates with words.’ In Mulhall’s 
opinion the ‘extraordinariness’ of this shopping trip reveals ‘that Wittgenstein conceives of the ordinary 
not as immune to, and hence as available as a simple counterweight to, philosophical appropriations and 
misappropriations, but as inherently vulnerable to them.’ Indeed the scene might be thought of as an 
everyday actualisation of the philosophical fantasy that every word has a corresponding, determinate 
meaning. Significantly, in response to Mulhall’s paper, Derrida also identifies the ‘production of the 
extraordinary within the ordinary’ as a possible meeting point between Wittgenstein and himself.
In the contexts of my project, Mulhall and Derrida’s readings imply that an opening to the ‘strangeness 
of the ordinary’ identified by Pears cannot be kept separate from the recognition that ordinary language is 
susceptible to philosophical fantasy. In my view this suggests that Wittgenstein’s imaginative portraits of 
philosophy might have a productive as well as a dissolving role, in so far as they draw attention to the 
strangeness of the everyday. The full implications of this idea will be developed in the course of the 
thesis. See Steven Mulhall, ‘Wittgenstein and Deconstruction, Ratio 13 no. 4 (2000): 411 and Jacque 
Derrida, ‘Derrida’s response to Mulhall’ Ratio 13 no. 4 (2000): 415.
81 Mulhall emphasises that ‘continuous aspect perception’ should be distinguished from the experience of 
aspect-dawning. The dawning of an aspect, ‘is a very specific visual experience with characteristic forms 
of verbal expression,’ for example, I might say, ‘Now I am seeing it as . .  .’ Continuous aspect perception 
‘is an attitude whose presence is sometimes revealed in an individual’s susceptibility to aspect-dawning 
experiences, but which also finds expression in a variety of other fine shades of verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour. This attitude is certainly not a continuous sequence of aspect-dawning experiences.’ Steven
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“possibilities” of phenomena.’82 Although Mulhall does not directly link ‘continuous 
aspect perception’ to an outlook of wonder at the ordinary in his book Inheritance and 
Originality, the very capacity to view language, other beings and the environment 
aspectivally seems to me to coincide with an intransitive vision, a wonder that no longer 
seeks resolution in a founding object, but explores life in all its possibilities.
This transformed feeling of wonder (which coincides with an aspectival opening to 
life and language) may even, as Wittgenstein implies in the Investigations, generate a 
newfound peacefulness, a safe haven from the anxieties and confusions produced by the 
demand for metaphysical certitude.83 Indeed one might say that not only does 
Wittgenstein transform the philosopher’s insatiable wonder, but he also reworks the 
philosopher’s impulse to find secure resolution to their wonder, so that the desire for 
safety is no longer tied up with the establishment of metaphysical foundations, but 
becomes a form of liberation from this demand. The relation between the transformed 
sensations of wonder and safety will be pursued in detail in chapter’s 2 and 6. For the 
moment, however, I want to make a few comments in defence of my claim that 
Wittgenstein’s aspectival vision of language is staged in terms of feelings.
The difficulty with formulating ‘continuous aspect perception’ in terms of feeling, is 
that this seems to limit it to something which occurs only when the perceiving subject 
experiences the feeling of wonder, whereas Mulhall intends this form of perception to 
‘characterize what it is to have a mother-tongue, to speak a language like a native.’84 
However, by making the link between the extraordinary ordinary and ‘continuous 
aspect perception’ explicit, I want to emphasise something already alluded to in 
introductory remarks of this chapter. For in the Investigations Wittgenstein tells us that 
sensations need not be confined to subjective states but can be given in language itself.85 
This suggests to me that the language-games which make up the Investigations and 
which give rise to Wittgenstein’s vision of language, manifest the extraordinary 
ordinary, regardless of whether the sensation of wonder is in fact felt by the subject.
In my view, the vision of language I have been outlining with the help of Pears and 
Mulhall captures the spirit of Wittgenstein’s engagement with language far more closely 
than Hacker’s insistence that Wittgenstein asks us to relinquish the feelings of mystery
Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2001), 175.
82 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §90.
83 See, for example, Investigations § 122-133, where Wittgenstein suggests that the practical task of 
describing the various aspects of words, might bring ‘philosophy peace.’
84 Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality, 179.
85 See for example, Investigations, 174.
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and wonder entirely. Nevertheless, I still take as a genuine problem the question of how 
Wittgenstein might moves from his (at times pedantic) appeal to the literal and 
everyday, to an exploration of the “‘possibilities” of phenomena,’ a feeling of wonder 
transposed across the everyday? I will discuss this problem in detail in chapters 3 and 
4. However a broader version of this question also informs the thesis as a whole: how 
might one move from Wittgenstein’s localised descriptions of language use, and his 
dissolution of individual conceptual confusions, to an aspectival overview of language 
and life?
Returning to Pears reading in light of the above discussion I want to emphasise an 
interesting discrepancy; for the philosophical image and the feelings that first inspire 
philosophical speculation have a very different fate in Pears. The dissolution of the 
former, helps facilitate the dispersal and dissemination of the latter. But how should we 
understand the relation between emotion and imagination? If we read The False Prison 
in conjunction with ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ Pears seems to be suggesting that the 
self-implosion of the fantasy images driving philosophy makes way for a new sense of 
wonder at the ordinary. But could an overly literal approach to words play a more 
productive role in the generation and dispersal of wonder? What other role (other than 
self dissolution) might ‘a private language, ’ ‘a second of deep grief or ‘twenty 
minutes of wonder’ play? Might the nonsensical scenes revealed through 
Wittgenstein’s technique of imaginative literalism also be transformed?
To help respond to these questions I will turn to the work of Stanley Cavell. Like 
Pears, Cavell emphasises that in Wittgenstein’s view philosophy is not primarily a set of 
theories about the world, but rather a pathological form of thinking. Cavell puts this in 
explicitly Kantian terms: ‘[hjuman reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its 
knowledge it is burdened by questions which . . .  it is not able to ignore, but which . . .  it 
is also not able to answer.’86 Philosophy, in this view, ‘is what thought does to itself.’ 87 
Indeed it seems that the philosopher’s overly literal approach to language can border on 
madness, for ‘[a] schizophrenic can suffer from idea that he is literally empty or hollow 
or transparent or fragile or coming apart at the seams.’88 In Cavell’s eyes, Wittgenstein 
offers therapies or procedures which will help us work through this madness.
86 The opening words of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, quoted by Cavell in ‘Ending the 
Waiting Game,’ Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976), 126. See Immanuel Kant, The Critique o f Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith, (London: 
Macmillan, 1929).
87 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 126.
88 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’122.
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Wittgenstein, saying in his Investigations that his later methods (he compared them to 
therapies) were to bring philosophy peace at last, seemed to find opportunity, and 
point, within such disaster: ‘The philosopher is the man who has to cure himself of 
many sicknesses of the understanding before he can arrive at the notion of the sound 
human understanding’ - as though there were no other philosophical path to sanity, 
save through madness. 89
This passage from Cavell, with its emphasis on therapy, madness and cure, also has 
clear resonances with Pears, who presents literalism as a ‘temptation’ in which we must 
first indulge, in order to finally overcome. However if we look closely at the 
Wittgensteinian procedures that Cavell deploys in his reading of Beckett’s play, a 
different account of therapeutic opening to madness emerges, one that I believe has 
bearing on our understanding of both Wittgenstein and Beckett’s work.
Literalism -  the too much dimension of language
The words strew obscurities across our path and seem wilfully to thwart 
comprehension; and then time after time we discover that their meaning has been 
missed only because it was so utterly bare -  totally, therefore unnoticeably, in view. 
Such a discovery has the effect of showing us that it is we who had been wilfully 
uncomprehending, misleading ourselves in demanding further, or other, meaning 
where the meaning was nearest.90
In the above passage Cavell describes Beckett’s play Endgame. Cavell’s reading of 
Beckett in the essay ‘Ending the Waiting Game’ is of particular interest here because of 
the way he deploys a Wittgensteinian vocabulary to help facilitate his reading. 
Throughout the essay he draws on terms such as Titerality,’ ‘grammar,’ the ‘ordinary,’ 
the ‘extraordinary’ and ‘the difficulty of seeing the obvious, ’ and he directly links his 
reading to the procedures of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy, 
movements that are traditionally linked to Wittgenstein’s early and late periods 
respectively.
89 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 126-127. Cavell is quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1956), 157. Cavell adds: ‘[o]ne will not have understood the opportunity if one 
is eager to seize it. Genuine philosophy may begin in wonder, but it continues in reluctance.’ I will ask if 
the reluctance of ‘genuine philosophy’ that Cavell describes gives rise to a different form of wonder?
90 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 119-120.
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Cavell asks two central questions of Beckett’s text, firstly: ‘what do these words 
literally mean?’ and the secondly: ‘under what ordinary circumstances might this 
bizarre thing be said?’ The first question is often associated with the Tractcitus, 
particularly when the Tractcitus is read under the banner of the logical positivist dream 
of a purely literal language. But as Pears has helped show, the first question might also 
be given a therapeutic function and hence can be understood to be part of Wittgenstein’s 
later ‘ordinary language procedures.’ The second question emerges from within the 
perspective of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, for only ordinary language philosophy 
sees that literal meanings are bizarre, in the sense that they defeat the ‘normal 
implications of language.’ 91
In Cavell’s view the status of the literal is a pressing problem for both positivist and 
post-positivist thought. Likewise, it is Beckett’s ‘effort at literalising’ that he believes 
readers of Endgame should address, 92 for as we will soon see Cavell believes that the 
play’s ‘hidden literality’ is the key to its ‘grammar’: ‘its particular way of making
•i 93sense.
Cavell tells us that by deploying Wittgensteinian procedures in his reading of 
Beckett, his aim is not primarily to reveal a hidden pathology, a void of meaning or an 
imaginative confusion; rather he hopes to better understand the conditions of ‘mind’ and 
‘community’ that bring this situation about. ‘My argument will be that Beckett, in 
Endgame, is not marketing subjectivity, popularising angst, amusing and thereby 
excusing us with pictures of our psychopathology; he is outlining the facts - of mind, of 
community - which show why these have become our pastimes. ’ 94
Although I certainly do not want to claim that literalism has exactly the same 
function in the Investigations and Endgame, but Cavell’s Wittgenstein inspired reading 
of Beckett does help to open up a discussion of the effects of literalism beyond the 
unmasking of unconscious fantasy that Pears describes. In the following section I will 
not abandon Pear’s idea that the techniques of literalism and imagination allow 
Wittgenstein to respond to the unconscious fantasy pictures of philosophy, but I will 
begin to rethink what this unconscious might be.
Like Pears in his reading of Wittgenstein, Cavell singles out Beckett’s techniques of 
literalism for special consideration. He points out that the riddles in Endgame generally 
do not depend on word play, ‘distracting clues’ or ‘verbal twists,’ but on ‘avoiding a
91 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 124.
92 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 123.
93 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 119.
94 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 116-117
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conventional’ or idiomatic reading.95 Both Pears and Cavell emphasise the difficulty of 
‘staying true’ to literalism. But whereas Pears insists that Wittgenstein is distinctive 
among philosophers for his efforts to spell out the literal implications of a theory, 
Cavell describes Beckett ‘s efforts to bring out the literal rather than the conventional 
implications of syntax.
At first Beckett’s words seem meaningless and we do not understand what is said, 
Cavell tells us. For example:
HAMM. Did you ever think of one thing?
CLOV. Never.96
Here we expect Clov to respond to Hamm’s question by saying ‘What?’ This answer 
would take the question as a typical conversational gesture. But according to Cavell:
Clov declines the move and brings the gesture to life by taking it literally. His answer 
means that he has always thought only of many things, and in this I hear a confession 
of failure in following Christ’s injunction to take no thought for your life, what ye 
shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body for tomorrow -  the moral of 
which is that ‘thine eye be single. ’ 97
Notice that although Clov’s words seem strange at first, his answer to Hamm’s question 
is not entirely incoherent, for by taking the question literally, he draws attention to his 
inability to truly think only of one thing, to always be preoccupied with multiple 
thoughts. He stretches thought and language beyond its clichdd form. Literality, Cavell 
concludes, can sometimes help us recognise aspects of life that our conventional forms 
do not necessarily make visible.
A second important function of literality, according to Cavell, is the undoing of 
curses. Take for example these lines from Endgame: ‘What in God’s name could there 
be on the horizon? ’ 98 and ‘Catch him [a flea] for the love of God.’ 99 Although God’s 
name is mentioned in a sentence that takes the form of a curse, Cavell points out that the 
broader context of the lines leads us to think that the characters do not take them as
95 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 128.
96 Samuel Beckett, Endgame: A Play in One Act, (New York: Grove Press, 1958), 39.
97 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 120-121.
98 Beckett, Endgame, 31.
99 Beckett Endgame, 33.
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curses but ‘in perfect literalness.’ 100 ‘In context, the first instance shows Hamm really 
asking whether anything on the horizon is appearing in God’s name, as his sign or at his 
bidding; and the second instance really means that if you love God, have compassion 
for him, you will catch and kill the flea. ’ 101 In this case, the curse is that all we can do is 
curse, only ever take God’s name in vain. Beckett breaks this curse, not by using God’s 
name in prayer (at other points in the play Beckett suggests this is not an option), but 
‘by turning its formulas into declarative utterances, ones of pure denotation -  using the 
sentences ‘cognitively,’ as the logical positivist would to put it. ’ 102
The accounts of literalism in Cavell and Pears are similar in several important ways. 
In each case a wish is granted -  the wish for literal meaning - but the wish’s fulfilment 
is not what was expected and, as Cavell puts it, ‘the normal implications of language 
are defeated. ’ 103 Indeed, Pears’ account of Wittgenstein’s strategies of literalism and 
imagination could be understood as a specialised example of the undoing of cliche 
described by Beckett. In Pears’ account the cliche is the ‘traditional’ philosophical 
notion that that there is an original position from which we could speak a truly private 
language. Certain powerful philosophical conventions help keep this cliche in place -  
that the words of a theory have a special philosophical sense which is different from 
their ordinary' sense - that no one ask what it would really (literally) be like if the theory 
were true. Wittgenstein breaks with these conventions by spelling out the literal 
implications of a private language spoken from the original position. The philosophical 
cliche is undone when it is revealed (in light of the ordinary conventions of our speech) 
as an ‘imaginative misunderstanding.’
There is, however, no such distinction between philosophical conventions and 
ordinary conventions in Beckett’s play. So whereas Pears’ Wittgenstein defies the 
conventions of philosophy in order to remind us of the ‘ordinary implications’ of 
language, Beckett unsettles our ‘ordinary implications,’ but has no further shared 
criteria for correctness to appeal to. For Pears, an overly literal relation to words is a 
‘temptation’ we indulge, in order to overcome, whereas for Beckett (in Cavell’s 
reading), the madness of literality is necessary if we are to undo the curses and the 
norms of our world, so that ‘when language is being most efficiently used...it is being
100 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 120.
101 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 120.
102 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 120.
103 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 124.
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most efficiently misused.’1W The irony of course, is that in Endgame, language is 
‘misused’ only when it is used most properly. According to Cavell:
Beckett (along with other philosophers recognizable as existentialist) shares with 
positivism its wish to escape connotation, rhetoric, the noncognitive, the irrationality 
and awkward memories of ordinary language, in favour of the directly verifiable, the 
isolated and perfected present. Only Beckett sees how infinitely difficult this escape 
will be. Positivism said that statements about God are meaningless; Beckett shows that 
they mean too damned much. 105
In Cavell’s account the literal sense of a word does not mark the absence of meaning, 
but rather the presence of too much meaning -  more meaning than our world can 
properly contain. Not a failure of meaning for Beckett’s play but rather an ‘inability not 
to mean what we are given to mean.’106 Literality is an excess of meaning that goes 
beyond our ordinary expectations and idioms. An excess which is in some sense 
inescapable as Cavell suggests.
I want to draw attention for a moment to the relation between the too much 
dimension of meaning that Cavell describes, and Hacker’s and Pears’ accounts of the 
philosophical imagination. Hacker alludes to the too much dimension of language when 
he speaks of the philosopher’s overly literal relation to forms of expression. In Hacker’s 
reading of Wittgenstein our ‘surface grammar’ creates the illusion of extra meaning, but 
this excess turns out to be no more than a nonsensical expression. Pears’ account of 
‘imagination out on a limb,’ can also be understood as an example of the too much 
dimension of meaning, for in this case imagination extends beyond the bounds of 
testability. Both Hacker and Pears view the too much dimension of language as 
something that Wittgenstein aims to overcome: Hacker believes that by making the 
senselessness of philosophical pictures explicit, Wittgenstein intends to dismiss them; 
while Pears, on the other hand, argues that we must imaginatively enter into the 
philosopher’s ‘imaginative misunderstanding’ in order to dissolve them. However, both 
Pears and Hacker ultimately characterise the philosophical imagination as an empty 
excess. This view is reinforced by various passages in the Investigations where 
Wittgenstein speaks of the objects of philosophical inquiry as merely ornamental, as 
idle yet strangely compelling, like chimeras or phantoms. I certainly do not want to
104 Beckett, Disjecta, 171-72.
105 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 120.
106 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 117. Cavell’s italics.
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dismiss this account; far from it, I believe that the disengagement from the demands of 
everyday life that Wittgenstein associates with the philosophical pursuit of the too much 
dimension of language is fundamental to his whole conception of fantasy. But Cavell’s 
reading of Beckett also helps us see that this too much dimension of language has a dual 
function. It is both the stuff of fantasy, and the material that might enable us to break 
with the conventions, norms and curses of our world.
The ‘too much’ dimension of meaning as I am developing it here, resembles the 
Freudian unconscious as it is outlined by Eric Santner in his book The Psycho theology 
of Everyday life. For Santner the unconscious is not a pattern of thought that can be 
dispelled by bringing to it to consciousness as it is for Pears. Rather it is an excess that 
cannot ever be contained or fully cognised.
[T]he human mind is, we might say, defined by the fact that it includes more reality 
than it can contain, is the bearer of an excess, a too much of pressure that is not merely 
physiological. The various ways in which this ‘too much,’ this surplus life of the 
human subject, seeks release or discharge in the ‘psychopathology of everyday life’ 
continues to form the central focus of Freudian theory and practice.107
According to Santner’s reading of Freud this ‘too much of pressure’ organises itself into 
fantasy. But the overcoming of fantasy is not a dissolution of this excess, rather it 
entails a reorganisation and transformation of its energies. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will 
develop this reading of the unconscious in the context of Wittgenstein’s ‘Conversations 
on Freud,’ and Cavell’s reading of the opening passages of the Investigations. For the 
moment, however, I will make a few remarks about the transformation at work in 
Beckett’s play.
The ordinariness of the extraordinary
I believe that the transformative potential of literality is brought out most clearly if 
we adopt the second of Wittgenstein’s procedures, and ask not only ‘what is literally 
said?’ but also ‘under what ordinary circumstances would I say this odd thing?’ This 
question asks for everyday situations where language defies its ‘ordinary implications.’ 
One circumstance we have already considered is described in remark 269 of the 
Investigations, where the term ‘private language’ is used by Wittgenstein to describe
107 Eric L. Santner, On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Refections on Freud and Rosenzweig 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 8.
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situations where we are under the illusion that what we say is meaningful. The tie 
between being under the illusion of making sense and speaking philosophically is 
pursued by Pears in ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ and in Chapter 2 I will draw on the 
work of Cora Diamond in order to relate this experience to the speaker of ethics.
In his reading of Beckett, Cavell proposes at least two further answers to the 
question: ‘under what ordinary circumstances might this bizarre thing be said?’ He 
observes that Beckett’s play ‘sounds as extraordinary as its people look,’ however he 
points out that it replicates ‘the qualities of ordinary conversation among people whose 
world is shared -  catching its abrupt shifts and sudden continuities, its shades of 
memory, regret, intimidation, its opacity to the outsider.’108 To miss the ordinariness of 
the lives in Endgame’ Cavell insists, ‘is to miss the extraordinariness (and ordinariness) 
of our own.’109 Here Cavell uses Wittgenstein’s procedure of imagining ordinary 
circumstances for bizarre language in order to show both the ordinariness of the play’s 
remarkable language and the remarkableness of our ordinary language. This opening to 
the strangeness of the ordinary recalls Pears description of the shift from metaphysical 
wonder (with its demand for final explanation) to wonder diffused across ordinary life 
and language. Only for Cavell the release of wonder is not an after effect of the self 
implosion of fantasy; instead an investigation into the ordinary life of literality enables 
us to re-picture our implicit fantasies as the enigmatic material of everyday speech. 
Here a transformation takes place not only at the level of feeling, but also at the level of 
imagination. So it is the transformation, rather than the correction of philosophical 
imagination, that helps disperse wonder.
Cavell also offers another answer to the question: ‘in what ordinary circumstances 
would I say this strange thing?’ Consider this example from Endgame.
HAMM. I’ve made you suffer too much.
(Pause.)
Haven’t I?
CLOV. It’s not that.
HAMM. (shocked) I haven’t made you suffer too much?
CLOV. Yes!
HAMM (relieved). Ah you gave me a fright!
(Pause. Coldly.)
Forgive me.
108 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 119.
109 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 119.
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(Pause, Louder.)
I said, Forgive me.
CLOV. I heard you. 110
Hamm’s command for forgiveness at the end of this passage sounds strange but is not in 
fact uncommon. As Cavell points out:
An ordinary circumstance for its use would be one in which someone needs 
forgiveness but cannot ask for it. . . . In Hamm’s case, moreover, it would have been 
trivially preposterous, and less honest, had he really been asking for forgiveness ‘for 
having made you suffer too much’: How much is just enough? We have the need, but 
no way of satisfying it; as we have words, but nothing to do with them; as we have 
hopes, but nothing to pin them on. * 111
Indeed, W ittgenstein’s second o f deep grief might also be an ‘extraordinary 
ordinary’ event of language, for we feel deep grief for a second, even though we do not 
necessarily speak of it, in circumstances where we do not have the time or the energy to 
grieve. Here a second of deep grief is not so much a portrait of false imagination of 
philosophy, but a portrait of our culture. A portrait not just of our ‘psychopathology’ but 
the conditions of community or the ways of life that give rise to it, as Cavell would 
say . 112
Although Cavell’s article does not directly address the function of literality in 
Wittgenstein’s work but rather uses Wittgensteinian procedures to open up a reading of 
Beckett’s play, one must consider the effect of these procedures closer to home, in the 
context of Wittgenstein’s own writing. To do so is to take Wittgenstein to overcome not 
only a cliche - the cliche of an ideal cognitive meaning, but also a curse - the curse that 
after dissolving the dream of literality we are left only with the idiomatic and 
metaphoric. This curse is undone, not by resurrecting cognitivism and denying all that is 
idiomatic and the metaphoric, but by opening to (and transforming) the too much 
dimension of meaning that shapes the cognitivist fantasy. This opening can be seen in 
the recognition that the life or force of words exceeds the life they have in any given 
context, as both Derrida and Wittgenstein emphasise. But it can also be seen in 
Wittgenstein’s attempt to find and invent contexts for language that is enigmatic.
110 Beckett, Endgame, 6-7.
111 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 124-125.
112 Cavell, ‘Ending the Waiting Game,’ 117.
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In fact the question: ‘under what ordinary circumstances would I say this strange 
thing?’ also requires one to ask: ‘whose literality? Who are we speaking of? For Hacker 
literalism clearly belongs to the traditional philosopher mistaking the idioms of our 
ordinary speech for genuine philosophical problems. In Pears’ account, literalism is 
practiced by the ‘traditional’ philosopher and by Wittgenstein, who gives in to the 
philosopher’s temptation in order to reveal both its attraction and its illusoriness. By 
adopting Wittgenstein’s procedure of imagining ordinary circumstances for language 
which transgresses our ordinary expectations, Cavell asks whether this literality, this too 
much of meaning, might also be our own?
In my view, by staging philosophy as a potential of everyday language, rather than a 
specific intellectual pursuit, Wittgenstein implies that the nonsensical fantasies he 
engages with are not confined to academia but can manifest in our lives more broadly. I 
intend to develop this claim throughout the thesis. Firstly in relation to the analogies 
Wittgenstein emphasises between philosophy and ethics. Later, in relation to the debate 
between theorists who claim that Wittgenstein targets specifically philosophical 
mythologies and the deconstructive readers of Wittgenstein who stress the susceptibility 
of the ordinary to the philosophical. I will argue that Wittgenstein’s strategies of 
thought take shape through his specific argument with academia, however many of the 
mythologies he addresses operate as part of a much broader cultural imaginary. I will 
also argue that for Wittgenstein there is always a double aspect to fantasy, that it can 
strike us as natural or strange and perturbing. This helps explain why Wittgenstein 
presents fantasy both as the unthought dimension of language and culture and in terms 
of a series of disturbing existential effects. My aim will be to consider Wittgenstein’s 
analyses of the operations of fantasy, along side his practical imaginative engagements. 
This method of reading ultimately leads me to conclude that in Wittgenstein’s work the 
pictures that captivate us might also have a liberating effect.113In my view, the seeds of 
this view can be found in the account of imaginative literalism I have just outlined.
In summary I have proposed two ways of thinking about an overly literal relation to 
language. On the one hand, it can signify the empty excess of a fantasy image, but on 
the other hand it may turn out to contain too much meaning, or at least more meaning 
than our conventions can convey. In each case this literal excess might be thought of as
113 Furthermore, I believe that the account of fantasy I have briefly outlined is important, not only in the 
context o f the particular mythologies Wittgenstein focuses on (for example the dream of self-present 
meaning), but in so far as it contributes to an understanding of the manifestation of fantasy in general. In 
this regard I believe that his treatment of fantasy has a relevance that exceed the particular pictures he 
addresses. I will discuss this idea further in chapter 5.
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a form of nonsense, for the ordinary implications of language are defied. But while in 
Pears’ and Hacker’s accounts the philosopher’s words dissolve once their nonsensicality 
is revealed, Cavell’s Wittgenstein helps us see that ordinary contexts can be discovered 
for extraordinary language, so that nonsense and sense are placed in dialogical relation. 
In Cavell’s case this task is two fold for he draws attention to the ordinariness of 
nonsensical or enigmatic sounding language and he also questions the nonsensical cast 
of certain expressions by suggesting that their ‘hidden literality’ is the key to their 
‘grammar,’ their special way of making sense. For Pears the transformation of wonder 
that demands final foundation, into wonder dispersed across the everyday, coincides 
with the dissolution of fantasy images. But as I have begun to suggest, a sense of the 
extraordinary ordinary might be brought about by an opening to, rather than a dispelling 
of, the products of Wittgenstein’s imaginative literalism and the too much dimension of 
language to which they belong.
As we will see, it is only in Wittgenstein’s later writings, where the question - ‘in 
what ordinary circumstances would I say that strange thing?’ is explicitly and 
continually raised, that the full transformative potential of Wittgenstein’s scenes of 
illustrated nonsense emerges. However, from the Notebooks and Tractatus onwards, 
Wittgenstein treats the urge to speak nonsense as a valuable human inclination which 
calls for a form of imaginative response. There is also a second important point of 
continuity, for the feeling of wonder at the many possibilities of life has its origins in 
Wittgenstein’s earliest ethical reflections. In the following chapter I will explore the 
relation between these two ideas by tracing their development across the course of 
Wittgenstein’s thought.
Chapter Two
Ethics: A Valuable form of Nonsense
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Chapter 2
Ethics -  a valuable form of nonsense
Introduction
In the first chapter I focused mainly on academic maladies, but towards the end I 
suggested that Wittgenstein could be concerned with the condition of culture more 
broadly.1 In this chapter, I hope to bring this idea to the fore by focusing on the ethical 
tenor of Wittgenstein’s work, his desire to affect our mode of being in the world. I will 
argue that Wittgenstein’s early ethical remarks have important bearing on his later 
therapeutic project, and this implies that the function of Wittgenstein’s later vision of 
language is not simply to dispel certain intellectual delusions, but to make possible new 
ways of living.
Let’s imagine a theatre, the curtain goes up & and we see someone alone in his room 
walking up and down, lighting a cigarette, seating himself etc. so that suddenly we are 
observing a human being from outside in a way that ordinarily we can never observe 
ourselves; as if we were watching a chapter from a biography with our own eyes, - 
surely this would be at once uncanny and wonderful. More wonderful than anything 
that a playwright could cause to be acted or spoken on the stage. We should be seeing 
life itself. -  But then we do see this every day & it makes not the slightest impression 
on us! . . . But now it seems to me too that besides the work of the artist there is 
another through which the world may be captured sub specie ceterni. It is -  as I believe 
-  the way of thought which as it were flies above the world and leaves it the wav it is, 
contemplating it from above in its flight.2
In this passage from 1930, Wittgenstein ties a vision of the ‘wonderful' and ‘uncanny’ 
details of ordinary life to a form of thought that ‘flies above the world’ and leaves 
everything as it is, ‘contemplating it from above in its flight.’ The passage is important 
because it suggests a certain congruity of spirit between Wittgenstein’s early and late 
work that is not often recognised in the literature. In particular, it reminds us that the
1 See, for example, the discussion on page 44.
: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains, rev. 2nd edition, 
ed. Georg Henrik von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. Peter Winch, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1998), 7. The underlining is in the original text.
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vision of the extraordinary everyday that Wittgenstein presents in his later writings has 
its origins in Wittgenstein’s earlier work, his account of contemplating life as a ‘limited 
whole,’ sub specie ceterni; his description of viewing the world aesthetically, as ‘God’s 
work of art." One might also say that, early and late, a transformation is called for, but a 
transformation of attitude which paradoxically leaves everything as it is. As the above 
passage suggests, Wittgenstein’s hope is that a vision of the miracle of ‘life itself’ might 
be made possible through a new movement of thought.
This chapter will trace several continuities between Wittgenstein’s early and late 
work. I will focus on Wittgenstein’s account of the will, on his vision of life, on his 
efforts to understand what takes place when we try to articulate this vision, and on the 
analogy between metaphysical and ethical utterances. To help make these continuities 
clear, I will draw not only on the texts that have been taken to exemplify his early and 
late periods -  the Tractatus and Notebooks on one hand, the Investigations on the other 
- but also on work from the middle of his career where the cross over of thought is most 
vivid, especially the above passage from Culture and Value and his 1930 ‘Lecture on 
Ethics.’3 4
By taking this approach I do not intend to iron over the significant stylistic and 
intellectual shifts that take place between his early and late work. I do not want to deny, 
for example, that Wittgenstein sometimes presents his later work as a therapeutic 
critique of claims put forward in his early work. In section 114 of the Investigations, for 
example, Wittgenstein observes that the Tractatus claim that propositions picture, or 
mirror the world, and hence tell us “‘how things are”5. . .  is the kind of proposition that 
one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the 
thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through 
which we look at it.’6 Nor do I want to downplay the contrast between the beautiful yet 
austere form of the Tractatus and the open ended, dialogical quality of Wittgenstein’s 
later investigation of the details of everyday life. Terry Eagleton has written that while 
the Tractatus has ‘the shimmering purity of an Imagist poem or Suprematist canvas,’ 
the Investigations reads, ‘more like an assemblage of ironic fables of fragments of a
3 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 6.
4 The ‘Lecture on Ethics’ was prepared at some point between September 1929 and December 1930. The 
text of the lecture is a transcript of the shorthand notes made by Friedrich Waismann during and after his 
conversations with Wittgenstein and Moritz Schlick about the lecture. Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics.’ 
The Philosophical Review vol. 74, (1965).
5 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, rev. edition., trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. 
McGuinness (London: Routledge, 1974), §4.5
6 Indeed the dream of a denotative language expressed by Wittgenstein’s early ‘picture theory of 
language,’ is the very fantasy-picture Wittgenstein later treats therapeutically through the technique of 
imaginative literalism.
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novel, deceptively lucid in their language but teasingly enigmatic in their thought. ’7 
However, I believe that across these differences, Wittgenstein’s philosophy maintains a 
certain ethical spirit that requires one to relinquish false demands; to open to the 
miracle of life; to feel safe; and to understand what it is for oneself or another to evoke 
an ethical vision of life. As we will see, this spirit is at once deeply personal, and 
manifest in language itself. The following chapter will be divided into two main halves; 
each half will explore the relation between early and late work in a slightly different 
way.
In the first half I argue that, early and late, Wittgenstein’s hope is to counter the 
fantasy demand that the world fit one’s will. I link the feeling of wonder and safety 
which comprise Wittgenstein’s first attempts to describe a life which does not make 
false demands, to his later vision of language. In particular, I want to emphasise that 
Wittgenstein stages this vision in terms of sensations which are manifest in language 
and practice but which cannot be found in any fact of the world, or pinned down to an 
individual subjective state.
Building on this, the second half of the chapter focuses on the structural analogy that 
Wittgenstein suggests between ethical and metaphysical expressions. In particular, I 
look at the way that Wittgenstein characterises our efforts to express an attitude to life 
as a whole in terms of the feeling of the sublime and in terms of an encounter with the 
limits of language. In this section I want to draw attention to Wittgenstein’s efforts to 
understand the metaphysical or ethical speaker - not by dismissing what they say as 
incoherent or decoding a hidden meaning, but rather by imaginatively opening oneself 
to the nonsensicality of what is said. By outlining Wittgenstein’s imaginative 
engagement with the speaker of nonsense, I hope to trace the origins of Wittgenstein’s 
later strategy of imaginative literalism.
If we bring the two halves of the chapter together an interesting tension emerges, for 
the first half puts forward a vision of language that the second half declares nonsense. 
So I will end this chapter with some speculations about the relation between nonsensical 
expressions and the miracle of the existence of language.
To begin with, however, I will build on my previous discussion of imposition and 
release of fantasy. Both early and late Wittgenstein characterises this force as an effort 
of the will.
7 Terry Eagleton, Wittgenstein: The Terry Eagleton Script, The Derek Jarman Film (London: British Film 
Institute Publishing, 1993), 9.
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The will in Wittgenstein’s later work
‘I am thinking of N .’ ‘I am speaking of N today’ -  But surely that is not enough! 
After all, when I say ‘N ’ I might mean various people of this name. ‘Then there must 
surely be a further, different connection between my talk and N, for otherwise I should 
still not have meant HIM.X
When I make myself a sketch of N ’s face from memory, I can surely be said to 
mean him by my drawing. But which of the processes taking place while I draw (or 
before or afterwards) could I call meaning him?
For one would naturally like to say; when he meant him, he aimed at him. But how 
is anyone doing that, when he calls someone else’s face to mind?
I mean, how does he call HIM to mind?
How does he call him?9
When we say that we mean somebody, Wittgenstein insists, it is not as if we have a 
‘dead picture’ of that person, instead ‘its like going up to someone,’ or like ‘aiming at 
him.’10 And suddenly having a name, an illustration, a mental image, an abstract idea, or 
even a feeling of him is not enough; for a picture of how things must be takes hold. For 
when Wittgenstein thinks of N, he feels as if a force or mechanism is needed as a 
‘motor’ to put ‘images in motion,’ only then can N be fully present in Wittgenstein’s 
thoughts, words or portrait." The context in which Wittgenstein speaks of N, the reason 
he first thinks of him become insignificant. By looking closely at his sketch of N, by 
repeating his name, it seems to Wittgenstein that he might call N forth.
Like many of the scenes and descriptions that make up the Investigations, 
Wittgenstein brings out the feelings and images implicit in the philosophical dream of 
pure intentionality by first submitting himself to this dream. In the story of Wittgenstein 
and N, ‘A wish seems already to know what will or would satisfy it; a proposition, a 
thought, what makes it true -  even when that thing is not there at all!’ and Wittgenstein 
goes on to ask: ‘Whence this determining of what is not yet there? This despotic 
demand? (“The hardness of the logical must.”)’12
x Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edition, ed. G. E. M Anscombe and R. Rhees, 
trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1958), §689
9 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §691. Wittgenstein’s emphasis.
10 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §433, §689
" Wittgenstein, The Wittgenstein Reader, 177. 
i: Wittgenstein, The Wittgenstein Reader, §427.
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In Wittgenstein’s later work the ‘despotic demand’ of the ‘logical must,’ takes two 
forms: there is the must that ensures each thought knows the conditions of its own truth 
and each wish the conditions of its fulfilment, and there is the must that makes such a 
picture of meaning (meaning which is fully self present) seem compelling. The latter 
imposes itself upon us from outside, as if an external will has determined how things 
must be. The former appears to be the logical fulfilment of the latter, but in fact, in 
Wittgenstein’s dramatisation, amounts to no more than his own futile effort to make the 
world correspond to his will. By characterising the will both as a powerful picture 
imposing itself on one from outside, and as one’s reaction to this external picture (e.g. 
my wilful efforts to actualise this picture), Wittgenstein shows that there is nothing 
ultimately justifying the ‘despotic demand.’ Although there is no final escape in the 
Investigations from the powerful pictures embedded in language, 13 neither are we 
completely determined, for it is we who choose to be determined by demanding that 
reality fit our fantasy-picture of it. 14
In the last chapter we saw that the willingness to submit to the picture of meaning as 
self present is tied both to the imaginary dimension of our grammar, and to the 
conviction that the strange or wondrous aspects of our grammar can be given full 
explanation. This conviction results in an insatiable wonder regarding our idioms and 
forms of speech. This wonder begins ordinarily enough:
If it is asked: ‘how do sentences manage to represent?’ -  the answer might be 
‘don’t you know? You certainly see it, when you use them .’ For nothing is concealed.
How do sentences do it? - Don’t you know? For nothing is hidden.
But given this answer: ‘But you know how sentences do it, for nothing is 
concealed’ one would like to retort ‘Yes, but it all goes by so quick, and I should like 
to see it as it were laid open to view.’15
Ultimately the demand for a deeper understanding fuels a wonder that cannot find 
satisfaction in the world. As the story of Wittgenstein and N suggests, this wonder ends 
not in a clearer truer vision, but in confusion, alarm and loss. Caught up searching for 
the essence of his image of N, Wittgenstein seems to lose sight of the real N altogether. 
Like an apparition N is obsessively called for and called into question. But
13 See for example Investigations § 115.
14 See for example Investigations § 115. Wittgenstein also writes: ‘images often beset us against our will 
and remain, refusing to be banished. Yet the will can struggle against them.’ Ludwig Wittgenstein, The 
Wittgenstein Reader, ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994), 177.
15 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §435.
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Wittgenstein’s own life is also, as it were, in suspended animation. In search of an 
‘ideal’ he finds that he cannot move, in the desire to understand the very nature of 
meaning he can no longer make sense to himself or others. 16 At various points of the 
Investigations Wittgenstein likens this compulsion to repeat to a spell or incantation. 
When this constraining form of thought takes hold, he is in the thrall of a phantasm. 17
Wittgenstein’s promise in the Investigations is to help release thought and life from 
this rigid state of suspension: ‘we have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction 
and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are 
unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!’Is On 
the ‘rough ground’ of actual word usage ‘we make detours, we go by side roads. We see 
the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is permanently 
closed. ’ 19 On the ‘rough ground’ we can feel safe from philosophical torment.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy 
when I want to .—The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer 
tormented by questions which bring i ts e lf  into question. —Instead, we now 
demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken 
off.— Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like 
different therapies.20
As we saw in the last chapter, therapy entails both the description of actual language 
usage and the difficult task of finding or inventing ‘application^]’ for pictures which 
impose themselves but have no obvious use or ‘application. ’21 Wittgenstein writes that 
‘imagining is subject to the will’ both because images impose themselves on us like a 
foreign will and because we have the capacity to react or respond to them: ‘images
often beset us against our will and remain, refusing to be banished. Yet the will can 
struggle against them. ’ 22 As I argued in the last chapter, the treatment of philosophical 
delusion entails a transformation, rather than a dismissal of its imaginative and emotive 
energies: ‘patent nonsense’ becomes part of ordinary language’s ‘rough ground,’ the
16 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §107.
17 See for example, Wittgenstein, Investigations, 38.
IS Wittgenstein, Investigations, §107.
19 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §426.
20 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §133. Wittgenstein’s emphasis.
21 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §422.
22 Wittgenstein, The Wittgenstein Reader, 177.
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feeling of wonder is released from the demand for explanation, and the feeling of safety 
is no longer manifest as the metaphysical or logical demand for certitude. 23
The will in Wittgenstein’s early work
In the Investigations Wittgenstein does not explicitly characterise the revelation 
brought about by therapy in moral or ethical terms. Nevertheless, the therapeutic 
practice of the Investigations echoes an ethical distinction made in his early work 
between the ‘unhappy’ demand that the world fit the conditions I lay down, and the 
‘happy’ opening to life, no matter what happens. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein draws a 
contrast between a ‘happy’ and ‘unhappy life’ and links this to the contrast between 
what he calls ‘good’ and ‘bad willing. ' 24 Wittgenstein speculates in his Notebooks that 
‘the happy life seems to be in some sense more harmonious that the unhappy,’ and that: 
‘in order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world.,2^  The ‘agreement’ that 
Wittgenstein speaks of amounts to an acceptance of the independence of the world from 
my will. Disagreement between the willing subject and the world arises when we 
demand that life fulfil our wishes or fantasies. Wittgenstein’s early work shares with his 
later therapeutic procedure the aim of releasing us from the futile demand that the world 
fit our desires. Early and late Wittgenstein hopes to replace the demand that the world 
fit one’s will with a vision of life as it truly is. In the Investigations, this takes the form 
of a description of the “possibilities' of phenomena’; in the Tractatus it comes as the 
acceptance of the independence of world and will.26
Throughout his life Wittgenstein risks being read as politically or socially 
conservative.27 However, as we have begun to see in the context of the Investigations, 
the task of describing the world as it is need not be an appeal to the status quo, but 
rather forms part of Wittgenstein's attempt to overcome fantasies which are themselves 
popular norms. As I mentioned at the start of this chapter, Wittgenstein’s description of 
‘a way of thought which as it were flies above the world and leaves it the way it is, 
contemplating it from above in its flight, ’ 28 also captures something of the contradictory
23 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §464, §107.
24 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §6.43.
25 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916, 2nd edition, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, 
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 78, 75.
26 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §90. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §6.373.
27 See for example, J.C. Nyfri 'Wittgenstein’s Later Work in relation to Conservatism,’ Wittgenstein and 
his Times, ed. Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), 44-67.
2S Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 7.Underlining in original removed.
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sensibilities of his work -  a vision that simply lets life be, brought about through a new 
criss-cross movement of thought.
However it would be equally inaccurate to conclude that Wittgenstein is opposed to 
change per se in the Tractatus, for according to Wittgenstein in order to live a truly 
happy life one must not seek to conserve this or that particular order; but be willing to 
accept life, no matter what happens. So in the course of one’s life one may in fact be 
called on to affirm quite radical change. But although Wittgenstein is not advocating a 
conservative preservation of the status quo in the Tractatus, he is nevertheless making a 
claim about the kind of relation human beings can have to the world, and it is here that 
he seems to depart from his later interventionist critique of fantasy, for it is indeed 
difficult to see how the Tractatus’ insistence that the world is independent of my will 
could amount to more than a flat denial of the human capacity to instigate change.
The aim of this chapter, however, will be to argue that the impulse to effect our 
outlook on life can be found not only in the Investigations, but also in Wittgenstein’s 
earliest writings.29 But before I develop this argument in detail, I want to draw attention 
to several important differences between Wittgenstein’s early and late work - 
differences which have often functioned in the literature to overshadow the task of 
exploring possible continuities in his thought.
At the start of this chapter 1 mentioned that some significant intellectual and stylistic 
shifts that occur between Wittgenstein’s early and later writings. The world of the 
Investigations, for example, is composed of multiple language-games that are often 
interconnected and sometimes incommensurable. Factual language is only one of many 
language-games, and as Wittgenstein is at pains to show, the use of scientific paradigms 
to determine the meaning of our ordinary words is an important source of philosophical 
confusion. The world of the Tractatus, by contrast, is comprised of facts that can be 
described as true or false propositions. An important claim in the Tractatus is that an 
investigation into the limits of expression which distinguishes true or false expressions 
from nonsensical ones, tells us about the limits of our world, because language and 
world mirror each other in their underlying logic. However, underpinning this early 
‘picture theory of language, ’ is the dream of pure denotative meaning, the very fantasy- 
picture Wittgenstein later treats therapeutically through techniques such as imaginative 
literalism. Given these differences, it is difficult at times to recognise the continuity in 
Wittgenstein’s thought regarding the fantasy dimension of the will.
In the following sections of this chapter I will argue that in spite o f significant differences in 
Wittgenstein's work, early and late, his later conviction that a transformation of life takes place through 
practical activities of the will can be traced back to his earliest writings.
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Nevertheless, from his earliest writings on, Wittgenstein maintains the hope to halt 
the totalising expansion of the scientific techniques of explanation and maintains that 
aesthetic practice and ethical, religious or metaphysical beliefs can never be explained 
or justified in purely factual terms. But since the world of the Tractatus is comprised 
only of facts, the early Wittgenstein situates all expressions of absolute value outside 
the world, beyond the realm of the discourse of sense. The ethical will, as Wittgenstein 
speaks of it in his early work, is ‘transcendental’; it only affects the ‘limits of the world’ 
rather than the facts within it.30
Wittgenstein vividly illustrates this notion in his ‘Lecture on Ethics’ by asking the 
audience to imagine a ‘world-book’ that contains in it everything that has taken place. 
According to Wittgenstein, nothing in the world-book, none of the events, and none of 
the feelings or actions described from the standpoint of empirical psychology would 
express what he means by ethics.
If for instance in our world-book we read the description of a murder with all its 
details physical and psychological, the mere description of these facts will contain 
nothing which we could call an ethical proposition. The murder will be on exactly the 
same level as any other event, for instance the falling of a stone. Certainly the reading 
of this description might cause us pain or rage or any other emotion, or we might read 
about the pain or rage caused by this murder in other people when they hear of it, but 
there will be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics. And now I must say that if I 
contemplate what Ethics really would have to be if there were such a science, this 
result seems to me quite obvious. It seems to me obvious that nothing we could ever 
think or say should be the thing. That we cannot write a scientific book, the subject 
matter of which could be intrinsically sublime and above all other subject matters.31
As this passage suggests, the ethical will cannot be found in any event in the world, 
but it also does not have its source in any subjective state. Indeed in the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein refers to the ethical will as the ‘metaphysical subject,’ and his discussion 
of the ‘metaphysical subject’ ties in with the critique of solipsism raised by Pears in the 
previous chapter.32 As Pears points out, Wittgenstein demonstrates that the subject of 
solipsism cannot at once form the limits of the world and be pointed to as a determinate 
entity. This critique can be traced back to section 5.64 of the Tractatus, where
30 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §6.421, §6.43.
31 Wittgenstein ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 6-7.
32 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §5.633.
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Wittgenstein writes that ‘solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, 
coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, 
and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.’ But although Pears argues that by 
making the imaginative misunderstanding of solipsism explicit, the standpoint 
dissolves, Wittgenstein in fact takes 5.64 to show that, ‘there really is a sense in which 
philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.’33
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world.’
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human 
soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the 
world -  not a part of it. 34
Here Wittgenstein suggests that there is a certain ‘truth’ to the solipsist notion of self, if 
the self is conceived as a limit but not an entity.35
But where, then, is the willing subject if it cannot be found in the world? 
Wittgenstein’s answer is that although our will to be good or bad does not reside in the 
facts, it functions in a different way: as an attitude to life as a whole which we have both 
the freedom and responsibility to affect. This attitude to life as a whole cannot be ‘said’ 
because it cannot be found in any physical fact or psychological state, but it can 
nevertheless be ‘shown,’ for it effects the limits of our world. For example, in #6.43 of 
the Tractatus Wittgenstein writes:
[i]f the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits 
of the world, not the facts -  not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so 
to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.
I will return to a detailed discussion of the status that the Tractatus assigns to our 
efforts to articulate a bad or good will later in the chapter. However, for the moment it 
will suffice to say that for Wittgenstein an unhappy life is characterised by an intense 
dissatisfaction with life: by the fear that things will not turn out as we want; and by the 
despotic demand that the world correspond to our desires. By contrast: ‘a man who is
33 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §5.641.
34 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §5.641.
35 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §5.62.
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happy must have no fear. Not even in face of death. ’ 36 A happy life and a good will can 
be seen in a person’s refusal to be afraid of suffering or death, and in their acceptance of 
life whatever may take place. It is only by accepting the contingency of what happens, 
Wittgenstein says, that we come to feel absolutely safe. 7,1 A sense of absolute safety, 
Wittgenstein suggests, emerges only once we relinquish the demand that the world fit 
our desires, and accept in happiness the contingency of life. 38
The happy acceptance of life may not at first look like an ethical position at all, for it 
seems to impose no normative constraints. However, as Cora Diamond points out, 
Wittgenstein’s acceptance of the contingency of life does not amount to the view that 
everything is allowable. This can be seen, she suggests, in Wittgenstein’s brief remarks 
in the Notebooks on suicide. According to Wittgenstein, no fact in the world makes 
suicide intrinsically wrong, however suicide can still be described as the ‘elementary 
sin. ’ 39 This is because the act of suicide would make the continuation of one’s life 
dependant on things turning out in a particular way. To refuse suicide is to acknowledge 
that we are in an important sense ‘powerless’ over life and to keep ourselves open to 
life, whatever takes place.40
A further difficulty remains about how is it is possible to distinguish between good 
and bad willing if they are not given through the facts of the world. In one attempt to 
formulate Wittgenstein’s early conception of ethics Cora Diamond writes: ‘just as logic 
is not, for Wittgenstein, a particular subject, with its own body of truths, but penetrates 
all thought, so ethics has no particular subject matter; rather, an ethical spirit, an attitude 
to the world and life, can penetrate any thought or talk. ’41 A spirit of good or evil can 
pervade a person’s actions and thoughts even though that spirit cannot be pinpointed 
when we interrogate any individual act or thought.
To help illustrate her point, Diamond draws on Nathaniel Hawthorne’s tale ‘The 
Birthmark.’ The main character of the story is a scientist named Aylmer who is 
‘“unhappy” in Wittgenstein’s sense: the world does not meet the conditions he lays 
down. ’42 According to Diamond, the ‘ethical spirit’ of the tale is shown by Aylmer’s
3(1 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 74.
37 The happy life, and the feeling of absolute safety that accompanies this life, are like the unhappy life in 
so far as they are impossible to articulate verbally and cannot be tied down to any experience described 
by empirical psychology.
3X For Wittgenstein an acceptance of life as it is does not amount to the acceptance of a particular order 
but rather to the recognition that the possibilities of life exceed any order.
39 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 91.
40 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 73.
41 Cora Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,’ Bilder der 
Philosophie, ed. R. Heinrich & H. Vetter (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1991), 61.
4: Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 61.
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reaction to his beautiful wife’s birthmark, ‘but it is also meant to be seen by us in what 
he goes on to do, seen to be the spirit in his destructiveness of life, goodness, beauty. ’ 43 
Reflecting back, Diamond observes that a sense of terrible evil pervades the tale and 
lurks not only in the story’s dreadful culminating events but also at the start in Aylmer’s 
initial reaction to the birthmark:
One day, very soon after their marriage, Aylmer sat gazing at his wife with a 
trouble in his countenance that grew stronger until he spoke.
‘Georgiana,’ said he, ‘has it never occurred to you that the mark upon your cheek 
might be removed?’
‘No, indeed,’ said she, smiling; but perceiving the seriousness of his manner, she 
blushed deeply. ‘To tell you the truth it has been so often called a charm that I was 
simple enough to imagine it might be so.’
‘Ah, upon another face perhaps it might,’ replied her husband’ ‘but never on yours. 
No, dearest Georgiana, you came so nearly perfect from the hand of Nature that this 
slightest possible defect, which we hesitate whether to term a defect or a beauty, 
shocks me, as being the visible mark of earthly imperfection. ’44
Yet the difficulty with the suggestion that this passage pre-empts the terrible evil to 
come, is that on the surface all the passage really describes is a man telling a woman 
that he dislikes her birthmark, and this ‘seems a trivial thing. ’ 45 In Diamond’s view, 
Hawthorne’s tale shows us that ‘some of the thoughts we are inclined to have about evil 
seem to be justified by nothing that is as it were available on the surface of events, 
including here what is available to empirical psychology. We have a sense of something 
dark and terrible ‘within,’ as we might say. ’46
Likewise, one could say that the spirit of the happy and unhappy life pervades our 
words, feelings, and actions yet cannot be pinned down to any given word, feeling or 
action conceived of as a fact in the empirical world. In the following section I want to 
emphasise that Wittgenstein stages his vision of the happy and unhappy life in terms of 
moods and feelings which are manifest in language and practice but which nevertheless 
cannot be pinned down to any fact of the world or any determinate subjective state.
43 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 62.
44 Nathaniel Hawthorne, 'The Birthmark,’ The Complete Novels and Selected Tales of Nathaniel 
Hawthorne, ed. Norman Holmes Pearson (New York: Random House, 1937), 1022.
45 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 81.
46 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 82-83.
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The Tractatus and Notebooks also describe a second way of distinguishing between 
an unhappy and happy life. Here the ties between Wittgenstein’s early work and his 
later critique of the generalisation of scientific paradigms become more apparent. 
Consider, for example, the passages leading up to Wittgenstein’s declaration in that: 
‘[tjhe world is independent of my will. ' 47
There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. 
The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.
The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so- 
called laws of nature are the explanation of natural phenomena.
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, 
just as God and Fate were treated in past ages.
And in fact both are right and both wrong: though the view of the ancients is 
clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while the modern 
system tries to make it look as it everything were explained.48
The world is independent of my will.
As in his later work, Wittgenstein ties the desire to impose one’s will on the world to a 
‘illusion’ of modern times; the ‘illusion’ that natural laws are ‘inviolable’ or logically 
necessary.49 According to Wittgenstein his present day culture invests science with a 
power that was once possessed by God or Fate. But whereas both God and Fate 
command us without the need for further justification, ‘the modern system tries to make 
it look as if everything were explained. ’ 30 It is ridiculous to say that: ‘Science has 
proved that there are no miracles. ’ 31 As Wittgenstein insists later in his ‘Lecture on 
Ethics:’ ‘[t]he truth is that the scientific way of looking at a fact is not the way to look at 
it as a miracle. For imagine whatever fact you may it is not in itself miraculous in the 
absolute sense of the term. ’ 32
47 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §6.373.
4S Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §6.37, §6.371, §6.372. 6.373.
49 In his later work Wittgenstein questions not only the scientific paradigm but also his earlier focus on 
logical necessity.
50 Hence speaking from within the language of science, which is, strictly speaking, the only language 
allowed by the Tractatus, one is unequipped to understand how ‘modern’ fantasies about the capability 
and breath of scientific language takes hold. A similar idea, is developed by Cora Diamond in ‘Ethics, 
Imagination.’
51 Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 11.
52 Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 11.
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According to the Notebooks, the happy person does not look at the world from the 
point of view of science but instead, like an artist or a religious person struck by the 
miracle of creation, they feel wonder without feeling the demand for an ultimate 
explanation.
Aesthetically, the miracle is that the world exists. That what exists does exist.
Is it the essence of the artistic way of looking at things, that it looks at the world 
with a happy eye? 53
Here Wittgenstein evokes Schopenhauer’s distinction between viewing the world as 
objects of representation, and viewing the world aesthetically or sub specie ceterni. 54 
For Schopenhauer, aesthetic experience ‘involves the pure, incommunicable experience 
of regarding the world without imposing conceptual categories on it, and without 
awareness of one’s own separateness from it. ’55 Wittgenstein makes a similar point in 
his Notebooks when he contrasts looking at something as an object among other objects 
and contemplating it in such a way that ‘becomes my world,’ so that object, self and 
world are no longer distinguished.51’ Indeed it is this intransitive vision, a vision with no 
determinate object, that Wittgenstein refers to when he insists: ‘besides the work of the 
artist’ there is another way that we might be able to perceive life’s miracle .57
However unlike Schopenhauer, who believes it is possible to have access to reality 
beyond the phenomenal world, Wittgenstein insists that the limits of the world must 
always be staged in terms of the limits of language ;58 hence the new movement of 
thought Wittgenstein promises is manifest in language itself. In the ‘Lecture on Ethics’ 
Wittgenstein says: ‘Now I am tempted to say that the right expression in language for 
the miracle of the existence of the world, though it is not any proposition in language, is 
the existence of language itself. ’ 59 The existence of language is an assumption that 
underpins everything that is said, yet it cannot itself be put into words, so, as Giorgio
53 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 83.
54 For example, on page 83 of his Notebooks, Wittgenstein writes: ‘The work of art is the object seen sub 
specie aeternitatis, and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connexion 
between art and ethics. The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, 
the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside. In such a way that they have the whole world as 
background.’
55 Christopher Janaway, Self and World in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, p. 319.
56 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 83.
57 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 7.1 have removed underlining.
58 See, for example, page 3 of Wittgenstein’s ‘Preface’ to the Tractatus, and also page 330 of Janaway’s 
reading of Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer in Self and World in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy.
91 Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 11.
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Agamben has suggested, the question becomes: how can we bear witness to the very 
existence of language!™
I will return explicitly to this question at the end of the chapter, but for the moment I 
want to make a few comments to summarise Wittgenstein’s notion of the happy life. If 
we read the Tractatus and Notebooks in conjunction with Wittgenstein’s 1930 ‘Lecture 
on Ethics,’ it could be said that the happy life entails two aspects: a feeling of wonder 
towards life as a whole, and a feeling of safety no matter what happens. Indeed in his 
lecture Wittgenstein singles out ‘wonder at the existence of the world’ and the feeling of 
being ‘absolutely safe’ as his ethical experiences ‘par excellence.’61 In a way that is not 
yet fully clear, these early remarks on the happy life seem to pre-empt the redemptive 
outcome of therapy, which entails both an intransitive wonder,62 and a sense of 
peacefulness in the face of metaphysical incertitude.
Are ‘will as action’ and ‘will as attitude’ incompatible?
The close relation between Wittgenstein’s early ethical reflections and his later 
therapeutic reorientation, has often been overlooked because the standard reading of 
Wittgenstein insists that the ‘will as attitude’ described in the Tractatus is incompatible 
with the account of the will advocated in the Investigations. Peter Winch, for example, 
argues that the claim that the will is external to the world and affects only its limits, is in 
direct conflict with Wittgenstein’s later characterisation of willing as acting or doing 
things in the world.63 In the Investigations Wittgenstein abandons his early notion of a 
‘metaphysical subject’ of the will and replaces it with an account of our actual uses of 
the word ‘will.’ In such an account, willing is not a mysterious force but ‘the action 
itself.’
Willing, if it is not to be a sort of wishing, must be the action itself. It cannot be 
allowed to stop anywhere short of the action.’ If it is the action, then it is so in the 
ordinary sense of the word; so it is speaking, writing, walking, lifting a thing,
Wl See Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. & trans. Daniel Heller- 
Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). In the context of Wittgenstein’s later work I believe 
that to adopt this mode of relation to language, is to open oneself to its aspectival dimension.
61 Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 8.
62 The idea that the outcome of therapy amounts to an ‘intransitive vision’ is argued by Antonia Soulez in 
‘Conversion in Philosophy: Wittgenstein’s “Saving Word,”’ trans. Melissa McMahon, Hypatia, 15:4 
(2000): 127-150.
63 Peter Winch. ‘Wittgenstein’s Treatment of the Will,’ Ethics and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1972), 110-29.
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imagining something. But it is also trying, attempting, making an effort, - to speak, to 
write, to lift a thing, to imagine something etc.64
Indeed as we saw in the previous discussion of the Investigations, pictures impose 
themselves on us, like an external will, but we can always exercise our own will to 
‘struggle against them.’ This counter will is not a ‘mechanism’ or a ‘wish,’ but the 
practical activity of therapy which includes recalling what we do with words, imagining 
what we might do and trying to imagine or find contexts for philosophical pictures. 
Given the therapeutic reading of the will that I am developing, how can Wittgenstein's 
earlier pronouncements on the independence of will and world but collapse into the 
rejection of change brought about through action?
In the Notebooks Wittgenstein is certainly conscious of the possibility of such a 
collapse, for although he never commits to the claim that we are determined, he speaks 
of the feeling of being determined.
In order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world. And that is what 
‘being happy’ means.
I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear 
dependent That is to say: ‘I am doing the will of God. ’65
So one might argue that the feeling of being utterly determined by an external will is 
something Wittgenstein resists in the Investigations, whereas in his early work it seems 
to be this same feeling that he wants us to accept. In section 426 of the Investigations, 
for example, Wittgenstein describes our struggle with the feeling of being determined:
A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense unambiguously. The actual 
use, compared with that suggested by the picture, seems like something muddied. 
Here again we get the same thing as in set theory: the form of expression we use 
seems to have been designed for a god, who knows what we cannot know; these forms 
of expression are like pontificals which we may put on, but cannot do much with, 
since we lack the effective power that would give these vestments meaning and 
purpose.
64 Wittgenstein, Investigations, 615.
65 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 75.
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In the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by side roads. We see the 
straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is permanently 
closed.66
However to take the later Wittgenstein to be rejecting the religious feeling of being 
determined by God, is to miss the ongoing significance he gives to the contrast between 
the scientific will, with its appetite for answers, and the will of God, which defies 
explanation.67Although in the Investigations Wittgenstein rejects the idea that certain 
‘forms of expression’ seem to be ‘designed for a God,’ here he is objecting to the notion 
that God ‘himself’ must follow universal laws. For throughout his life, Wittgenstein 
maintains that the will of God has no moral or rational justification.6* Hence to follow 
God’s will is to be compelled by an authority in the absence of any meaningful 
explanation.
I will address the way that fantasy-pictures also entail force or validity in excess of 
their meaning later in chapter 5, but for the moment I want to stress that although a 
certain analogy can be drawn between the will of God and the imposition of powerful 
fantasy-pictures, it is also true that by abandoning all demand for final justification, 
Wittgenstein’s hope is to ultimately bring about an intransitive vision of wonder, and 
opening to the miracle of life. In his early work, for example, Wittgenstein equates the 
feeling of being determined by God’s will to an opening to the miracle of ‘the existence 
of language itself’ rather than to the demand that this or that fact occur. So in this sense 
Wittgenstein’s conception of the will of God is quite unlike his portrayal of the god-like 
will of science.
We might conclude that the recognition of the independence of the world and will 
does not amount to a conservative acceptance of the status quo, in so far as it entails a 
refusal of a fantasy (scientism) that had become the status quo of Wittgenstein’s culture. 
Still one might ask whether the cost of a critique of our illusions about the power of 
science must be, as the Tractatus suggests, the separation of will and world? The 
‘happy’ life seems to amount to no more than a renouncement of the will, whereas 
Wittgenstein’s later work does not separate world and will in this final way but rather 
replaces the notion of willing as wishing with willing as acting, thereby posing a 
positive counter will.
66 Wittgenstein’s emphasis.
67 See Wittgenstein’s: ‘Lectures on Religious Belief’ in Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations on 
Aesthetics, Psychology & Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), for an 
example of the continuity of Wittgenstein’s thought on this question.
6X For example Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture on Ethics’ and his 1938 ‘Lectures on Religious Belief.’
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This idea certainly fits with Christopher Janaway’s reading of Wittgenstein in Self 
and World in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy. He argues that the choice between good and 
bad willing described in Wittgenstein’s early work corresponds to the contrast 
Schopenhauer draws between the exercise of the will and its renouncement. According 
to Schopenhauer the ‘experience of our own agency’ gives us a glimpse of reality 
beyond the phenomenal world. 69 This knowledge is not the product of intellectual 
inquiry or scientific investigation, but ‘a direct, intuitive inside knowledge of our own 
strivings’ and desires.70 However, for Schopenhauer the will that underpins reality is 
ultimately something we must overcome: ‘Schopenhauer fights through to the 
conception of the pure, will-less, timeless subject that mirrors the world only after 
explaining that as subjects we are material embodiments of the will. ’71 Although 
Wittgenstein makes no mention of ‘will as action’ in the Tractatus, Janaway points out 
that in his Notebooks Wittgenstein describes the will as both a limit to the world and as 
an action.72 Janaway argues that although it is unclear whether Wittgenstein came to the 
idea that will is acting through reading Schopenhauer, he experiences a strain in his 
Notebooks between will as limit to the world, and will as action which is, ‘analogous to 
the central tension we found in Schopenhauer. ’72 According to Janaway:
Wittgenstein has decided in his notebooks that through expression of my will my body 
has a privileged status for me as a subject, which must threaten the notion of a pure, 
non-worldly T.’ If he had admitted this into the Tractatus, his final position there 
would have been openly even more Schopenhaurian than it already appears. For it 
would have been that it is solely by denying our status as embodied subjects of willing 
that we attain the perspective of the metaphysical subject from which the world is 
‘seen alright,’ and in adopting which we find happiness. The alternative is to retain 
either the pure metaphysical subject or the bodily nature of willing suppressing or 
abandoning the other. Wittgenstein appears to have resolved this highly 
Schopenhaurian dilemma in one way in the Tractatus, and the other in his later 
works.74
64 David Pears, The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy vol. 1 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 5.
7(1 Pears, The False Prison, vol. 1,5.
71 Chirstopher Janaway, Self and World in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
341.
77 On page 87 of the Notebooks Wittgenstein writes: ‘The act of will is not the cause of the action, but is 
the action itself. One cannot will without doing’
77 Janaway, Self and World, 341.
74 Janaway, Self and World, 341-42.
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Janaway argues that Wittgenstein does not resolve the tension between will and 
world as Schopenhauer does by staging the overcoming of the acting will. Rather he 
takes Wittgenstein to believe that ‘will as attitude’ to the world and ‘will as action’ are 
incompatible with each other, pursuing the former in the Tractatus and the latter in the 
Investigations. ‘The notion that the will is manifest in action is wholly suppressed from 
the published Tractatus, and the reason seems to be precisely its conflict with the view 
that the will is external to the world and can affect only its limits. ’ 73
There is, however, an alternative way of understanding the relation between the 
Tractatus and Notebooks which I now want to put forward. In the Notebooks 
Wittgenstein makes a distinction between willing as acting (wollen) and willing as 
wishing that something be the case (wüschen) .1(" It is the word, wüschen that 
Wittgenstein uses in the Tractatus when he speaks of the ‘unhappy’ life and our desire 
to make the world correspond to our demands.77 But when, ‘[ tjhe act of the will is not 
the cause of the action but is the action itself,’ the will (wollen) is not, according to the 
Notebooks, a force applied to the world by a subject, as in the case of wishing.78 So it is 
possible that although the Tractatus renounces willing in the sense of wüschen or 
wishing it may not renounce willing in the sense of wollen or acting. That there is 
consistency in Wittgenstein’s conception of the will, early and late, is reinforced by the 
fact that the later Wittgenstein, for all his focus on therapy as an imaginative act of the 
will, still does not believe that the action of the will can effect the facts of the world, but 
only our image of the world or our attitude to it. ‘It is just because imagining is subject 
to the will that it does not instruct us about the external world. In this way -  but in no 
other -  it is related to an activity such as drawing. ’74
One might speculate that the practical activities in the Investigations are intended not 
only to dissolve particular confusions but also to shift our orientation to life and 
language as a whole. The idea that the practical activities of therapy amount to a kind of 
‘showing’ in the Investigations is pursued by Pears in his book Wittgenstein.80 The 
notion of ‘therapeutic showing’ might be one way of accounting for the non-theoretical 
vision of language and life which theorists as diverse as Hacker, Pears and Mulhall each 
associate, in their own ways, with Wittgenstein’s later work. For if therapy is ultimately
77 Janaway, Self and World, 337. This view is drawn from Peter Winch. ‘Wittgenstein’s Treatment of the 
Will,’ 110-29.
76 See Notebooks, 87-88.
77 For example see Tractatus §6.347.
78 Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 87.
79 Wittgenstein, The Wittgenstein Reader, 176.
m David Pears, Wittgenstein (London: Fontana Press, 1971), 168-198.
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a form of ‘showing’ then this might help us envisage the leap from individual 
descriptions of language use, and imaginative engagements with fantasy-pictures, to an 
overview of the possibilities of life and language.
However, my argument differs from Pears’ in two important ways. Although Pears 
believes that ‘showing’ and ‘doing’ are linked in Wittgenstein’s later work, he does not 
take Wittgenstein to associate them in the Tractatus. Indeed, as I pointed out in chapter 
1, although Pears recognises certain continuities in Wittgenstein’s thought, early and 
late, he still believes that the primary aim of the Tractatus is to put forward an ineffable 
metaphysical thesis - a thesis which the Investigations later critiques. However if, as I 
have stressed during the first half of this chapter, we focus on Wittgenstein’s early 
ethical remarks as well as his logical claims, then the vision of the world Wittgenstein 
describes in his early work- a sense of absolute safety coupled with a wonder at the 
existence of language -  clearly pre-empts Wittgenstein’s later hope that a capacity to 
wonder at possibilities of our everyday lives might save us.
Secondly, I want to focus on a possibility that Pears does not consider. If 
Wittgenstein unites acting and ‘showing’ in a dimension distinct from ‘saying’ from his 
Notebooks onwards, then the Tractatus might also effect a transformation at the level of 
practice, which is to say it must be, in some way, therapeutic. Drawing on the work of 
Diamond, I will discuss this proposal in detail in the second part of this chapter. But 
looking back over my previous account of Wittgenstein’s early work, I believe that the 
tie between an attitude to life as a whole and the domain of practice is already suggested 
when I described Wittgenstein’s notion of ethics as a mood that pervades words and 
actions, but that cannot be pinned down to any determinate physical or psychological 
event. In the following chapters, I hope to show that Wittgenstein continues to be 
concerned with the ways that feelings and attitudes take expression in life, 
independently of the presence of determinate subjective states. For the moment, I will 
briefly review the argument so far, before turning to the second part of my argument.
In the first half of this chapter I argued that there are significant continuities between 
Wittgenstein’s early and late work regarding the operation of fantasy and his vision of 
language. In particular, I argued that throughout his career Wittgenstein envisages 
wonder freed from need for final explanation, and a sense of safety that does not 
demand foundation. In the second half of this chapter, I will turn in detail to 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of what is at stake in the attempt to articulate an attitude to 
language and life as a whole. To do so I will question conventional understanding of the 
relation between Wittgenstein’s late and early work. To begin with I posit that in
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Wittgenstein’s later work nonsense and the sublime do not merely function as ‘terms of 
criticism, ’ but rather something of the ethical sensibility of his earlier work is 
maintained. Then I will shift my focus back to Wittgenstein’s early work. Drawing on 
Diamond’s work, I suggest that the Tractatus, like the Investigations, is therapeutic in 
the sense that it imaginatively engages with the metaphysical or ethical speaker in order 
to reveal the nonsensicality of what they say. Unlike Pears, Diamond emphasises that 
once the speaker recognises the nonsensicality of what they say, they need not 
necessarily give their words up as empty, for some ethical expressions withstand the 
realisation that they do not make sense. So I will end with some reflections on the value 
of nonsense.
Sublime Nonsense
I have argued that Wittgenstein’s early ethical vision is tied to the obtainment of a 
happy life, a life where we feel safe and can wonder at the existence of language 
without demanding an ultimate explanation. In the ‘happy’ life we are in ‘in harmony’ 
with the world because we do not falsely impose our will upon it. I have also suggested 
that the ethical feelings described in Wittgenstein’s early work pre-empts his later 
therapeutic procedure, and that furthermore the dimension of ‘showing’ outlined in his 
early work may be closely tied to the dimension of doing emphasised by the 
Investigations. However the fundamental difficulty with all these remarks, is that from 
the point of view of the Tractatus, nothing can be ‘said’ on the topic of ethics. Speaking 
about the feeling “‘how extraordinary that anything should exist”’ and the ‘experience 
of feeling absolutely safe’ Wittgenstein insists that ‘the verbal expression which we 
give to these experiences is nonsense!’81
I could of course wonder at the world round me being as it is. If for instance I had this 
experience while looking into the blue sky, I could wonder at the sky being blue as 
opposed to the case when it’s clouded. But that’s not what I mean. I am wondering at 
the sky being whatever it is. One might be tempted to say that what I am wondering at 
is a tautology, namely at the sky being blue or not blue. But then it’s just nonsense to 
say that one is wondering at a tautology. Now the same applies to the other 
experience which I have mentioned, the experience of absolute safety. We all know 
what it means in ordinary life to be safe. I am safe in my room, when I cannot be run
Kl Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 8.
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over by an omnibus. I am safe if I have had whooping cough and cannot there fore get 
it again. To be safe essentially means that it is physically impossible that certain things 
could happen to me and therefore it’s nonsense to say that I am safe whatever 
happens.82
In his lecture Wittgenstein draws on the feeling of the sublime, with its allusion to an 
excess that cannot be expressed, to describe the experience of giving expression to 
ethical tautologies. Wonder and safety characterise Wittgenstein’s own personal ethical 
vision, but the sublime is the feeling we have when we try to express this vision or 
indeed allude to anything of absolute value. Wittgenstein writes: ‘[ejthics, if anything is 
supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup 
full of water’ even if ‘I were to pour out a gallon over it.’83 For although no states of 
affairs are ‘intrinsically sublime and above all other subject matter,’ the aesthetic of the 
sublime still tells us something about the dynamic of ethical claims; namely that in our 
attempt to ‘go beyond the world’ we will inevitably ‘thrust against the limits of 
language.’84
Now there is a clear structural analogy between ethical utterances, with their sublime 
excess that cannot be contained, and the too much dimension of fantasy, which I 
associated with metaphysical utterances in Chapter 1. Stanley Cavell, for example, 
draws on the Romantic aesthetic of the sublime to help describe the account of language 
that Wittgenstein gives in the Investigations: ‘whereas in Kant the psychic strain is 
between intellect and sensibility, in Wittgenstein the straining is of language against 
itself, against the commonality of criteria which are its conditions, turning as it were 
against its own origins.’85 Wittgenstein alludes to the sublime thrust of language against 
its limits, for example, when he says that his job is to treat ‘the bumps that the 
understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language.’86 In the 
context of the previous discussion of ethical utterances this raises an important question. 
From the perspective of the Investigations are Wittgenstein’s earlier ethical 
pronouncements, in fact metaphysical expressions to be treated therapeutically?
One author who believes that the Investigations rejects the ethical views expressed in 
the Tractatus and Notebooks, is Richard Rorty. In ‘The Philosophy of the Oddball’
x2 Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 8.
83 Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 7.
84 Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 7, 11, 13.
x5 Stanley Cavell This New Yet Unapproachable America (Albuquerque: Living Batch Press, 1989), 54. 
X6 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §119.
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Rorty dramatically recreates what he believes the later Wittgenstein might say to his 
earlier self, regarding the sublime nature of ethics and logic.
Why . . . did I think that logic -  the outermost frontier of language, looming over the 
abyss beyond -  was something sublime? Or even if it were, what is the sublime to me? 
Why did I hope that there was something like a ‘limited whole’ to be felt? Why did I 
think that language had a limit, that there was a single problem called ‘the problem of 
life,’ that to grasp that problem one must teeter over an abyss? Not, he concluded, 
because deep philosophical researches showed such limits to exist, but because an 
ascetic, obsessively self-purificatory attitude towards ordinary human life had 
demanded that there be such limits, such a problem, and such an abyss.87
In this passage, Rorty associates the sublime with a ‘purificatory attitude to ordinary 
life,’ but he also compares the limits of language to a ‘looming . . . abyss’ linking 
Wittgenstein’s early conception of ethics and logic to the eighteenth century Romantic 
aesthetic of the sublime found in the work of Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant. 
Rorty’s argument is that Wittgenstein’s later work rejects the feeling of the sublime in 
both of these senses. According to Rorty, the Investigations reveals that the intuition 
that there are sublime religious and ethical truths and that philosophy might help us 
‘transcend the human,’ is simply a product of ‘habitual’ forms of expression.88 ‘What is 
described as such a consciousness is simply a disposition to use the language of our 
ancestors to worship the corpses of their metaphors. ’89 However, by de-divinizing90 our 
world, by accepting an account of ‘truth as what comes to be believed in the course of 
free and open encounters’91 we ground ourselves in ‘contingency’ and recognise life and 
language as they really are: ‘a product of time and chance. ’92 In Rorty’s view, 
Wittgenstein abandons his earlier conviction that “‘the world” names something we 
ought to respect as well as cope with. ’ 93 The strain of language against its own limits 
does not point to a transcendental realm outside the world, rather it is a deluded activity 
that arises from intellectual confusions about the nature of language.
87 Richard Rorty, ‘The Philosophy of the Oddball,’ The New Republic (June 19, 1989) pp. 39-40.
88 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 21- 
22.
89 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 21.
90 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 21.
91 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 68.
92 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 22.
93 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 21.
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One reason why critics tend to assume that the Investigations rejects Wittgenstein’s 
earlier conception of ethics is that Wittgenstein does adopt the sublime as a mode of 
criticism in the Investigations.94 For example, he ties the feeling of the sublime to those 
‘forms of expression’ that send us ‘in pursuit of chimeras’ and speaks of our ‘tendency 
to sublime the logic of our language. ’ 95 In these passages the word sublime denotes 
something pure and essential, something transcendent (like a ‘super-order’) but also 
something deeply hidden (as in the word sublimate).
However, as Gordon Bearn points out in his book Waking to Wonder, Wittgenstein 
does not actually use the German term for the aesthetic sublime Das Erhabene, when he 
refers to the sublime in the Investigations, but instead the word sublimes, which 
commonly describes the chemical process whereby a solid transforms into gas without 
becoming liquid in between. Bearn takes this to suggest that Wittgenstein does not 
intend the aesthetic sublime to function as a ‘term of criticism’ in the Investigations. 
The difficulty with Bearn’s argument, as Cavell helps show, is that the Investigations 
resonates with the strain of the Romantic sublime. Nevertheless, I think that Bearn’s 
discussion of the chemical procedure of the sublime helps expand our understanding of 
the term. According to Bearn, while Wittgenstein’s allusion to the chemical sublime 
may at first seem obscure, what he actually does is to remind us that we tend to think of 
thought as a gaseous medium. To assume that, if communication is to occur, 
“‘propositional contents’ must accompany words in an invisible gaseous realm of 
thought,’ is ‘to sublime -  in the chemical sense -  the functioning, the logic, of our 
language. ’ 96
There are also further connotations that follow from the chemical process of 
subliming. The term ‘subliming’ also refers to the process whereby a chemical or 
compound is converted into a gas and then is resolidified in purer form. So the analogy 
could also describe the attempt to crystallise the mysterious spirit behind words, as if 
abstractions are also ‘something concrete . . . the hardest thing there is.’ Here thoughts 
take on a quality of ‘abstract concreteness,’ as in some of the experiences typical of 
psychosis and schizophrenia. 97 This reading of the sublime fits with Wittgenstein’s 
account of the philosopher in the thrall of a fantasy-picture, but significantly it also
94 See for example §38, §89 & §94 of the Investigations, where Wittgenstein directly mentions the 
sublime.
95 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §94, §38.
96 Gordon Bearn, Waking to Wonder: Wittgenstein’s Existential Investigations (Albany: SUNY Press, 
197), 87.
97 Wittgenstein, §97. See for example Louis A. Sass’s book The Paradoxes of Delusion (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1994).
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describes the technique of imaginative literalism, practiced at times by both 
Wittgenstein and Beckett.
As I proposed in Chapter 1, the too much dimension of language, can be conceived 
under two different aspects. On the one hand it designates an empty excess, a fantasy- 
picture which leads us to evade the demands of everyday life. But on the other, it can 
open us to too much meaning, or at least more meaning that our current conventions can 
contain. In the context of the current discussion, this would seem to imply that while 
the ‘sublime’ does operate as a ‘term of criticism’ in the Investigations, Wittgenstein’s 
ultimate aim is not to dismiss the sublime aesthetic but rather, as with the mode of 
wonder, to enact its transfiguration. What bearing might the alternative account of the 
sublime I am putting forward have on an understanding of ethics?
An alternative to Rorty’s account is provided by James Noggle in ‘The 
Wittgensteinian Sublime.,9h Noggle’s essay elaborates on Cavell’s suggestion that the 
strain of language ‘against itself’ characteristic of the sublime, is not a dysfunction of 
language but rather part of its ‘order.’99 Cavell writes: ‘the philosophically pertinent 
griefs to which language comes are not disorders, if that means they hinder its working; 
but are essential to what we know as the learning or sharing of language, to our 
attachment to our language; they are functions of its order’100 To help explain the part 
played by the sublime in Wittgenstein’s vision of language, Noggle utilises some of the 
ideas advanced by Pears which we looked at last chapter. In his book Wittgenstein, 
Pears outlines the relation between a clear vision of ordinary language and the 
objectivist metaphysical theories that attempt to describe it. Wittgenstein ‘believed that 
the correct method’ of philosophical inquiry, ‘was to fix the limits of language by 
oscillation between two points.’101
In this case the outer point was a kind of objectivism which tries to offer an 
independent support for our linguistic practices, and the inner point is a description of 
the linguistic practices themselves, a description which would be completely flat if it 
were not given against the background of that kind of objectivism. His idea is that the 
outer point is an illusion, and that the inner point is the whole truth, which must, 
however, be apprehended through its contact with the outer point. 102
9X James Noggle ‘The Wittgensteinian Sublime,’ New Literary History vol. 27 no. 4 (1996). 
99 Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America, 54.
I(KI Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America, 54.
1(11 David Pears, Wittgenstein, (London: Fontana Press, 1971), 170.
102 David Pears, Wittgenstein, 170.
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Although Pears does not say so, Noggle points out that the description he gives of 
Wittgenstein’s technique for marking the limits of language, closely resembles the 
dynamic of the sublime.
Our attempts to venture beyond language games, beyond the ‘inner point’ of ordinary 
language, posit a super sensible domain of discourse -  what Wittgenstein in the 
Investigations describes as ‘a super-order between -  so called -  super-concepts.’ But 
as Wittgenstein says, our apprehension of this domain is illusory. We attain an illusion 
of transcendence similar to the illusion experienced in the sublime, where the 
saturation of our cognitive or perceptual faculties seems to present the infinitely 
mighty or vast. But in fact can indicate no more than our inability to cognitize or 
perceive infinitely. This finitude, this limitedness of our own impressions, in Pear’s 
words, is ‘the whole truth’ that could never be revealed without the failing effort to 
ascend beyond it.103
Noggle concludes that: ‘[ordinary language is both all the language we ever really have 
and radically in need of the extraordinary language of metaphysical illusion -  which is 
useful only insofar as it proves from the perspective of ordinary language to be 
useless. ’ 104 The upshot of his account is that the sublime is therapeutic in Pears’ sense of 
the term. By dramatising the urge to transcend everyday life and language, the urge is 
ultimately revealed to be illusory. Noggle contrasts the therapeutic function of the 
sublime in the Investigations with the sublime expressions of Tractatus, which, in his 
view, ‘gesture outward toward some ineffable but metaphysically significant realm 
beyond the ordinary. ’ 105
So in response to Rorty one might say that the later Wittgenstein does not dismiss the 
sublime, rather he assigns it a new therapeutic function; for it is only through our failed 
efforts to transcend language that we come to recognise the finitude and contingency of 
the world. I think that Noggle is right to connect the sublime to the therapeutic 
workings of the Investigations, and right to suggest that one function of the sublime is 
to dissolve epistemological claims of objectivity. He also briefly points out that as a 
result of imaginative engagement with the sublime, the transcendent realm and the 
ordinary world become paradoxically interconnected. However, with the exception of a
103 Noggle, ‘The Wittgensteinian Sublime,’ 610. Noggle is quoting §97 of the Investigations. 
11)4 Noggle, 'The Wittgensteinian Sublime,’ 611.
105 Noggle, 'The Wittgensteinian Sublime,’ 609.
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few suggestive remarks, he does not inquire into the effects of therapy beyond self­
dissolution of metaphysical claims.
In this sense he is in danger of replicating Rorty in reducing ‘the issues raised by the 
human need for transcendence to an epistemologically foundational question [and] 
failing in this way to recognize that philosophical foundationalism is merely one of the 
multiple forms that the need can assume.’106 According to Victor J. Krebs, Rorty’s 
dismissal of the ethical dimension of Wittgenstein’s later work, ‘is the result of seeing 
matters from a narrow epistemological perspective, which leads Rorty to conflate an 
attitude of respect towards the world, say a resistance to its instrumental reduction, with 
a false belief in its ‘objectivity ’ understood in a foundational sense; as if -  once we 
have abandoned our false foundational expectations- we could not still be inspired to 
awe by the pure contingency and unpredictability of the world.'107
Indeed, neither Rorty or Noggle can adequately account for Wittgenstein’s insistence 
in his ‘Lecture on Ethics’ that ethics is worthy of ‘respect’ and public discussion in a 
way that logical propositions are not.I(KS Nor can they account for the ongoing 
importance Wittgenstein gives in his later work to those expressions of ethical or 
religious belief that thrust against the limits of language.
For example, in 1938 (when the Investigations was already well under way) 
Wittgenstein gave a series of lectures on religious belief. In these lectures, Wittgenstein 
insists that the gulf between people of different ethical beliefs are ‘quite inconclusive’ in 
a scientific sense. In such cases ethical language defies even our ordinary strategies of 
language, and we come face to face with the enigma of language. Reflecting on the 
relation between a person who believes in the Last Judgement and someone such as 
himself, he says: ‘I don’t know whether to say they understand another or not.’109 Here 
Wittgenstein refuses to commit to the assertion that he understands the believer, or to 
the assertion that he does not understand them. He finds himself lacking the ‘thoughts or 
anything that hangs together with them,’ the ‘pictures,’ the practices, the shared ways of 
life that might make understanding possible."0 However, in Wittgenstein’s view this 
difference between himself and the believer cannot be explained as the absence of 
knowledge. As with his earlier remarks on ethics, the problem lies with our words 
which strain to express something that cannot fully be said: ‘and then I give an
106 Victor Krebs, ‘“Around the axis of our real need”: On the Ethical Point of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy,’ 
347.
107 Krebs “‘Around the axis of our real need,”’ 347.
I0X See the introductory and concluding remarks of Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture on Ethics.’
109 Wittgenstein, ‘Lectures on Religious Belief,’ 55.
110 Wittgenstein, ‘Lectures on Religious Belief,’ 55.
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expression “I don’t believe in . . . ”, but then the religious person never believes what I 
describe.’* 1" In this situation, the strain of language against itself is something 
Wittgenstein acknowledges rather than dissolves. Rather than dismissing what is said on 
the basis of its incoherence, he draws attention to the attempt to speak ethically - the 
sublime nonsense it produces.
Re-thinking the relation between Wittgenstein’s early and late work
Throughout this chapter I have been putting the standard account of the relation 
between Wittgenstein’s early and late work under question. 112 Although I alluded to 
this at times, I did not outline the standard narrative of the relation between the 
Tractatus and Investigations or my divergence from it in detail, because I wanted to let 
my reading of the ethical dimension of Wittgenstein’s vision of language take shape 
independently.
At this stage of my argument, however, I want to contextualise my approach to 
Wittgenstein by broadly aligning it with ideas from the new reading of Wittgenstein 
opened up by Cora Diamond and James Conant. This reading breaks with the traditional 
account of the trajectory of his thought. So in order to understand the significance of 
this break, 1 will first turn to the standard account and discuss it in detail.
In broad terms, the nonsensical remarks of the Tractatus are often thought to gesture 
towards the ineffable truths concerning the foundation of language and the world. The 
aim of the Investigations, by contrast, is to show that this search for foundations is 
confused and to reassure us that the meaning of words and conventions are adequately 
explained by examining their use. In his original edition of Insight and Illusion, for 
example, Hacker suggests the Tractatus advocates a form of realism or a truth- 
conditional theory of meaning that Wittgenstein then seeks to replace with anti-realism 
or an assertibility conditions theory of meaning in the Investigations. Hacker later 
abandons this account in the revised edition of Insight and Illusion, arguing that the
111 Wittgenstein, ‘Lectures on Religious Belief,’ 55.
'121 am in fact borrowing the term ‘standard account’ from Alice Cray’s introduction to The New 
Wittgenstein. She uses it to designate the convention of reading Wittgenstein’s later work as a critique of 
his earlier views (see the detailed outline below). P. M. S. Hacker’s work, which we looked at in chapter
1 exemplifies this broad approach. For further examples see Michael Dummett, The Logical Basis of 
Metaphysics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), chapters 14-15 and Norman Malcolm, 
Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein's Criticism o f his Early Thought (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). By 
using this term, however, I do not want to deny that there are important differences between the authors 
whose work corresponds broadly with the standard account, nor that some early commentators on 
Wittgenstein’s such as Rush Rhees suggest ways of reading Wittgenstein that do not follow the standard 
account.
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Investigations puts forward no general theory of meaning, but rather a ‘non-theoretical 
map’ of language use. Nevertheless, he still believes that Wittgenstein’s ‘non- 
theoretical map' of language use is intended to dispel the metaphysical views expressed 
in the Tractatus along with the profound sense of mystery that surrounds them. In 
broad terms Rorty’s account also follows a similar pattern, for he argues that the later 
Wittgenstein rejects the conception of ethics and logic as something sublime in order to 
embrace the contingency of what we do and say.
Despite these differences, however, all three accounts hold that Wittgenstein’s later 
work is a critique of his earlier work. In a positive sense, they presume that 
Wittgenstein’s aim in the Investigations is to show that ‘the meaning of a word is fixed 
not by an act which serves to connect it to particular features of reality but rather by the 
ways in which we use it -  by its place in the language-game or by its grammar.’113 In a 
negative sense, they presume that the aim of the Investigations is to find strategies that 
show how the forms of our language mislead us into thinking that it is possible to 
transcend the empirical world.
In this narrative relating Wittgenstein’s early and late work, changes in 
Wittgenstein’s view on ethics are taken primarily as the result of his shifting account of 
sense and nonsense. In the Tractatus ethical and logic expressions are nonsensical by 
virtue of their failure to meet the strict definition of factual discourse. However, they are 
to be distinguished from plain nonsense on the basis of their capacity to point towards 
‘ineffable’ truths. In Wittgenstein’s later work, his earlier rigid definition of senseful 
discourse is relaxed. Ethics need no longer be banished to the limits of life and 
language; rather we should shift our focus to the varied ways that ethics forms part of 
our lives. The word nonsense in the Investigations simply designates forms of 
expression that transgress our shared inter-subjective meanings, or which violate the 
ordinary criteria for what we say when. Our ethical beliefs manifest themselves in 
shared practices and forms of life, and so long as ethics abandons the gesture of 
sublimity, it should not be regarded as nonsense.
As we have just seen, Noggle diverges from this narrative by suggesting the dynamic 
of the sublime plays a therapeutic role in the Investigations, but he still maintains a 
central tenet of the account, namely that the aim of Wittgenstein’s later work is to 
critique his earlier ‘truth conditional’ account of meaning.
113 Alice Cray, ‘Introduction,’ The New Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Cray & Rupert Read (London: Routledge, 
2000) ,  2 .
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Imaginatively understanding the speaker of nonsense
In her article ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,’ 
Diamond challenges the above account of the relation between the Tractatus and the 
Investigations. She argues that the Investigations is not a refutation of the Tractatus, but 
that the Tractatus is itself a critique of foundationalism and that this critique is tied to 
the ethical purpose of the book. According to Diamond, readers who take the sentences 
of the Tractatus to point to inexpressible truths, 114 tend not to pay enough attention to 
the frame of the book -  especially its introductory and concluding remarks.
Diamond points out that in the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein writes: ‘Lt]he 
whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said 
at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in 
silence. ’ 115 But then he continues:
[t]hus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather -  not to thought, but 
to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we 
should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to 
think what cannot be thought).
It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on 
the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.116
According to Diamond, the initial remark quoted tells us that there are two realms: the 
realm of things that can be spoken about and the realm that we cannot speak about. The 
implication seems to be that Wittgenstein is going to distinguish between these two 
groups, between ‘what words can reach and what they cannot. ’ 117 However,‘the 
following paragraphs then seem to be meant to get us to question just that picture, to ask 
ourselves whether such a picture is not confused. ’ 118 For although Wittgenstein begins 
the next paragraph by saying that the book’s aim is to draw a limit to thought, he soon 
corrects this view. It is impossible to draw a limit to thought because to do this you 
would have to identify what cannot be thought, to capture what cannot be thought in 
thought. So instead you must draw the limits in language, outline what can be said. As
114 This point of view is first put forward by Elizabeth Anscombe’s book An Introduction to the 
‘Tractatus’ (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1971), but is also held by the majority of traditional readers of 
Wittgenstein including P. M S. Hacker in Insight and Illusion.
115 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 3.
116 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 3-4.
117 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 56.
11S Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 56.
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Diamond writes: ‘[tjhat can be done; the book is going to back up the claim that it can 
be. But once you draw that limit, what there is besides straightforwardly intelligible 
sentences will be bits of plain nonsense.’119
Diamond argues that these remarks give definite instructions about how the 
Tractatus should be read. If we are to take Wittgenstein seriously, she says, then we will 
recognise that metaphysical and ethical attempts to express a view on life as a whole are 
not inadequately formed truths, but straightforward nonsense, logically no different 
from sentences such as ‘going into then' or ‘blubluha.’ Hence, on Diamond’s reading 
we cannot say that the Tractatus tries to resolves the tension between the articulation of 
a happy life and the recognition of its nonsensicality, by claiming that ethical nonsense 
nevertheless points to a higher truth.
This interpretation of the Tractatus appears at first to do away with all notion of 
ethics. Peter Hacker and Marie Me Ginn, for example, have both criticised Diamond’s 
reading for its self-destructiveness.120 Diamond admits that it is at first difficult to see 
how her reading of the Tractatus differs form the non-cognitivism of the logical 
positivists.
Nevertheless she believes that the author of the Tractatus differs from logical 
positivism in an important regard. Unlike the positivists, Wittgenstein is concerned with 
the way that scientific frameworks such as empirical psychology are characterised by ‘a 
will not to be concerned with the ethical.’l2lFor Diamond this will to dismiss the ethical 
does not amount to a refusal to understand the content of ethical claims, for according to 
the Tractatus we cannot understand what is said by any ethical sentence that expresses 
an attitude to life as a whole. Rather Diamond is speaking of a will to disregard the 
person who speaks ethically, the speaker of nonsense. Diamond turns to section 6.54, 
one of the final remarks of the Tractatus and ‘the other part of the frame.’122 Here 
Wittgenstein says:
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands 
me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them —as steps —to 
climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has 
climbed up it.)’
114 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination," 56.
120 For example, speaking about Diamond’s reading of the Tractatus Hacker writes: ‘it was never meant 
to be a working clock, but a self-destructive one designed to explode as soon as wound up." Peter Hacker, 
‘Was he trying to Whistle it?" in The New Wittgenstein, 359-360.
121 Diamond ‘Ethics, Imagination,"88.
122 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination," 56.
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Diamond emphasises what she takes to be the ‘slight but deliberate’ peculiarity of 
phrasing in the passage. 123 She writes:
Wittgenstein says: my propositions serve as elucidations in that whoever understands 
me will recognize them as nonsensical. It is very natural to misremember that 
sentence, to think that Wittgenstein said that his propositions serve as elucidations in 
that whoever understands them, will recognize them as nonsensical. But the sentence 
is meant to strike the reader by its not being that. The sentence fails to be what we 
expect at just that point, and very deliberately. That is, at this significant point in the 
book, Wittgenstein chooses his words to draw attention to a contrast between 
understanding a person and understanding what the person says. If you recognize that 
Wittgenstein’s propositions are nonsense, then you may earlier have thought that you 
understood them, but you did not. In recognizing that they are nonsense, you are 
giving up the idea that there is such a thing as understanding them. What Wittgenstein 
means by calling his propositions nonsense is not that they do not fit into some official 
category of intelligible propositions but that there is at most the illusion of 
understanding them. 124
So while the only strictly correct method is to talk only of the facts, to describe a 
person’s beliefs and experiences in terms of empirical psychology, and then to show 
when someone says something metaphysical that they have failed to give a meaning to 
some sign, ‘the Tractatus...understands its own departure from the only strictly correct 
method to lie in its understanding of those who utter nonsense. ’ 125 Furthermore, in 
Diamond’s view, the Tractatus requires from its readers this same kind of 
understanding. 126 ‘When you understand someone who utters nonsense,’ Diamond 
writes, you are not ‘outside his thought and describing what goes on from the point of 
view of empirical psychology. But, on the other hand, you are not inside his thoughts as 
you are when he makes sense and you understand what he says, because there is no such 
internal understanding. ’ 127 Neither position, in Diamond’s view, enables us to 
understand the speaker of nonsense for there is no inside to his/her thoughts, and from 
the outside, from the point of view of empirical psychology, ‘there is nothing to be seen
123 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 57.
124 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 57.
125 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 65.
126 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 65.
127 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 67.
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that could be called his being in the grip of an illusion that so-and-so, as opposed to his 
being inclined to come out with certain word-constructions. ’ 128
The aim of the Tractatus, Diamond argues, is to invite us to partake in a form of 
understanding different from both of the accounts given above, for in Diamond’s view 
the Tractatus helps its readers to an ‘imaginative understanding’ of the speaker of 
nonsense, not the nonsense itself.121' For although all nonsense is plain nonsense, it is 
still possible to assign nonsense a different function, to put it to different uses. 130
Diamond goes on to contrast the metaphysician who speaks nonsense but believes 
that what they say makes sense, with Wittgenstein, the author of the Tractatus, who 
imaginatively enters into the illusion he is making sense in order to better understand 
the speaker of nonsense.
My point then is that the Tractatus, in its understanding of itself as addressed to those 
who are in the grip of philosophical nonsense, and in its understanding of the kind of 
demands it makes on its readers, supposes a kind of imaginative activity, an exercise 
of the capacity to enter into the talking of nonsense for sense, of the capacity to share 
imaginatively the inclination to think that one is thinking something in it. If I could not 
as it were see your nonsense as sense, imaginatively let myself feel its attractiveness, I 
could not understand you. And that is a very particular use of imagination. 131
There are two aspects of Diamond’s reading I want to highlight here. Firstly, the 
particular notion of understanding Diamond proposes does not amount to a mastery of 
the content of what is said, or the dismissal of the content of what is said. By shifting 
the focus away from what is said, to the relation we adopt towards what is said, 
Diamond draws attention to the kind of imaginative effort required if we are to 
understand what it is to express an attitude to life as a whole or to speak in absolute 
ethical terms. 132 The capacity to feel at once the attraction and the nonsensicality of 
these expressions opens up a space of relation between subjects and within oneself, a 
form of understanding manifest though a willingness to imaginatively respond.
128 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 67.
129 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 72.
130 On page 70 Diamond writes ‘For a sentence that is nonsense to be an elucidatory sentence is entirely a 
matter of features external to it.’
131 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 68.
132 This idea is echoed in the ‘Lecture on Ethics’ where Wittgenstein also discusses what it is to have an 
ethical view on life as a whole and to live with others who have their own outlooks. According to 
Wittgenstein what needs to be understood (in oneself or another), is not the meaning of the outlook but 
the nonsensicality of what we hold most dear - our failures to express this outlook in general terms, 
failures which Wittgenstein regards with the greatest respect. Again, our relation to the speaker of 
nonsense is foregrounded.
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Secondly, it seems to me that this space of relation and the imaginative engagement 
with nonsense it entails pertains not only to the Tractatus but also to Wittgenstein’s 
later explicitly therapeutic project. One might say that early and late Wittgenstein’s 
writing is therapeutic in the sense that he imaginatively enters into the illusion of 
making sense in the hope of better understanding the attractiveness of a nonsensical 
combination of words. This reinforces my previous suggestion that therapy as a form of 
showing through doing has its origins in Wittgenstein’s early work. 133
But nor would it be true to say that Diamond’s account of imaginatively 
understanding the speaker of nonsense is identical to the therapeutic practice of 
imaginative literalism I outlined last chapter. There are two important differences I want 
to focus on here. Firstly, Wittgenstein adopts a far more fluid approach to the relation 
between nonsense and sense in his later work - proposing possible contexts for 
nonsensical combinations of words and inventing everyday scenes for nonsensical 
expressions. Secondly, the notion of picturing acquires a literal cast in his later work 
so, as I suggested last chapter, he responds to the intangible pictures of fantasy 
(including the ‘picture theory of meaning’ proposed in the Tractatus) with a series of 
his own scenic word-illustrations. But in spite of these later developments a certain 
form of therapeutic engagement with the speaker of nonsense can be traced back to the 
Tractatus. So one might ask: is the Tractatus therapeutic in Pears’ sense of the term, so 
that its ethical point of the book is to overcome metaphysical illusions?
Against this, Diamond’s account of the imaginative encounter with the speaker of 
nonsense can be shown to differ from Pears’ in an important regard. She holds that 
overcoming a false imagination is not the only function that Wittgenstein gives to the 
procedure of imaginatively taking nonsense for sense. According to Diamond, whereas 
‘the attractiveness of philosophical sentences will disappear through the kind of self­
understanding that the book aims to lead to in philosophers; the attractiveness of ethical 
sentences will not. But if we understand ourselves, the utterers of ethical nonsense, we 
shall not come out with ethical sentences under the illusion that we are talking sense. ’ 134 
She believes that philosophy as Wittgenstein conceives it in the Tractatus ‘cannot
133 The notion of showing through doing I am referring to here is the imaginative engagement with 
nonsense, however there are other forms of showing through doing that Wittgenstein develops in his later 
work. For example, his detailed descriptions of what we might do with words help give rise to an overall 
vision of language. The following discussion in the body of the text brings together both these two 
therapeutic forms by suggesting that in Wittgenstein’s later work nonsense helps provoke Wittgenstein’s 
aspectival opening to possibilities.
134 Diamond, 'Ethics, Imagination,’ 74.
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survive the recognition that the intentions in it were incompatible with making sense,’135 
whereas when one speaks ethically ‘the nonsensicality of what is said’ sometimes 
‘belongs to the essence of the linguistic intention.’136
Diamond, however, stresses that ethics and philosophy should not be regarded as two 
separate categories of nonsense for there are no different types of nonsense. Rather, they 
are two possible responses to nonsense, two possible ways of contextualising nonsense, 
or two possible intentions within the speaker of nonsense. She suggests that the word 
‘ethics’ might be used to mark this ‘transcendental talk’ as a kind of talk not to be 
mixed up with the talk of science or empirical psychology.137 According to Diamond, 
the self-awareness of the nonsensicality of ethical claims may be indicated by the way 
the speaker contextualises his or her words. For example, in the ‘Lecture on Ethics’ 
Wittgenstein says: 7  am inclined to say that the world is miraculous,’ and 7  find  myself 
wanting to say that I feel safe no matter what.’138
What bearing might this distinction between the transcendental expressions of ethics 
and empirical psychology have on Wittgenstein’s later work?139 For surely in his later 
work his aim is to return ethical words to their everyday use, and to describe the 
practices and forms of life which give our ethical beliefs meaning? In her concluding 
remarks Diamond suggests that the claim that the Investigations intends to put ‘ethics 
back into the world is at best a partial truth.’'40 There is no reason, she suggests, why the 
contrast between ‘transcendental talk’ and empirical psychology should not continue to 
be a concern for Wittgenstein in his later work. His later work simply enables us to see 
this distinction in the context of the other very different ways that ethics also enters into 
our lives. These remarks suggest to me that the ethical aspect of nonsense (the aspect 
that survives dissolution because it can stand being nonsense) might also operate in 
Wittgenstein’s later writings.
t
The kind of self-awareness that Diamond speaks of is shown, for example, in 
W ittgenstein’s 1938 ‘Lectures on Religion’ where he describes the relation between 
himself and a person who believes in the Last Judgement. For while Wittgenstein 
demonstrates that the content of his friend’s beliefs cannot be communicated
135 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 75.
136 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 75.
137 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 85.
138 Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 8.
139 Another important line of thought, pursued earlier in the chapter but not the central focus of my 
comments here, is that expressions such as 7  am inclined to say that the world is miraculous,’ and ‘Ifind 
myself wanting to say that I feel safe no matter what,’ are attempts to express in very general terms the 
vision of language which is later given through Wittgenstein’s aspectival techniques of descriptions.
I4<l Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 89-90.
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meaningfully, the ethical relation between them is nevertheless given in language, in the 
nonsensicality of Wittgenstein’s attempts to articulate their positions, the thrust of 
language against its limits.
A further objection to the view I am proposing could be put forward, for one might 
argue that from the point of view of Wittgenstein’s later writings ethical or religious 
beliefs are meaningful to those people who share the same practices and patterns of life, 
whereas metaphysical utterances describe no form of life, for they are departures from 
the agreements that comprise the human form of life. In Chapter 6 I will address this 
question in detail and tease out the continuities and discontinuities between 
Wittgenstein’s therapeutic encounters, and the encounters he describes between beings 
that are strange to each other by virtue of their way of life. For the moment, however, I 
simply want to emphasise something about Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief. 
Notice that Wittgenstein is not just struggling to articulate his friend’s position, he is 
also struggling to state his own. This suggests two things to me: Firstly, that 
Wittgenstein continues to be concerned with the gap between understanding manifest as 
a way of life, and our struggle to articulate this understanding in general terms. 
Secondly, although it is often said that Wittgenstein writes from within a given practice 
or way of life, these remarks suggest that he is equally concerned with the nonsensical 
attempt to articulate the relation between different forms of life; not just ethical 
meaning, but ethical relationality.
What is therapy?
Although Diamond does not set out to directly explore the nature of the therapy, I 
believe her article has important bearing on this notion. On the one hand, the 
imaginative engagement with the speaker of nonsense that she associates with the 
ethical purpose of the Tractatus might be thought of as a form of therapeutic 
engagement, a forerunner to Wittgenstein’s later therapeutic strategies. But on the other 
hand, she suggests that the distinctions Wittgenstein makes between ethics and 
empirical psychology might continue to operate in ways in his later work. In addition to 
these two ideas I want to propose something further -  that the therapeutic encounter 
with nonsense in the Investigations may be ethical in Diamond’s sense of the term, 
which is to say that the effect of therapy is not to dissolve nonsense but to facilitate an 
opening to it. This open-ended engagement with nonsense is the space of relation, 
reaction and response between beings and within oneself. However by describing ethics
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as a space of relation opened up by the encounter with nonsense, I am also evoking 
something much broader than the therapeutic project of the Investigations and 
Wittgenstein’s other related later writings. For this space of relation is suggested both 
in Wittgenstein’s early ethical remarks, and in his later discussion of the relation 
between people with different beliefs. So the thesis as a whole will attempt to think the 
nonsensical space of relation in three different settings. Currently the main focus is on 
our attempts to express an attitude to life as a whole, but as the thesis progresses I 
intend to think this space of relation more directly in terms of the therapeutic encounter 
outlined in the Investigations. Finally, however, I will move beyond the strict confines 
of the therapeutic relation and branch out into a much broader discussion of the 
encounter between different forms of life. But before developing these themes in detail I 
want to reflect back on the issues raised in this chapter and say a few words about the 
relation between its two halves.
Rethinking the subject
In their own ways both halves of this chapter significantly rethink the notion of the 
subject as the source of meaning. In the first part I speak of the subject as an ethical 
will, whose feelings manifest in language and practice but cannot be pinned down to 
any given psychological state. This non-psychological conception of the subjective 
mood, attitude and feeling may at first seem directly at odds with the second part of the 
chapter where I discuss the imaginative attempt to understand the speaker of nonsense. 
But as I have tried to show, the true focus of this engagement is not the subject per se 
(the ineffable meaning of their words) but rather our capacity to acknowledge, in 
ourselves or in others, the nonsensicality of the attempt to express a vision of life as a 
whole. But even if both halves of the chapter do re-think subjectivity, it remains unclear 
how an opening to nonsense as a space of relation might bear upon an understanding of 
the idea that feeling and vision can be manifest in language and practice. For in the first 
half of this chapter I propose a vision of language that, from the point of view of the 
second half, is nonsensical. How then do the two halves of the chapter fit together? 
What is the relation between the liberating feelings of wonder and safety that I associate 
with Wittgenstein's vision of language and sublime nonsense on the other? Why might 
an opening to nonsense testify to the miracle that language exists?
In the following section I will respond to these questions with some speculative 
remarks that I then intend to develop in detail in chapters 5 and 6. To help set the scene
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for these later chapters I will briefly turn to Agamben, a reader of Wittgenstein who 
shares some of the concerns I have just laid out.
Nonsense and the miracle of language
In his book of collected essays Potentialities, Agamben draws on the early 
Wittgenstein’s thesis that we cannot communicate the existence of language 
propositionally, but can only let it be ‘shown. ’ 141 The essays in Agamben’s book are 
each reflections on the question: ‘What does it mean for a thing to be ‘expressible,’ for a 
thing to exist in the mode of something that can be said?’142and the related question: 
‘What does it mean to see and to expose the limits of language? ’ 143 In Potentialities 
Agamben searches for the ‘redemption of language’: ‘a discourse that, without being a 
metalanguage or sinking into the unsayable, says language itself and exposes its 
limits. ’ 144 In this sense he brings together the ethical experiences of wonder and safety 
described by Wittgenstein with the suggestion that the miracle that language exists 
(rather than an inquiry into what exists) is what is capable of saving us, of making us 
safe. In Daniel Heller-Roazen’s introduction to the book he writes that Agamben is not 
supposing something ‘unsayable’ or ‘ineffable . . . but, rather, an event presupposed in 
every utterance, a factum linguae to which all actual speech incessantly, necessarily 
bears witness.’14^ So we might ask whether Wittgenstein’s concern is also with this 
‘event’ of language?
The idea that the dimension of showing does not point to an ineffable truth beyond 
language but directs us to the nonsensicality of the ethical expression itself is already 
suggested by Diamond’s reading of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein makes the same point in 
his ‘Lecture on Ethics’: T see now that these nonsensical expressions were not 
nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their 
nonsensicality was their very essence. ’ 146 Whereas Kant sees the failure of the 
imagination in the experience of the sublime as a testimony to reason’s superior 
capacity, Wittgenstein’s interest lies with the nonsensical products of imagination’s 
failure, with our pictures of the unimaginable. In the Investigations Wittgenstein’s
141 See page 22 of Daniel Heller-Roazen’s introduction to Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected 
Essays in Philosophy, ed. & trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
142 Heller-Roazen, ‘Introduction,’ 10.
143 Giorgio Agamben, ‘The Idea of Language,’ Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. & 
trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 46.
144 Agamben, ‘The Idea of Language,’ 46.
143 Heller-Roazen ‘Introduction,’ 4.
14(1 Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 11.
88
picture of the unimaginable is the too much dimension of meaning. In the Tractatus, 
Notebooks and ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ the unimaginable is pictured as a tautology. The 
examples Wittgenstein gives in his lecture are - ‘the experience of feeling absolutely 
safe’ (LE 8) and ‘the experience of seeing the world as a miracle.’ (LE 11) According to 
Agamben, ‘The experience of a tautology -  that is, a proposition that is impenetrable to 
truth conditions on account of always being true (“the sky is blue or it is not blue”) has 
its correlate . . .  in the experience of a thing’s capacity to be true and at the same time 
not be true.’147 That is, in the experience of a thing’s ‘potentiality,’ which is also ‘the 
domain of human freedom.’I4* Heller- Roazen writes of Agamben’s conception of 
potentiality: ‘something can be capable of something else only because it is originally 
capable of its own incapacity, and it is precisely the relation to an incapacity that, 
according to Agamben, constitutes the essence of all potentiality’144 Agamben’s remarks 
suggest that nonsense is valuable because it marks the ‘incapacity’ of everything we are 
capable of: ‘[o]nly because it can say nothing is language truly “sayable.” ’150 Put in 
Wittgensteinian terms, these remarks imply that the correlate the nonsensical ethical 
tautologies Wittgenstein describes is an aspectival opening of possibility.
Although I do not want to argue that Agamben's notion of the ‘potentiality’ matches 
W ittgenstein’s conception of possibilities in this thesis, I believe that Agamben’s 
remarks help to raise an important question in the context of Wittgenstein’s work. In 
spite of the changes in W ittgenstein’s definition of what counts as sense, could 
nonsense maintain a certain singularity of purpose: that is, to testify to the miracle of 
language by opening us to the “ ‘possibilities” of phenomena’?151
As I have argued in this chapter, Wittgenstein’s early writings lead us to think that 
nonsense might play such a role. But I also believe that the capacity of nonsense to 
testify to the possibilities of life only comes to full fruition in his later writings. In the 
next three chapters I will bring my previous account of W ittgenstein’s imaginative 
strategies and the ethical dimension of his thought, to bear on an understanding of 
therapy as it operates in Wittgenstein’s later work. To further explore the open-ended 
nature of the therapeutic encounter with nonsense I will need to consider its effects 
beyond the dissolution of fantasy outlined by Pears and Noggle. To do so, I will return
147 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Bartleby, or on Contingency,’ Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. 
& trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 261.
I4X Agamben, ‘Bartleby, or on Contingency,’ 261.
144 Heller-Roazen ‘Introduction,’ 16.
150 Heller-Roazen ‘Introduction,’ 18-19.
151 Wittgenstein, Investigations, 90.
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to the comparison I made at the start of this thesis between Wittgenstein and 
deconstruction.
Chapter Three
*
«'S
'v
4
• *
v  / 
, • .■ y . \
y*t
( ©  ' / ® .V, / X
,  A / * '  A  ; 
0 • > L-'~ r 
v / 1 "
V .  * \
wy f . i  .
- vc  /
- ' S  • L '  '
C
r
< t 0  y
1 ' - ^ N ^ W ^ V V y
• :■: % ^  y < * > v - * y  . . v .
- y 1 y-  v*~ _ / . y  J-x<£y v°J.J Ac ;f:f V w /y
J  V* - f - 7 W W.-V ?■ V x* /:üy Y- • •• *■v  i ' :■
<X - t  , y '  y y
5 t  . -<r /  *4 ,
1  ^ \\^ys ®
/  y*  ^ , r y r ■ _• /, / - y /  //©/©A, v
yi';" fyy /.. Vjy-/.v .‘y - ' ' , t / /VO \0V' '
‘V
„' * s,. •; ■;•' - , ° ^ V yY r%  I'O
;  y ' y-^Sy*:T>’ %y  vv5 w-v>. .  1 t y ’x  '<‘e «'j' y .
. •• ^  v ,r
- f 
y  >•M 
y  f Vv *-y/-4 yy -. v
y y vV «?■ /
V /
; \  y - .
v\ .
V “  .O' V- .‘VVA
; y y . - y -
V.
\
y*
j ' \  *- r v ■ s  ^ ix^vV-^~i T/ 
, y y y  y < / ; y - % t ( /
,A
Deconstruction & Therapy
91
Chapter 3
Deconstruction and Therapy
Introduction
In Chapter 2 I argued that for Wittgenstein our ethical orientation to life cannot be 
summed up as a proposition or substantive thesis, however it might be shown through 
the practical action of therapy. As Diamond suggests, the Tractatus does not treat its 
nonsense sentences as ineffable truths but therapeutically engages with nonsense in 
order to explore the attraction of claims about life as a whole. However, in the context 
of Wittgenstein’s later work, which is avowedly therapeutic, a different question might 
be raised: do the therapeutic procedures of the Investigations extend beyond the 
dissolution of localised conceptual confusions? Do they also show, through practical 
means, an attitude to life as a whole? In the previous chapters I sketched a response to 
this question. I argued that the practical activities of the Investigations liberate the 
feelings of wonder and safety from the demand for final explanation - inaugurating a 
new vision of life. I also suggested that this transformation comes about through an 
opening to, rather than a closing off from nonsense.
In this chapter I will develop my account of Wittgenstein’s vision of language 
further. To do so I will return to the comparison I made in Chapter 1 between 
Wittgenstein and Derrida. Deconstruction, in my view, might also be thought of as a 
form of showing through doing, for the general account of the nature of language that it 
provides is itself the product of rhetorical strategies and methods of reading, rather than 
straightforward general theoretical argument. So in this chapter I will ask: how does 
Derrida’s work inform an understanding of Wittgenstein’s vision of language and life? 
Is the therapeutic orientation of the Investigations deconstructive?
In Chapter 1 I looked at Pears’ argument that the strategies of imagination and 
literalism in Philosophical Investigations are a form of deconstructive therapy. By 
deconstruction Pears means an activity that takes philosophy ‘to pieces’ with a
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particular purpose in mind.1 The philosophical accounts at stake in Pears’ article are the 
ideal of private meaning and the unity of the subject. According to Pears the purpose of 
Wittgenstein’s deconstruction is ultimately therapeutic - to show the philosopher that 
the pieces that make up his or her account do not work together as he or intended but 
rather are based on an ‘imaginative misunderstanding.’2 3Although Pears does not 
directly compare the ‘deconstructive’ procedure he locates in Wittgenstein’s work to 
deconstruction as conceived by Derrida, his remarks imply a certain allegiance between 
Wittgenstein and deconstruction’s most famous proponent.
A close relation between the later Wittgenstein and the early writings of Derrida is 
argued for in two book length studies: Henry Staten’s Wittgenstein and Derrida and 
Simon Glendinning’s On Being with Others. ' As I argued in Chapter 1, a careful 
examination of the individual rhetorical strategies practiced by Wittgenstein and 
Derrida reveals not only ties but also discontinuities between them. There is a certain 
tension between deconstruction as Derrida conceives of it, and some of Wittgenstein’s 
therapeutic strategies; in particular his appeal to the everyday connotations of academic 
language, his determination to ‘spell out’ philosophical images, his concern for the 
existential dimension of metaphysics and his refusal to articulate his position in general 
theoretical terms. Stanley Cavell has observed that although there are important 
similarities between Wittgenstein's notion of the ‘ordinary’ and Derrida’s conception of 
‘writing,’ there is a ‘systematic turning’ that makes it difficult to grasp, from within the 
vocabulary of one, the sense and motivation of the other. ‘Derrida sees ordinary 
language as an “effect” of a general writing, which is its possibility, and Wittgenstein 
sees metaphysics as an effect of ordinary language, needing its words but denying their 
shared criteria.’4 This chapter is a working through of the ‘systematic turning’ between 
the two authors.
To begin with I will outline Staten and Glendinning’s characterisation of 
Wittgenstein as a deconstructionist, and then turn to the counter argument put forward 
by Martin Stone: that Wittgenstein gives voice to deconstruction as part of a therapeutic 
practice that ultimately renders deconstruction unappealing. I will argue that
1 David Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination: Wittgenstein’s Deconstruction of Traditional Philosophy,’ 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies vol. 10, no.l (2002): 3.
2 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ p.4.
3 My discussion will focus on texts from Derrida’s early classical deconstructive period that influence 
Staten and Glendinning’s readings. See Henry Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1985) and Simon Glendinning, On Being with Others: Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein, 
(London: Routledge, 1998).
4 Stanley Cavell, A Pitch for Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1994), 63. Cavell is referring to Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature, Event, Context,’ Limited Inc,
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 19.
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Wittgenstein has far stronger affinities with deconstruction that Stone recognises, but 
that the value of Stone’s account is that it draws attention to some of the particularities 
of Wittgenstein’s style. The challenge for a deconstructive reading of Wittgenstein, 
however, is to articulate the affinities between Wittgenstein and Derrida without 
assimilating their distinctive rhetorical techniques. I will argue that Glendinning’s work 
is of particular interest in this regard, for he draws on Wittgenstein’s work to re-think 
the deconstructive moment, but I will also raise some difficulties with both Stone and 
Glendinning’s readings.
As the above account suggests, this chapter addresses readings of Wittgenstein as a 
critic or as a practitioner of deconstruction rather that proposing a comprehensive 
reading of Derrida’s project. So although I will use some key ideas from Derrida’s 
thought to help explicate my reading of Wittgenstein, and although I will draw on 
Wittgenstein to critique certain aspects of deconstruction, the main aim of my 
comparative discussion is to explore the possibilities opened up by Wittgenstein’s 
particular rhetorical practice.
Derrida’s account of deconstruction
The deconstructive method shows that words are a priori repeatable and hence 
always possible to mimic. The central target of deconstruction is the ‘metaphysics of 
presence:’5 the idealisation of self-present meaning such that ‘ univocity’ becomes the 
‘telos of language.’6 Deconstruction, as Derrida characterises it, is not an empirical 
claim about our use of language - for example, the claim that concepts are usually 
neither ideal nor pure;7 rather it attempts to ‘to account for the necessary or structural 
possibilities of the functioning of any language.’8 In Chapter 1 I looked briefly at 
Derrida’s argument, in ‘White Mythology,’ that concepts are both generated and undone 
by a more general metaphorical play. Now I will turn to Limited Inc, where Derrida 
proposes a similar dynamic in the context of the term writing. I will focus on Limited 
Inc, because all three theorists I go on to consider relate this text to Wittgenstein’s work.
5 See for example Derrida, ‘Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language,’ Margins 
of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 157-158.
(1 Jacques Derrida ‘White Mythology,’ Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 247.
7 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc, trans. Samuel Weber (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 
116-117
K Glendinning, On Being with Others, p.79.
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In ‘Signature, Event, Context’ the opening essay of Limited Inc, Derrida replaces 
what he takes to be the traditional philosophical account of the task of writing - the 
representation of presence - with an alternate account. He emphasises the capacity of 
writing to disengage itself from any given context, and ‘graft’ itself into new situations. 
Writing, on this view, is always able to function in the absence of its author and its 
intended receiver.
A writing that is not structurally readable -  iterable -  beyond the death of the 
addressee would not be writing. . . . Imagine a writing whose code would be so 
idiomatic as to be established and known, as secret cipher, by only two ‘subjects.’ 
Could we maintain that, following the death of the receiver, or even of both partners, 
the mark left by one of them is still writing? Yes, to the extent that, organized by a 
code, even an unknown and non-linguistic one, it is constituted in its identity as a 
mark by its iterability, in the absence of such and such a person, and hence ultimately 
of every empirically determined ‘subject.’ This implies that there is no such thing as a 
code -  organon of iterability -  which could be structurally secret.4
Derrida’s claim is that the notion of writing he outlines does not just describe written 
text but also other forms of communication including speech, which is often taken as 
the site of self present meaning. He extends the boundaries of writing to include ‘the 
totality of “experience” in so far as it is inseparable from this field of the mark, which is 
to say, from the network of effacement and of difference.’ According to Derrida, ‘[t]he 
possibility of repeating and thus of identifying the marks is implicit in every code, 
making it into a network [une grille] that is communicable, transmittable, decipherable, 
iterable for a third, and hence for every possible user in general. ’ 10 Writing, in Derrida’s 
view is ‘an iterative structure, cut off from all absolute responsibility, from 
consciousness as the ultimate authority, orphaned and separated at birth from the 
assistance of its father. ’ * 11 For Derrida this generalisation of writing amounts to the claim 
that misunderstandings and new readings are a necessary possibility of all texts. 12 As 
Glendinning writes in On Being With Others: ‘In its most clearly critical aspect, this 
approach aims to show that the condition of possibility for conceptual identity is at the
9 Derrida, ‘Signature, Event, Context,’ 7-8. 
1(1 Derrida, ‘Signature, Event, Context,’ 7-8.
11 Derrida, ‘Signature, Event, Context,’ 7-8.
12 Derrida, Limited Inc, 57.
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same time the condition of impossibility of the rigorous unity required by the ideal of 
conceptual exactness.’13
Before beginning my discussion of the relation between Wittgenstein and Derrida’s 
work in detail, I want to draw attention to the affinity between Derrida’s insistence that 
there could be no such thing as a ‘structurally secret’ code, and Wittgenstein’s critique 
of a truly private language. In the discussion that follows, all theorists agree that 
Wittgenstein and Derrida each challenge the ideal of self-present meaning. The dispute, 
as we will see, concerns the consequences of this challenge, the vision of life and 
language that follows.
Staten’s reading of Wittgenstein as a ‘deconstructionist’
The first major study to argue that Wittgenstein practices a form of deconstruction in 
the Investigations was Henry Staten's 1985 book Wittgenstein and Derrida. In his book 
Staten argues that there are two ‘axes’ to Wittgenstein’s later work, a deconstructive or 
‘interpretivist’ ‘axis’ and a normalising ‘axis’ that promises to bring an ‘end to 
interpretation’14 by returning words ‘home.’ 15 By identifying two axes, Staten hopes to 
do justice to the multifaceted nature of Wittgenstein’s writing, and point out some of its 
internal tensions. Staten associates the deconstructive axis with Wittgenstein’s open- 
ended style of thought, his insistence that rules are subject to contingency and that 
meaning is never fixed, and his critique of the fantasy of a truly private language. He 
associates the normalising access with Wittgenstein’s appeal to the conventions of 
everyday life and with his suggestion a certain agreement in forms of life is what makes 
communication possible.
Staten links this normalising axis of Wittgenstein’s thought to the work of Charles 
Altieri. According to Altieri, Wittgenstein should be read as a critic of deconstruction 
because his ‘project’ entails ‘a “normalization” of philosophical language, a return to 
“real life,” a dissolving of fruitless and misguided speculation by a recognition of how 
things really are.’16 Staten accepts that such a reading is ‘well informed, consistent, and, 
as far as it goes, accurate . . .  yet we perceive the limits of this reading when we find 
Altieri calling ‘forms of life’ the ‘irreducible ontological base’ of Wittgenstein’s
l3Glendinning, On Being with Others, 79. See also Derrida, ‘Signature, Event, Context,’ 19-20.
14 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 74-75.
15 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edition, ed. G. E. M Anscombe and R. Rhees, 
trans. G.E.M Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1958), §116.
If> Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 75.
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investigations.’17 He goes on to ask: ‘Is there any more thoroughly metaphysical
concept than this?’18 In Staten’s view, however, the metaphysical presumption of 
Altieri’s account is challenged by the deconstructive axis of Wittgenstein’s thought.19
To help make his case, he draws attention to those passages in Wittgenstein that 
stress the deceptive side to ordinary language. For example, the tendency of ‘surface 
grammar’ to make certain misleading analogies, certain fantasy-pictures appear seem 
natural to us.20 In Staten’s view, ‘it is the normality, the at- homeness of ordinary 
language—to which we are supposedly to be returned by Wittgenstein—that creates the 
blindness, the unconsciousness of distinctions.’21 He concludes that,‘[ tjhere is a 
profound complicity between normality, between “ordinary language,” and 
philosophy.’22
In the face of this complicity, Staten believes that the deconstructive axis of 
Wittgenstein’s thought reminds us of the contingency of language, its openness to new 
interpretations. His argument is that the metaphysical tendencies of Wittgenstein’s 
thought, and by this he means Wittgenstein’s appeal to ordinary language and to the 
agreements in language and life that make meaning possible, are continually 
‘destabilized’ from within the text.23 For example in sections 193 and 194 of the 
Investigations, Wittgenstein contrasts a real machine, in which there may always be a 
‘distortion of the parts’ with a ‘machine-as-symbol,’ in which no distortion seems 
possible. According to Staten: ‘ [t]he possibility of a particular movement as given in the 
diagram of the machine or ideal machine seems absolute and immutable, whereas an 
actual machine is subject to accidents.’24 Staten continues: ‘Wittgenstein wants us to 
stop thinking of the operation of rules on the model of the machine-as-diagram and 
thing, rather, in terms of something actual that is subject to contingency, to which 
accidents may happen. To think an essential law of contingency, as Derrida does is to 
generalize as a “grammatical rule” the principles of the kind of critique that 
Wittgenstein here instantiates.’23 Although Wittgenstein does not explicitly formulate a
17 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 75. Staten is quoting Charles Altieri, ‘Wittgenstein on Consciousness 
and Language: A challenge to Derridian Literary Theory,’ Modern Language Notes vol. 91, no. 6 
(December 1976): 1409.
18 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 75.
19 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 75.
20 Wittgenstein, Investigation, §664.
21 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 76-77.
22 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 76.
23 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 75.
24 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 18.
23 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 18.
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general rule of contingency, Staten believes that such a rule can unproblematically be 
extracted from the remarks and examples that make up his later writing.
But what of the ‘systematic turning’ between Wittgenstein and Derrida? In what 
sense are their vocabularies distinctive or even unassimilable? In the introduction to 
Wittgenstein and Derrida, Staten acknowledges that there are stylistic differences 
between the two authors. He cites Derrida’s careful reading of texts from the history of 
philosophy and Wittgenstein’s scorn for much of academic tradition. According to 
Staten, deconstruction ‘makes sense only in relation to philosophy, to what, following 
Derrida, I will call “the text of philosophy,” treating the claim of philosophical works 
since Plato as “one great discourse” to be read and interpreted. ’ 26 This, he admits, raises 
problems for a comparative account of Wittgenstein and Derrida for Wittgenstein 
refuses to draw on the technical language of philosophy or to read its texts in close 
detail.27 The disadvantage of this, according to Staten is that Wittgenstein can only 
address the problems of philosophy in their most general and abstract form. ‘Whereas 
Wittgenstein's style of deconstruction erases from its surface its relation to, and 
dependence upon the parent language,’ Derrida traces this dependence in great detail 
and outlines his own ‘deviations’ against its ‘background. ’28 For Derrida,‘the new 
threads’ of deconstructive thought, ‘must be twisted into the old ones with the tightness 
appropriate to philosophical textuality. ’29 He ties Wittgenstein’s aversion to academia to 
the moments in the Investigations where Wittgenstein tries to escape the tradition of 
philosophy by appealing to ordinary language; an escape that is impossible from 
Derrida’s point of view. The danger of Wittgenstein’s work, according to Staten, is that 
in its false hope of final escape from the history of philosophy it falls prey to a form of 
‘historical amnesia’ and ends up perpetuating the metaphysics it is trying to critique.30 
Staten’s suggestion is that Derrida’s emphasis on the way that deconstruction is linked 
to the history of philosophy could be taken as an antidote to those parts of the 
Investigations where Wittgenstein calls for complete liberation from metaphysics. 
Notice that Staten treats these discrepancies as part of the ‘normalising axis’ of
26 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 2. Staten is quoting Jacques Derrida, ‘The Supplement of Copula: 
Philosophy before Linguistics,’ Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), 177.
27 There are some notable exceptions. For example, he draws on the work of Arthur Schopenhauer in his 
early writing, and he begins the Investigations with a detailed discussion of Augustine’s recollection of 
learning language in his Confessions.
2X Staten Wittgenstein and Derrida, 3.
27 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 2.
30 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 2.
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Wittgenstein’s thought - an axis that he believes can be countered by Wittgenstein’s 
deconstructive ‘axis,’ with some extra help from Derrida.
On the other hand, Staten suggests, Derrida is at risk of perpetuating metaphysics for 
quite the opposite reason, for his own writing sometimes so closely resembles the 
language of metaphysics that it is difficult to distinguish the two. According to Staten: 
‘Deconstruction, in order to remain deconstruction, must be recursively applied to itself. 
This is difficult, perhaps impossible, to do unless we have alternative ways of going 
about it... So it is essential that Derrida and Wittgenstein not be too close together. A 
mesmerising style, like a Medusa’s head, will turn us to stone if we stare at it too 
long. ’ 31 For this reason Staten argues that Wittgenstein’s attention to the details of 
ordinary language can provide an important counterpoint to Derrida’s detailed 
utilisation of the language of metaphysics. Staten concludes that ‘we can use 
Wittgenstein’s language to remind ourselves of how much there is to be suspicious of in 
the metaphysical tendencies of Derrida’s style. ’32 But then he adds: ‘ Not that Derrida 
ever succumbs to these tendencies, but there are many traps in his style for the unwary 
reader. ,33
Staten says that his book does not attempt to assimilate Wittgenstein and Derrida, but 
is an effort to allow their two related perspectives to co-exist and interact, so that 
ultimately no single deconstructive practice comes to dominate. But then Staten adds an 
after thought that goes against the general flow of his comments: it is the ‘unwary 
reader’ (rather than Derrida himself) who falls prey to the metaphysical ‘traps’ inherent 
in Derrida’s writing style.34 What should we make of Staten’s assertion that Derrida is 
protected by a kind of authorial infallibility, so that responsibility for the metaphysical 
tendencies of deconstruction lies entirely with the foolish reader? This seems an odd 
remark given Derrida’s insistence that a text’s meaning is determined neither by its 
author’s intentions nor its reader’s intentions. Nevertheless in the context of Staten’s 
book, his remark functions to re-establish the authority of Derridian deconstruction. For 
as Staten tells us there are two axes in Wittgenstein’s work -  a deconstructive voice and
31 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 27.
32 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 3.
33 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 3. My emphasis.
34 In Hipparchia’s Choice, Le Doeuff criticizes both the idea that the authority to determine a text’s 
meaning lies entirely with the author, and the idea that it lies entirely with the reader, who unmasks the 
philosophical ‘unthought.’ See Michele Le Doeuff, Hipparchia’s Choice: an Essay Concerning Women, 
Philosophy, etc, trans. Trista Selous (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 166.
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a normalising voice -  whereas in Derrida’s work there is only one axis, the 
deconstructive one, all else should be dismissed as ‘traps’ for the ‘unwary reader. ’ 35
In The Philosophical Imaginary, Michele Le Dceuff remarks that when texts make 
passing comments that go against the general movement of their ideas, more is often 
entailed than a small inconsistency. The effect of this rhetorical gesture can be to down 
play the full implications of the text’s argument.36 This often happens when there is a 
discrepancy between what the text can justifiably argue and the fantasy of possessing a 
general authority. 37 Wittgenstein and Derrida’s different brands of deconstruction may 
limit each other, Staten suggests, only in so far as deconstruction, in general, is 
recognised as the position they both adopt and the necessary alternative to metaphysics. 
Indeed in Wittgenstein and Derrida, Staten does not consider in any seriousness 
whether Wittgenstein’s work might contain a critique of the generalising aspects of 
deconstruction. 38
In summary, while I think Staten is right to point out that there is a certain 
normalising strain in some of Wittgenstein’s remarks, I believe that to reduce 
Wittgenstein’s appeals to everyday life to a normalising axis is to miss the specificity of 
Wittgenstein’s form of thought. Although Staten’s aim in posing the two axes is to 
acknowledge the heterogeneity of Wittgenstein’s later thought, I believe that he does so 
in a way that ultimately misses the originality of Wittgenstein’s account of the ordinary.
Glendinning on Wittgenstein as a ‘deconstructionist’
Before turning to Stone’s reading of Wittgenstein as a critic of deconstruction, I want to 
discuss an even stronger assertion of the allegiance between Wittgenstein’s 
Investigations and deconstruction, made by Simon Glendinning in his book On Being 
With Others. Like Staten, Glendinning takes Wittgenstein to be practicing a form of
35 But if neither the author nor the reader is entirely responsible (as Derrida in fact insists), must all 
thought of responsibility be abandoned? As we will later see, a third way to conceive of responsibility 
might be to give up the task of recreating the intention of the author or reader and focus on the textual 
effects of a given discourse.
36 See Michele Le Doeuff, ‘Preface: The Shameful face of Philosophy’ and ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas’ 
in The Philosophical Imaginary, trans. Colin Gordon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).
37 According to Le Dceuff, philosophy’s attempt to claim a general authority is often easy to challenge 
when it is argued for explicitly. This is why the territorial claims of a system of thought are often asserted 
at the imaginary level of the text, through passing comments or vivid images which can avoid careful 
scrutiny from the reader.
3X However, this is not true of Staten’s insightful article ‘Wittgenstein and the intricate evasions of “is,”’ 
in the Wittgenstein and Literary Theory Special edition of New Literary History vol. 19 no. 2, (1988). 
Staten’s article discusses how a Wittgensteinian style of deconstruction poses a challenge to various 
generalizations implicit in Derrida’s work.
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deconstruction in the Investigations, but unlike Staten, Glendinning does not postulate a 
second ‘normalising axis’ to Wittgenstein’s thought. Rather he argues that the central 
purpose of Wittgenstein’s later writing is deconstructive. Glendinning is able to make 
this much stronger claim for two reasons.
Firstly, Glendinning argues that differences in style and focus between the two 
authors are underwritten by much stronger similarities. According to Glendinning both 
Wittgenstein and Derrida aim to identify ‘the basic structural figure which characterises 
the tradition as such. ’39 Wittgenstein's technique is to show how philosophy in its most 
abstract and general form might emerge from everyday life and language and Derrida's 
technique is to identify, through his reading of the history of philosophy, an underlying 
discourse of metaphysics which underpins not only the philosophical genre of writing 
but Western culture. In this discourse or ‘white mythology’: ‘[a] noun is proper when it 
has but a single sense. Better, it is only in this case that it is properly a noun. Univocity 
is the essence, or . . . the telos of language. ’40 According to Derrida: ‘[ n]o philosophy, 
as such, has ever renounced this Aristotelian ideal. This ideal is philosophy. ’41 
Glendinning calls the philosophical search for a pure and unequivocal meaning the 
‘ideal of conceptual exactness,’ and he argues that, like Derrida, Wittgenstein treats this 
ideal as ‘the archon of philosophy.’4" Hence for Glendinning the central feature of 
deconstruction is not, as Staten sometimes suggests, an engagement with the historical 
text of philosophy per se, but rather the singular ideal that philosophy emblemises.
As Glendinning points out, his reading of Wittgenstein differs from G. P. Baker and 
P. M. S. Hacker’s proposal that Wittgenstein’s targets are the various manifestations of 
the ‘Augustinian picture’ of language.43 According to Baker and Hacker this picture is 
first described by Saint Augustine at the start of the Investigations: ‘the individual 
words of a language are names of objects and sentences are combinations of names. ’44 
Put this way, Baker and Hacker’s account sounds similar to Glendinning’s, however 
Baker and Hacker argue that this simple version of the ‘Augustinian picture’ gives 
rise to an expansive ‘Urbild,’ which effects ‘vast ranges of philosophical thought in a 
multitude of different and frequently unrecognised ways. ’45 If Baker and Hacker turn 
out to be correct in their suggestion that Wittgenstein has no single definition of
39 Glendinning, On Being with Others, 85.
4(1 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 1982, 247
41 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 1982, 247
42 Glendinning, On Being with Others, 89.
43 G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Analytic Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations:
Wittgenstein: Meaning and Understanding, vol. 1. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 33.
44 Baker and Hacker, Analytic Commentary, 33.
4:1 Baker and Hacker, Analytic Commentary, 60.
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philosophy as its target, then Glendinning’s close comparison of Wittgenstein and 
Derrida would look less plausible. As Glendinning admits: ‘When philosophy is 
conceived as a “family of accounts” that can grow out of this sprawling “Urbild” we 
certainly do not wish to say of any particular ideal of traditional philosophy, as Derrida 
does, “this ideal is philosophy. ’” 46
According to Glendinning, both Wittgenstein and Derrida show that the ‘ideal of 
conceptual exactness’ is not only prevalent in language - it is quite normal. To help 
make his point he draws on Staten’s insistence that for Wittgenstein it is precisely 
because we tend to ‘obey the rule blindly,’ that is the rule seems natural to us, and we 
miss the actual ‘play’ of language.47 According to Staten, ‘ normality is the necessary 
background against which it would be possible to think the essence.’4S Glendinning 
concludes that the ‘automatism’ of normal language use, our tendency to speak 
mechanically, without thinking, ‘connects us all -  ‘philosophers’ or not -  to the dream 
of our language that is the desire for ideal conceptual exactness. ’49
Glendinning’s reading differs from Staten’s, however, in an important regard. For 
while Staten emphasises the misleading dimension of ordinary language and interprets 
Wittgenstein’s appeal of ordinary criteria as re-instantiation of the ‘metaphysics of 
presence,’ Glendinning recognises the duel function of ordinary language in 
Wittgenstein’s work -  both the source of the ‘ideal of conceptual exactness’ and the 
resource that might unsettle this ideal.50 When Wittgenstein appeals to ordinary criteria, 
Glendinning argues, he is not reinstating an ‘irreducible ontological base’; rather he 
demonstrates that although our ordinary practices require ‘no deeper explanation’51 they 
also cannot ‘stop up all the cracks. ’ 52 Hence Wittgenstein’s account of ordinary 
language shows that the ‘automatism’ of language is without foundation and that 
‘something like “a new decision”. . . is always called for on each occasion of the 
employment of a concept-word. ’53 The ‘new decision’ need not be made consciously, 
however, it can be as simple as ‘opening one’s mouth to speak or putting the pen to
46 Glendinning, On Being with Others, 87. Glendinning’s emphasis.
47 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §219.
48 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 79. Staten’s emphasis.
44 Glendinning, On Being with Others, 88. Glendinning is referring to Staten’s account of the 
‘automatism’ of language. Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 79.
50 Although Glendinning does not remark on this, his account of the function of the ordinary in 
Wittgenstein’s work closely relates to Cavell’s point, that for Wittgenstein the ordinary is both the source 
of illusion, and the material for our redemption. Cavell, however stresses the distinctiveness of 
Wittgenstein’s insistence that the ordinary has this dual function.
51 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §209.
52 Glendinning, On Being with Others, 100.
53 Glendinning, On Being with Others, 100. See Wittgenstein’s Investigations §186 and Derrida’s Limited 
Inc, 116.
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paper. ’ 54 It is only because ‘my action (leap) exceeds the calculable’ that it ‘can open 
the space in which such considerations are possible. ’ 55 On this basis, Glendinning 
concludes Wittgenstein’s approach, like Derrida’s, ‘aims to show that the condition of 
possibility for conceptual identity is at the same time the condition of impossibility of 
the rigorous unity required by the idea of conceptual exactness. ’ 56
Glendinning makes a stronger claim than Staten when he argues that Wittgenstein’s 
appeal to the ordinary is part of the deconstructive movement. However, the importance 
of Glendinning’s reading is that he recognises the duel function that everyday language 
plays in Wittgenstein’s work - both the source of delusion and the resource for 
transfiguration. Later in this chapter I will return to Glendinning’s reading of 
Wittgenstein, but for the moment I will turn to Stone’s reading of Wittgenstein as a 
critic of deconstruction.
Stone: Wittgenstein’s therapeutic critique of Deconstruction
In his article ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction’ Martin Stone challenges the allegiance 
of Wittgenstein and Derrida's project and ultimately draws on the Investigations to 
question the appeal of deconstruction. 57 According to Stone, Wittgenstein shows that by 
attempting to critique metaphysics, deconstruction perpetuates the ‘idol’ that it hopes to 
destroy. 58 The basis of Stone’s argument is that Wittgenstein’s therapeutic practice is 
intended to make any point of view on language as a whole, including a deconstructive 
point of view, unattractive.
To understand the extent of the disagreement that Stone finds between Wittgenstein 
and Derrida we must first look at the points he believes that they share in common. 
According to Stone, they ‘both take metaphysical philosophy as their primary target’ 
and locate in metaphysics the ‘suspect notion of the mental self presence of meanings. ’ 59 
They are both critical of the way metaphysics ‘bracket's off’ the mind from language
34 Glendinning, On Being with Others, 102.
55 Glendinning, On Being with Others, 102.
56 Glendinning, On Being with Others, 79. Glendinning’s emphasis.
37 Martin Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ The New Wittgenstein, (London: Routledge, 2000). 
Stone mentions both Glendinning and Staten’s work in his characterization of the deconstructive reading 
of Wittgenstein.
38 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Big typescript sections 86-93’ in Philosophical Occasionsl912-1951, ed. J. 
Klagge and A. Nordmann (Indianapolis, Hackett, 1993), §88. The full quote is: ‘All that philosophy can 
do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one -  for instance as in “absence of an idol.’”
59 Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 84.
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and the world in order to identify an ideal and exact concept of meaning.60 Stone also 
acknowledges that some of the comments in the Investigations have a deconstructive 
feel because they draw attention to the way that the meaning of a word is open to 
interpretation.
As we have seen, both Stone and Glendinning draw from Wittgenstein’s collected 
remarks two general theses that are explicitly stated by Derrida. Firstly, that the single 
target of deconstruction is the idealisation of conceptual purity, and that it is this ideal, 
rather than any other, that dominates the history of western thought. Secondly, that our 
capacity to communicate and understand each other rests on the more general claim that 
misunderstandings or new interpretations are a necessary possibility of all texts.
The deconstructive ‘thesis,’ as Stone characterises it, is most clearly put forth by 
Staten. According to Staten, ‘Wittgenstein shows over and over that any sign (or 
formula or mental picture) taken in isolation can be interpreted, that it contains no 
essence within it that dictates how we must necessarily understand it. ’61 For example, as 
Wittgenstein points out, an arrow could always be taken to point in the direction of the 
shaft and not the head.62 There is nothing about the sign in itself that guarantees that it 
must be read in one way and not the other and there is no rule or set of instructions for 
interpreting the sign that possesses the rigidity of a set of rails.63 Our capacity to follow 
rules has no deeper foundation than the iteration of custom and hence there is always a 
certain structural anonymity to every sign, an openness regarding its future applications.
Stone characterises deconstruction as a form of ‘interpretivism’ which he believes is 
not particular to Derrida, but can also be found in Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein.64 
But he emphasises that ‘interpretivism’ should not be mistaken for the explicit sceptical 
claim that a text has ‘no decidable meaning,’ rather it is the thesis that it is ‘always 
possible that it has not decidable meaning. ’ 65 Stone focuses on the word ‘interpretation’ 
rather than ‘terms that find gainful employment only in deconstructive philosophy’ such 
as ‘differanee,' ‘arche-writing,’ or ‘iterablity’ because Wittgenstein also discusses 
interpretation in detail and because, most importantly to Stone, the word ‘interpretation’ 
is not just a technical term but also has an everyday function. In Stone’s words: ‘while a 
neologism like “differance” has its uselessness outside of philosophy graphically
60 Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 84. Stone characterizes both Derrida and Wittgenstein’s 
target as Platonism.
61 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 74.
62 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 33.
63 See Wittgenstein, Investigations, §218-§242.
64 Stone stresses that ‘interpretivism’ is not the thesis that we always misinterpret texts, but rather the 
thesis that texts are always open to the possibility of new interpretations.
^Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 89.
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inscribed on its face (“it is literally neither a word not a concept” Derrida points out) the 
term “interpretation” (which clearly functions as a word and a concept) is bound to 
carry associations from its significant use in other contexts.’66 In response to Stone’s 
dismissive remark one might point out that Derrida and Wittgenstein do not necessarily 
take the term ‘interpretation’ in the same way. But this is part of what Stone wants to 
bring to the fore. He believes that the everyday associations of the word which 
Wittgenstein highlights, ‘are at once the source of its attractiveness for philosophical 
purposes and an impediment to seeing clearly what someone who is thus attracted to the 
word, and who uses it to characterize the “general space of possibility” of meaning 
might mean.’67
To make his argument, Stone focuses on section 201 of the Investigations. In this 
section Wittgenstein points out that if every action were open to interpretation a 
paradox would follow:
This was our paradox: no course o f  action could be determined by a rule, because 
every course o f action can be made out [i.e. on some interpretation o f it: § 198] to 
accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with 
the rule then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither 
accord nor conflict here.
As Stone points out, if to understand a sign (or indeed an action, diagram or rule) is to 
interpret it, and if this interpretation is not simply another name for grasping its 
metaphysical foundation, then ‘an interpretation’ would have to ‘be one more discrete 
item which itself requires an interpretation before it determines a particular use of the 
sign.’68 According to Stone this infinite regress is not as yet a full articulation of the 
‘deconstructive paradox,’ for in response to the ‘sceptical threat’ that all meaning 
collapses the voice of deconstruction allows that ‘there is a way of grasping a rule 
which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” 
and “going against it” in actual cases.’69
In Stone’s view the deconstructive response to the threat of scepticism, amounts to 
the claim that rules require no deeper foundation than the repetition of a ‘custom’ or
“ Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 88. The quote from Derrida comes from ‘Difference’ in 
Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. D. Allison (Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press, 1973), 131.
67 Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 88.
6K Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 74.
69 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §201.
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‘practice.’ However for the deconstructionist, he adds, these customs are not themselves 
normative, rather they are underpinned by a more general ‘law’ which marks the 
possibility of difference within every repetition of the same. So in this sense, there is no 
‘end to interpretation’70 and, according to Stone, the deconstructionist finds him or 
herself again committed to a paradox.
The paradox at §201 has two components. First, it is assumed that some applications 
of a rule are in accord with it. That is, there is undoubtedly such a thing as following a 
rule, creating an exception to a rule, and so on. Such everyday things are not fictions. 
Secondly, what makes such phenomena possible (viz., interpretive activity) appears at 
once as the condition of their impossibility -  the impossibility, that is, of any action 
being, as a matter of simple fact, in accord with the rule.71
The deconstructive paradox, as Stone outlines it in the Investigations, has clear 
parallel’s with Glendinning’s account of deconstruction, which in its most general terms 
‘aims to show that the condition of possibility for conceptual identity is at the same time 
the condition of impossibility of the rigorous unity required by the idea of conceptual 
exactness.’72
However, after outlining the deconstructive paradox of section 201, Stone goes on to 
argue that it would be a mistake to argue on the basis of this or other related passages 
that the Investigations as a whole puts forward a general deconstructive account of 
language. The true value of Wittgenstein's book, he argues, lies not in its ‘substantive 
thesis’ but in its distinctive style and ‘formal procedures.’73 One distinctive feature of 
Wittgenstein's method, according to Stone, is that he leads words back from their 
metaphysical to their ordinary use.74 The implication being, that by appealing to the 
ordinary use of words Wittgenstein shows how another critic of metaphysics (i.e. 
Derrida) leaves words ‘metaphysically astray.’75 The other distinctive feature is that 
Wittgenstein challenges Derrida’s insistence that we must choose between a 
metaphysical and a deconstructive account of language. Stone believes that
70 Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 74.
71 Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 97.
12 Glendinning, On Being with Others, 79. Glendinning’s emphasis. Although both Staten and 
Glendinning do mention section 201, neither author uses the passage to explicate the deconstructive 
paradox.
73 Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 112. In their own ways both Staten and Glendinning also base 
their reading on Wittgenstein’s rhetorical procedures, so the dispute is in fact over which of these 
procedures is most important.
74 See Wittgenstein, Investigations, §116.
73 Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 84.
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Wittgenstein does this by first imaginatively giving voice to deconstruction. Hence the 
deconstructive sounding passages in the Investigations are not complications Stone 
wants to explain away, but part of Wittgenstein’s attempt to ultimately render 
unappealing the question: ‘how is meaning possible?’ For Wittgenstein encourages us to 
ask whether this question is really ‘an autonomous problem which philosophy is 
naturally obliged to address.’76
One central problem with the deconstructive reading, according to Stone, is that it 
ignores the remainder of what Wittgenstein says in section 201. After stating the 
paradox Wittgenstein writes: ‘It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here.’ 
Further on in section 201 he says that ‘every action according to the rule is an 
interpretation’ is something that we have ‘an inclination to say’ [my italics]. According 
to Stone, the kind of language that Wittgenstein uses to frame the deconstructive 
paradox ‘suggests that to have stated the paradox is already to have drained it of 
significance;77 or more precisely, that to recognise the interpretivist thesis as harbouring 
a paradox is thereby already to have “answered” the paradox by undermining the 
attractiveness of that thesis.’78 Stone takes Wittgenstein’s contextualisation of the 
deconstructive voice to suggest that when he makes the paradox underpinning 
‘interpretivism’ explicit, his aim is not to embrace the paradox but to make the paradox 
unappealing by virtue of its obvious nonsensically.79
Now the deconstructive reader of Wittgenstein might object that the 
‘misunderstanding’ at stake arises only when we insist that interpretation means 
something like ‘the substitution of one expression of the rule for another, ,8° so that ‘in 
the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one 
contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it.’81 
Clearly, if interpretation is taken to mean the substitution of one form of the rule for 
another, and if this form of interpretation is generalised to all cases, then this would be 
an utterly misleading claim; but deconstruction does not understand interpretation in 
this substitutional sense, so it is not actually deconstruction that Wittgenstein dismisses 
in section 201.
7f’ Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 105.
77 As Stone acknowledges this point is also made by Stanley Cavell in A Pitch for Philosophy page 68.
™ Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 100.
79 Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 100. Stone is suggesting that Wittgenstein’s aim here is to 
make a piece of ‘unrecognisable’ or ‘latent’ nonsense patent However, 1 do not think that Stone is right 
to suggest that that patent nonsense is necessarily something which Wittgenstein presents as 
unappealing. See Wittgenstein, Investigations, §464.
K" Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, §201.
Xl Wittgenstein Investigations, §201.
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Stone argues that Wittgenstein’s aim is to show that the deconstructive paradox does 
not fully take hold until after the deconstructionist has recognised that interpretations 
understood as ‘linguistic substitutions or analogous mental items, do not by themselves 
-  i.e. apart from applicative behaviour, determine meaning.’82 For it is only after the 
deconstructionist insists in section 201 that interpretations are not independent of 
applicative behaviour and that ‘there is a way of grasping a rule...which is exhibited in 
what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases,’ that Wittgenstein 
concludes: ‘[hjence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an 
interpretation.’ According to Stone, this shows that the true target of Wittgenstein’s 
remarks is the deconstructive paradox, which ‘represents the flowering into 
recognizable or patent nonsense of a line of thought which looked compelling because 
previously it contained only unrecognisable or latent nonsense.’83
Giving voice to deconstruction in order to question its appeal is one of the distinctive 
formal features that Stone also identifies in the Investigations, returning words from 
their metaphysical to their everyday use is another. When Wittgenstein describes his 
task in section 116 of Investigations as bringing ‘words back from their metaphysical to 
their everyday use,’ the words ‘metaphysical use’ are used directly to refer to 
philosophical attempts to pinpoint the essential meaning of a word. But Stone’s 
assumption is that the words 'metaphysical use’ have a much broader application in the 
Investigations and refer to all attempts to give a general account of the possibility of 
meaning. And since Stone takes Derrida to be providing just such an account, 
deconstructive words are also considered ‘metaphysically astray.’
Stone’s case rests strongly on the last paragraph of 201: ‘Hence there is an 
inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought 
to restrict the term “interpretation” to the substitution of one expression of the rule for 
another.’ According to Stone, by insisting that ‘interpretation be limited to “the 
substitution of one expression of the rule for another,”’ Wittgenstein returns the word 
‘interpretation’ back from its deconstructive to its ordinary use. Stone writes: ‘[i]n thus 
juxtaposing the interpretivist’s paradox-inducing use of the word ‘interpretation’ with a 
felicitous sense which might be given to the word (“the substitution of one expression 
for another”), §201 should lead us to ask whether there is anything which the 
‘interpretivist’ would exactly be satisfied to be construed as saying: or whether, on the
Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 102. 
Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 100.
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contrary, his philosophical purposes are such as to be frustrated when the word 
“interpretation” is made fathomable. ’ 84 Stone goes on to say:
[t]hus construed, §201 does not (as it must on the deconstructive reading) depart from 
one of Wittgenstein’s main points about his own philosophical procedures: ‘If one 
tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, 
because everyone would agree to them.’ Tailored to the present context, the point 
would be that what might be said about the need for ‘interpretation’ in grasping a rule’ 
(i.e., upon giving the word ‘interpretation’ a clear or fathomable essence) is something 
to which the present parties would in fact agree. To say that they would agree is to say 
that the opponent of Platonism would not wish to be construed as denying the 
instruction that ‘there is a way of responding to a rule which is not . . .the substitution 
of one expression for another.’ S/he would not want to say that we must always 
interpret in that sense. And beyond this, §201 merely frames the form of expression 
which would seem to be saying something philosophically disagreeable. So by way of 
(1) drawing attention to something to which ‘everyone would agree,’ and (2) framing 
the rest as something ‘there is an inclination to say,’ §201 ends by not saying 
(asserting or denying) anything; it ends, one might venture to say, in silence.*5
From the above discussion it should be clear that Stone’s analysis draws on the two 
features of Wittgenstein’s therapeutic procedure outlined by Pears in ‘Literalism and 
Imagination.’ According to Pears: ‘[t]he literalism characterizes his critique of 
philosophical theories, because it is a critique that picks on the words in which they are 
expressed and insists on giving them the meanings that they have in daily life. The 
imagination shows in the way he traces philosophical theories back to their origin in 
misleading pictures of the human predicament. ’ 86 But while Pears takes the therapeutic 
procedures of literalism and imagination to be a form of deconstruction, 87 Stone argues 
that these strategies are deployed to help release us from deconstruction’s charms. 
According to Stone, by vividly dramatising deconstruction Wittgenstein makes the 
nonsensicality of its claim explicit, and by insisting that the word ‘interpretation’ be
84 Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 103.
85 Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ 103. Stone is quoting Wittgenstein, Investigations, §128: ‘If 
one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone 
would agree to them.’ [slight alteration to phrasing]
86 Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 8
87 As noted earlier Pears does not go so far as to assign Wittgenstein a deconstructive thesis on language, 
and it is perhaps for this reason that he does not recognize the potential tension between the 
deconstructive and the therapeutic elements of Wittgenstein’s work.
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taken in its literal or ordinary sense, Wittgenstein returns us, by way of contrast, to 
something that nobody would want to dispute.
An important consequence, Stone suggests, is that deconstruction’s ‘reliance on 
philosophy and its institutions’ need no longer appear ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable. ’ 88 To help 
illustrate his point, Stone ties Wittgenstein’s conception of the ordinary use of words to 
Austin’s idea that meaning (what we ordinarily say) can be distinguished from idealised 
meaning (what philosophers search for). Philosophy, in Austin’s eyes is no more than 
an academic’s deluded search for ideal meanings. Drawing on Austin, Stone argues that 
expressions like ‘guarantee absolutely’ or ‘following a rule without interpretation’ have 
an everyday use which is different from their use in the philosophical tradition. Hence 
the ideal of conceptual purity is revealed as an academic fantasy, rather than a 
phenomena that exists ‘autonomously and invidiously. ’ 89 Stone concludes that when 
Wittgenstein returns words from their deconstructive to their everyday use, he is not re­
establishing a metaphysical account of meaning, but rather reminding us of meanings 
that belong to ‘a merely colourful but innocuous’ pre-philosophical ordinary.90
The central problem with this version of Stone’s argument however, is that while 
Wittgenstein shares Austin’s suspicion of specialised academic terminology, he does 
not share Austin’s conviction that philosophical delusions are limited to academic 
practice. 91 As Norman Malcolm observes of Wittgenstein’s writing: ‘non-philosophers 
become immersed in philosophy at the drop of a hat. ’92 This is because philosophical 
misunderstandings are embedded in the ‘forms of our language. ’ 93 Stone also 
acknowledges this towards the end of his article when he writes that Wittgenstein does 
not define philosophy as a particular class of sentences or claims (eg learned texts), but 
rather as a certain mood towards our words -  the feeling that what we ordinarily say is 
strange or queer and hence in need of deeper justification. However if, as Stone finally 
concludes, philosophy is not a set of claims but a feeling or attitude towards our words, 
then it is no longer possible to maintain that the ‘metaphysics of presence’ is merely an 
academic ideal. For the feelings that lead us to postulate this ideal emerge from 
ordinary language itself and might take hold both within and outside the academy.
88 Stone ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 90.
89 Stone ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 109.
90 Stone ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 107.
91 See Philosophical Investigations § 111 & § 115, for example.
92 Norman Malcolm, Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein’s Criticism o f his Early Thought (Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford: 1986), 106.
93 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §111.
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Nevertheless, by characterising the metaphysical impulse in terms of feeling, Stone is 
still able to maintain his more general point that when we ordinarily compare rules to a 
set of rails (or speak of seeing with the mind’s eye etc) we are not necessarily 
committed to a metaphysical stance, or a deconstructive response. According to Stone, 
Wittgenstein tells us that when we ordinarily say such things we are simply using a 
‘colourful’ expression. In the context of rule following, this entails the recognition that 
‘in an innocuous sense future applications of a rule are present’ and that ‘in a no less 
straight forward sense, future applications are not present (i.e. they are not spatio- 
temporally present, physically present before they take place) . ’ 94 The metaphysician 
however, is overcome by the feeling that there is something ‘queer’ about our ordinary 
expressions.95 They reject both these points and try to discover how the future 
applications of a rule are absolutely and entirely present.96 Deconstruction challenges 
this claim, but in doing so ignores that there is an ‘innocuous’ sense in which rules are 
like rails before the feeling that this idea is ‘spooky’ ever takes hold.97 Hence Stone’s 
account intends to show that deconstruction is not the only alternative to metaphysics, 
since a second alternative would be to return the expression ‘rules are like rails’ from its 
metaphysical (absolute) to its ordinary (harmless) use.
Some problems with Stone’s account
In Stone’s view, while Derrida sees the paradoxical consequences of deconstruction as 
‘a radically insightful type of nonsense’ which requires us to ‘follow out -  even to as 
yet “unheard-of thoughts” 98 -  the paradoxical implications’ of the deconstructive thesis, 
Wittgenstein presents the deconstructive view point as mere nonsense, a 
misunderstanding to be dismissed so we can return to an ordinary (un-queer) language 
use. As Stone points out, this fits with ‘the only strictly correct’ method, first outlined in 
the Tractatus." The strictly correct method demands that one ‘say nothing
94 Stone ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 108. [Slight alteration to text.]
95 See for, example, Wittgenstein, Investigations, §38, §93, §195.
% Stone draws this account of the Platonist’s metaphysical position from John McDowell, Mind and 
World, (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1994). See also John Me Dowell ‘non-cognitivism and rule 
-following,’ The New Wittgenstein, (London: Routledge, 2000).
97 Stone ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 108.
98 Stone ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 92. Stone is quoting Derrida ‘Dijferance,’ 103 -104.
99 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, rev. ed., trans. D.F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness 
(London: Routledge, 1974), §6.53. Staten and Glendinning, like most traditional readers of Wittgenstein, 
emphasise a dramatic break between his early and late work. Staten and Glendinning take Wittgenstein to 
be deconstructing the Tractatus account of language. However, like Cora Diamond and James Conant and 
the new readers of Wittgenstein, Stone emphasizes continuities in Wittgenstein’s early and late work 
regarding his conception of the task of philosophy.
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[philosophical] and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something 
metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs 
in his sentences.,IIK) By emphasising this continuity in Wittgenstein’s conception of 
philosophy, Staten aligns himself with the new readings of Wittgenstein championed by 
Cora Diamond and James Conant.
Indeed, Stone’s argument that Wittgenstein ‘gives voice’ to ‘interpretivism’ in order 
to make the nonsensicality of this position explicit, seems to echo Diamond’s argument 
that the Tractatus imaginatively ‘takes nonsense for sense.’101 But unlike Diamond, 
Stone does not consider that in ‘imaginatively taking nonsense for sense’ Wittgenstein 
in fact diverges from the ‘strictly correct method’ of doing philosophy. Diamond 
suggests that W ittgenstein’s departure can be seen if we read remark 6.53 of the 
Tractatus along side 6.54. In 6.54 Wittgenstein writes: ‘[m]y propositions serve as 
elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes 
them as nonsensical.’ As we saw in Chapter 2, this passage indicates that the Tractatus 
is in the ‘service of an imaginative understanding of the speakers of nonsense.’ Now 
one might argue that in Stone’s account the later Wittgenstein also addresses the 
speaker of nonsense, for he dramatises deconstruction in order to render it less 
appealing. However, while Stone claims that deconstruction cannot but collapse under 
the weight of its nonsensicality, Diamond distinguishes between two different functions 
that patent nonsense can play. For although there are certain utterances that do not 
survive the recognition of their nonsensicality, there are other utterances where 
nonsensicality is part of the ‘linguistic intention.’102 In this later context the speaker 
acknowledges the nonsensicality of what is said by framing their words: 7  am inclined 
to say that the world is miraculous,’ or 7  find myself wanting to say that I feel safe no 
matter what.’102 Here, as Wittgenstein tells us, nonsensicality is the very essence of what 
is said,104 and the framing words ‘I am inclined to say . . .’ do not, as Stone insists they 
must, announce the irrelevance of a nonsensical utterance.
1(10 Stone ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 109. Stone is quoting and paraphrasing §6.53 of the 
Tractatus. What Stone does not emphasize is the shift in this method from early to late work. By 
‘nothing philosophical’ Wittgenstein actually means ‘ to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. 
propositions of natural science -  i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy.’ Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus, §6.53.
Whereas in Wittgenstein later work he does not limit what can be said in this same way.
101 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination,’ 68.
Il):! Diamond ‘Ethics, imagination and the method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus' The New Wittgenstein, 
(London: Routledge, 2000), 75. Diamond’s examples are the logical propositions of the Tractatus and the 
ethical expressions in the ‘Lecture on Ethics’ respectively.
103 See Wittgenstein ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ 8-9. Wittgenstein’s emphasis.
104 See Wittgenstein ‘Lecture on Ethics, 11.
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This leads me to ask whether, the nonsensicality of Wittgenstein’s ‘deconstructive’ 
expressions might likewise be part of their ‘linguistic intention’? For example when 
Wittgenstein writes: ‘[i]t would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was 
needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage’; or when he 
writes: ‘Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an 
interpretation,’ he may not be dismissing these expression, but rather acknowledging the 
attractiveness and the nonsensicality his own attempts to extrapolate a general account 
of language.105
While it is true that Derrida does not contextualise the general Taw’ of writing or 
iterability with the expression: T am inclined to say, ’ he does acknowledge paradoxical 
consequences of this general law in another way. For example in Limited Inc he writes 
that: ‘the concept of iterability itself, like all the concepts that form or deform 
themselves in its wake, is an ideal concept, to be sure but also the concept that marks 
the essential and ideal limit of all pure idealisation, the ideal concept of the limit of all 
idealisation, and not the concept of non ideality (since it is also the concept of the 
possibility of ideality).’106 Derrida insists that: ‘My formulas are not absolute or 
absolutely formulizable; they cannot claim to be a metalanguage.’107 One strategy 
Derrida uses to distinguish deconstruction from a meta-language, is to supplement one 
‘chain of “words” or “concepts’” with another. ‘Iterability’ is part of an open chain 
which includes ‘pharmakon, supplement, hymen [and] paregon.’ All terms ‘share a 
certain functional analogy’ according to Derrida ‘but remain singular and irreducible to 
one another, as are the textual chains from which they are inseparable. They are all 
marked by iterability, which however seems to belong to their series.’108
In the context of Stone’s work these reflections give rise to an important question, for 
if the nonsense of the deconstructive stance is not something that Wittgenstein is 
necessarily committed to dissolving, then is it correct to say that Wittgenstein returns us 
to a pre-philosophical ordinary or does he acknowledge (albeit in his own distinctive 
way) a deconstructive vision?
The difficulty with Stone’s reading is brought out most clearly if we consider his 
responses to section 213 of the Investigations. Here Wittgenstein writes:
105 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §186, §201. Wittgenstein’s emphasis.
106 Derrida, Limited Inc, 119.
107 Derrida, Limited Inc, 120.
108 Derrida, Limited Inc, 115.
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‘[b]ut this initial segment of a series obviously admitted of various interpretations . . . 
and so you must first have chosen one such interpretation.’ - Not at all. A doubt was 
possible in certain circumstances. But that is not to say that I did doubt, or even could 
doubt. (There is something to be said, which is connected with this, about the 
psychological ‘atmosphere’ of a process.)
According to Stone, this passage calls into question the necessity and the 
comprehensibility of the deconstructive notion of ‘possible doubt.’ Stone points out that 
the deconstructive notion of ‘possible doubt’ entails the claim that every sign carries a 
certain structural anonymity, which enables us to consider ‘a sign by itself’ in 
‘abstraction’ from any given context. In Stone’s view, the ‘necessity’ of the 
deconstructive paradox,
appears only on the basis of the assumption that we can intelligibly consider a bit of 
sign-involving behaviour in abstraction from its surrounding circum stances and 
nonetheless still have sign-invoWmg behaviour in view. By means of the expression ‘a 
sign by itself,’ we thus precisely manage to represent a doubt which is merely 
notionally possible as already present, just as if any doubt which actually (i.e., in 
certain circum stances) arises somehow merely reveals an indeterminacy that was 
present in any grasp of meaning all along.w)
However, Stone goes on to say, if we understand the use of a sign as Wittgenstein does 
in the Investigations, ‘as an event which, appropriately specified, includes the 
surrounding circumstances, then we are bound to see that from the fact that a doubt 
about meaning is possible, it does not follow that anyone does, or even intelligibly 
could (under the circumstances) actually doubt. . . . Hence we should want to ask: is 
there really any clear sense in which doubts and misunderstandings about the meaning 
of a sign are, as Derrida insists, a “necessary possibility?”’110
There are several problems with Stone’s reading that I would like to make clear. 
Firstly, by insisting that doubt (or indeed the feeling that something is queer) is 
unintelligible unless it corresponds to a psychological state, Stone misses the sense in 
which feelings, in Wittgenstein’s terms, can be given through language and need not 
always be traced back to a particular psychological experience. In my view, when 
Wittgenstein concludes in section 213: ‘[tjhere is something to be said, which is
109 Stone ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 106. Stone’s emphasis
110 Stone ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 106.
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connected with this, about the psychological “atmosphere” of a process,’ he emphasises 
the word ‘atmosphere’ in order to question the notion that subjective feelings such as 
doubt must always be thought of as a determinate subjective state.111
However, to make the claim that Wittgenstein re-conceives the concepts of ‘feeling’ 
and ‘subjectivity,’ is also to disagree with Stone in a second way, for I am suggesting 
that Wittgenstein proposes a notion of ‘subjective feeling’ which goes beyond our 
everyday grasp of the term.
Thirdly, Stone’s reading unfairly reduces deconstruction to the claim that ‘sign­
involving behaviour’ exists ‘in abstraction from its surrounding circumstances.’ He fails 
to see that for Derrida the de-contextualisation of a sign is not an event that should be 
considered in isolation from an ongoing process of re-contextualisation. In Limited Inc 
Derrida writes:
[o]ne of the definitions of what is called deconstruction would be the effort to take this 
limitless context into account, to pay the sharpest and broadest attention possible to 
context, and thus to an incessant movement of re-contextualization. . 112
The two moments of deconstruction
In On Being With Others, Glendinning draws on Wittgenstein’s account of criteria for 
what we say when, to help conceive of deconstruction in a way that does not reduce it 
entirely to the moment of structural anonymity. When Wittgenstein posits criteria, 
Glendinning tells us, he describes what we might say in particular circumstances. 
However, criteria are not rules of use; rather they are proposals of how we might 
‘project’ words in given circumstances. To be in agreement regarding our criteria for 
the use of a word, in Glendinning’s view, is to be willing to make a ‘spontaneous ‘leap” 
of affirmation, to say: ‘yes, I would also use that word as you do.’ Criteria, on this 
account, help us see that deconstruction entails two moments. On the one hand all 
words, and indeed ‘iterable traits’ more broadly, ‘must . . . maintain a certain 
independence from what occurs in a particular contexts’ because ‘the possibility of 
another repetition is internal’ to them.
This is what confers on the trait an intrinsically public intelligibility. The problem is, as I have 
indicated, that it also confers on it a structural anonymity. In my view, this anonymity is
111 My emphasis.
112 Derrida, Limited Inc, 136.
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ineliminable, and any reading-response must pass through it. However, as should be clear, such 
anonymity is also limited; there is no absolutely anonymous trait. Like any recognition of an 
iterable model, a reading-response always assumes a non-calculable ‘moment of the leap’ (a 
‘Y es’-saying) with a singularity of its own (even if one which is structured by an internal 
relation to other times).113
The importance of Glendinning’s reading is that it refuses to articulate 
deconstruction as a single all encompassing account in the manner that Staten’s reading 
at times suggests. His work helps highlight that deconstruction entails two 
interconnected but irreducible modes. Indeed the moment of anonymity (or de- 
contextualisation) and the moment of the affirmative leap (or re-contextualisation) that 
Glendinning associates with deconstruction correspond closely to the two experiences I 
outlined the previous chapters - an opening to enigma, and a sense of safety that does 
not demand foundations. As I suggested earlier, these experiences might in turn be 
understood as transformations of the metaphysical demand that wonder end in certitude.
To end this chapter I want to say a few words about the various affinities and the 
differences between Wittgenstein and Derrida’s projects as they have emerged in the 
thesis so far. Although Derrida said little about the relation between his own work and 
the work of Wittgenstein, some brief comments he made at a recent conference 
addressing this relation suggest that the ‘production of the extraordinary within the 
ordinary’ might be a meeting point. " 4 There are two ideas I want to draw out here. 
Firstly the intermingling of wonder and safety, the ordinary and the extraordinary and 
the remarkable and the everyday results from techniques of reading that pay careful 
attention both to the movement of de-contextualisation and re-contextualisation. As I 
have suggested, both Derrida and Wittgenstein deploy such techniques. The value of 
Glendinning’s account is that it emphasises that although there is no absolute moment 
of contextualisation, nor is there a pure moment of de-contextualisation, reminding us 
that deconstruction is a double movement that entails a certain settling as well as an 
opening of context.
Secondly, by appealing to ‘the production of the extraordinary within the ordinary,’ 
Derrida reaffirms one of the themes of this chapter, namely that ordinary language is 
susceptible to, and indeed generates, the remarkable language of philosophical
1,3 Glendinning, On Being with Others, 143 -144.
114 Jacques Derrida, ‘Derrida’s response to Mulhall’ Ratio 13 no. 4 (2000): 415. See also Steven Mulhall, 
‘Wittgenstein and Deconstruction, Ratio 13 no. 4 (2000) and Jacques Derrida, ‘Derrida’s response to 
Mulhall’ Ratio 13 no. 4 (2000): 415. 1 previously discussed these ideas in chapter one.
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fantasy.1" Read together these two ideas suggest that an opening to the strange and 
wondrous possibilities of ordinary language cannot be separated from an imaginative 
rearrangement of the stuff of philosophical fantasy. In Chapter 5 I intend to develop 
this idea further but for the moment I want to stress a disparity between Wittgenstein 
and Derrida.
Although towards the end of his career Derrida identifies the extraordinary ordinary 
as a point of contact between himself and Wittgenstein, this term does not function in 
quite the same way for the two authors. In the Investigations Wittgenstein emphasises 
the lived and felt dimensions of the extraordinary ordinary, its symptomatic 
manifestation. In a certain regard it is true that these concerns also preoccupy Derrida in 
his later period, when he engages more directly with ethical and political questions, but 
in his earlier post-structuralist writings which are the focal point of this chapter, there is 
little attention paid to the existential dimension of fantasy and its overcoming. For 
example, Staten and Glendinning’s deconstructive readings of Wittgenstein draw 
heavily on Derrida’s early more formal early work, and neither author really attempts to 
explicate Wittgenstein’s existential staging of philosophy.
So by relating both metaphysics and the double movement of deconstruction directly 
to feelings, the discrepancies between my reading of Wittgenstein and Derrida’s early 
deconstructive project also become apparent. Indeed, as Derrida stresses in Limited Inc, 
the risk of staging philosophy in terms of feeling is that we can miss its operation in the 
absence of feeling.116 In the context of this chapter, this danger is clearly exemplified by 
Stone’s reading, his conviction that our words are only ‘metaphysical’ if we actually 
experience them as ‘queer.’ But underpinning both Stone’s dismissal and Derrida’s 
warning, there would seem to be the assumption that talk of feelings will eventually 
lead us back to the experiencing subject who is the origin of those feelings. As I have 
begun to suggest, however, Wittgenstein's writing might open up a third way of 
conceiving of feeling, not as a determinate state but as an atmosphere manifest in our 
forms of life and language.117 In the following chapters I will argue that while it is of 
great importance to Wittgenstein that individuals do at times feel this mood quite
115 In the context of Derrida’s discussion with Mulhall philosophical language is referred to as 
‘extraordinary.’
116 In Limited Inc Derrida warns that by presenting the ‘longing for metaphysical plenitude’ in existential 
terms we risk obscuring metaphysics as it manifests itself independently of subjective imagination and 
emotion. Derrida, Limited Inc, 121. These ideas were first raised during my discussion of Wittgenstein 
and deconstruction in chapter 1.
117 See for example my discussion of Cora Diamond’s work and Wittgenstein’s account of the ethical will 
in the previous chapter.
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literally, it is of equal importance to his account that the mood or atmosphere of our 
way of life goes unfelt.
In Chapter 4 I will draw on this idea to raise several issues that complicate the 
deconstructive reading proposed by Glendinning. For while Glendinning’s work is 
valuable in the sense that it enables us to think of Wittgenstein’s appeal to criteria as 
part of the double movement of deconstruction, his reading does not fully do justice to 
the therapeutic spirit of his writing, its engagement with the existential effects of 
fantasy. I also want to return to an important stylistic difference between the two 
authors highlighted by Stone’s reading. For although Glendinning gives a 
deconstructive account of criteria in the Investigations he does not really explain 
Wittgenstein’s (sometimes pedantic) appeal to the commonsense or literal connotations 
of words. So in the following chapter I will ask whether it is possible to reconcile the 
particularity of Wittgenstein’s approach - both his appeal to straightforward meaning 
and his existential staging of philosophy - with the deconstructive aspect of his thought?
Chapter Four
" &
The Straightforward Dream 
and the
Enigmatic Dream Fragment
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Chapter 4
The ‘straightforward’ dream and the enigmatic dream fragment: 
Wittgenstein, Derrida and Freud
Introduction
This chapter began from a sense that most existing literature on Wittgenstein does not 
adequately depict both the normality of fantasy-pictures and the particularity of 
Wittgenstein’s argument with academia.1 There is, I believe, both a specificity and a 
generality to Wittgenstein’s notion of philosophy, which is often missed. P. M. S. 
Hacker, for example, interprets Wittgenstein as a critic of academic philosophy and of 
the philosophical tendencies in the sciences more broadly, but is reticent to speak of a 
general cultural critique. In doing so he misses the all pervasiveness of fantasy - its 
embeddedness in everyday life - but nor does he grasp how Wittgenstein’s argument 
with academia shapes his rhetorical style. Derridian readers of Wittgenstein, on the 
other hand, tend to identify a single general target - the ‘metaphysics of presence’- but 
in the process they down play his argument with academia, and the techniques of 
literalism and imagination that this argument gives rise to. My claim is that the 
distinctiveness of Wittgenstein’s practice is shaped through his dispute with academia 
and that this dispute furnishes him with the rhetorical tools to critique philosophical 
fantasies as they become manifest in our general cultural imaginary.
In the discussion that follows I will pick up some of the unresolved threads of the 
previous chapter. Focusing on Wittgenstein’s argument with academia, I hope to 
explain how some of his particularities of style - his appeal to the common sense or 
literal sense of a term, and his existential staging of metaphysics - might bear upon the 
deconstructive reading I have put forward. One of the aims of this chapter is to bring out 
what I take to be the true import of Martin Stone’s critique, while staying true to the 
affinities between Wittgenstein and deconstruction highlighted at the end of the last 
chapter. Another is to re-conceive the therapeutic stream of Wittgenstein’s thought.
1 As I suggest later in the chapter, Stanley Cavell’s work is, to a certain extent, an exception to this claim.
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As I have already begun to argue, there are clear affinities between Wittgenstein and 
Freud - the term ‘therapy,’ for example, is borrowed from psychoanalytic practice, and 
in David Pears’ words: ‘there is an obvious analogy between the origin and correction 
of . . . involuntary fantasies and the origin of emotional disorders and their cure by 
psychotherapy.’2 For the most part, authors who focus directly on Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of Freud, temper this shared therapeutic spirit with the claim that 
Wittgenstein is a critic of Freud. Jacques Bouveresse, for example, argues that 
Wittgenstein unmasks the pseudo-scientific pretensions of Freud’s discourse.3 Rhess, 
however, felt that Wittgenstein wanted to ‘separate what is valuable in Freud from that 
“way of thinking” which he wanted to combat.’4 My aim in this chapter will be to 
understand what Wittgenstein’s critique of Freud entails, while at the same time 
identifying the true import of his thought for Wittgenstein.
Furthermore, I am interested in the relation between deconstruction and therapy as 
Wittgenstein deploys it. Both Wittgenstein and Derrida are readers of Freud’s work.5 
The most detailed recorded response to Freud by Wittgenstein is a series of 
conversations transcribed from memory by Rush Rhees between 1942 and 1946.6 
Derrida, on the other hand, has published various essays on Freud including ‘Freud and 
the Scene of Writing,’ in his 1978 book Writing and Difference, which will be my 
focus.7 In the second half of the chapter 1 will draw attention to some similarities 
between Wittgenstein and Derrida’s approach to Freud, but to begin with I want to 
focus on Wittgenstein’s reading of Freud directly. I will argue that a careful analysis of 
Wittgenstein’s approach to Freud might help us understand what is really at stake in the 
deconstructive critique which Stone identified last chapter.
2 David Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination: Wittgenstein’s Deconstruction of Traditional Philosophy,’ 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, no.l (2002): 4.
3 See Jacques Bouveresse Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious, trans. Carol Cosman 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
4 Here Rush Rhees is introducing Wittgenstein’s ‘Conversations on Freud,’ in Wittgenstein: Lectures and 
Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology & Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1966), 41.
5 According to Bouveresse in Wittgenstein Reads Freud, p. 4: ‘Wittgenstein’s readings of Freud seem  
concerned chiefly with the works published before the First World War. The two works he cites most 
frequently are The Psychopathology of Everyday Life and, in particular, The Interpretation of Dreams', on 
several occasions he also alludes to Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. But as Brian 
McGuinness notes, he was probably familiar with much more of Freud’s work ‘simply through osm osis.’ 
McGuinness discusses the cultural influence of Freud’s work in Brian Me Guinness, ‘Freud and 
Wittgenstein,’ in Wittgenstein and his Times, ed. Me Guinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 27.
h Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations on 
Aesthetics, Psychology & Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966).
Derrida ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’ Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1978). Later texts by Derrida which engage with Freud include: Jacques Derrida, The 
Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987 and Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1996).
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Wittgenstein’s argument with academia
In the following section I will draw on Wittgenstein’s reading of Freud to help articulate 
what I take to be Wittgenstein’s true argument with academia. In the previous chapter I 
briefly outlined Henry Staten’s charge that Wittgenstein avoids close readings of 
academic texts and fails to trace the historical origins of this own thought.8 Simon 
Glendinning, on the other hand, has a different stance. He suggests Wittgenstein’s 
intention is not to dismiss the history of philosophy but to reveal the ‘unplaceable’ 
quality of philosophy, its operation beyond the traditional cannon.9 In support of this 
argument he draws attention to Wittgenstein’s decision to begin the Investigations with 
Saint Augustine’s autobiographical reflections on language learning from his 
Confessions, instead of an explicitly philosophical passage from elsewhere in the 
book.10 In Glendinning’s view, by showing that philosophy might emerge at any point 
in our lives, Wittgenstein re-enforces Derrida’s claim that philosophy is not a specific 
genre of thought but a discourse which underpins Western culture generally.
But if, as Derrida suggests, the philosophical ideal really is the mythology of culture, 
then Wittgenstein’s critique of the academic imaginary seems to be eclipsed. In the 
following sections 1 will challenge this view. 1 will argue that although Wittgenstein 
shows that philosophical fantasies can pervade our everyday lives, he also maintains a 
very particular argument with academia. I use the word ‘academia’ here to indicate that 
Wittgenstein’s argument is not just with the collection of texts that are traditionally 
categorised as philosophical, but more broadly with many of the conventions and 
rhetorical devices of learned thought. I believe that Wittgenstein’s ‘Conversations on 
Freud,’ might usefully introduce certain details of this argument.
x Staten’s claim is not completely true in the sense that Wittgenstein does cite the influence of various 
thinkers (such as Schopenhauer, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Saint Augustine and Sigmund Freud) 
and he also deploys certain philosophical conventions (the symbolism of logic, for example) and evokes 
certain traditional philosophical ideals. Most notably he hopes his own work will help overcome illusion 
and clarify thought. Actual references to the history of philosophy, however, are sporadic and 
Wittgenstein attempts no systematic readings of its texts.
9 Simon Glendinning, On Being with Others: Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein, (London: Routledge, 
1998) ,  85.
10 Indeed, by finding philosophy in the work of the psychoanalyst Freud, he challenges the conventional 
boundary of the philosophical discipline.
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The ‘straightforward’ dream
Consider, for example, Wittgenstein’s reaction to Freud’s insistence that dreams are 
camouflaged wish fulfilments.
To say that dreams are wish fulfilments is very important chiefly because it points to 
the sort of interpretation that is wanted - the sort of thing that would be an 
interpretation of a dream. As contrasted with an interpretation which said that dreams 
were simply memories of what had happened, for instance. (We don’t feel that 
memories call for an interpretation in the same way as we feel this about dreams.) And 
some dreams obviously are wish fulfilments; such as the sexual dreams of adults, for 
instance. But it seems muddled to say that all dreams are hallucinated wish 
fulfilments. (Freud very commonly gives what we might call sexual interpretation. But 
it is interesting that among all the reports of dreams which he gives, there is not a 
single example of a straightforward sexual dream. Yet these are common as rain.) 
Partly because this doesn’t seem to fit with dreams that spring from fear rather than 
from longing. Partly because the majority of dreams Freud considers have to be 
regarded as camouflaged wish fulfilments; and in this case they simply don’t fulfil the 
wish. Ex hypothesi the wish is not allowed to be fulfilled, and something else is 
hallucinated instead. If the wish is cheated in this way, then the dream can hardly be 
called a fulfilment of it. Also it becomes impossible to say whether it is the wish or the 
censor that is cheated. Apparently both are, and the result is that neither is satisfied. So 
that the dream is not an hallucinated satisfaction of anything.11
Wittgenstein’s strategy of reading (or perhaps more accurately misreading) Freud 
resembles Stone’s account of the deconstructive critique put forward by remark 201 of 
the Investigations, in an important regard. For he dramatises the general Freudian 
account of dreaming in order to reveal its paradoxical nature and he confines himself 
only to the ordinary or literal connotations of Freud’s words. In both cases 
Wittgenstein’s aim seems to be to reveal the contradictions and incoherency of a general 
theory and in both cases Wittgenstein refuses to find in these theoretical words anything 
other than what we might ordinarily say.
In fact the passage is comprised of a whole series of emphatic refusals, on 
Wittgenstein’s behalf, to be situated within Freud’s system of thought. (1) ‘We don’t 
feel that memories call for an interpretation in the same way as we feel this about
11 Wittgenstein ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 47. Wittgenstein’s italics (Latin term italicized by me).
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dreams’ Wittgenstein reminds us. But this misses Freud’s point, which is that wish 
fulfilment dreams are displaced childhood memories and hence do ‘call for an 
interpretation.’ (2) ‘And some dreams obviously are wish fulfilments; such as the sexual 
dreams of adults, for instance.’ But by limiting wish fulfilment dreams to dreams that 
are literally about sex, Wittgenstein disregards Freud’s account of repression and 
displacement. (3) ‘But it seems muddled to say that all dreams are hallucinated wish 
fulfilments . . . partly because this does not seem to fit with dreams that spring from fear 
rather than from longing.’ However, by confining wish fulfilment to a ‘commonplace’ 
definition such as ‘dreams which spring from . . . longing,’ Wittgenstein blatantly 
disregards Freud’s insistence that sexual dreams often evoke fear and anxiety. (4) In 
camouflaged wish fulfilments ‘the wish is not allowed to be fulfilled, and something 
else is hallucinated instead. If the wish is cheated in this way, then the dream can hardly 
be called a fulfilment of it.’ Freud would agree with Wittgenstein that in our conscious 
life, wishing something is not the same as fulfilling the wish. However, Freud’s point is 
that the unconscious is unable to distinguish between ‘wishing’ and ‘doing,’ so it is in 
this sense that he believes we can speak of dreams as wish fulfilments. (5) ‘Also it 
becomes impossible to say whether it is the wish or the censor that is cheated. 
Apparently both are, and the result is that neither is satisfied. So that the dream is not an 
hallucinated satisfaction of anything.' In the final sentences of the passage Wittgenstein 
tries to imagine what a camouflaged wish fulfilment might actually be like and 
concludes that, strictly speaking, it would not be a fulfilment of anything.
Something new is being said by Freud, new sets of concepts and metaphors are 
taking shape, but Wittgenstein hears only the everyday, the literal sense of what he says. 
What does this deflationary appeal to the commonplace meanings of Freud’s words 
really entail?
In an important regard, Wittgenstein’s reading of Freud clearly resembles the pattern 
identified by Stone. Wittgenstein ‘draw[s] attention to something to which everybody 
would agree’ (all dreams are not literally about sex; wishing and doing are not the same, 
etc.) and frames the remainder of what he says as ‘paradox inducing.’12 But nor can 
Stone adequately describe Wittgenstein’s approach to Freud for two main reasons.
Firstly, as we have already seen, Wittgenstein does not conclude that the paradoxical 
nature of Freud’s account renders his work completely unappealing. As Rhees recalls, 
Wittgenstein ‘would speak of himself - at the period of these discussions - as “a disciple
12 Martin Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction,’ The New Wittgenstein, (London: Routledge, 2000),
103.
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of Freud” and a “follower of Freud.”’n So whatever Wittgenstein’s argument with 
academia, his intension is not to make Freud’s views entirely unattractive.
Secondly, Stone does not seriously consider the paradoxes inherent in Wittgenstein’s 
own procedure. For, as Wittgenstein’s account of Freud makes clear, in order to ‘return’ 
words from their academic to their ordinary or straightforward sense, Wittgenstein 
wilfully misreads Freud’s work, separating its concepts from their intellectual context, 
from the debates, the case studies, the texts and the history which form their ‘home. ’ 14 
Indeed this makes Wittgenstein more like the metaphysician than he may be willing to 
admit, for he approaches Freud’s work like a foreigner, a savage or a child, disregarding 
its nuances and taking its metaphors literally.More broadly one might say that while 
the metaphysician is estranged from the details of the everyday, Wittgenstein 
consciously estranges himself from many of the conventions of academic practise. For 
only an outsider, or perhaps a person who pretends to stand outside, is in a position to 
hear only commonplace meanings of theoretical strivings, or to illustrate academic 
‘turns of speech. ’ 16
There are two different ways that one might think about Wittgenstein’s strategy of 
wilful misreading; as defamatory refusal of new thoughts or as an effort to open an 
academic vocabulary to further perhaps unimagined readings. From the latter 
perspective, Wittgenstein also resembles Stone’s ‘interprevist,’ for he too opens words 
to unforseen contexts. But given that the non-academic meanings Wittgenstein opens 
Freud’s words to are not really new, but simply commonplace, everyday associations, it 
would be strange indeed to interpret his wilful misreading as an act of creative re­
interpretation, an opening to the possibilities of language. For surely when Wittgenstein 
alludes to the straight forward sexual dream, or appeals to the literal or everyday 
connotations of Freud’s words, he pins down the meaning of Freud’s words and hence 
evokes the ‘metaphysics of presence’?
The difficulty of this view, however, is that Wittgenstein explicitly objects to Freud’s 
search for the ‘essence of dreaming,’ and indeed he sees his appeal to literal sexual 
dreams as part of this critique. 17 So one must either conclude that Wittgenstein tries to
13 Russ Rhees in Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 41.
14 In this sense he is different from Le Doeuff who charts the history of philosophical image use.
15 Speaking about the activity of doing philosophy Wittgenstein writes: ‘When we do philosophy we are 
like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on 
them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it.’ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, 2nd edition, ed. G. E. M Anscombe & R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M Anscombe (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1958), §194.
1(1 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §295.
17 Wittgenstein ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 48.
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replace Freud’s essentialist account of dreaming, with his own essentialist reading of 
Freud’s words, or that Wittgenstein’s appeal to everyday connotations is not a claim 
about the essential meaning of Freud’s words at all. To better understand what 
motivates Wittgenstein’s wilful misreading  I will turn to his account of the 
mythological dimension of Freud’s work.
The double aspect of fantasy
In ‘Conversations on Freud' Wittgenstein imaginatively stages an encounter between 
himself and Freud. ‘“Do you want to say, gentlemen,”’ asks Freud, “‘that changes in 
mental phenomena are guided by chance? ’” 18 In response to Freud, Wittgenstein retorts: 
‘psychologists want to say: “there must be some law” -  although no law has yet been 
found . . . where to me the fact that there aren’t any such laws seems important. ’ 19 The 
causal laws governing physical bodies can be tested, but there are no experiments that 
will determine the causes of ‘feeling and motivation. ’20 It is common to criticise Freud’s 
theories because they are impossible to prove or disprove, but significantly Wittgenstein 
does not dismiss Freud’s work on this basis. Instead, he uses Freud to find ways to 
describe psychological concepts such as ‘feeling and motivation’ without posing 
general explanatory laws. He wants to liberate Freud’s thought from its claim to be a 
science. 21 Wittgenstein’s task then, is to describe the rhetorical mechanism Freud uses in 
order to make us feel that his explanations must be so.
Freud refers to various ancient m yths...and claims that his researchers have now 
explained how it came about that anybody should think or propound a myth of that 
sort. Whereas in fact Freud has done something different. He has not given a scientific 
explanation of the ancient myth. What he has done is to propound a new myth. The 
attractiveness of the suggestion, for instance, that all anxiety is a repetition of the 
anxiety of the birth trauma, is just the attractiveness of a mythology. ‘It is all the
1S Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 42.
19 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 42
20 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 42.
21 Wittgenstein believes that under some circumstances Freud’s mythological accounts are capable of 
helping patients. For example, the concept ‘Urszene’ gives a tragic form to life. ‘Many people have, at 
some period, serious trouble in their lives -  so serious as to lead to thoughts of suicide. This is likely to 
appear to one as something nasty, as a situation which is too foul to be a subject of a tragedy. And it may 
then be an immense relief if it can be shown that one’s life has the pattern . . .  of a tragedy -  the tragic 
working out and repetition of a pattern which was determined by the primal scene.’ However this myth or 
‘primal scene,’ cannot provide a causal explanation of a patient’s dream, rather Freud must accept that 
the ‘primal scene’ is whichever scene ‘the patient recognizes as such’ or the scene that ‘effects the cure.’ 
See Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 51.
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outcome of something that happened long ago.’ Almost like referring to a totem.22
According to Wittgenstein, what Freud’s work has ‘actually brought out’ is that an 
explanation which people are ‘disinclined to accept’ is likely to be one that they are 
also ‘inclined to accept. ’23 For example, Freud’s procedure of free association ( frier 
Einfall), is not simply something that the public is resistant to, rather the procedure 
holds a strange appeal. The feelings of inclination and disinclination also mingle in a 
second way. Wittgenstein suggests that it would be a valuable discovery if it turned out 
that that the analyst’s predictions and ‘what the dreamer is led to by freier EinfalV were 
often the same, but ‘it would be queer to claim (as Freud seems to) that they must 
always coincide. ’24 Yet it is precisely the ‘queer’ insistence ‘ must always ’ that is so 
attractive.25 As Wittgenstein observes in Philosophical Investigations, words that seem 
strange or ‘queer’ are often highly compelling: “‘But this isn’t how it is!” -  we say. 
“Yet this is how it has to be!” ’26
In conclusion, Wittgenstein warns that: ‘although one may discover in the course of 
[analysis] various things about oneself, one must have a very strong, keen and persistent 
criticism in order to recognize and see through the mythology that is offered or imposed 
on one. There is an inducement to say, “Yes, of course, it must be like that.” A powerful 
mythology.’ 27 Here, Wittgenstein uses the word ‘mythology’ to mark, not this or that 
particular picture, but the feeling that any given picture must be so. ‘To learn from 
Freud you have to be critical,’ Wittgenstein tells Rhees, ‘and psychoanalysis generally 
prevents this. ’28
Wittgenstein’s keen criticism is evident in his account of the mythological means by 
which Freud establishes himself as a science. Nevertheless, the influence of Freud can 
equally be seen in the way that Wittgenstein’s analysis of the mechanism of fantasy 
echoes Freud’s insistence in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life that unconscious 
fantasy formations such as parapraxis or slips and errors often pass us by in ordinary 
life, their strangeness quite unnoticed. 29 According to Paul Kegan: ‘Freud is the first 
observer to be philosophically struck,’ not by the number of slips, ‘but by how
22 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 51.
23 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 43.
24 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 46.
25 My italics.
2(1 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §112. Wittgenstein’s italics.
27 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 51-52.
2X Rhees’ recollection in Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 41.
29 Sigmund Freud, The Psychopathology o f Everyday Life (London: Penguin books, 2002).
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unintrigued we are by the fact -  how feckless, how innocent.’™ Indeed as Wittgenstein 
himself says of Freud, the very symbols that from one perspective seem ‘queer’ can also 
appear to us as ‘the most natural thing in the world. ’ 31
The double aspect of the fantasy formations of the unconscious -  at once normal and 
peculiar -  can help shed light on a problem raised at the end of the previous chapter. In 
order to align Wittgenstein and Derrida, Glendinning and Staten both emphasise the 
‘automatism’ of the metaphysical fantasy, its sheer normality. 32 Stone, by contrast, 
reduces metaphysics to a narrow subjective response -  the insistence that a particular 
combination of words is ‘spooky.’ So how can Wittgenstein stage fantasy in terms of 
feeling, but at the same time present fantasy as an all-pervasive, yet largely unthought 
norm? Drawing on Freud, Wittgenstein shows that fantasy can appear under two 
aspects: as something natural and beyond remark, and as something remarkable, 
‘queer’ and potentially unsettling. This suggests that there is a felt and an unfelt 
dimension to fantasy, and that Wittgenstein’s intention is to reveal both these 
dimensions. 33 In broad terms Wittgenstein’s account of the double aspect of fantasy 
lends further support to Glendinning’s claim that the ‘metaphysics of presence’ operates 
regardless of whether it is felt at a given moment. Nevertheless, Glendinning’s reading 
does not help us understand why Wittgenstein pays such careful attention to the lived 
and felt aspect of metaphysics. In this regard he does not fully engage with the 
therapeutic dimension of Wittgenstein’s thought, its engagement with the symptomatic 
manifestations of fantasy. The following chapter will develop an account of therapy in 
Wittgenstein’s writing, by investigating the relation between these two dimensions of 
fantasy. Although I will continue to draw on Derrida’s work at times, I will need to 
move beyond the scope of the deconstructive readers I address in this chapter. For the 
moment, however, I want to further explicate the distinctiveness of Wittgenstein’s 
rhetorical strategy and this returns me to my comparative discussion of Wittgenstein 
and Derrida.
Wittgenstein’s critique of fantasy
Although the double aspect of fantasy lends a certain support to Derrida’s claim that the
30 Paul Kegan, ‘Introduction,’ to Sigmund Freud, The Psychopathology o f Everyday Life (London: 
Penguin books, 2002), ix.
31 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 44.
32 Henry Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 79.
331 will say more about the relation between these two dimensions of fantasy in Chapter 5.
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philosophical ideal of presence is a cultural mythology, there is no reason to assume on 
this basis that Wittgenstein also holds that the ‘metaphysics of presence’ is the 
philosophical ideal and the mythology of our culture. To illustrate this point I will look 
further at Wittgenstein’s reading of Freud. According to Wittgenstein, Freud masks the 
strange mythic quality of the demand - it must be so - by purporting to be a science that 
breaks with all mythology. But this ‘break’ is itself a myth, an imaginary creation. In 
broad terms Derrida makes a similar point in ‘White Mythology’ where he argues that 
metaphysical thought claims to break with myth and metaphor, while all the while 
depending on it. 34
Nevertheless, two features distinguish Wittgenstein’s critique of Freud from 
Derrida’s. Firstly, Wittgenstein directly links Freud’s search for the essence of dreaming 
to Freud’s denial that ‘he might be partly right but not altogether so. ’ 35 As Jacques 
Bouveresse argues in Wittgenstein and Freud, Wittgenstein criticises Freud for trying to 
convert a potentially valuable point of view into a discourse that assumes the title of a 
general science. But conversely we might say that Freud’s claim that psychoanalysis is 
a general science is made possible by virtue of his refusal to be seen as a localised 
expertise which is ‘partly right but not altogether so. ’ 36 For it is only by displaying ‘a 
certain scepticism’ towards his own partial knowledge that Freud is able to give the 
impression that his discourse has a general authority.5'
Secondly - and here we return to Wittgenstein’s wilful misreading of Freud - 
Wittgenstein confines himself to the everyday connotations of Freud’s words. Indeed 
the following extract might be read as emblematic of Wittgenstein’s whole procedure. 38 
‘Freud very commonly gives what we might call sexual interpretation. But it is 
interesting that among all the reports of dreams which he gives, there is not a single 
example of a straightforward sexual dream. Yet these are common as rain. ’ 39 Not only 
does Wittgenstein explicitly describe his task as one of remaining open to the ordinary 
or literal sense of theoretical terms in this passage, but most importantly he also goes on 
to link the generalisation of the ‘sexual interpretation’ by Freud, to Freud’s refusal of 
the ‘literal’ or ‘commonsense’ use of the word ‘sexual.’ The metaphorical 
generalisation of a ‘sexual interpretation’ into all aspects of dreaming is made possible
34 See Derrida’s ‘White Mythology,’ for example.
35 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 48
36 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 48.
37 This phrase is originally used to describe the work of Pierre Roussel in Michele Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre 
Roussel’s Chiasmas’ in The Philosophical Imaginary, 169.
3X The term ‘emblematic’ is also used by Le Doeuff when she identifies the chiasmas at work in ‘Pierre 
Roussel’s Chiasmas.’
39 Wittgenstein ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 47. My italics.
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by virtue of this refusal, Wittgenstein suggests.
Neither of these strategies is particularly in keeping with Derrida’s rhetorical 
practice. Wittgenstein’s suggestion that Freud ‘might be partially right but not 
altogether so’ would probably seem, from a Derridian perspective, to replace a logic of 
all or nothing with an ‘empiricism of degrees’ or ‘logic of approximation, ’40 and 
Wittgenstein’s referral to ‘straightforward’ sexual dreams could not but help appear as a 
re-legitimisation of the primacy of literal or proper meaning. However, as I have already 
begun to suggest, there is something quite different at stake in Wittgenstein’s reading of 
Freud. When Wittgenstein says that Freud does not create a general science but a new 
myth - the myth that it is possible to break with all myth - the myth he is speaking of 
cannot adequately be summed up as ‘the metaphysics of presence,’ even though it is 
true to say that this is an immensely important target for Wittgenstein. For in his reading 
of Freud, he demonstrates that the naturalness or necessity of Freud’s account emerges 
by virtue of a series of sceptical gestures, for example: the denial that his expertise 
might be partial and the denial that some dreams might literally be about sex.
The chiasma
In her essay ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas’ Michelle Le Dceuff makes a similar point 
regarding Lacanian psychoanalysis: ‘The Lacanian,’ Le Dceuff writes, ‘continually 
reminds us that the analytic cure is not intended to ‘heal’ or help (this being the 
practical corollary of the denial of partial knowledge).’
One might have thought that the analysts would content themselves with possessing a 
partial competence, a specialized knowledge, a particular technique of cure. But it is 
no secret that they lay claim instead to a general competence - that . . .they behave as 
though analytical theory possessed global explanatory value and jurisdiction over a 
whole range of problems: metaphysical (happiness, death), ethical, aesthetic, 
linguistic, epistemological . . . One may well wonder into what sector of the present- 
day encyclopaedia psychoanalysis has not intervened to hand down some pre-given 
certainty. There is an answer to this rhetorical question: if psychoanalysis never 
admits to doubt when treating of politics or morals, it becomes strikingly
40 Derrida, Limited Inc, trans. Samuel Weber (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1988), 117. 
Derrida insists that he does not want to replace the ‘logic of all or nothing’ with an empiricism of degrees: 
‘rather 1 add a supplementary complication that calls for other concepts, for other thoughts beyond the 
concept and another form of “general theory,” or rather another discourse, another “logic” that accounts 
for the impossibility of concluding such a “general theory.”’
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problematical when it comes to speaking o f itself. The Lacanian polemic against 
scientism in dealing with the unconscious goes in tandem with the dogmatism of 
Lacan’s disciples, and indeed of Lacan himself, when dealing with ‘o ther’ fields of 
knowledge.’41
Le Doeuff goes on to link psychoanalysis and the work of other ‘present-day 
philosophers’42 to an ‘imaginary of learnedness’ which she believes first emerged 
during the enlightenment. One of the ‘enlightenment’s conceptual products,’ observes 
Michele Le Doeuff in The Philosophical Imaginary, is the transformation of a ‘lettered 
imagination (that which belongs to the general culture of the educated) into a learned 
[savant] imaginary’ or ‘an imaginary of learnedness.’43 In th is‘imaginary of 
learnedness theoreticians claim to break with popular myth, while simultaneously using 
myth to give their discourse a hegemonic status.
During the enlightenment, Le Doeuff argues, a general system of thought based on 
reason became vulnerable to localized discoveries made by the sciences. ‘[0]ne 
constructs by pure mental exertion a palace of systematic ideas, and then there ensues 
some localised discovery, “a single part which wrecks the architecture,” and everything 
collapses. Hence the retreat from generality, from the “systems of the world,” as this 
proves to be an uninhabitable space.’44 This leaves the space of generality momentarily 
empty, she suggests, but it is soon ‘annexed’ by the Ideologues, a group of thinkers 
who, ‘possessing the limited authority conferred by a localised competence, expanded 
it into a right to pronounce on everything’45 Although the Ideologues actually draw on 
their partial knowledge in order to authorise their general expertise, they must also 
‘neutralize the force’ of this partial knowledge, for they are aware that local expertise 
(their own or another’s) is capable of destroying their general claims.46 In effect the
41 Le Doeuff, 'Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 161.
42 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 186. Note that although Le Doeuff does not directly state that 
Derrida deploys Roussel’s rhetorical strategies, she certainly suggests as much in a footnote: T would add 
this much to my comparison between Roussel and present-day philosophers: they too describe their 
discursive practice in terms of a privileged object: metaphor. The metaphor presupposes the literal 
meaning, but (we are told) since there is not literal meaning, there is nothing but metaphor and thus one is 
always already installed in a detour. This evidently serves to invalidate in advance the critique of the 
philosophers metaphorical evasions when faced with the ‘literal meaning’ of certain conflictual objects.’ 
Le Doeuff, The Philosophical Imaginary, 186 n.
43 Le Doeuff, The Philosophical Imaginary, 141. The words ‘an imaginary of learnedness’ refer to the 
rhetorical and imaginative attempts of learned discourses (psychoanalysis, psychology, but also the 
emerging sciences) to separate themselves from popular imagination and make it seem that their theories 
must be so.
44 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 168 
43 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 169 
46 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 169.
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Ideologues create an ‘imaginary knowledge’ for themselves, or their own ‘imaginary of 
learnedness. ’47
To help illustrate her point Le Doeuff describes the work of the eighteenth century 
gynaecologist Pierre Roussel. Roussel, she says, will happily dogmatise on all subjects 
but frequently denies his own local expertise, for he shows a ‘definitive scepticism 
concerning the most elementary question of gynaecology. ’48 ‘ Roussel sees sexual 
difference in every element of women’s lives and bodies, but holds that there is one 
bone in the body which admits of no sexual difference: namely the pubis. ’49 Here 
Roussel denies, not only his own local expertise but also the ‘literal’ or ‘commonsense’ 
place of female difference in the pubis. Le Doeuff names the mythological figure at 
work here the chiasma. She defines the chiasma as: ‘the denial of a quality ‘X’ to an 
object or place which common sense holds it actually to possess, with the compensating 
attribution of that same quality to everything but that object or place’ and ‘the 
transposition of an authority founded on a competence which . . . makes it possible to 
suspend the reign of authority over the very domain the writer himself is supposed to 
master. ’50 Indeed, as Le Doeuff points out for Roussel there is ‘[s]ilence as to the literal 
meaning, a void at the centre; metonymic proliferation everywhere else,’ and she 
concludes: ‘[i]n my view we have a function over four terms, not just over there, as in 
the figure of “displacement.”’5'
From a metaphysic a point of view
Le Dceuff’s essay helps us see that what Stone actually finds in Wittgenstein’s work is a 
critique of the chiasmic devices where by Derridain deconstruction may globalise its 
outlook.52 One globalising strategy is to insist that the ‘metaphysics of presence’ is the
47 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 141.
48 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 140
49 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 140.
50 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 140.
51 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 140.
?2 There is an important objection to this reading for it seems to assign ultimate responsibility to the 
author of the text, almost as if participation in the chiasmic logic were a calculated strategy on Derrida’s 
behalf. This appears to be the reversal of Staten’s objectionable claim that ‘the unwary reader’ must take 
responsibility for the ‘metaphysical tendencies’ of deconstruction. Penelope Deutscher raises a similar 
objection to some aspects of Le Dceuff’s work. According to Deutscher, ‘because Le Doeuff analyses the 
work performed by contradictions, there is sometimes a tendency towards the suggestion that 
contradictions have been deployed by agents so as to perform the rhetorical work in question. ‘Language 
which ascribes intentions is manifest’ in her early writing in particular: 'si on veut dogmatiser.' If one 
wants to be dogmatic, suggests Le Doeuff, one first has to express modesty about the force of one’s local 
knowledge.’ However, Deutscher points out that Le Doeuff’s analysis of the contradictory chiasmic logic 
does not always focus on authorial intentions, but instead often operates as an ‘“effects-based” analysis.’
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only philosophical ideal (both Glendinning and Staten make this claim) and the other 
strategy is to insist that everyday meanings are intrinsically metaphysical - a move only 
made by Staten.
For if Wittgenstein, as I have argued, is as a thinker concerned with the imaginary 
figure of the chiasma, then one cannot presume that the ‘metaphysics of presence’ is his 
only target. Indeed by critiquing the ‘metaphysics of presence,’ an ideal that is prevalent 
both in the philosophical discipline and in Western thought, Wittgenstein is not thereby 
prevented from also criticising the rhetorical means by which the discipline of 
philosophy claims a general authority for itself. Le Doeuff and Wittgenstein each remind 
us of the way philosophy can participate in an ‘imaginary of learnedness,’ which is to 
evoke a notion of philosophy in a far more limited sense than Derrida would allow. My 
claim is that although philosophical theories have their source in everyday feelings, 
images and desires, these feelings and desires can nevertheless manifest themselves in 
specifically academic fantasies (for example the academic fantasy of becoming an all 
encompassing discourse) . 53
One of the ways that philosophy establishes itself as a foundational discourse is 
through the ‘metaphysics of presence,’ the claim to have identified the essential 
meaning of a our concepts, 54 but another way that philosophy sets itself up as a 
founding discourse is by blurring the distinction between philosophical language and 
ordinary language entirely; by denying that philosophy is a genre of thought among 
others. In Hipparchia s Choice Le Doeuff levels this criticism against deconstruction: 
‘since it is philosophy which has understood that all philosophies arise from forces 
which pre-exist thought, should we not recognize once more that the challenge to 
philosophy comes from itself? If it is internal, it is a trick of philosophy; thus 
philosophy still entirely contains itself, including any challenges to it. The Derridians 
have made much of this detour which returns to the point of departure, with all the 
imaginable consequences for the defence of the pre-eminence of philosophy over all the 
other disciplines. ’55
Such an analysis, investigates the possible rhetorical effects of a text while bracketing off questions of 
authorial intention. This second type of analysis fits better with the reading of Wittgenstein that I am 
developing for it acknowledges that texts give rise to multiple rhetorical effects. Nevertheless, as I also 
suggest in this chapter, an effects based approach need not divorce us from all talk of responsibility or 
feeling. See Penelope Deutscher, Yielding Gender: feminism, deconstruction and the history of 
philosophy (London: Routledge, 1997), 67-69.
53 Le Doeuff also makes this point in ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas.’
34 Hence philosophy claims the general authority of a science.
55 Michele Le Doeuff, Hipparchia’s Choice: an Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc, trans. Trista 
Selous (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 167.
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Ironically, Le Doeuffs criticism could equally be levelled at Stone, who ends his 
article by asking whether by challenging philosophy’s capacity to make general claims, 
the discipline will lose all its importance? According to Stone, Wittgenstein’s ‘idea of 
philosophical success -  at once deeply practical and negative -  may seem to spell the 
end of philosophy. But one ought to remember that in so far as the philosophical 
problem involves a false sense of a philosopher’s importance, the structure of the 
problem is such that it is philosophy which is needed to solve it. ’56 When faced with the 
prospect that Wittgenstein’s challenge to general theoretical claims might also 
undermine philosophy’s authority, Stone quickly takes the opportunity to reassert the 
importance of philosophy insisting, in effect, that ‘the challenge to philosophy comes 
from itself. ’57 Stone fails to recognise that by abandoning the claim to be a general 
authority Wittgenstein primarily gives up the imaginative philosophical attempt to 
secure for itself a general territory. But in that case what kind of philosophical practice 
remains?
I propose that Wittgenstein is not just a critic of philosophy’s globalising impulse, 
but also a practitioner who envisages a new way of doing philosophy which is no longer 
driven by the need for final self definition.58 In Hipparchias Choice, Le Dceuff points 
to the intimate tie between claims of philosophical authority and the activity of 
assigning a definitive meaning to the word ‘philosophy.’7' But in the practice that Le 
Doeuff envisages, philosophy’s lack of strict definition should cease ‘to be a problem 
and becomes on the contrary a sign that the dynamics of thought are getting themselves 
reorientated.,6° To describe this conception of philosophy she borrows Henri Bergson’s 
term ‘thinking-on-the-move.’M But this description also recalls Wittgenstein’s own
56 Stone, ‘Wittgenstein on Deconstruction,’ 112. In response to Stone I suggest that art, literature and the 
sciences also have ways of making this problem explicit.
57 Although these are Le Doeuffs words they clearly resonate with Stone’s aspirations for philosophy. Le 
Dceuff, Hipparchia’s Choice, 167.
5X Abandoning the task of self-definition should not be interpreted to imply that philosophy has no 
meaning. Rather, efforts to fix the definition of philosophy or to assert philosophical territory prevent 
philosophy from being the kind of practice which is capable of reorienting itself. This ties in with 
Cavell’s observation that for Wittgenstein philosophy is unassertive, it ‘does not speak first. Philosophy’s 
virtue is responsiveness.’ Stanley Cavell, ‘Declining Decline: Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Culture,’ 
This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein (Albuquerque: Living 
Batch Press, 1989), 74. In the context of Cavell’s work this idea will be explored further in Chapter 5.
59 Le Doeuff’s idea that we should give up the task of defining philosophy once and for all is similar to the 
more general point that Wittgenstein makes when he says that many concepts do not have a single 
definition but a ‘family’ of interrelated meanings.
60 Le Doeuff, Hipparchia’s Choice, 168.
61 Le Doeuff, Hipparchia’s Choice, 168. Le Doeuff is drawing on Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, 
trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), 153.
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description of thought, describing the world ‘in its flight. ’62
Now as we saw earlier Glendinning speaks of philosophy as being ‘unplaceable,’ in 
the sense that the metaphysical ‘ideal of exactness’ is not confined to a particular class 
of sentences but is embedded in our ordinary language.62 While this conception of 
metaphysics is of great importance to Wittgenstein, his work also shows us that the 
effort to define metaphysics as a particular language game (for example, the idealisation 
of concepts) which is the ‘mythology’ of our culture, can have, as one of its rhetorical 
effects, the assertion of philosophical authority over other fields of thought. This gesture 
risks undermining the true ‘unplaceable’ quality of philosophy, in Le Doeuff’s sense of 
the term, its co-existence with other forms of thought - the dynamic which enables 
thought’s continual reorientation.
However, Le Dceuff also offers us a way to think about the scope and the limits of 
Stone’s effort to differentiate Wittgenstein and deconstruction. For according to Le 
Doeuff, philosophical theories that claim the general authority of a ‘metaphysic’ are 
capable of being reconceived as a valuable ethic or ‘point of view,’ if they are mobilised 
alongside other perspectives from both inside and outside the field of philosophy.M As 
we have seen Wittgenstein uses this technique in his reading of Freud. But I also believe 
that by revealing that deconstruction entails two moments, a moment that reveals the 
structural anonymity of the sign, and a leap of affirmation, Glendinning also draws 
attention to the movement of deconstructive thought, its refusal to solidify into a 
metaphysic. So although Glendinning is wrong to claim that Wittgenstein’s only target 
is the ‘metaphysics of presence,’ he does not complete the logic of the chiasma, because 
he does not claim, as Staten claims, that the ordinary and the everyday is intrinsically 
and inevitably metaphysical. He recognises the affirmative leap entailed by 
Wittgenstein’s appeal to the everyday.
To bring this section to an end I want to indicate an important difference between Le 
Doeuff’s account of the chiasma and the reading I am making of Wittgenstein’s work. 
For while Le Doeuff argues that some elements of Roussel’s thought were adopted by 
the popular imaginary, she also insists that the chiasmic logic - ‘silence about the thing 
itself with hyperbolic proliferation of metaphors elsewhere; denying the partial and the 
local, while appealing to the general and global’ -  has never operated beyond ‘the world
62 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, G. H. von Wright ed., Peter Winch trans. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998), 7.
63 Glendinning, On being with Others, 85.
64 Le Doeuff develops this idea in her discussion of Simone de Beauvoir who she argues utilizes 
existentialism as ‘point of view’ rather than a ‘metaphysics.’ See Hipparchia's Choice p. 89-91
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of letters and learning.'6" She writes: ‘[ t]he non-exportable quality of these ideas 
suggests that they amount simply to a self-serving advocacy . . . that they belong not 
just to a learned imaginary but to an imaginary of learnedness. ’ 66 While Wittgenstein 
also critiques this ‘imaginary of learnedness,’ the rhetorical techniques he develops in 
his effort to undo its chiasmic logic have direct bearing not only on the learned 
imaginary but on fantasy formations more broadly. One might say that for Wittgenstein 
the ‘ordinary’ and the ‘literal’ play a dual function: to challenge the reduction of 
deconstruction to a moment of structural anonymity, and to deconstruct the 
metaphysical dream of normality and literality by rethinking these terms from within.
‘Tethering’ in the Investigations
In place of Stone’s image of words returned to a pre-philosophical or pre-academic 
ordinary, I want to propose Cavell's scene of ‘tethering. ’67 According to Cavell, the 
notion of ‘tethering’: ‘reverses Derrida’s picture of philosophy’s concept of writing as 
extending the limits . . .  of the voice or breath . . . turns it so to speak into one of 
limiting the inevitable extension of the voice, which must always escape me and will 
forever seek its way back to me. ’ 68 In Cavell’s view this shows that:
the price of having once spoken, or remarked, taken something as remarkable (worth 
noting, yours to note, about which to make an ado), is to have spoken forever, to have 
entered the arena of the inexcusable, to have taken on the responsibility of speaking 
further, the unending responsibility of responsiveness, or answerability, to make 
yourself intelligible. It is in recognizing th is  abandonm ent to my words, as if to 
unfeasible epitaphs, presaging the leave -  taking of death, that I know my voice, 
recognize my words (no different from yours) as mine.69
Hence the gesture of ‘tethering’ does not, cover over the ‘truth of scepticism,’ for we 
are inevitably abandoned to our words, to the un-grounded dimension of language. The
h5 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 159.
66 Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas,’ 159.
67 Both Stone’s pre-philosophical ordinary and Cavell’s image of ‘tethering,’ are originally drawn from 
Austin, and are later applied, by each author to their discussion of Wittgenstein. So in a certain sense the 
dispute between Stone and Cavell I will outline not only concerns Wittgenstein but also J. L. Austin, 
especially his book How to Do Things with Words. See J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
68 Stanley Cavell, ‘What Did Derrida Want of Austin?’ Philosophical Passages'. Wittgenstein, Emerson, 
Austin, Derrida (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 64. Cavell’s italics.
69 Cavell, ‘What Did Derrida Want of Austin?,’ 64-65. Cavell’s italics.
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danger of this sceptical truth is that it leads us to ‘abdicate such responsibility as we 
have over our words. ’ 70 In face of this threat, Derrida’s strategy is to rethink 
conceptuality so that it takes into account this metaphysical incertitude. However, 
Cavell believes that we must do more than mark this ‘inevitable’ escape of meaning, for 
it is by ‘recognizing this abandonment to my words’ that I also accept our public 
language as my own. Language, Cavell suggests is public and anonymous, in the sense 
that words will ‘always escape me’ (always exceed their authorial intention) however I 
can still tether myself to words, make them my own, by taking on the ‘unending 
responsibility of responsiveness.’
Speaking directly about the Investigations, Cavell writes that Wittgenstein
finds the (actual) everyday to be as pervasive a scene of illusion and trance and 
artificiality (of need) as Plato or Rousseau or Marx or Thoreau has found. His 
philosophy of the (eventual) everyday is the proposal of a practice that takes on, takes 
upon itself, precisely (I do not say exclusively) that scene of illusion and of loss; 
approaches it, or let me say reproaches it, intimately enough to turn it, or deliver it; as 
if the actual is the womb, contains the terms, of the eventual.71
These comments suggest that the transformation that Wittgenstein brings about is itself 
ambiguous, not simply a return to what is familiar, but neither a turn to something 
wholly new.72 Indeed what differentiates Wittgenstein’s efforts to overcome life’s daily 
illusions from other thinkers, according to Cavell, is the insight that
the ordinary has, and alone has the power to move the ordinary, to leave the human 
habitat habitable, the same transfigured. The practice of the ordinary may be thought 
of as the overcoming of . . . replication or imitation by repetition, of counting by 
recounting, of calling by recalling. It is the familiar invaded by another familiar. 
Hence ordinary language procedures, like the procedures of psychoanalysis, inherently 
partake of the uncanny.73
In Stone’s view Wittgenstein dispenses with the philosopher’s sense that words are 
strange or ‘queer.’ But Cavell’s comments suggest that Wittgenstein’s response to our
70 Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: the Constitution of Emersonian 
Perfectionism, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 22.
71 Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ 46.
7: Simon Glendinning also recognizes the dual quality of ordinary language, as I suggested at the start of 
the chapter.
73 Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ 47.
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metaphysical and sceptical illusion - his practice of ‘tethering,’ ‘recounting’ and 
‘recalling,’ might itself be understood as an ‘uncanny’ procedure.
‘The familiar invaded by another familiar’
In the concluding sections of this chapter I will return to Wittgenstein’s conversations 
on Freud, to explain how they exemplify the procedure of tethering that Cavell outlines. 
Consider, for example, the following passage from Wittgenstein’s conversations with 
Rhees.
I (L.W.) was once looking at an exhibition of paintings by a young woman artist in 
Vienna. There was one painting of a bare room, like a cellar, Two men in top hats 
were sitting on chairs. Nothing else. And the title: ‘Besuch’ (‘Visit’). When I saw this 
I said at once ‘This is a dream,’ (my sister described the picture to Freud, and he said 
‘Oh yes, that is quite a common dream’ -  connected with virginity.) Not that the title 
is what clinches it as a dream -  by which I do not mean that anything like this was 
dreamt by the painter while asleep. You would not say of every painting ‘this is a 
dream.’ And this does show that there is something like a dream language.
Freud mentions various symbols: top hats are regularly phallic symbols, wooden 
things like tables are women, etc. His historical explanation of these symbols is 
absurd. We might say it is not needed anyway: it is the most natural thing in the world 
that a table should be that sort of symbol.
But dreaming -  using this sort of language -  although it may be used to refer to a 
woman or to a phallus, may also be used not to refer to that at all. If some activity is 
shown to be carried out often for a certain purpose -  striking someone to inflict pain -  
then a hundred to one it is also carried out under other circumstances not for that 
purpose. He may just want to strike him without thinking of inflicting pain at all. The 
fact that we are inclined to recognize the hat as a phallic symbol does not mean that 
the artist was necessarily referring to a phallus in any way when she painted it.
Consider the difficulty that if a symbol in a dream is not understood, it does not 
seem to be a symbol at all. So why call it one? 74
According to Wittgenstein, although it is peculiar to suggest, as Freud suggests, that 
a ‘table=a woman,’ or a ‘top hat=a phallus,’ or that the painting as a whole symbolises 
virginity, these symbols might also easily strike us as ‘the most natural thing in the 
world.' Freud’s interpretation, Wittgenstein suggests, has a strange appeal. As I have
74 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 43-44.
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already argued earlier, this description fits with Wittgenstein’s characterisation of a 
person enthralled by metaphysics. ‘Wittgenstein’s metaphysical’ Cavell writes, 
‘appears as the ordinary hyperbolicized, Wittgenstein sometimes says sublimised. ’77 
In the above passage Wittgenstein responds to the strange attractiveness of 
A Freudian reading of ‘Visit,’ by tethering us to further everyday possibilities of the 
term ‘dreaming.’ He reminds us, for example, that although the dream-painting ‘may be 
used to refer to a woman or to a phallus’ it ‘may also be used not to refer to that at all.’ 
Although Wittgenstein tries to dispel the strange appeal of the psychoanalytic ‘must 
always’ through this procedure of tethering, he does not reject the uncanny but engages 
with it in a new way.
Indeed for Wittgenstein ‘the familiar’ (the top hat symbolises a phallus, the table a 
woman) is ‘invaded by another familiar’ (the top hat and the table also have other 
meanings). The other meanings Wittgenstein appeals to include the recognition that the 
artist who painted ‘Visit,’ was not ‘necessarily referring to a phallus in any way.’
Notice that the meanings that the artist gives her painting remain an important 
consideration for Wittgenstein, even though the painting’s dreamlike quality does not 
depend on anything that the painter experienced when she was asleep. Without 
appealing to the inner intentions of the artist, or trying to reconstruct her perspective, 
Wittgenstein nevertheless portrays her point of view as worthy of respect, a valuable 
counterpoint to the interpretation of the analyst. One might conclude that just as 
Wittgenstein acknowledges that the artist’s view is valuable, even though her inner 
thoughts do not determine the painting’s meaning, he also insists that ‘straightforward’ 
dreams must not be ignored, even though all dreams do not speak straightforwardly.‘It 
is probable that there are many different sorts of dreams and that there is not single line 
of explanation for all of them,’ Wittgenstein writes, ‘[jjust as there are many different 
sorts of jokes. Or just as there are many different sorts of language. ’ 76
This procedure of tethering, which might also be thought of, conversely, as the 
unravelling of the chiasmic logic, helps highlight differences in Wittgenstein and 
Derrida’s responses to the Freudian notion of ‘displacement.’ Derrida likes Freud’s 
notion of displacement because it challenges the ideal of literality, but he is critical of 
Freud’s idea that it is possible to interpret or translate the displaced ‘meaning’ of 
dreams according to a law.77 Wittgenstein agrees with Derrida that there is no one way
75 Stanley Cavell, ‘The Argument of the Ordinary,’ Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The 
constitution o f Emersonian Perfectionism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 99.
76 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 47-48.
77 Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing,’ 209.
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to interpreting a dream. But in keeping with Le Doeuff, he warns that in generalising the 
notion of displacement, Freud fails to recognise that certain dreams may not function as 
symbols or metaphors at all.78 At the end of his discussion of the dream symbolism 
suggested by the painting ‘Visit’ Wittgenstein remarks: ‘[c]onsider the difficulty that if 
a symbol in a dream is not understood, it does not seem to be a symbol at all. So why 
call it one? ’ 79
The enigmatic dream fragment
As his conversation with Rhees progresses Wittgenstein reformulates this question by 
describing what he perceives to be the language-like quality of dreams.
There seems to be something in dream images that has a certain resemblance to the 
signs of a language. As a series of marks on paper or on sand might have. There might 
be no mark which we recognised as a conventional sign in any alphabet we knew, and 
yet we might have a strong feeling that they must be a language of some sort: that they 
mean something. There is a cathedral in Moscow with five spires. On each of these 
there is a different sort of curving configuration. One gets the strong impression that 
these different shapes and arrangements must mean something.80
So although dreams resemble language puzzles in the sense that they ‘invite 
interpretation,’ they cannot be translated according to a definite code, so are not 
language-like in that regard. Wittgenstein goes on to say:
[s]uppose we were to regard a dream as a kind o f game which the dreamer played. 
(And by the way, there is no one cause or one reason why children always play. This 
is where theories of play generally go wrong.) There might be a game in which paper 
figures were put together to form a story, or at any rate were somehow assembled. The 
materials might be collected and stored in a scrap-book, full of pictures and anecdotes. 
The child m ight then take various bits from the scrap-book to put into the 
construction, and he might take a considerable picture because it had something in it 
which he wanted and he might just include the rest because it was th e re .81
78 See Wittgenstein’s discussion of camouflaged wish fulfillment, for example in ‘Conversations on 
Freud,’ 47.
79 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 43-44.
K0 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 45
xl Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 49-50
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Not only does Wittgenstein suggest that different parts of a dream can be interpreted 
in various ways, but he also suggests that there are parts of a dream that may be there 
for no significant reason; indeed a dream may have no ‘right interpretation’ at all.82 
Here Wittgenstein assigns a second function to the term ‘literal dream.’ For to undo 
Freud's chiasmic logic Wittgenstein appeals, not only to the dreams literal or 
‘straightforward’ meaning but also to the dreams enigmatic quality, its capacity to resist 
interpretation entirely. Given that Wittgenstein makes the nonsense of fantasies ‘patent’ 
in the Investigations through a persistent literalism, and given his open-ended 
engagement with nonsense, one might ask: what is at stake in the comparison he makes 
between language and dreaming? For although Wittgenstein certainly speaks of the 
language-like quality of dreams, his comments may also have bearing on the dream­
like quality of language, its validity in excess of codification - an excess suggestive of 
the Freudian notion of the unconscious. So in conclusion I want to ask if Wittgenstein’s 
comments on dreaming might in some way be characteristic of the vision of language 
and life he inaugurates?
Up till now this chapter has drawn on Wittgenstein’s reading of Freud to explicate a 
series of stylistic and thematic concerns that distinguish Wittgenstein from Derrida. By 
outlining these differences I hope to indicate the ways that Wittgenstein’s thought 
exceeds the preoccupations of the deconstructive readings. However, 1 also believe that 
there is an important congruity between Derrida’s deconstructive approach to Freud and 
Wittgenstein’s critical ‘discipleship’ that need to be addressed. For although 
Wittgenstein and Derrida deploy quite different techniques in their critique of 
mythology,82 both authors ultimately value the Freudian account of the unconscious for 
similar reasons.
In the section that follows I will illustrate my point by reading Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on dreaming in conjunction with Derrida’s essay ‘Freud and the Scene of 
Writing, ’ which is a response to Freud’s 1925 essay ‘Note upon the Mystic Writing 
Pad.’84 Like Wittgenstein, Derrida suggests in his essay that Freud’s important 
contribution is something other than his claim to provide a scientific account of dreams. 
He locates within Freud’s work, a notion of dreaming which puts an ‘essential 
limitation’ on ‘generality and the fixity of a specific code for dream writing.’8^ He notes
x: Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 50
x3 Derrida emphases the open play of metaphor, Wittgenstein the transformative potential of terms such as 
the ordinary, literal and the local.
x4 In ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’ Derrida does not confine himself to this essay but draws on its 
notion of writing, to re-read Freud from the Project (1895) onwards. 
x5 Derrida ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing,’ 210.
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that at times Freud separates his activity from simple decoding and is ‘prepared to find 
that the same piece of content may conceal a different meaning when it occurs in 
various people or in various contexts. ’ 86 This fits closely with Wittgenstein’s insistence 
that an image or sign in a dream can give rise to different interpretations.
Derrida also draws attention to the way that Freud likens dream language to Chinese 
writing. He writes that dream symbols ‘frequently have more than one or even several 
meanings, and as with Chinese script,’ and ‘the correct interpretation can only be 
arrived at on each occasion from the context. ’ 87 Wittgenstein also ties the language-like 
quality of dreams to their resemblance to writing: T might be making scratches on the 
wall. It seems in a way like writing, but it is not a writing which either I or anyone else 
would recognise or understand. ’88 In Derrida’s view, ‘this writing, for example, the 
kind we find in dreams which follow “old facilitations,” a simple moment in a 
regression towards a “primary” writing, cannot be read in terms of any code. ’89
It works, no doubt, w ith a m ass o f  elem ents w hich have been cod ified  in the course o f  
an individual or co llec tiv e  history. But in its operations, lex icon , and syntax a purely  
id iom atic residue is irreducible and is m ade to bear the burden o f  interpretation in the 
com m unication betw een unconsciousness.90
Like the five spires of the cathedral in Moscow that Wittgenstein describes, the dream 
writing that Derrida finds in Freud’s essay is ‘irreducible’ to a single interpretation or 
code.
Derrida finds in Freud’s dream writing a metaphor not only for dreaming or the 
unconscious, but for language in general. ‘The logical and ideal structures of conscious 
speech’ he writes, ‘must thus submit to the dream system and become subordinate to it, 
like part of its machinery. ’91 So although the term ‘dream writing’ is ‘singular and 
irreducible’ in the sense that it emerges from particular ‘textual chains, ’92 he also
8fi Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud vol. 4 
(London, Hogarth Press: 1975), 105 quoted in Derrida ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing,’ 209.
87 Freud, Complete Psychological Works vol. 5, 353.
88 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 44.
89 Derrida ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing,’ 210.
90 Derrida ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing,’ 210. Could Wittgenstein’s ‘private language’ be tied to the 
private grammar of dreams that Derrida describes? I will explore this idea at the end of Chapter 5.
91 Derrida ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing,’ 218
92 Derrida makes these comments in Limited Inc, 155 but they also apply to his discussion o f ‘dream 
writing.’
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recognises that it ‘share[s] a certain functional analogy’43 with other deconstructive 
concepts such as ‘writing,’ ‘iterability’ and ‘generalised metaphoricity.’
Wittgenstein also believes that dream writing cannot be confined to actual dreams.94 
He holds this view partially because he believes that in an important sense our dream 
readings are ‘still part of the dream, ’95 and partially because the waking world can 
sometimes strikes us as dream-like. Indeed the majority of the examples of dream- 
language that he raises (the painting, scratch marks on the wall or in the sand, the 
Moscow Cathedral, the child’s scrap book) are not real dreams at all, but language 
games: language games which we do not always know how to play. Like the Freudian 
unconscious, we might think of Wittgenstein’s dream-writing as an enigmatic excess 
within the fabric of daily life.
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein limits the expansion of the notion of ‘dream writing’ into 
all aspects of life and language in an important way. For example, he says: ‘[y]ou would 
not say of every painting ‘this is a dream.’ And this shows that there is something like a 
dream language. ’ 96 This remark is indicative of the ‘criss-cross’ 97 nature of
Wittgenstein’s work, his continual tendency to check the generalising impulse of his 
own thought. The analogy I highlighted between Wittgenstein’s notions of dream­
writing and philosophical nonsense suggests that dream language and the realm of the 
unconscious more broadly form an important part of his procedure. However, nor 
would it be true to say that Wittgenstein, strives to ‘submit’ all ‘conscious speech’ to the 
operations of a dream writing, because for Wittgenstein the very notion of dream­
writing gets its meaning from the fact that all language does not strike us as dream-like.
However, dream-writing may be suggestive of Wittgenstein’s procedure in a 
somewhat different regard: for according to Wittgenstein a dream sign, which has no 
definitive context of its own, can invite the process of contextualization. ‘When a 
dream is interpreted it is fitted into a context in which it ceases to be puzzling. In a 
sense the dreamer re-dreams his dream in surroundings such that its aspect changes. ’ 98 
Still, this process of contextualisation remains open in the sense that it is ‘always 
possible that its aspect changes when it is brought into relation with other things 
remembered’ and in the sense that ‘there may be no ground for saying that there must
93 Derrida, Limited Inc, 155.
94 Here Wittgenstein demonstrates his understanding of Freud’s account of dreaming, for as Freud 
increasingly comes to believe, unconscious fantasy formations are not limited to actual dreams, or to the 
symptoms of his patients, but are part of the fabric of everyday life.
95 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 45.
96 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 43.
97 Wittgenstein uses these words in the preface to the Investigations.
9X Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 45
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be an interpretation of the whole thing or of every detail of it on similar lines. ’99
The readings of Freud I have just outlined are emblematic of both the meeting and 
the passing of Wittgenstein’s later and Derrida’s early thought. On the one hand, both 
authors emphasise the ambiguous quality of the unconscious, its resistance to singular 
translation, its open suggestiveness, but on the other hand Wittgenstein shares Freud’s 
concern for the lived and felt dimension of fantasy, and borrows his notion of therapy, 
two aspects of psychoanalysis that are not directly manifest in Derrida’s early writings. 
Furthermore, stylistic differences between the two authors complicate the task of 
articulating what bearing their shared notion of the unconscious might have on an 
understanding of language more broadly. In my view, it is particularly important that 
Freud’s work forms the space of this encounter. In the discussion that follows I will 
build on the notion of the unconscious explicated by Wittgenstein and Derrida by 
turning to Freud’s work directly and to a series of authors who read Wittgenstein’s 
therapeutic project in the light of psychoanalysis. My aim will be to investigate the 
analogy between Wittgenstein’s account of nonsense and the operations of the Freudian 
unconscious. As the previous discussion already implies, the unconscious resembles 
Wittgenstein’s account of philosophical nonsense in the sense that it too can be the stuff 
of fantasy and the material for its overcoming - the dimension of everyday language that 
resists full translation and provokes possibilities. In the chapter that follows I will 
explore the transformative potential of the unconscious by outlining Wittgenstein’s 
approach to its existential and unthought dimensions.
99 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 46,49.
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Chapter 5
Acknowledging the Unconscious
Introduction
In the previous chapter I argued that fantasy has a double aspect, for it can strike us as 
natural and perturbing. Sometimes these contradictory feelings mix - when, for 
example, the strange appeal of the fantasy-picture leads to a crisis of meaning - but 
often the uncanny insistence of mythology goes unfelt and strikes us as normal. By 
persistently staging our fantasies existentially, Wittgenstein reminds us of their lived 
dimension, of the paradoxical mixture of feelings they entail. But if Wittgenstein’s 
concern is primarily with the state of culture why does he intertwine fantasy-image with 
subjective feeling? In this chapter I will further explore the double aspect of fantasy. 
However, in order to explicate the relation between the unthought and existential 
dimensions of fantasy I will need to move beyond the previous deconstructive reading. 
Although Derrida will continue to be a reference point, I will also draw on the work of 
Stanley Cavell, Sigmund Freud, Eric Santner, Jean Laplanche, and Antonia Soulez to 
address Wittgenstein’s engagement with the lived dimension of fantasy.
Indeed, as Cavell suggests, the transformation that Wittgenstein promises as an 
outcome of therapy is itself ambiguous, not simply a return to what is familiar, but 
neither a turn to something wholly new.1 A conversion of our culture, our world is 
called for, but as if from within. This chapter investigates how such a conversion might 
take place. I will argue that the unconscious, the stuff of fantasy, is also what we must 
open to, acknowledge, in others and ourselves in order to bring about this conversion. 
For the outcome of therapy is not a determinate subjective state; rather the subject is 
reconceived always in relation and in reaction to others.
To make my argument I will extend my discussion of Cavell’s notion of 
‘philosophical responsiveness’ and elaborate on Wittgenstein’s technique of 
imaginative literalism.
1 Stanley Cavell, ‘Declining Decline: Wittgenstein as a Philosopher o f Culture,’ This New Yet 
Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein (Albuquerque: Living Batch Press, 
1989), 46. As I argued at the start of Chapter 4, Simon Glendinning also recognizes the dual quality of 
ordinary language in On Being with Others.
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I will also return to themes established in Chapter 2. In particular I will bring together 
Wittgenstein’s non-psychological account of the feeling (feelings that are manifest in 
language and practice) and the ethical space of relation opened up by his imaginative 
engagement with the speaker of nonsense. My intent will be to show that Wittgenstein’s 
testimony to the miracle of existence, his vision of the possibilities of language, is 
brought about through our shared opening to nonsense.
The ‘language of a suffering subject’ or the ‘suffering language of a subject’?
In her article ‘Conversion in Philosophy: Wittgenstein’s ‘Saving Word,” Antonia 
Soulez recognises the very problematic that concerns us. Namely, that although 
Wittgenstein puts great importance on our subjective reactions, he does not designate 
the cure of the ‘subject’ as the endpoint of therapy. To help illustrate the very particular 
notion of therapy at work here she compares Wittgenstein to Freud.
Soulez recognises various allegiances between the therapeutic practice of the two 
thinkers. Both struggle with powerful mythologies that operate at the level of feeling 
and imagination and that leave traces in language. They both address a ‘pathological’ 
speaker who is struck by the ‘omnipotence of thoughts.’2 ‘[UJnder the sway of a foreign 
will,’ Soulez writes, the speaker ‘uses language like dead signs, in some way uprooted 
from the milieu which naturally gives them meaning.’3 Both therapies understand ‘cure’ 
as a turn (or return to) the shared life of our words, and to ‘the assurance that one is 
understood by those around one.’4
However, while Soulez believes that Freud addresses the ‘language of a suffering 
subject,’ she believes that Wittgenstein’s concern is with the ‘suffering language of a 
subject,’ which, as she points out, is a different thing entirely.5 For while in her view 
Freud’s interest in the ‘omnipotence of thoughts’ pertains to a ‘singular subject 
influenced by a repetition compulsion linked to his specific fantasies,’ Wittgenstein 
‘situates this phenomenon on the level of language that is inherited by all of us.’6 Indeed 
as early as proposition 4.002 of the Tractatus Wittgenstein tells us that, ‘[ejveryday 
language is part of the human organism and is not less complicated than it.’
2 Antonia Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy: Wittgenstein’s “Saving Word,”’ trans. Melissa McMahon, 
Hypatia 15, no. 4 (2000): 143.
3 Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 142.
4 Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 142. However, the nature of this ‘understanding’ will be under 
discussion in this chapter.
5 Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 142.
6 Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 143.
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In Soulez’s view, Wittgensteinian therapy is ‘addressed to a community affected by 
certain unhealthy attachments to compulsive forms of thought that mentally enslave 
some of its members. ’ 7 The community is the ‘linguistically suffering body that must be 
saved on the level of its users, for obviously one cannot directly act on it as a whole, nor 
change everybody at once, ’ 8 and the subject is ‘the level at which the speaker vouches 
for the signs that one uses before the community. ’9
This is not to say, however, that there is no relation between individual suffering and 
the suffering of a culture. For as Soulez points out, the well being of Wittgenstein’s 
individual speaker rests with the ‘health’ of the community as a whole; and for Freud an 
unwell civilization can impact on the language of individual speakers. But although 
Freud speaks of a ‘neurotic society’ in certain sections of Civilization and Its 
Discontents, Soulez believes that ‘treating such a society therapeutically remains in his 
eyes a null and void idea, and the project of “tearing away . . . concepts . . . from the 
sphere in which they have originated and been evolved,” is for him a dangerous 
business evoking the mission of a prophet. ' 10 Wittgenstein, on the other hand, ‘struggles 
on the level of language for a speaking culture,’ but ultimately ‘remains silent on the 
topic of the subject affected by the linguistic ills for which s/he is also responsible. ’ * 11 So 
although Wittgenstein’s is not an overtly political philosophy, Soulez casts him as ‘a 
therapist engaged in the service of the linguistic community, perhaps even, as Nietzsche 
said, a “doctor of civilisation. ’” 12
These final remarks may seem particularly difficult to understand, especially 
because, as Soulez herself admits, Wittgenstein clearly appears to delve into the subject 
when she explores the felt and imagined dimension of mythologies. However her 
suggestion is that by staging these feelings and images, Wittgenstein does not take 
himself as representative of a suffering individual, but rather of the suffering language 
of our community - a language we all carry within us but which is never simply our 
own. Rather than functioning as the site of individual cure, the subject becomes ‘co- 
responsible for the health of the collective speaking body. ’ 13
7 Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 143.
8 Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 143. 
l) Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 143.
10 Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 144. Soulez is quoting from Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its 
Discontents, Group Psychology, Civilization and its Discontents and other works: Vol 12 of the Pelican 
Freud Library, ed. A. Dickson, trans. James Starchey (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), 144.
11 Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 144.
12 Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 143-44.
13 Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 144.
148
Soulez’s account fits in with my own reading of Wittgenstein in two important 
regards. Firstly to make sense of the expression ‘suffering community,’ or ‘suffering 
language’ one must be able to think of feeling as something given in language, and not 
restricted to a determinate psychological state. In my view this means that although only 
certain individuals experience language as ‘queer’ or perturbing, these feelings and the 
‘crisis of meaning’ that follows pertain to a dimension of language and life which 
Wittgenstein suggests that we might each find within ourselves. But it also means that 
the transformation of feeling that Wittgenstein strives for takes place though language 
and practice itself.
Secondly, by evoking a shared responsibility to affect the wellbeing of the linguistic 
community, Soulez redirects focus from the subject to the ethical relation between 
subjects.
To help better understand this latter point, I will turn to Cavell’s account of the 
autobiographical or confessional dimension of Wittgenstein’s writing. According to 
Cavell:
[ojrdinary language philosophy system atizes, abstractly, the use o f the so-called first 
person. The method o f language games, or the kin (Austinian) method o f saying what 
we should say when, are nothing, not even one man’s opinion, let alone the sublime 
acts o f arrogation they turn out to be, unless they are games that I imagine m yself to 
play, words I find I have it in mind, or at hear, to say.14
As this passage suggests, it is of fundamental importance to Wittgenstein that his 
readers partake in the language-games of the Investigations, that they take themselves as 
representative speakers of ordinary language. However, the act of speaking for others or 
proposing a new vision of community, is a form of ‘sublime’ ‘arrogation’ which must 
take place, according to Wittgenstein, not impersonally or generally, but in the mode of 
the first person.
This implies that as a subject speaking in the name of a ‘healthy’ linguistic 
community, does not speak for us all, if by this one means in the voice of dominant 
cultural convention, but as an T  who finds within the public language they use, the
14 Stanley Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts On the Opening of Wittgenstein’s Investigations,’ 
Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida (Oxford: Blackwell , 1995), 177-78. 
‘Notes and Afterthoughts’ is based on the notes Cavell made for a course of lectures about Wittgenstein 
that he gave to his students between 1960 and 1979. He uses italic type to indicate his lecture notes, and 
regular type to indicate new interventions, mainly made at the point of transcription in 1991.1 have 
maintained this typological device in my quotations of his essay and will simply distinguish between my 
own, and Cavell’s emphasis in the extracts that follow.
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possibility of another community, a culture that in Cavell’s words ‘is not appalled by 
our mad origins, that is revolted, yet sane, in the face of culture’s current dispensation 
(artistic and political) and that promises us expression, breath.’1''
The ‘subject,’ on Cavell’s account is not the origin of its own meaning, nor does it 
directly reap the benefits of therapy which it nevertheless undergoes. One might say 
that Wittgenstein’s notion of the subject is inherently ethical in the sense that it is 
always considered to be in a state of relation to others. Soulez emphasises the ethical 
relation between subjects when she insists that we are all ‘co-responsible for the health 
of the collective speaking body. ’ 16 Cavell presents it in terms of our responsibility 
towards ‘another culture’ an ‘eventual’ 17 everyday, a community that cannot be spoken 
for communally, but which, as Wittgenstein demonstrates, can only be evoked 
paradoxically, through a subject who opens themselves to the ‘mad origins’ we share.
In Soulez’s eyes it is the ethical dimension of therapy that separates Wittgenstein 
from Freud. For according to Soulez, Freudian therapy focuses on the subject rather 
than subject in relation to others. This in turn is tied to Freud’s perceived reluctance to 
address the ‘health’ of our culture, to engage with fantasy in ways that might threaten to 
unsettle the subject’s place in the existing social framework.
However in his book - On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life - Eric Santner puts 
forward an alternate way of understanding the psychoanalytical procedures Freud 
inaugurates. In his study of the relation between Freud’s account of the psyche and the 
work of Jewish theologian Franz Rosenzweig, Santner recasts Freudian therapy as an 
‘intervention into this dimension of fantasy and thus into the very thing that at an 
unconscious level and often quite rigidly holds the subject’s world together. ’ 18 ‘What is 
at stake,’ he writes, ‘is the possibility of recovering, or “unbinding,” the destructive 
core of fantasy and converting it into “more life,” the hope and possibility of new 
possibilities. ’ 19 In my view, the ethical space of relation opened up by Wittgensteinian 
therapy can be understood in just these terms. To help illustrate this idea, I will begin 
with Cavell’s account of the responsiveness inherent in the Investigations.
15 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 182.
I(’ Soulez, ‘Conversion in Philosophy,’ 144.
17 Stanley Cavell, ‘Declining Decline, 46.
18 Eric L. Santner, On the Psychotheology o f Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig 
(Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 2001), 40.
19 Santner, Psychotheology, 40.
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The Opening of the Investigations
In his essay ‘Notes and Afterthoughts on the Opening of Wittgenstein’s Investigations,’ 
Cavell emphasises that Wittgenstein does not begin the Investigations with his own 
words but with the words of another, with Augustine’s childhood recollections about 
first learning language.
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards 
something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they 
uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily 
movements, as it were the natural language of all people: the expression of the face, 
the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of the 
voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejection, or avoiding 
something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various 
sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I 
had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.20
In section 1 Wittgenstein tells us that Augustine’s words ‘give . . .  a particular picture of 
the essence of human language.’ In this picture ‘the individual words in language name 
objects -  sentences are combinations of such names’ and it contains ‘the roots of the 
following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It 
is the object for which the word stands.’ Augustine’s words are troubling Wittgenstein 
goes on to say (in the first section of the Investigations), in the sense that he ‘does not 
speak of there being any difference between kinds of words.’
Later in the Investigations, Wittgenstein will relate his unease concerning this 
implicit picture of meaning entailed by Augustine’s words with the impossible demand 
for a truly private language. But for the moment Wittgenstein simply remarks that the 
‘philosophical concept of meaning’ implicit in Augustine’s words ‘has its place in a 
primitive idea of the way language functions, ’ but one can also describe it as ‘the idea 
of a language more primitive than ours.’21
What interests Cavell most of all in ‘Notes and Afterthoughts’ is not what 
Wittgenstein immediately says in criticism of Augustine’s passage, but rather what he
20 Extract from Augustine’s Confessions quoted in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958), §1.
21 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §2.
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does not say, given that the passage has just been ‘singled ... out as philosophically 
remarkable. ’ 22
He does not say, for example, that it is false, or that there is insufficient evidence for 
it, or that it contradicts something else Augustine says elsewhere, or that it is unclear, 
or that it contains an invalid argument. These are familiar terms o f criticism in 
philosophy; and they are strong ones. If any o f them does fit a statement, then that 
statement has been severely and importantly chastised,23
The absence of these standard forms of criticism in Wittgenstein’s response suggests 
perhaps that he takes the notion of meaning implied by Augustine’s words to be largely 
impervious to such critique. It also suggests that Wittgenstein’s aim is not to refute 
Augustine’s account, but rather to understand something further about the appeal of his 
words and also about the sense in which they are troubling. Cavell writes:
Wittgenstein (but what or who Wittgenstein is, o f course, not determined), is not led 
to philosophical reflection from his own voice (or what might be recognized, right 
off, as his own voice), but from, as it were, being accosted. The accosting is by 
someone Wittgenstein cares about and has to take seriously; in particular, it is by 
such a one speaking about his childhood, so in words o f memory, and more 
particularly, about his first memory o f words, say o f first acquiring them.24
Reflecting on the way Wittgenstein’s philosophising begins, not by itself but only 
because he is ‘accosted’ by someone he nevertheless ‘cares about,’ Cavell concludes 
that the ‘peculiar virtue’ of philosophy as Wittgenstein depicts it, is its capacity to listen 
and then respond, to stay ‘awake when all the others have fallen asleep. ’ 25 For by 
‘hearing philosophy called for in these unstriking words - the writer of the 
Investigations declares that philosophy does not speak first. Philosophy’s virtue is 
responsiveness. . . .  Its commitment is to hear itself called on, and when called on -  but 
only then, and only so far as it has an interest -  to speak. ’ 26 Indeed as Cavell points out, 
what Augustine says is not obviously ‘accosting’ - he is not arresting or provocative in 
the manner of Socrates’ interlocutors, for example. Cavell recalls that before he read the 
Investigations he had thought philosophically about the passages in Augustine’s
22 Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 130.
23 Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 130.
24 Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 128. Cavell’s emphasis.
23 Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 129.
26 Cavell ‘Declining Decline,’ 74.
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Confessions on the nature of time, but not about Augustine’s account of learning 
language. ‘So if there is something disturbing or remarkable about those words,’ Cavell 
writes, ‘then I am prepared to find that it is itself a remarkable fact about them. ’ 27 This 
implies that there is an ideological dimension to Augustine’s words, for their 
remarkableness, say their phantasmic quality, is passed off as normal. According to 
Cavell:
The altercation over two ways [of taking the Augustine passage] may sound as 
follows: One observes, ‘What could be less remarkable than Augustine’s remark about 
his elders moving around and uttering sounds?’ Another retorts [intensely, let us now 
add], ‘Less remarkable -  when we are in a maze of unanswered questions about what 
naming is, what it is to call a thing or a person, what constitutes an object, how we 
(with certainty) grasp one idea or image or concept rather that another, what makes a 
pointer point, a talker mean!' nothing is wrong; everything is wrong. It is the 
philosophical moment.28
Cavell’s account of the dispute between the ordinary and the metaphysical reading of 
Augustine’s words re-enforces my earlier suggestion that fantasy has a normal and a 
peculiar aspect; that it may induce an unthinking acceptance or a profound crisis.
Cavell’s suggestion, however, is that Wittgenstein does not intend the argument to 
be decided either way: ‘Wittgenstein’s Investigations is designed to show that (what I 
call) the voices of melancholy and merriment, or of metaphysics and the ordinary (or, as 
in my ‘Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,’ the voices of temptation and 
correctness) -  are caused by one another, and form an argument that is not to be decided 
but is to be dismantled. ’ 29 As the previous chapters suggest, the dismantling of this 
debate does not entail the complete disappearance of these voices but rather their 
transformation, allowing them to continue in a manner that is no longer directly 
oppositional. For while Wittgenstein shares with the metaphysician the sense that there 
is something remarkable about Augustine’s words, he does not convert his sense of the 
remarkable into a demand for answers ‘beyond’ the fabric of daily lives. Conversely, 
although Wittgenstein demonstrates a great commitment to the ordinary life of words,
27 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 129.
2K Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian 
Perfectionism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 98. Quoted in Cavell, ‘Notes and 
Afterthoughts,’ 137.
29 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 136.
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he recognises also that we easily miss the ‘ideology’ or ‘mythology’ embedded in these 
words.30
Imaginative literalism and the absence of criteria
One of Cavell’s early hopes for ‘Notes and Afterthoughts’ was that it might form an 
alternative opening to the Claim of Reason. As it stands The Claim of Reason begins 
with a discussion of the significance of the language-game of appealing to criteria -  the 
investigation of what we say in particular circumstances. As Cavell suggests, sections 
572 and 573 of the Investigations might be understood as ‘miniature’ investigation of 
criteria or, as Wittgenstein sometimes also says, grammar. In these sections 
Wittgenstein writes:
[ex p ecta tio n  is, gram m atically, a state; like: being o f an opinion, hoping for 
something, knowing something, being able to do something . . . What, in particular 
cases, do we regard as criteria for som eone’s being o f such-and-such an opinion? 
When do we say: he reached this opinion at that time? When: he has altered his 
opinion? And so on. The picture which the answers to these questions give us shows 
what gets treated grammatically as a state here.
As we have seen, the request, proposal and account of criteria is not limited to those 
passages where the term actually occurs, but is an ongoing activity in the Investigations, 
perhaps even its therapeutic procedure par-excellence.
Cavell points out that Wittgenstein’s appeals to criteria always evoke a community 
for they entail an T  who takes themselves as representative of a ‘we,’ of ‘what we 
say.’31 However, a criterion is not a general claim but a ‘sample,’ a ‘(supposed) instance 
of what we say.’ 32 Hence when Wittgenstein proposes criteria he is not asserting 
popular convention, but making a ‘claim’ of ‘community,’ or at least ‘an invitation for
30 In this regard Cavell situates Wittgenstein much closer to Jacques Derrida than does Stone. Indeed 
Cavell acknowledges that the ‘metaphysics of presence’ can be understood as one of Wittgenstein’s 
important targets. However he adds this qualification: ‘say that Wittgenstein shows us that we maintain 
unsatisfiable pictures of how things must happen. The idea of presence is one of these pictures, no doubt a 
convincing one. But the question seems to be why we are, who we are, that we are, possessed of this 
picture.’ Wittgenstein’s particularity, Cavell seems to suggest, can be seen in his efforts to understand 
how pictures including the ‘metaphysics of presence’ come to be appealing. Cavell, ‘Notes and 
Afterthoughts,’ 152.
31 Cavell, Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Scepticism, Morality and Tragedy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), 18-19.
32 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 19.
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you to see whether you have such a sample, or can accept mine as a sound one.’33 What 
such an investigation of criteria brings to the fore, according to Wittgenstein, is the 
extent to which ‘human beings . . . agree in the language they use.’34 This is not to say 
that we agree over specific facts or ‘opinions,’ but we do agree, to a considerable extent 
in ‘form of life.’351 will say a lot more about the nature of this ‘agreement’ in the final 
chapter, but for the moment I want to draw attention to something else.
In ‘Notes and Afterthoughts’ Cavell draws attention to something that he had not 
previously realised, namely that the game of recalling criteria is absent from the 
opening of the Investigations:
I had not taken it in before that the work of what Wittgenstein calls criteria -  for all 
the importance many of us attach to that development -  is (is precisely, I would now 
like to say) delayed in its entry into the Investigations, precisely absent from its 
opening. Its first appearance, I believe, is at section 51, and it doesn’t really get going 
until some hundred sections later; it may not reach its height until section 580 and 
following.36
‘Notes and Afterthoughts’ might be thought of as a way of marking the importance of 
the delayed entry of criteria for the Investigations. In my view this delayed entry draws 
attention to a second therapeutic technique, the technique of imaginative literalism, 
which was first outlined in Chapter 1. What would it be like, Wittgenstein asks in 
section 2, if Augustine’s account of language learning were actually correct?37
Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language 
is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with 
building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in 
the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words 
‘block,’ ‘pillar,’ ‘slab,’ ‘beam.’ A calls them out; —B brings the stone which he has learnt to 
bring at such-and such a call.-----Conceive this as a complete primitive language.
The difficulty of carrying out this ‘thought experiment’ is indicated by the awkward 
almost cartoon-like quality of the builders and by Wittgenstein’s framing sentences. The 
first sentence invites us to join Wittgenstein in imagining what language might fit
33 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 20, 19.
34 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §241.
35 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §241.
36 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 155.
37 Wittgenstein first uses the term ‘appropriate’ in section 3 of the Investigations.
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Augustine’s account, and the final sentence commands us to do so, as if some further 
effort is required to make the scene into a convincing portrait of language.
Cavell observes that the apparent absence of any pre-established language game for 
imagining what Wittgenstein asks us to do distinguishes the game of section 2 from the 
activity of recalling existing criteria. According to Cavell, ‘Wittgenstein is then to be 
understood as proposing his game in section 2 as one which manifests this imagining; it 
is his invention, one may say his fiction.’38 The fiction of the builders attempts to 
illustrate, as carefully as possible, Augustine’s account but as Cavell points out the 
result is ambiguous and at best one can say that this fiction ‘may or may not’ realise his 
words in a ‘satisfying’ manner.39
If The Claim of Reason did begin with ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ then the reader 
would begin by dramatising, as vividly as possible, expressions for which we have no 
established criteria. This would help emphasise an idea already at work in The Claim of 
Reason, namely that when scepticism takes hold - when metaphysics fails to give us the 
reassurance we seek - criteria are not capable of re-establishing absolute certainty. 
Criteria are not intended as a refutation of scepticism; rather the task of recalling criteria 
operates side by side with the attempt to illustrate the words of the person under the 
spell of a fantasy picture. Wittgenstein invites us to feel the initial attraction of 
Augustine’s words and then to further investigate their ‘appropriateness.’40 ‘To know the 
source of appropriateness’ Cavell says, ‘would be to know how we can have passed it 
by; how, we might say, its remarkableness, its motivatedness, has been disguised.’4I For 
Wittgenstein the investigation into the concealed strangeness of Augustine’s words (one 
might even say their hidden nonsensicality) entails ‘concretely’ building the picture that
38 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 143. In ‘Notes and Afterthoughts’ Cavell compares games like the 
one in section 2, which try to actualise a particular expression, with games which ‘extend’ explicitly ‘to 
mythological cases.’ For example in an attempt to satisfy the fantasy that words correspond to inner 
pictures, one might give assistant B a picture of a slab in his head, and still this does not generate an 
association we would be willing to call ‘understanding.’ The purpose Cavell’s assigns to these 
mythological cases is largely in keeping with David Pears account of literalism and imagination which we 
discussed in Chapter 1. According to Pears, imagination can be seen in the way that Wittgenstein ‘traces 
philosophical theories back to their origin in misleading pictures of the human predicament’ (in this case 
meaning is understood as an inner picture) and literalism can be seen in the way that Wittgenstein 
pedantically ‘spells out the details of’ these myths. David Pears, ‘Literalism and Imagination: 
Wittgenstein’s Deconstruction of Traditional Philosophy,’ International Journal o f Philosophical Studies 
10, no. 1 (2002):8. In Cavell’s case we might say that he gives the builder’s assistant an outer sample of 
his supposed inner slab-picture and still it does not ensure that the assistant understands the order.
39 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 153.
4(1 Wittgenstein first asks if Augustine’s description of language learning is “‘an appropriate description or 
not?”’ in section 3 of the Investigations. His first response is: ‘[y]es, it is appropriate, but only for this 
narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe.’ This answer, 
however, is vague and not immensely satisfying and as the book progresses he continues his attempt to 
grasp the appropriateness of Augustine’s words.
41 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 134.
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leads us to take Augustine’s words as ‘natural or ‘unremarkable.’42 This procedure can 
help us see, as Pears puts it, that the ‘pieces’ of the picture are ‘not what the author 
takes them to be,’43 which in turn may lead us to grasp the picture’s inappropriateness, 
its origin in imaginative misunderstandings.
But as Cavell points out, the language game in section 2 is distinguished by its 
demand that we ‘conceive’ of the scene as a ‘complete primitive language.’ Here, 
Wittgenstein seems to require us to pursue the question of the scene’s appropriateness 
further, or more seriously, than Pears understanding of Wittgenstein’s techniques of 
literalism and imagination require.44
The appropriateness of the builders
Speaking about the absence of criteria from the opening of the Investigations Cavell 
observes that:
The significance o f  the opening or ‘delayed’ absence seem s bound up with 
W ittgenstein’s impulse to begin and maintain his thoughts in the region o f the 
‘primitive,’ with a child before the life of language, with workers before their culture’s 
possession (or permitting them possession) o f a shared, undoubted language.43
By emphasising ‘childhood’ and the ‘primitive’ at the start of the Investigations, Cavell 
believes that Wittgenstein introduces two related ideas. Firstly, he reminds us that the 
concept ‘language’ is closely tied to our notion of learning language, and secondly, he 
reminds us that our words are lived, so that, as Wittgenstein puts it in section 19, ‘[t]o 
imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.’ Hence to understand the 
‘appropriateness’ of Augustine’s words one must grasp their existential dimension, the 
modes of feeling and practice they evoke.46
Wittgenstein goes on to imagine contexts where people would use a language 
comprised only of four shortened calls. His example is ‘a language consisting only of
42 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 138.
43 Pears ‘Literalism and Imagination,’ 3.
44 This suggests to me that the game of inventing possible realisations of Augustine’s words continues 
once we have glimpsed the ‘emptiness’ of these words and their ‘disguised naturalness.’ As I will suggest 
later, even Wittgenstein’s mythological re-enactments can be said to do more than self-dissolve.
45 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 155.
4(1 By exploring the existential dimension of words Wittgenstein’s work bears upon ethical questions of 
how we live and relate to one another. I will explore these ideas in detail later in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 
6 .
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orders and reports in a battle.’47 But we could just as easily imagine that the builders are 
working on a noisy construction site and hence are forced to use four abbreviated orders 
to communicate. An alternative suggestion is that the scene described in section 2 could 
be a game played by children learning their first language. For example, the child 
‘names the objects, that is he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone.’48 In 
this scene Wittgenstein is reticent to say that the child is as yet speaking a language, 
instead the child’s game resembles a language and this in turn seems to suggest that 
language does not begin full blown but rather with a child’s language-like procedures. 
A little later, when the child learns to speak, a third interpretation of the scene emerges, 
for we might now say that the child is ‘playing builders.’
How then should we take the scene in section 2: as a four order language spoken by 
adults and truncated by circumstances, or as a game played by children learning 
language, perhaps the game of playing builders? In Rush Rhees’ view, the difficulty 
here is that Wittgenstein does not provide us with enough information in section 2 to 
judge how we should take the scene.41' We start to understand the scene only once we 
introduce further context, when we move beyond Wittgenstein’s initial simplified 
thought experiment and imagine it as part of a complex web of language and life. But 
Wittgenstein seems to foreclose this investigation of context and criteria by insisting 
that the scene must be thought of as a complete primitive language. Abstracted from 
other patterns of language and life, the task the builders carry out lacks meaning, it 
might just as easily be performed by puppets or trained animals.50 Rhees’ feeling that 
the builders present at best a simulacrum of life and language will itself turn out to be 
fruitful notion. For the moment, however, I want to stress that for Rhees the scene is 
empty because Wittgenstein does not provide us with the broader context which would 
enable us to ascertain what its satisfying realisation would be, and since the building 
scene is also Wittgenstein’s portrait of Augustine’s account of language then the 
implication is that this account is also empty.
On this view, Wittgenstein’s technique is to illustrate the fantasy-picture 
underpinning Augustine’s account of language. The building scene is one such attempt. 
In the attempt to grasp the appropriateness of this picture, further interpretations are 
proposed (for example: builders on a noisy construction site, orders in battle, a
47 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §19.
4X Wittgenstein, Investigations, §7.
49 See Rush Rhees, ‘Wittgenstein’s Builders,’ Discussions of Wittgenstein (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul).
50 Rhees, ‘Wittgenstein’s Builders,’ 83.
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childhood game resembling language, children playing builders, performing animals). 
But Wittgenstein’s true intention is to help his companion or interlocutor to realise that 
their fantasy can never be realised in a fully satisfying manner.
I am not convinced that we should conclude that Augustine’s words and 
Wittgenstein’s imagining of these words through the scene of the builders have nothing 
to do with language at all.51 For although the scene of the builders lacks the context 
sufficient to settle its meaning, the fragmentary nature of the scene also provokes a 
series of possible interpretations. So one might say that while the ambiguity of 
Augustine’s words means that no one interpretation is fully satisfying, at the same time 
it ensures that the scene can be actualised in a multitude of possible ways. But how then 
should we understand this language-game of picturing re-picturing? Must its scenes be 
dissatisfying? If they do not satisfy fantasy, might they satisfy something (or someone) 
else? What relation exists between Wittgenstein’s invented scenes and the scenes of 
everyday life?
Objects of Comparison
In sections 130-131 of the Investigations Wittgenstein writes:
Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future 
regularisation of language -  as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air- 
resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are 
meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but 
also of dissimilarities.
For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the 
model as what it is, an object of comparison -  as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as 
a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we 
fall so easily in doing philosophy.)
These comments are part of a much broader reflection on Wittgenstein’s own 
philosophical practice, so it is not clear from the immediate context exactly what kind of 
‘clear and simple language-games’ he has in mind. He may, for example, be referring to 
the language-game of recounting shared criteria. Thus he would be telling us that his 
proposals of criteria are not representations of how the world must be (for example, an
51 Cavell makes a similar point about Rhees’ account of the builders. See Stanley Cavell, ‘Declining 
Decline,’ 62.
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idealised map of language usage) but objects of comparison which others may then find 
similar or dissimilar to their own.52
But Wittgenstein’s description of games that are ‘clear and simple’ also recalls his 
suggestion that the primitive game of section 2 might help clear the ‘fog’ of 
philosophical confusion.55 In that case Wittgenstein could be saying the scene described 
in section 2 is not ‘a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond,’ rather our 
illustrations of this scene are ‘objects of comparison.’ But since some of these ‘objects 
of comparison’ resemble everyday life (builders on a noisy work site) and others are 
utterly different (Rhees’ reading of the builders, for example) and further scenes are 
both similar and different (the child whose language begins with games that resemble 
language), then I would add that the comparison is not simply between ‘the facts of 
language’ and Wittgenstein’s language-games, but between the language-games (the 
‘objects of comparison’) themselves.
What might we discover about Augustine’s account of learning language, if we 
compare builders on a noisy construction site with the builders of section 2 as they stand 
(prior to further contextualisation)? 7/7 imagine the calls “Slab,” “Pillar,” e t c in the 
context of a loud work site, Cavell writes, 7  do not imagine them said sluggishly and 
vacantly, (unless I were to imagine one of the workers ill or drunk), but vigorously, in 
shouts, perhaps with hands cupped around the mouth.' ' The scene starts to make sense 
to us once we imagine it making sense to the builders - once we imagine the builders 
capable of both understanding and misunderstanding their world and each other. But for 
this very reason, builders on a construction site are a disappointing realisation of the 
builders described in section 2, for what seems to characterise the builders is precisely 
their lack of understanding. Cavell writes: 7  feel that the builders' responses ... are 
“too mechanical” for them to be using language ... / can imagine robots, or men 
hypnotised, doing the things the builders do at the same four calls,’ 55 Rhees, as we saw, 
compared them to puppets but if, as Cavell suggests, Wittgenstein intends to forestall 
appeals to criteria, and to present a simulacra of language and life then what is at stake 
in the scene of the zombie builders? What contexts might we imagine for beings who 
seem immune to context, or who do not possess a sense of context?
52 This reading is in keeping with Cavell’s account of criteria.
53 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §5.
54 Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 159.
55 Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 146. Later, on page 155 he writes: ‘[imagining, following 
Wittgenstein’s instruction, the primitiveness of the builders -  questioning their capacity to understand 
their words and actions; which is to say, questioning their possession of words -  is imagining them 
without the possibility and necessity of exercising judgment, which is a philosophical way of saying: 
without the possession of (shared) criteria. Their humanity is the stake of the game.’
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Criteria, understanding and freedom
In Cavell’s view, the builder’s lack of understanding, their mechanical zombie-like 
existence, their strange inhumanity, is tied up with their primitive life they seem to lead; 
a life prior to the possession of shared criteria. If we were really to follow 
Wittgenstein’s instructions and think of the builder’s language as ‘complete,’ Cavell 
writes, then they would ‘only use their words when they are in this situation, doing this 
work, ’ 56 To use their words differently, to talk about their work or speak about future or 
past projects would require them to break with their life of repetition and somehow 
invent an idiom.
Earlier we imagined that they do not speak apart from working; now we may imagine 
that they do not speak differently in noisy than in peaceful environments. They are not 
free. May be this is the sense of their behaving “mechanically ” that I expressed 
earlier; and may be this lack of alternative is the way to describe what was missing for 
me when 1 agreed that I missed a sense of understanding in them.57
But a child also begins with only a few words, words that it does not rea lly  
understand. How then is the child learning language different from the builders? The 
question of whether the building scene is appropriate to the experience of language 
learning is an important one for Cavell. Given that the builders are also Wittgenstein’s 
illustration of Augustine’s account of learning language we might also ask: is 
Augustine’s account of language learning true in any way?
Cavell’s first response to these questions is to say that, in the case of the child we are 
not so troubled by the question of whether it ‘understands’ its first four words: 
‘because, as Wittgenstein says, the child is “learning to talk” - that is, we do not have 
to imagine that the child is (yet, exactly) speaking a language. ’ 58
The child’s language has a future. But when /  try to image adults having just these 
words -  e.g., the builder and his assistant -  /  find that I imagine them moving 
sluggishly, as if dull-witted, or uncomprehending, like cave men... The child has a
56 Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 145. Rhees also makes this point in ‘Wittgenstein’s Builders,’ only 
unlike Rhees Cavell does not take this to mean that the scene has no bearing at all on everyday language.
57 Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 160-61.
5X Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 146.
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future with its language, the builders have, without luck, or the genius o f invention, 
none -  only their repetitions ,59
Cavell concludes that more than ‘understanding’ the builders seem to lack ‘imagination’ 
and ‘freedom’ - the ability to invent a future.60 On this reading one might conclude that 
the whole scene is a parable that shows that ‘outer’ criteria make the inner life possible, 
and that our agreement in forms of life does not determine us but makes freedom 
possible. In Chapter 6 I will say more about the relation between freedom and shared 
forms of life. For the moment, however, I want to stress that it is not Cavell’s intention 
to stop with the thought that Augustine describes no language, or at least no language 
that is recognisable as our own. This becomes clear if we consider the second ‘non­
competing’61 interpretation of the builders that he proposes.
‘The Reign of the Undead’
The builders, Cavell suggests, could be taken ‘as an allegory of the way many 
people, in more developed surroundings, in fact speak, forced as it were by 
circumstances to speak in more or less primitive, unvaried expressions of more or less 
incompletely educated desires.’62 ‘This allegory’ he concludes, ‘may be seen as a kind 
of political parody of the repetition (or say the grammar) without which there is no 
language.’63 Internal to humanity, Cavell tells us, lies a troubling inhumanity, for in this 
scene we are all vulnerable to the repetitive, hypnotic state of suspension exemplified 
by the builders. This could mean that we are neither truly alive nor truly dead, but 
rather, in Santner’s words, under the ‘reign of the undead f M The practices we share and
59 Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 146.
60 Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 162.
61 Cavell ‘Declining Decline,’ 63. Quoted by Cavell in ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 163.
62 Cavell ‘Declining Decline,’ 63-64. Quoted by Cavell in ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 163.
63 Cavell ‘Declining Decline,’ 64. Quoted by Cavell in ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 163.
64 Santner, Psychotheology, 25. Santner is drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s account of a life violently 
riven by the question of whether it is truly alive. See, for example Giorgio Agamben’s revision of 
Foucault in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans, Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1998). In light of this discussion one might ask: what counts as a life worth 
living? By interpreting the builders as an allegory for the mindless, repetitive dimension of everyday life, 
Cavell believes he may have found a ‘possible site of meeting, or passing, of Wittgenstein and Heidegger 
on the topos of the everyday -  a place from which it can be seen both why Heidegger finds authenticity to 
demand departure and why Wittgenstein finds sense or sanity to demand return.’ The two writers meet, 
we might say, to the extent that they are both troubled by the question of whether everyday life is truly 
alive, but they depart, or at least pass each other in their attempts to describe a life worth living. Cavell, 
‘Notes and Afterthoughts, 163.
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repeat no longer enable understanding, freedom and imagination for they have rigidified 
into restrictive law -  conventional caricatures that miss the true complexity of criteria.
In such a world, Cavell observes, ‘a fuller description’ may not encapsulate the 
repetitive procedures whereby we become ‘subjects,’ for ‘the generalized equipment of 
noise and the routines of generalized others, are perhaps no longer specifiable in simple 
descriptions, having become invisible through internalisation.’ 65 To me this also 
explains why we do not recognise ourselves in the builders, for our automatism has 
become internal, largely unthought.
In order to account for this internalisation, Cavell speculates that Wittgenstein’s 
procedures of description and invention may need to give way at points to theory. If 
there were to be such a theory, he writes: ‘it must, I suppose, be understandable as one 
that demonstrates the modes whereby, in Foucault’s words, power “reaches into the 
very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and 
attitudes, their discourse, learning processes and everyday lives. ” ’ 66 Such a theory 
would account for the internalisation of social laws and institutions by a subject, 
through a certain hypnotic compulsion to repeat.67
Cavell does not directly elaborate such an account in ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 
perhaps because a theory of subjectivisation, spelled out in isolation would diverge too 
far from the techniques of description and imaginative literalism he is keen to trace in 
his essay. However, neither is it true to say that the techniques he outlines have no 
bearing on such a theory. In Cavell’s third attempt to realise the scene of the builders, 
he imagines them on the very threshold of language and subjectivity. In this scene the 
builders become emblem for the procedures of subject formation, and image and theory 
intertwine.
The ‘advent’ of language
The builders speak a language that is on the brink of being language. This thought leads 
Cavell to revises his earlier proposal that they entirely lack understanding.
65 Cavell ‘Declining Decline,’ 64, quoted in Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 163. Even though 
Wittgenstein is inventing a context for the builders -  an allegory for ‘political denial,’ this procedure is 
different from his earlier suggestion that builders are on a noisy construction site, because context alone 
cannot tell us how the ‘generalized equipment’ etc. comes to be ‘internalised.’
66 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 163.
67 So not only do the builders show us that ‘outward’ criteria make our ‘inner’ lives possible (for without 
criteria the builders seem like robots) but they also can be read as an emblem of our ‘outer’ social order 
made ‘inner.’
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Something is understood by the builders, that desire is expressed, that this object is 
called for . . . Therewith an essential of speech is present, a condition of it, and not 
something that can, as new words are taught, be taught (‘Therewith’? There I am 
taking the builders also as illustrating Augustine’s scene as of an advent of language 
(challenging a picture of the accumulative ‘learning’ of language), something that 
comes ‘with’ an advent of the realm of desire, say of fantasy, ‘beyond’ the realm of 
(biological) need. I have been instructed, here particularly concerning Freud’s concept 
of Treib, spanning the ‘relation’ between biological and psychological drive, by the 
exceptional study of Freudian concepts in Jean Laplanche’s Life and Death in 
Psychoanalysis. )6X
Drawing on the work of psychoanalyst Laplanche,69 Cavell takes the builders to 
illustrate a ‘primal scene’ describing the ‘advent of language’ - the passage from 
‘biological’ ‘need,’ into the ‘realm’ of ‘fantasy’ and ‘desire’: ‘the “perversion” of 
instincts into drives in the infant’s turning to the human. ’ 70
To Cavell’s account I would like to add the observation that the builders appear to 
experience the force of words (that an order is made, that ‘desire is expressed’), without 
fully grasping their meaning (what is ordered or expressed). One might say that the 
assistant understands the builder’s command in the sense that he follows it, but the 
significance of the action eludes him. The ‘advent’ of language, our entry into the socio- 
symbolic order, coincides with this excess of force over significance.
The proposal that Wittgenstein’s builders illustrate the ‘advent’ of language may look 
problematic, however if we recall Wittgenstein’s discussion of the role of primal scenes 
in psychoanalysis. In his conversations with Rush Rhees, for example, Wittgenstein 
criticises Freud for masking the mythological quality of primal scenes by presenting 
them as scientific explanations for our biological instincts. ‘The attractiveness of the 
suggestion, for instance, that all anxiety is a repetition of the anxiety of the birth 
trauma,’ Wittgenstein insists, ‘is just the attractiveness of a mythology. “It is all the 
outcome of something that happened long ago.” Almost like referring to a totem . ’ 71 
Wittgenstein warns that although primal scenes discovered through analysis can bring 
us ‘immense relief because they give ‘pattern’ and significance to our lives and enable
68 Cavell ‘Declining Decline,’ 63. Quoted by Cavell in ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 162.
69 Jean Laplanche, Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976). In the appendix to Life and Death in Psychoanalysis Laplanche brings Foucault’s 
discussion of the origin of language to bear on Freud’s concern for ‘primal language.’
70 Cavell ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 170.
71 Ludwig Wittgenstein ‘Conversations on Freud,’ Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations on 
Aesthetics, Psychology & Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), 51.
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a certain adaptation within the social order, they can also be harmful because they 
distort life by presenting it according to a pattern which must be so: ‘although one may 
discover in the course of [analysis] various things about oneself, one must have a very 
strong and keen and persistent criticism in order to recognize and see through the 
mythology that is offered or imposed on one. ’72
However, Laplanche shares many of Wittgenstein’s reservations about the tendency 
of psychoanalysis to treat primal scenes as though they were scientific explanation of 
our biological origins.77 The true value of primal scenes, in Laplanche’s view, is not that 
they provide true or reassuring accounts of our origins that then enable a degree of 
social adaptation; but rather that they ‘bear fateful questions pertaining to my place and 
value in the desire of the Other. ’74
To cast the ‘advent of language’ in terms of the operation of force or validity in 
excess of signification is to make precisely such an investigation. The builder’s 
assistant, for example, understands that he is being addressed (he feels the force of the 
builder’s call) without grasping in a fully meaningful way what is called for\ the 
broader context necessary to make the order meaningful is missing. Indeed, one might 
say that Wittgenstein’s scene of the builders reminds us of something in Augustine’s 
account. Namely that language learning begins, not when labels are found for our 
desires, but when the child is interpellated by the mysterious desire of his elders. 
Previously Cavell suggested that the scene of the builders shows that we become 
subjects by internalising social institutions, but now the very process of internalisation 
seems fraught, for we begin life addressed by signs whose significance we do not as yet 
grasp.
Laplanche links the ‘traumatic encounter with the dense, enigmatic presence of the 
Other’s desire’75 not just to the acquisition of language but to the child’s entry into the 
symbolic order more broadly. To do so he draws on the Freudian account of seduction. 
According to Freud the child begins its life totally dependent on its adult carers and this 
leaves it exposed to seductive messages that it cannot fully ‘metabolise’ or master. In 
Laplanche’s view such a situation entails:
an encounter between an individual whose psycho-somatic structures are situated
predominantly at the level of need, and signifiers emanating from an adult. Those
12 Wittgenstein ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 51-52.
12 According to Laplanche, psychoanalysis, by presenting itself as a Naturphilosophie, defends against the 
vital role that the concept ‘seduction by another’ plays in generation of the unconscious.
74 Santner Psychotheology, 35.
75 Santner, Psychotheology, 33.
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signifiers pertain to the satisfaction of the child’s needs, but they also convey the 
purely interrogative potential of the messages-and those other messages are sexual. 
These enigmatic messages set the child the difficult, or even impossible, task of 
mastery and symbolization and the attempt to perform it inevitably leaves behind 
unconscious residues.76
Laplanche links sexuality and the advent of human subjectivity to the troubling question 
of our place in life. For the child this entails the question of its place in the desires of its 
principal carer. In Laplanche’s primal scene of seduction, the mother’s breast satisfies 
the child’s need for nourishment, but because it also functions within a symbolic order it 
gives off further ‘enigmatic messages’ which are sexual and which translates into the 
troubling question: ‘what does the breast want from me, apart from wanting to suckle 
me, and, come to that why does it want to suckle me?’77 According to Laplanche the 
‘enigmatic messages’ that the child encounters leave behind a certain ‘trauma’ in the 
mind, an unconscious excess of excitation that the subject cannot work out psychically. 
In Santner’s words, ‘The mind is left possessed or haunted, under the “ban” of 
something that profoundly matters without being a full-fledged thought or emotion, that 
is, anything resembling an orientation in the world.’78
One such ‘enigmatic message,’ described by Wittgenstein in the Investigations, is the 
picture that sometimes comes before our mind when words are taught. Such a picture, 
Wittgenstein says in section 6, has as yet no definite meaning or ‘purpose,’ like a 
‘break-leaver . . . separated from its support . . .  it may be anything, or nothing.’ 
Nevertheless we often think of meaning in just these terms - as an inner picture 
symbolised by outer symbols. Imagine, Cavell goes on to suggest, if we were to give 
the builders an actual picture or sample, a kind of outer manifestation of meaning’s 
inner picture: ‘[sjuppose the builder holds up his instance of the object he wants, e.g., a 
slab, and exaggeratedly (that is, for the benefit of the assistant) hugs and kisses it. You 
can see that this is subject to interpretation, and that it might or might not be 
interpreted to mean that he wants another object just like the one he is embracing.,79 
But in a world where much weight is put on finding labels for things (and the builders 
may well be a reminder that such a world could be our own) ostensive definitions alone 
will not express meaning for they can always be interpreted variously. Here a troubling
7fl Jean Laplanche, New Foundations for Psychoanalysis, trans. David Macey (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1989), 130.
77 Laplanche, New Foundations, 128.
78 Santner, Psychotheology, 39.
74 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 151.
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question emerges: ‘What does the builder want from me?’ Or as Wittgenstein goes on 
to ask in the Investigations: what does the ‘elliptical’ order ‘Slab’ ask me to think? 80
[I]f you shout ‘slab!’ you really mean: ‘Bring me a slab.’ -  But how do you do this: 
how do you mean that while you say ‘Slab!’? Do you say the unshortened sentence to 
yourself? And why should I translate the call ‘Slab!’ into a different expression in 
order to say what someone means by it? And if they mean the same thing -  why 
should I not say: ‘when he says ‘Slab!’ he means ‘Slab!’’? Again, if you can mean 
‘Bring me the slab,’ why should you not be able to mean ‘Slab!’?—But when I call 
‘Slab!,’ then what I want is, that he should bring me a slab\— Certainly, but does 
‘wanting this’ consist in thinking in some form or other a different sentence from the 
one you utter? 81
Reflecting back on Augustine’s account of language learning in ‘Notes and 
Afterthoughts,’ Cavell observes that that ‘[tjhere is . . .  a hint of permanence in the 
child’s isolation, the absoluteness of its initial incapacity to make itself known, in its 
absolute reliance on its elders’ recognition of its attempts at expression, that is, on their 
recognition of the grip of its needs as the medium of expression.’ This leads him to 
‘understand the child as mad, not exactly deranged, but in the condition of 
derangement. ’82 But in Cavell’s view the ‘idea of derangement, containing the idea of 
undoing . . .  a circle or ring, can accordingly mark the turn to the human and its speech 
as renouncing the unending circle of the animal, the realm of the untalking subjects, of 
the repetitive cycles of need as satisfaction.’ On such an account, the unconscious 
residue produced by the traumatic distortion or ‘perversion’ of the ‘repetitive cycles of 
need and satisfaction,’ is also what makes human subjectivity possible. 83 But if the state 
of derangement is also the defining moment for humanity, how should we understand 
Wittgenstein’s promise of therapeutic intervention? What kind of engagement with the 
unconscious does he make? To respond to these questions I will turn to the account of 
the unconscious put forward by Eric Santner in On The Psychotheology o f Everyday 
Life.
80 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §19.
81 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §19. Wittgenstein’s emphasis.
82 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 170.
83 Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 170.
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The Unconscious
According to Freud the unconscious is the locus for instinctual energy, especially the 
libidinal drives formed in early childhood which can be understood as ‘a force 
exercising a “pressure”’ of a sexual nature. 84 By using the German word Treib (coming 
from Treiben - ‘to push’) Freud distinguishes the pressure entailed by the unconscious 
from instincts with a determinate aim, such as animal instincts. In The language of 
Psychoanalysis Jean Laplanche and J B Pontalis observe that Freud’s use of the word 
‘Treib,’ ‘draws attention to the irresistible nature of the pressure rather than to the 
stability of its aim and object. ’ 87 According to Freud, this instinctual pressure does not 
present itself directly to consciousness but manifests itself in dreams and everyday life 
through condensation, displacement and through symptoms such as repetition 
compulsion.
Santner’s account of Freud, which I will outline here, rests heavily on a point first 
stressed by Jacques Lacan, namely that for Freud ‘symptomatic agency’ or unconscious 
mental activity operates at the level of signifiers, rather than through fully formed 
meanings, beliefs, attitudes or propositions. ‘From the Project on,’ Santner writes, 
‘Freud emphasized the persistence, within the dynamics of symptom formation, of a 
non-semantic kernel. ’ 86 Freud’s achievement was to reveal something ‘mechanical’ or 
‘nonsensical’ at the core of unconscious mental energy -  the ‘persistence of a 
mindlessness immanent to mindedness. ’87 On this Lacanian account, unconscious 
excitations are an inner strangeness that cannot be fully alleviated by rational 
explanations, for they are immune to the question: ‘why do you do that?’
Santner warns that the unconscious should not be understood as nonsensical or 
mindless in a purely physiological sense, like, for example, the beating of a heart. The 
heart is literally mindless, of course, but this does not mean that its functioning cannot 
be given a rational explanation. In support of the reading of psychoanalysis I am 
advocating here we should recall that for Freud the unconscious is not a pre-cultural
84 Jean Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis The Language o f Psychoanalysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1973), 239-40. According to Freud, we often organise this 
pressure into fantasy formations.
85 Laplanche, The Language o f Psychoanalysis, 214. As Jean Laplanche and J.B.Pontalis write on pages 
214 to 215, the unconscious is ‘relatively indeterminate both as regards the behaviour it induces and as 
regards the satisfying object.’
86 Santner, Psychotheology, 28.
87 In Santner’s reading, Freud shows us that this persistence often generates within the subject a certain 
‘pain (or rather pleasure-in-pain)’ which fits with Lacan’s notion of fouissance.' Fantasy, then can be 
understood as the particular way in which a subject orders this ‘mindlessness’ or fouissance.'1 Santner, 
Psychotheology, 28, 29.
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state (a determinate animal instinct that can be unmasked, for example) but rather an 
indeterminate pressure that manifests itself through signifiers.88 If the unconscious were 
nonsensical in a strictly biological sense then, in Santner’s words, the job of 
psychoanalysis would be ‘the domestication of the primitive, quasi-biological energies 
of the drives into rational capacities and behaviours, the transmutation of the natural, 
“pulsationar core of life into flexible emotional orientations in a shared world. Analysis 
would be, in a word, a form of Bildung, the operator of a developmental narrative of
,  onprogress.
Now Wittgenstein’s concern is also for our ‘shared world,’ but he is critical of the 
way the developmental narratives (such as Freud’s primal scenes) reduce this world to 
an originary pattern. As we saw in Chapter 4, rather than limiting dream pieces or 
dream-like writing to any one interpretation, Wittgenstein emphasises the enigmatic 
quality of dream signs, their capacity to compel without fully signifying anything.90 
‘One gets the strong impression that these different shapes and arrangements must mean 
something,’ he writes.91 The affective yet nonsensical quality of dream pieces, is 
precisely what Santner stresses in his reading of the Freudian unconscious. What 
psychoanalysis brings to the fore, Santner believes, is that we are ‘always haunted, 
surrounded by the remainders of lost forms of life, by concepts and signs that had 
meaning within a form of life that is now gone and so persist, to use Lacan’s telling 
formulation, as “hieroglyphs in the desert.’”92 Here the task of therapy, is not the 
conversion of biological instincts into meaningful propositions, rather it helps us 
understand how dream-writing, like Lacan’s hieroglyphs or the five spires of the 
Moscow cathedral that Wittgenstein refers to,93 come to be the hub of affective charge. 
Indeed as Wittgenstein shows in his discussion of Freud, it is when we lose sight of the
xx More broadly, as Cavell emphasised in his previously quoted reading of Laplanche’s reading of Freud, 
the unconscious spans 'the “relation” between biological and psychological drive.’
X9 Santner, Psychotheology, 29. Given the importance Freud gives to development narratives throughout 
his work, Santner admits that it would be possible to read him in these terms. However, for somewhat 
different reasons, the world Bildung, is also fruitful in the context of Wittgenstein’s work. Bildung 
suggests both an integrated picture of the world constructed or built out of parts, and the story of an 
education, and this returns us, of course, to the builders, to the question of what they are building with 
their bricks and slabs; and also to the child 'playing builders’ and to the progress of their future education. 
The scene itself is also a ‘Bild,’ a picture, which as the German word suggests, has been built or made 
and, as such, has a certain power of being towards others that separates it from everyday objects. In 
Wittgenstein’s work the status of such pictures is precisely what is under question.
90 The capacity of dreams (and dream-like writing) to provoke various interpretations, or by virtue of a 
certain ‘literality,’ to resist full interpretation entirely is defended by Wittgenstein in his discussions with 
Rhees about Freud. Dream-writing, with its powerful charge that nevertheless defies translation, 
resembles, in this regard, the alternate notion of the unconscious I am beginning to develop here.
91 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 45.
92 Santner, Psychotheology, 43.
93 See my previous discussion in Chapter 5.
169
structural openness of a dream sign, and demand a singular interpretive myth, that the 
dream sign compels us most powerfully.
Fantasy
Santner’s argument is that fantasy organises the ‘surplus vitality’ of the unconscious 
‘into a schema, a distinctive “torsion” or spin that colours/distorts the shape of our 
universe [and] how the world is disclosed to us. ’94 In effect, fantasy shapes the surplus 
vitality of the unconscious into a foundational realm transcending our shared social 
world -  a realm that promises to provide ultimate justification for notions such as 
intentionality, sovereign authority, reason, knowledge or even inter-subjective meaning. 
However the ‘symptomatic torsion’ is also ‘what sustains our sense of the consistency 
of the world and our place in it. ’95 So the phantasmic binding of the unconscious at once 
maintains our sense of meaning and order and inaugurates a crisis of legitimation. As 
the previous reading of the opening of the Investigations suggests, we become subjects 
by internalising the symbolic order, but this process is fraught for we grasp the force of 
the order without being able to fully metabolise its meanings. In Santner’s words, the 
‘subject of psychoanalysis,’ or the subject with an unconscious does not begin with 
biological life,
but rather where biological life is amplified and perturbed by the symbolic dimension 
of relationality at the very heart of which lie problems of authority and authorization. 
To borrow a term from Giorgio Agamben, we might say that the life that is of concern 
to psychoanalysis is biopolitical life, life that has been thrown by the enigma o f its 
legitimacy, the question of its place and authorization within a meaningful order.96
94 Santner, Psychotheology, 39.
95 Santner, Psychotheology, 39.
96 Santner, Psychotheology, 30. (Santner’s emphasis). For Agamben’s account of biopolitical life see 
Giorgio Agamben Homo Sacer, 51: ‘[a]ll societies and cultures today’ Agamben argues, ‘have entered 
into a legitimation crisis in which law (we mean by this term the entire text of tradition in its regulative 
form, whether the Jewish Torah or the Islamic Sharia, Christian dogma or the profane nomos) is in force 
as the pure ‘Nothing of Revelation.” This crisis of legitimation takes place, according to Agamben, not 
because of specific orders and prohibitions issued by the law, but rather because the law is capable of 
being in force without signifying anything. Integral to the workings of sovereignty, he argues, is the 
moment of exception where in order for authority to continue to be in force, the particular details of its 
laws and regulations are held pendant. In the wake of September 11 2001, for example, the legal rights of 
the prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay were suspended, in the name of preserving the authority of the US 
state.
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Symbolic authority, as Slavoj Zizek has suggested, can be understood as ‘a certain call 
which cannot effectively force us into anything, and yet, by a kind of inner compulsion, 
we feel obliged to follow it unconditionally. ' 97 In this sense, it generates a split within 
the subject - between self and other, between the part that internalises the command, 
and the part of the subject which accepts the command.98 Santner’s suggestion is that 
the unconscious names ‘the procedures -  and impasses of symbolic investiture and 
legitimation. ’99 His central idea is that: ‘[ e]very call to order addressed to a human 
subject -  and a symbolic investiture is such a call -  secretes a “surplus value” a psychic 
excitation that, as it were, bears the burden, holds the place, of the missing foundation 
of the institutional authority that issued the call. ’ 100 The unconscious, in this view, is this 
“‘surplus value” of psychic excitation,’ a surplus that can never be fully dispelled for, 
paradoxically, it is also the ‘citation of a lack,’ a citation of the missing foundations of 
the authority. 101
Santner’s account transposes, into psychoanalytic terms, the analysis of symbolic 
authority made by Derrida in ‘Force of Law and the “Mystical Foundations of 
Authority.’” Drawing on Walter Benjamin's notion that the tautological assertion ‘The 
Law is the Law!’ has come to stand in for the law’s missing foundations, Derrida 
proposes that the performative utterances which enable us to assume new identities 
within a social order are maintained by a violent compulsion to repeat. ' 02
A performative utterance is a speech act that brings about its own propositional 
content, a form of symbolic investiture. As J. L. Austin points out in How To Do things 
With Words, a performative speech act does not simply say something, it performs an 
action. For example, when a person is declared a citizen by a representative of the 
Commonwealth Government of Australia, she or he becomes an Australian citizen. The 
process of symbolic investiture operates at two levels, on the one hand it simply affirms 
that the candidate already had the qualifications necessary for their new title, but on the 
other it confers upon them the title, converting, for example, the ‘attributes’ of
97 Slavoj Zizek, Enjoy your Symptom: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out, (London: Routledge, 1992), 
94-95.
9X In ‘Addressing the Crisis of Meaning: Towards a ‘psychotheological’ reading of the unconscious,’ 
Practical Philosophy (Autumn 2004): 40-45, Fiona Jenkins argues that is authority’s call produces a 
division in the subject, an indigestible surplus vitality that corresponds to the unconscious.
99 Santner Psychotheology, 27.
UK) Santner, Psychotheology, 50-51.
101 Santner, Psychotheology, 50.
102 Santner, Psychotheology, 57. As Santner points out, Agamben’s ‘state of exception’ is closely tied to 
the moment, described by Benjamin in ‘Critique of Violence,’ when a violent compulsion to repeat stands 
in for the tautological assertion ‘The law is the law!’ See Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’ 
Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York:
Schocken, 1986).
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citizenship into the ‘attribution’ of citizenship. 103 This second level of linguistic 
effectivity is in some sense ‘magical’ for it ‘adds no further attribute except the crucial 
one of title or name. ’ 104 For the magic of performative speech acts to work, for the 
performative to be meaningful within a symbolic order, it must take place within the 
context of a complex network of interconnected performatives. For example, in order 
for the official to perform her task, Commonwealth authority must not only establish his 
or her credentials but also symbolically invest the relevant authority on him or her. At a 
certain point, however, there is inevitably a gap in the network of interconnected 
performatives. What Benjamin’s work brings to the fore, according to Derrida, is that a 
dimension of violence, a compulsion to repeat, stands in for the missing foundations of 
symbolic authority. Symbolic authority is maintained by an excess of force over 
meaning such that ‘the very resources of legitimacy’ become ‘linked to a power of 
suspension and disruption. ’ 105
In Santner’s psychoanalytic terms a ‘surplus excitation . . . organized in fantasy, 
supplements and sustains the force of juridical normativity in ways that can be 
paralysing. ’ 106 The repetitive, zombie-like existence described by Wittgenstein in the 
scene of the builders testifies to the internal compulsion to repeat that sustains acts of 
symbolic investiture. According to Santner, by virtue of living within a symbolic 
universe we all carry within us traces of the law's phantasmic supplement and feel the 
effects, at least to a certain extent, of its hypnotic pull. On the one hand, as Cavell saw, 
this repetition is manifest in the ‘primitive, unvaried’ life many people live, but also in 
the anxiety that our culture has lost all depth and imagination, and in the fantasies 
intended to ally this anxiety.
But on the other hand, the unconscious repetition and the crisis of legitimation it 
inaugurates can be literally felt by the subject. For those who come too close to the 
law’s excess of force over meaning, the ‘peculiar form of animation,’ the ‘quasi­
mechanical insistence’ 107 exemplified by the builders changes from unthinking 
repetition into a lived reality. Wittgenstein, I believe parts way with Derrida in his 
attempt to open himself to this lived reality.
103 Santner, Psychotheology, 47.
104 Santner, Psychotheology, 47-48.
105 Santner, Psychotheology, 41. In Agamben’s words, ‘the sovereign exception . . . does not limit itself to 
distinguishing what is inside from what is outside but instead traces a threshold (the state of exception) 
between the two, on the basis of which outside and inside, the normal situation and chaos, enter into those 
complex topological relations that make the validity of the juridical order possible.’ A realm of 
indiscernability is generated within life itself. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 19.
m Santner, Psychotheology, 43.
107 Santner’s original phrase is ‘the peculiar form of animation, the quasi-mechanical insistence, that 
distinguishes biopolitical life.’ Santner, Psychotheology, 30.
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To briefly clarify the convergence and discontinuity in Wittgenstein and Derrida’s 
thought I am suggesting here, I will turn to one of Derrida’s rare mentions of 
W ittgenstein’s work. In a conference discussion devoted to W ittgenstein and 
deconstruction that I referred to briefly in Chapter 1, Derrida observes that after hearing 
Steven M ulhall’s account of the shopping expedition from section one of the 
Investigations, he was ‘struck’ by its ‘technological aspect.’108 ‘As if Wittgenstein was 
describing this series of operations as machine-like operations within the inner life, a 
description which would imply that a certain ‘techne’ is already at work within the so- 
called ‘private’ or inner’ sphere of mental operations.’109 This ‘techne’ is the mechanical 
compulsion that Derrida associates with the force of the law and Santner ties to the 
unconscious. But as Derrida also stresses the ‘techne’ is not simply opposed to the 
possibility of a non-mechanical decision,’ but ‘is its very chance.’110 Here Derrida 
reminds us the possibility of mutation is entailed by the compulsion to repeat, so like 
Wittgenstein he brings out both the determining and the liberating aspect of iteration. 
Wittgenstein's particularity, however, lies in the way that he attempts to unbind the 
violent compulsion to repeat. He does so by drawing attention to the lived aspect of 
fantasy, by staging it in terms of image and feelings. In the following sections I will 
describe his procedure in detail.
The literal performative
To illustrate the existential effects of exposure to force in excess of signification, I turn 
to memoirs of Judge Daniel Paul Schreber, 111 who underwent an intensified form of the 
crisis experienced by the child become philosopher in the Investigations.
Judge Schreber experienced his breakdown just as he was about to become 
Senatspräsident, a position of significant power and authority within the Saxon 
Supreme Court. Freud made Schreber’s memoirs famous when he diagnosing his
108 See Steven Mulhall, ‘Wittgenstein and Deconstruction, Ratio 13, no. 4 (2000), and Jacques Derrida, 
‘Derrida’s Response to Mulhall,’ Ratio 13, no. 4 (2000): 415. Mulhall and Derrida are referring to the 
shopping scene in section 1 of the Investigations, which directly precedes Wittgenstein’s scene of the 
builders in section 2. In section 1 Wittgenstein asks us to ‘think of the following use of language: I send 
someone shopping. I give him a slip marked ‘five red apples.’ He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who 
opens the drawer marked ‘apples’; then he looks up the word ‘red’ in a table and finds a colour sample 
opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers -  I assume he knows them by heart -  up to the 
word ‘five’ and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. -  It 
is in these and other ways that one operates with words.’
11)9 Derrida, ‘Derrida’s Response,’ 415.
110 Derrida, ‘Derrida’s Response,’ 416.
111 Daniel Paul Schreber, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, trans. Ida Macalpine and Richard Hunter 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
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paranoid delusions as a form of homosexual panic. Schreber’s own view, however, was 
that his breakdown was a crisis of meaning, and he insisted that theologians and 
philosophers could benefit more from his experience than the medically trained 
psychiatrists who treated him. He used the words ‘soul murder’ to express his sense that 
he was not longer truly alive; that a traumatic disturbance in the relation between God 
and creation left the world destroyed, lacking in all significance.
In Santner’s view the fact that Schreber’s crisis coincided with his nomination to a 
powerful position within the judiciary suggests that he underwent ‘a fundamental 
impasse in his capacity to metabolise’ the ‘performative magic’ entailed by this 
conferral of title and hence an inability to benefit from the ‘normative space opened by 
it. ’ 112 Put in Wittgensteinian terms, Schreber could not properly assume his new title 
because the very act of naming had become for him ‘an occult process. ’ 112 In the 
Investigations, for example, the philosopher fancies naming as ‘some remarkable act of 
mind . . .  a baptism of an object. 1' 4 Here naming entails, quite literally, an excess of 
address, for without adding anything meaningful ‘we can also say the word “this” to the 
object, as it were address the object as “this.”’11" Although Wittgenstein then notes: ‘a 
queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy, ’ 116 one must 
not reduce his words to a gesture of dismissiveness, for as Wittgenstein constantly 
shows, everyday language is chronically vulnerable to this philosophical queerness.
Later on in the Investigations, for example, Wittgenstein says that when he draws 
one line parallel to another or copies one of his doodles, he has the strange sense of 
being guided by a rule. ‘When I look back on the experience I have the feeling that what 
is essential about it is an experience of being influenced,’ Wittgenstein writes, ‘but at 
the same time I should not be willing to call any experienced phenomenon the 
“experience of being influenced” . . .  I should like to say that I had experienced the 
“because,” and yet I do not want to call any phenomenon the “experience of the 
because. ’” 117
As Louis. A. Sass points out in his book length study of Schreber, The Paradoxes of 
Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber and the Schizophrenic Mind, a close reading of 
Schreber’s memoirs shows that he does not view his direct experiences of influence as
112 Santner, Psychotheology, 48.
113 See Wittgenstein, Investigations, §38.
114 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §38.
115 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §38.
11(’ Wittgenstein, Investigations, §38.
117 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §176. In Santner’s view Schreber is ‘plagued by’ Wittgenstein’s 
“experiences of the because.’’ Santner, Psychotheology, 48n.
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real events in the phenomenal world; rather they possess for him a ‘phantom 
concreteness. ’ 118 The attraction exerted on the rays by the nerves should not be 
understood, Schreber says, ‘in terms of natural forces acting purely mechanically [but 
as] something like a psycho-logical motive power..., l19 appearing before the mind's eye. 
As Santner suggests we might ‘call these “impossible” experiences of a direct influence 
by norms the spectres or spirits -  rather than the spirit -  of normativity. ’ 120
Santner points out that Schreber’s ‘experience of symbolic processes -  and above all 
of language might be seen ‘as a kind of radicalisation and literalisation of the concept 
of the performative as understood by speech-act theory. ’ 121 A performative utterance, as 
I explained earlier, is an utterance that performs an action by virtue of saying 
something. In Schreber’s case however:
all speech came to be experienced as the performing of an action and, indeed, as the 
performing of an ultimately mechanical and nonsensical action directly on his nerves. 
That is, in essence, what “soul m urder” signifies: the collapse o f the symbolic 
dim ension of even so-called perform ative speech acts into some form of actual 
manipulation or influence, some form of direct psychophysical inscription.122
But given that Schreber also casts the effects of ‘soul murder’ in explicitly sexual 
terms -  he feels compelled by divine injunction, for example, to foster a form of 
‘feminine jouissance’ - his induction into the symbolic order might also be understood 
‘as an obscene and never-ending seduction ... a ramification of the processes that Jean 
Laplanche has analysed ... as seduction by a message. ’ 122 In Santner’s view this 
suggests even once we become adults and assume determinate social identities, we are 
still vulnerable to the traumatic encounter with ‘enigmatic messages,’ that first affects 
the pre-linguistic child.
118 Louis A. Sass, The Paradoxes o f Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the Schizophrenic Mind 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 72. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, the ‘phantom concreteness’ of 
certain psychotic experiences can also be likened to Wittgenstein’s account of the philosophical sublime 
in so far as it is something at once abstract and concrete.
119 Schreber, Memoirs, 48n.
120 Santner, Psychotheology, 48n^t9n. Santner’s emphasis.
121 Santner, Psychotheology, 48. On pages 53-54 Santner writes: ‘To return to the terms suggested by 
Agamben’s reflections on sovereignty, we can say that Schreber experiences, in the form of intense 
psychic and bodily distress, both sides of the duality comprising the state of exception: on the one hand, 
the sovereign’s sanctioned act of suspension of law, which marks a point of indistinction between 
constituted and constituting power, a point were the validity of sovereign authority -  its being in force -  
outstrips any meaningful content; and on the other hand, the subject’s (un) deadening exposure to this 
zone of indistinction.’
122 Santner, Psychotheology, 48. Santner’s emphasis.
123 Santner, Psychotheology, 49. Santner’s emphasis.
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The notion of trauma he evokes comes originally from Freud. In The Language of 
Psychoanalysis, Laplanche and Pontalis observe that Freud himself borrows the word 
‘trauma’ from its use in medicine and surgery. Tn adopting the term, psychoanalysis 
carries the three ideas implicit in it over on to the psychical level: the idea of a violent 
shock, the idea of a wound and the idea of consequences affecting the whole 
organization. ’ 124 This image of the subject pierced through or violently torn by a 
pressure that cannot be worked out psychically, recalls Schreber’s sense of life riven by 
the question of its own significance.12" In Santner’s words: ‘The collapse of the practical 
unity of life as a space of reason and normative engagement sustained by processes of 
symbolic investiture -  this radical disturbance of Schreber’s being-in the world -  
abandons Schreber to the pure intensity of undead life, to a protocosmic existence in 
which all meaningful relations among the regions of being have been effectively 
supplanted by purely external and nonsensical ones. ’ 126
On Santner’s account what needs to be dispelled is not the law per se but ‘the surplus 
excitation that, organized in fantasy, supplements and sustains the force of judicial 
normativity in ways that can be paralysing . ’ 127 Or as Wittgenstein says, when the 
philosopher grasps the sense of a word and feel that its future uses are ‘in a queer way’ 
already present to us, the problem lies with the words ‘in a queer way. The rest is all 
right. ’ 128 The paradox, however, is that the very expressions which strike us as queer, 
are also ‘the most natural thing in the world . ’ 129 For if the future uses of a word do 
sometimes appear before me, it seems quite natural to presume that to understand a 
word I must grasp its full use, or a rule for its use. By inviting us to feel, like the 
philosopher, the ghostly supplement of the law and meaning, Wittgenstein reminds us 
that the natural order is itself strange and phantasmic. In my view, the double aspect of 
fantasy, at once strange and normal, is also what Cavell refers to when he says that the 
argument between ‘queer’ and the ordinary in the Investigations, cannot be decided but 
must be dismantled.
My proposal is that dismantling this argument entails a transformation, rather than an 
escape from, the queer insistence of the unconscious. Under the spell of fantasy, 
Santner writes, ‘our entire being is in some sense permeated by making these enigmas
124 Laplanche, The Language of Psychoanalysis, 466.
125 Agamben also suggests this.
126 Santner, Psychotheology, 54-55. Santner’s emphasis.
127 Santner, Psychotheology, 43.
128 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §195.
124 Wittgenstein, ‘Conversations on Freud,’ 44.
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by which we feel ourselves addressed . . . make sense.’130 Therapy, on the view I am 
developing here, intervenes by ‘suspending the need to make sense’;131 by opening to 
the enigmas that the symbolic order simultaneously produces and tries to covers over. 
Thus the passage from fantasy and into the midst of everyday life, would involve a 
certain readiness to feel trauma,132 an acknowledgement of the crisis suffered by figures 
such as Schreber and Wittgenstein’s philosopher/child.
Acknowledging the unconscious
The term ‘acknowledgement’ is borrowed from Cavell. 133 Cavell believes that the 
fantasy of a foundational realm ‘beyond’ our shared world amounts to a failure to 
respond to the demands of everyday life. Cavell relates this failure to the dispute 
between the sceptic and the metaphysician. Both are engrossed by the question of 
whether we can truly know that the world and other minds exist. Their dispute rests on a 
shared fantasy, that our knowledge of the world must rest on absolutely certain 
foundations -  the metaphysician insists that we do have certain knowledge of the world, 
but the sceptic is never satisfied ends by doubting the very existence of the world and 
other people. However, as Cavell argues, both scepticism and metaphysics are 
misleading because our main way of engaging with the world is not in fact knowing or 
not knowing particular facts for certain, but rather acknowledging (or neglecting to 
acknowledge) the claims others make on us.134 ‘It is not enough that I know (am certain) 
that you suffer,’ he writes, T must do or reveal something (whatever can be done). In a 
word, I must acknowledge it, otherwise I do not know what “(your or his) being in 
pain” means.’ 135
Sass’s book, The Paradoxes of Delusion, draws on Wittgenstein’s work in an attempt 
to acknowledge the crisis Schreber suffers. Sass is concerned with the analogy between 
Schreber’s experience and Wittgenstein’s portrayal of the existential dimension of 
philosophy. In particular he focuses on the outlook of solipsism which, as we saw in 
Chapter 1, privileges the first person perspective and tends to put the independent 
existence of other people and the environment in doubt. In the Investigations,
130 Santner, Psychotheology, 97.
131 Fiona Jenkins, ‘Addressing the Crisis of Meaning’ 44.
132 Santner emphasises this point.
133 See Stanley Cavell, ‘Knowing and Acknowledging,’ Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 263.
134 Stanley Cavell, ‘Knowing and Acknowledging,’ 263.
135 Cavell, ‘Knowing and Acknowledging,’ 263.
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Wittgenstein often presents the solipsist separated from the stream of life, with thoughts 
turned inward, focused on the processes of mind. This meta-reflection can manifest 
itself as a form of staring intensely as if with the mind's eye. In Sass’ view Schreber’s 
delusions are precipitated by a similar withdrawal from the realm of action, a form of 
staring intensely.
In an attempt to imaginatively understand the solipsist, Wittgenstein invents various 
actualisations of the solipsist fantasy. Thorough this technique of imaginative literalism, 
he reveals that solipsism is not a cohesive picture; rather the solipsist fantasy depends 
on a series of operative contradictions. As David Pears points out, Wittgenstein shows 
that the self of solipsism cannot at once form the limits of the world and be pointed to as 
a determinate entity. In section 5.64 of the Tractatus, for example, Wittgenstein writes: 
‘it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides 
with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there 
remains the reality co-ordinated with it.’ So to say T am my world’136 is to make oneself 
imperceptible as an entity in the world.
As Sass points out, the paradoxes brought to the fore by Wittgenstein’s analysis of 
solipsism, coincide with Schreber’s lived reality, for he experiences himself both as a 
force constituting the entire world and as an abandoned being, utterly determined by the 
external force of the divine ‘rays.’ Sass writes: ‘the schizophrenic experience of 
swelling up to fill the world, yet of also being infinitesimal, only a negligible point at 
the centre of the vastness, can be understood as the expression of this solipsistic 
oscillation.’137
Drawing on Wittgenstein’s description of the paradoxes entailed by solipsism and 
other related philosophical ‘diseases,’ Sass hopes to better understand the lived 
experience of schizophrenic patients such as Schreber. In his view this gives his book a 
resolutely Wittgensteinian purpose: ‘to unravel, with as much care and simplicity as the 
subject allows, the self-deluding involutions of the schizophrenic “form of life” -  and 
thus to dissipate the atmosphere of unutterable mystery and profundity that surrounds 
such patients, often confusing them as much as those who seek to know them.’138 What 
Sass hopes to dissipate, in other words, is the feeling he finds common amongst some 
psychiatric workers, that the experiences of schizophrenic patients can never be known
136 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: 
Routledge, 1961) §5.63.
137 Sass, Paradoxes of Delusion, 69.
I3S Sass, Paradoxes of Delusion, 9. Sass is borrowing the term ‘form of life’ from Wittgenstein’s 
Investigations. In Chapter 6 I will bring the arguments of this chapter to bear on an understanding of 
Wittgenstein’s account of ‘form of life .’
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(and hence bear no relevance for treatment) since their experience is indescribably 
different from ours. However the understanding Sass hopes to bring to bear, does not 
amount to a cognitive mastery of the patient’s delusions, a rationalisation of their 
symptoms; rather the book gradually reveals something about the very source of 
schizophrenic apartness. Schizophrenic experience is not enigmatic, the book implies, in 
the sense that the patient’s world is utterly alien to ‘well’ people; rather what we must 
gradually come to understand is the patient experiences themselves as mysterious, so 
that it is ‘1 who am distant.’139
It is important to note that although Sass attempts to dissipate the mystery 
surrounding psychotic and schizophrenic patients by listening carefully to their 
accounts, he does not claim that his book effects a cure, if by cure we mean that once 
the patient’s paradoxical delusions are revealed they automatically dissolve and the 
patient is thus released from their crisis. In this sense, Sass diverges in his use of 
Wittgenstein from authors such as David Pears who equate Wittgenstein’s techniques of 
imaginative literalism with such a cure. For Sass, the value of Wittgenstein’s 
imaginative attempts to portray the paradoxes of delusion, is to give us an insight into 
the lived experience of someone under the spell of delusion, and the further question of 
whether this acknowledgement might function as a form of individual treatment is left 
unresolved.
What Sass’s book brings to the fore is that a certain openness concerning the precise 
outcome of therapy pervades Wittgenstein’s work. There is nothing about 
Wittgenstein’s techniques of imaginative literalism that will determine their precise 
effect on a given subject, not only in extreme cases like Schreber’s but more broadly in 
any therapeutic situation.1401 do not mean that Wittgenstein’s imaginative attempts to 
acknowledge the experience of a person suffering a crisis will have no impact, but 
rather that we cannot determine the outcome of therapy from the outset, nor measure it 
as a determinate subjective state.
Fiona Jenkins raises a similar point in her article: ‘Addressing the Crisis of Meaning: 
towards a “psychotheological” reading of the unconscious’ where she proposes a form 
of philosophical counselling, which does not purport to explain or cure, but rather 
attempts to acknowledge the crisis of meaning which the client suffers. Speaking about 
her own experiences as a volunteer counsellor she writes:
139 Sass, Paradoxes of Delusion, 130. [Slight alteration of text]
140 And even if these techniques were to effect a ‘cure,’ it is not certain whether the ‘cure’ would amount 
to the dissolution of fantasy images, or rather re-figuration of these images in ways that undoes their 
spell.
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this undergoing when another is communicating a sense of meaninglessness is 
particularly hard to enter into and particularly difficult to endure. One becomes 
impatient to return to the ground where it is possible to ask questions at a level which 
presumes intelligibility -  Why do you think that? Does that make sense? What is it 
you want to achieve? But all the time that one is able or compelled to occupy the 
space of listening one is forced to share the abyssal sense of the untenability of such 
questions, the powerlessness of reason to draw either of you up out of this abyss. . . . 
In sharing this space with another it is at least possible that something will happen 
through the very openness to a ‘meaning’ that remains enigmatic, irreducible to what 
one or the other anticipated finding. 141
This openness as to the outcome of therapy may in part be what Soulez alludes to 
when she observes that for all the importance Wittgenstein gives to our subjective 
reactions, he does not describe the outcome of therapy in terms of individual cure, but 
rather in terms of the health of the language we all share. To me this suggests that if a 
therapeutic ‘cure’ is to be wrought, it will not primarily amount to a newly found sense 
of individual well being; rather therapy has the potential to transform the ethical 
relations between us, to affect the very community to which we belong.
The nonsensical space of ethical relation
Wittgenstein’s therapy entails an opening to the existential effects of fantasy. This 
gesture of acknowledgement, 1 have suggested, requires us to re-conceive our very 
notion of subjectivity by shifting the focus from the individual to the subject in relation 
to others. In Chapter 2 I argued that Cora Diamond’s account of the Wittgenstein’s 
attempts to imaginatively understand the ethical or metaphysical speaker might be 
understood in this way. In so doing Wittgenstein does not attempt to decode the 
meaning behind the speakers words; but nor does he dismiss what is said: that is, he 
does not claim that their words conceal an inner truth; but nor does he unmask their 
error. Instead Wittgenstein shifts the focus away from the subject per se, to the space 
within and between subjects - to our capacity, as ethical, agents to acknowledge the 
nonsensicality of our attempts to express an outlook on life as a whole, and the 
nonsensicality of this undertaking by others.
141 Jenkins, ‘Addressing the Crisis of Meaning’ 45.
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Put directly in the terms of this chapter, the nonsensical space of relation entails an 
opening to the subject with unconscious.'42 Laplanche, for example, writes that we all 
carry within us an unconscious or ‘internal alien-ness...held in place by external alien­
ness,’ by the impenetrable desire of another but the ‘external alien-ness’ is ‘in turn held 
in place by the enigmatic relation of the other to his own internal alien.’143 Laplanche’s 
central thought is that the ‘external alien-ness’ keeping the ‘internal alien-ness’ of the 
subject ‘in place’ is not primarily the result of a lack of knowledge; hence never fully 
resolving the question of its place in the desires of others, because the others are 
enigmatic to themselves, for they too live with an unconscious or ‘internal alien-ness.’144
As Santner’s has observed, this may mean that ‘what matters most in a human life’ is 
not one’s subjective orientation, but rather ‘one’s specific form of disorientation, the 
idiomatic way in which one’s approach to and movement through the world is 
distorted.’145 For Santner this suggests that subjectivity cannot be reduced to a list of 
predicates (tall, female, hairy etc.) such that relations between peoples depend on 
determinate similarities and differences; rather we each carry a singular unconscious 
excess.
Indeed, the idiosyncratic excess of the unconscious, which cannot be summarised as 
a set of facts yet also does not point beyond the world to an ineffable truth, fits with the 
two aspects of the ethical will 1 emphasised in my discussion of the Tractatus and 
Notebooks. For on the one hand the idiosyncratic excess of the will can be thought of as 
a tautological presence - ‘I am my world’ - which is literally fe lt by Schreber in such a 
way that it is ultimately ‘I who am distant.’146 But on the other, the ethical will entails a 
mixture of feelings given in language and practice but irreducible to any determinate 
psychological state. So when Wittgenstein liberates the feelings of wonder and safety 
from the demand for foundation, or when he leads us to feel that the miracle of the
142 As my previous discussion of Cavell and Santner suggests, an opening to the unconscious entails not 
only a willingness to feel its existential effects, but also an analysis of the conditions of community which 
generate the crisis and cover it over, an acknowledgement that the conditions and the community at stake 
are my own. Laplanche’s work on Freud is of value here because it does not limit the deranging effects of 
this crisis to psychiatric patients, but ties it to the processes of subject formation more broadly.
144 Jean Laplanche , Essays on Otherness, ed. John Fletcher (London: Routledge, 1999), 80.
144 A similar idea is played out at the linguistic register in the Investigations for as Wittgenstein 
demonstrates throughout his book a word’s meaning is not open because its full definition remains 
unknown to me, but rather because its very ‘structure’ is open. Like the various resemblances that make 
up a family a word can function even though it’s meaning cannot be completely pinned down. See 
Wittgenstein, Investigations, 67.
145 Santner, Psychotheology, 39.
146 Indeed we might conclude that the two main aspects of Santner’s account of the subject with 
unconscious - that we are all distinguished by a singular excess and that by virtue of the language we 
share the other is enigmatic not just to me but, in a sense, to themselves -  have their correlates in 
Wittgenstein’s early and late work respectively.
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existence of language might save us, he also evokes an idiosyncratic excess - feelings in 
excess of any determinate psychological state.
In the context of the reading of the Investigations I have made in this chapter, this 
leads me to propose that by opening to the speaker of nonsense, to the ethical relation 
between subjects, Wittgenstein’s hope is to unbind the unconscious, by dispersing its 
mood and feelings across the details of life, so that we might sense the strangeness of 
the everyday, and the ordinariness of the strange. But this dispersal is only possible if 
the sovereignty of the subject is itself disbanded, for the fantasy of an autonomous, self­
present subject is precisely what covers over the paradoxical implications of the 
solipsist will - its manifestation as an idiosyncratic excess. 147 In this regard 
Wittgenstein’s attempts to illustrate the lived reality of the philosopher/child opens us to 
a crisis within language itself but as I have argued the recurrent symptom of this crisis - 
the strange unconscious excess - is not only the stuff of fantasy but also the resource for 
it’s overcoming. 148 To end this chapter I will suggest how Wittgenstein’s imaginative 
engagement with nonsense might help open us to the possibilities of life and language.
Illustrated Nonsense
To say ‘this com bination of words makes no sense’ excludes it from the sphere of 
language and thereby bounds the domain of language. But when one draws a boundary 
it may be for various kinds of reason. If I surround an area with a fence or a line or 
otherwise, the purpose may be to prevent someone from getting in or out; but it may 
also be part of a game and the players be supposed, say, to jump over the boundary; or
147 To posit oneself as a sovereign subject, the master of fully conceived thoughts, hopes and intentions, is 
to fantasise away our residue trauma, to disregard the constitutive role of others in our subject formation 
and the disorientation entailed by our entry into the symbolic life. As we saw in Chapter 2, Wittgenstein 
dramatises the fantasy of being the origin of one’s own meanings and desires, as a feeling imposed on us 
by language, like the command of a ‘foreign will.’ Following this command one tries to realise one’s 
own meanings as self-present, demanding, in effect, that the world correspond to my will. This demand is 
simultaneously an attempt to carry out the command of a foreign will and to cover over the trauma 
produced by its very operation by positing the sovereignty of the subject.
I4K As Santner writes: ‘the very locus of our psychic rigidity -  what I have referred to as our biopolitical 
animation or undeadness -  at the same time harbours our singular resource for “unplugging” from our 
capture by the sovereign relation. The very dynamic that attaches us to an ideological formation is, in this 
view, the site where the possibility of genuinely new possibilities can emerge. Per symptom, the very 
thing that impeded life, constrains our movement in the world, is at the same time the source of what 
Bloom referred to as the “blessings of more life.” In Hölderlin’s famous words, “Yet where danger lies,/ 
Grows that which saves.’” Santner, Psychotheology, 81. Santner is referring to Friedrich Hölderlin’s 
hymn ‘Patmos’ in Hymns and Fragments by Friedrich Hölderlin, trans. Richard Sieburth (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 184), 89.
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it may shew where the property of one man ends and that o f another begins; and so on.
So if I draw a boundary line that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for.149
Sometimes, when Wittgenstein draws the boundary between nonsense and sense, he is 
playing the game of illustrating nonsense. The purpose of his illustrations could be to 
draw attention to the nonsensicality of something we generally take as sense, to make 
implicit nonsense ‘patent. ’ 150 But it could also, quite literally, be to illustrate a 
nonsensical combination of words, to sketch their outline. The illustration might depict 
a nonsensical scene from everyday life, but it might also, through the very act of 
illustration, present the words in new light, perhaps even makes new senses for them; 
when for example Cavell reads the scene of the builders as an allegory for the ‘advent’ 
of language.
‘When a sentence is called senseless,’ Wittgenstein writes, ‘it is not as it were its 
sense that is senseless. But a combination of words is being excluded from the 
language, withdrawn from circulation. ’ 151 Now one may think that the combination of 
words that are being withdrawn are the words without function, the nonsensical words, 
but one might also say that the words withdrawn from the nonsensical expression are 
those that would give it its use. On can draw a boundary for many reasons, Wittgenstein 
tells us. Indeed, as Marjorie Perloff observes, a ‘sentence’s incompletion provides many 
intriguing semantic possibilities. ’ 152 So by revealing the nonsensicality of an expression, 
by separating it from its conventional context, one might also draw attention to the way 
that a ‘multitude of familiar paths lead off from these words in every direction. ’ 153
149 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §499.
150 Wittgenstein, Investigations, § 464.
151 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §500.
152 Marjorie Perloff, Wittgenstein’s Ladder (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 84-85.
153 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §525. In Chapters 3 and 4 I argued that Henry Staten’s book Wittgenstein 
and Derrida does not adequately pursue the significance of the stylistic differences between the two 
authors. However, Staten’s essay - ‘Wittgenstein and the Intricate Evasions of “is,”’ New Literary History 
vol. 19 (1988) 290 - draws attention to the particularity of Wittgenstein’s style that interest me here.
Staten suggests that like the poet, Wittgenstein diverges from the colloquial order, but in such a way that 
various colloquial orders swim around his words. To help make this clear he draws on the following 
passage from Wittgenstein’s Zettel, ‘a poet’s words can pierce us. And that is of course causally 
connected with the use they have in our life. And it is also connected with the way in which, conformably 
to this use, we let our thoughts roam up and down in the familiar surroundings of the words.’ Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Zettel, 2nd edition, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) §155.
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Augustine’s Child
To end I would like to relate these reflections back to Augustine’s child, who, as Cavell 
has suggested, might also be thought of as the hero of the Investigations. The child 
begins the Investigations perturbed by the question: ‘what do my elders want from me? 
What is my place in their desires?’ In ‘Notes and Afterthoughts’ Cavell does not settle 
this question, instead he turns it around, asking himself: ‘what does that the child want 
from me?’ In response he draws on a passage that he first wrote for Conditions 
Handsome and Unhandsome:
This time around, for some reason, what strikes me about Augustine’s description is 
how isolated the child appears, training its own mouth to form signs (something you 
might expect of a figure in a Beckett play), the unobserved observer of the culture. 
The scene portrays language as an inheritance but also as one that has, as it were, to be 
stolen, anyway in which the capacity and perhaps the m otivation to take it is 
altogether greater that the capacity and perhaps the motivation to give it. Haunting the 
entire Investigations, the opening scene and its figure of the child signals the question 
‘where did you learn -  what is the home of a concept’ may at any time arise (and not 
only in the couple of dozen sections in which the child explicitly appears), that the 
inheritance of a culture -  the process of cultivation (or what is the point of spading?) -  
comes not to a natural end, or rather to its own end, but to one ended, by poor 
resources, or by power; that when explanations in particular circumstances run out, 
teaching becomes heightened while control over what it is that is taught, say shown, is 
lessened.154
In this scene of cultural inheritance the child’s desire to learn is greater than its 
teacher’s willingness to give, and this brings the question of the ‘home of a concept’ 
(one of the driving questions of the Investigations) to an end ‘prematurely.’ Perhaps the 
fantasy that each word has a single home (motivating both metaphysics and scepticism) 
becomes the substitute for the unending task of investigating and describing the homes 
we make for words. 155 However as the passage goes on to suggest, we also fail to
154 Cavell, Conditions Handsome, 98, 99. Quoted by Cavell in ‘Notes and Afterthoughts,’ 169.
155 As Cavell elaborates in The Claim of Reason: ‘In “learning language” you learn not merely what the 
names of things are, but what a name is; not merely what the form of expression is for expressing a wish, 
but what expressing a wish is . . . Instead, then of saying either that we tell beginners what words mean, 
or that we teach them what objects are, 1 will say: We initiate them, into the relevant form of life held in 
language and gathered around the objects and persons of our world. For that to be possible, we must make 
ourselves exemplary and take responsibility for that assumption of authority; and the initiate must be able 
to follow us, in however rudimentary a way, naturally (look where our finger points, laugh at what we
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recognise that when explanations do run out, when an account of what we do is not 
enough to hold off the impasses of meaning, ‘teaching ’ may be ‘heightened’ even 
though our ‘control over what is taught’ diminishes.156 This, I believe, is the situation 
Wittgenstein puts us in when he invites us to imagine what it would be like if 
Augustine’s words were ‘appropriate’ or true. For although following the game in 
section 2 of the Investigations, Cavell proposes various scenes to illustrate the 
appropriateness of the Augustine’s account of childhood, none of these scenes are fully 
satisfying realisations of the fantasy of inner meaning that the words nevertheless 
suggest. But by relinquishing control over what is said, ‘teaching’ may be ‘heightened’ 
in the sense that the demand for a fully satisfying realisation of fantasy, and the un­
deadening effects of this impossible demand, give way to various scenes which 
actualise a potential aspect of Augustine’s account of language learning.
Over the course of this chapter, Augustine’s words, and Wittgenstein’s translation of 
those words into the scene of the builders, have been taken to illustrate no language and 
the very ‘advent’ of language; the compulsive repetition of fantasy, and the means by 
which we might undo fantasy’s spell, a closing off and an opening to the unconscious. 
So while the enigmatic nature of the building scene in section 2 may lead us to declare 
Augustine’s words empty, we might equally say that Augustine says too much, that the 
enigmatic quality of the scene provokes an incessant activity of contextualisation: where 
a multitude of possibilities are evoked but where no one possibility can be settled on 
determinately. Nonsense gives us a grasp of the multitude of possibilities that are open 
to us.
According to Wittgenstein, making an image, which is also a kind of seeing 
something as something can be distinguished from seeing, for unlike seeing it does not 
tell us anything correct or incorrect about the external world. For this reason images are 
not pictures that represent the external world, but nor are they ‘hallucinations’ or 
‘fancies’ misrepresenting the facts of reality.157 Instead‘images are subject to the 
will.’158 This is not to deny that ‘images often beset us against our will and remain,
laugh at, comfort what we comfort. . .); and he must want to follow us (care about our approval, like a 
smile better than a frown . .  .) . “Teaching” here would mean something like “showing them what we say 
and do,” and “accepting what they say and do as what we say and do,” etc.; and this will be more than we 
know, or can say.’ On this account teaching entails the proposal or the promise of a shared community - a 
willingness to take my actions and words representative of what we might do and say, and an 
acknowledgement that the actions and words of the child learning language are my own. But this 
community ‘will be more than we know, or can say’ for child’s words may only be language-like and 
their emulation of adults still a game. See Cavell, Claim of Reason, 177-78.
156 My emphasis.
1:17 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Wittgenstein Reader, ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 174.
ISX Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein Reader, 174.
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refusing to be banished.’ For images impose themselves on us like a foreign will, but it 
is through further images, rather than through facts of the world, that ‘the will can 
struggle against them.’159 Hence Wittgenstein’s central thought is not simply that we are 
constituted by an alien will whose command splits the subject into self and other (into 
the part which accepts and the part which commands) but rather that this split opens up 
a space not only of acquiescence but also reaction and response.
In Soulez’s words, Wittgenstein’s ‘practice or “pragmatic” is distinguished by the 
fact that it is completely inseparable from the idea that concepts do something to us, and 
that in return we do something with what they produce in us, namely images. For forms 
of language are both the deposit of our experiences -  their incarnated imprint -  and the 
means we use against the constraining of misleading effects these deposits leave in 
us.’1“
Words can in practise captivate and liberate precisely because, as images, they ‘strike’ 
us, and the pictorial traits that they diffract ‘make an impression’ on us. We must thus 
understand that only a certain ‘reactionism ’ makes it possible for interpretation to 
engage with language and its effects, in combination with this dynamic of the imaging 
function of language.161
And this, she believes helps explains Wittgenstein’s insistence, in a 1930 interview with 
Moritz Schlick, that: ‘everything we do consists in finding the word that saves us.’162 
Reflecting back on the previous chapters we might now say that W ittgenstein’s 
famous words of constraint might also be harnessed to save us -  for what more is the 
dream-writing that Wittgenstein defends in his discussion about Freud, than a response 
to, an imaginative reworking of a private language?163
159 Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein Reader, 177.
160 Soulez, ‘Wittgenstein’s ‘Saving Word,” 128.
161 Soulez, ‘Wittgenstein’s ‘Saving Word,” 128.
162 Wittgenstein in conversation with Schlick, quoted in Soulez, ‘Wittgenstein’s Saving Word,” 146n.
1631 am suggesting that the private language Wittgenstein imagines in sections 256-275 of the 
Investigations might be thought of as a further attempt to illustrate or draw out the ambiguity of 
Augustine’s opening words. By proposing that the dream-writing and the unconscious are further possible 
transfigurations of the private language image, I want to emphasis the idiosyncratic quality of the 
unconscious, its manifestation in each of us as a singular excess. These thoughts lead me back to 
Derrida’s account of the unconscious in ‘Freud and The Scene of Writing.’ Derrida writes: ‘This writing, 
for example the kind we find in dreams which “follow old facilitations,” a simply moment in regression 
towards a “primary” writing, cannot be read in terms of any code. It words, no doubt, with a mass of 
elements which have been codified in the course of an individual or collective history. But in its 
operations, lexicon, and syntax a purely idiomatic residue is irreducible and is made to bear the burden of 
interpretation in the communication between unconsciousnesses. The dreamer invents his own grammar.’ 
Jacque Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing,’ in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, (London: 
Routledge, 1978), 209.
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Here we begin to see the redeeming power of Wittgenstein’s imaginative 
engagement with nonsense. According to Wittgenstein certain nonsensical expressions 
captivate us precisely because they strike us as images. Like actual pictures, these 
fantasy-pictures seem to gesture at something that our words do not express; but as it 
turns out no actual picture can satisfyingly capture the full meaning of a fantasy picture. 
Hence Wittgenstein’s illustrations of fantasy-pictures are ambiguous or incomplete. But 
as I have suggested, the very openness of the scenes he illustrates turns out to be 
fruitful; for as fragments the scenes suggest not one but a multitude of possible 
contextualisations. 164 Here one might say that nonsense testifies, not just to this or that 
inexplicable occurrence in language, but to the miracle that language exists, for it helps 
inaugurate an intransitive or aspectival vision - ‘the hope and possibility of new 
possibilities. ’ 165
164 Here my account of nonsense mirrors Wittgenstein’s account of dream writing outlined at the end of 
Chapter 4.
165 Santner, Psychotheology, 40. And, if as Wittgenstein suggests in his ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ we feel 
nonsensical expressions to be sublime, then it is sublime nonsense that makes possible this mode of 
‘intransitive’ wonder.
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Chapter 6
The extent of the sympathetic imagination
Introduction
If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his 
feelings are hidden from me.
We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as 
regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn 
this when we come into a strange county with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, 
even given a mastery of the country’s language. We do not understand the people. (And not 
because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with 
them.
‘I cannot know what is going on in him’ is above all a picture. It is the convincing 
expression of a conviction. It does not give the reasons for the conviction. They are not readily 
accessible.
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.1
In my final chapter I will bring my previous reading of Wittgenstein to bear on 
questions of community and difference. We often contrast the shared intelligibility 
between community members with the opacity of strangers. Wittgenstein appears to 
make such a contrast in the passage above when he describes the experience of moving 
to a foreign country. But the simple contrast is soon called into question. One may not 
understand the people, he says, even when one has mastered their language. 
Furthermore, this lack of understanding does not amount to an inability to grasp what 
they are saying to themselves. Being unable to know what is going on inside another 
may be how we ‘picture’ our lack of understanding, Wittgenstein says, but it cannot 
explain what it is to not understand. In an effort to describe what takes place when we 
encounter others Wittgenstein makes two further points. Firstly, he suggests that we can 
respond in sympathy or understanding to others regardless of whether we have 
privileged access to their inner states. Secondly, he suggests that even our neighbours, 
the people with whom we share language and community, can be quite strange to us.
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1958), 223.
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Miscomprehension need not entail a gulf of absolute separation, he tells us, but may 
mark a near/far relation between us.
The first of these ideas ties in with the previous discussions of Simon Glendinning’s 
account of criteria for what we say when as spontaneous leaps to community, and with 
Stanley Cavell’s distinction between acknowledgement and knowledge. The second 
demonstrates Wittgenstein’s ongoing concern to reveal the intermingling of the familiar 
and strange, which in the previous chapter I tied to the unconscious.
In this chapter I intend to develop these two ideas further. To help open up my 
discussion I will outline the role Wittgenstein’s work plays in some existing debates 
about community and difference. I will look at Iris Marion Young and Chantal 
Mouffe’s critique of the way that community entails an appropriative claim of mutual 
intelligibility and their arguments in favour of an ethics based on respect for alterity. 
Drawing on the Wittgenstein influenced work of Cavell, Glendinning and Alessandra 
Tanesini, I will argue that there are more nuances of understanding and 
misunderstanding between beings than this polarised account suggests.
In my view, Wittgenstein presents the encounter between beings as an open textured 
conversation that need not find final resolution. This open-ended encounter has its 
counterpoint in the idea of determinate limits. So, for example, there are two different 
ways of reading Wittgenstein’s insistence-. ‘If a lion could talk, we could not understand 
him.’ On the one hand, our failure to comprehend the talking lion may be read as an 
emblem of the gulf between human and animal and as a warning that our sympathetic 
imagination has reached its limit. But on the other hand, the scene may be read as an 
emblem of the open yet enigmatic relation between different beings, of the nonsense we 
must speak if we are to embark in conversation. The first reading rests on the notion that 
the main function of nonsense is self-dissolution; the second reading emphasises the 
indeterminable quality of nonsense, its open suggestiveness. In the previous chapters I 
tied this latter account of nonsense to a shift in focus from the subject per se to the 
space of relation between subjects, firstly in the context of our attempts to express an 
outlook on life as a whole and secondly in the context of the therapeutic situation of the 
Investigations. In this final chapter I will ask: what bearing does the space of encounter 
opened up by an imaginative engagement with nonsense have on an ethics committed to 
the recognition of difference?
From within the terms of Wittgenstein’s project this question is in fact quite difficult 
to formulate. At the end of chapter 2, for example, I identified what might be 
understood as an important distinction between Wittgenstein’s therapeutic engagement
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with fantasy, on the one hand, and his outlook on differences in culture, belief, or 
behaviour, on the other. According to the Investigations both social and biological 
differences between beings can be interpreted as differences in ‘form of life,’2 3so that, 
for example, a religious belief may be meaningful from within a whole series of rituals 
and ways of talking, but outside these practices the same belief may seem impossible to 
understand. Therapy, by way of contrast, addresses the tendency to disengage from the 
stream of life and escapes into fantasy, evading the criteria that testify to our various 
shared forms of life. On the basis of this account it would seem that Wittgenstein’s 
intention is to distinguish between the enigmas addressed in the course of therapy and 
the enigma of beings whose form of life are unlike our own. In the former case the task 
seems to be to discover or rediscover a sense of community (even if the community 
amounts to a shared sense of derangement); in the latter case the task seems to be to 
accept that the sympathetic imagination has reached its limit when we encounter 
different forms of life.
However, although I do not want to claim that the element of Wittgenstein’s thought 
which advocates a respect for differences in ‘form of life’2 can be entirely reconciled 
with his therapeutic project, I nevertheless intend to outline some important points of 
cross over. In particular 1 will argue that to respond to another with respect or wonder 
is to risk a ‘we’ of some broader kind, a near/far space of relation opened up by 
differences that cross the shared being of life. What is at stake when we evoke or deny 
this community of life1. To help respond to this question I will read Wittgenstein’s work 
in conjunction with J.M. Coetzee’s book The Lives of Animals.
The Lives of Animals
In a well-known article, the philosopher Thomas Nagel describes his attempt to imagine 
what it would be like to be a bat.
It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one’s arms, which enables 
one to fly around . . . catching insects in one’s mouth; that one has very poor vision, 
and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound 
signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one’s feet in an attic. 
Insofar as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would
2 The notion of ‘forms of life’ recurs throughout the Investigations. See for example, §241, 174 and 226.
3 Wittgenstein’s description of the relation between himself and a religious believer, discussed previously 
in chapter 2 is one place where he advocates an open respect for difference.
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be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to 
know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted 
by the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task.4
Responding to this in Coetzee’s novel The Lives o f Animals, the author Elizabeth 
Costello, the book’s protagonist, tells her audience about the ‘sympathetic 
imagination, ’5 something in which Thomas Nagel puts little faith.
‘For instants at a time,’ his mother is saying, ‘I know what it is like to be a 
corpse. The knowledge repels me. It fills me with terror; I shy away from it, refuse 
to entertain it.
‘All of us have such moments, particularly as we grow older. The knowledge we 
have is not abstract -  ‘all human beings are mortal, I am a human being, therefore I 
am mortal’ -  but embodied. For a moment we are that knowledge. We live the 
impossible: we live beyond our death, look back on it, yet look back as only a dead 
self can.
‘When I know, with this knowledge, that I am going to die, what is it, in Nagel’s 
terms, that I know? Do I know what it is like for me to be a corpse or do I know 
what it is like for a corpse to be a corpse? The distinction seems to me trivial. What 
I know is what a corpse cannot know: that it is extinct, that it knows nothing and 
will never know anything anymore. For an instant, before my whole structure of 
knowledge collapses in panic, I am alive inside that contradiction, dead and alive at 
the same time.’ ..  .
‘This is the kind of thought we are capable of, we human beings, that and even 
more, if we press ourselves or are pressed. But we resist being pressed, and rarely 
press ourselves; we think our way into death only when we are rammed into the fact 
of it. Now I ask: if we are capable of thinking our own death, why on earth should 
we not be capable of thinking our way into the life of a bat? 6
At stake, is the breath of the sympathetic imagination - our capacity to imagine 
ourselves into the lives of other beings - but also the very nature of the life we 
imagine ourselves into. According to Nagel we do not have a bat’s sense modalities
4 Thomas Nagel, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’ in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), 169.
5 J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd ed. (London: Profile Books, 2000), 49. Coetzee’s character 
Elizabeth Costello is a novelist who has been invited by the university to give a talk on the topic of her 
choice. Instead of speaking in detail about her fiction or literary influences she makes the contentious 
choice to talk about her views on the lives of animals.
6 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 43-44.
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and this makes the bat ‘a fundamentally alien form of life . ' 1 But according to 
Elizabeth Costello the sympathetic imagination has no absolute bounds. At moments, 
she tells her audience, she lives the impossible, she is alive in death, but she can also 
think her way into the lives of creatures who have never existed, into the characters of 
pure fiction, and ‘[i]f I can think my way into the existence of a being who has never 
existed, then I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an 
oyster, any being with whom I share the substrate of life. ’ 7 8
I want to draw attention, for a moment, to something of the extraordinariness of 
this suggestion, by quoting an extract from Peter Singer’s imagined (fictional) 
conversation with his daughter Naomi regarding Costello’s remark. ‘You don’t have 
to be a philosopher to see what is wrong with that,’ Naomi tells her father. ‘The fact 
that a character doesn’t exist isn’t something that makes it hard to imagine yourself as 
that character. You can imagine someone very like yourself, or like someone else you 
know. Then it is easy to think your way into the existence of that being. But a bat, or 
an oyster? Who knows? ’ 9 We can sympathetically portray a fictional person, a person 
who actually does not exist, because their way of life is similar to our own or to the 
people around us, but how can we sympathise or imaginatively understand a life we 
are unfamiliar with?
If, as Naomi suggests, the ability to understand another’s life stops where our 
shared ways of life stop, then expressions of sympathy or understanding that try to go 
beyond these limits will seem only presumptuous, unconvincing or confused. In the 
face of this confusion, it would seem that the task of the philosopher is to identify 
exactly what forms of life, what practices, abilities or perceptual apparatus we do and 
don’t share with animals. For Nagel the answer would be very little, for although it is 
true that we share more with a monkey than a bat, and more with a bat than a 
Martian, we cannot say, in the case of the bat, what it would be like to be a bat 
because we do not share their sense modalities. 10 Peter Singer, on the other hand, says 
that we do share some things with animals, especially the capacity to feel pain, but 
that there are many other things (looking to the future, reasoning, reflecting on death) 
that we don’t share, and this explains why, even though the animal interest in life is 
important, the human interest in life is ultimately greater. 11
7 Thomas Nagel, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,’ 168.
x Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 49.
9 Peter Singer, 'Reflections,’ The Lives of Animals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 91.
10 Thomas Nagel, ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,’ 170.
" Peter Singer, 'Reflections,’ The Lives of Animals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 91.
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Naomi finds Costello’s ‘argument’ about the sympathetic imagination weak from 
the point of view of the non-philosopher, Singer has such little confidence in it that he 
doubts that the book’s author actually takes Costello’s views seriously. He speculates 
that the various characters who critique Costello’s talk are used by the author to 
distance himself from his protagonist’s claims. 12 He does not consider the possibility 
that The Lives of Animals posits no rational authorial viewpoint from which to 
adjudicate.
In summary we might say that for Singer, the fact that he can imaginatively invent 
a fictional conversation about Coetzee’s fictional heroine, has no bearing on his 
capacity (or incapacity) to envisage the lives of animals; 13 nor does it alter his 
conviction that life, although important to animals, is significantly more important to 
humans.
But if, as Elizabeth Costello suggests, animals and humans share a ‘substrate of 
life’ - a ‘fullness of being,’ a ‘body-soul’ 14 - then it may be possible for me to imagine 
myself into a life very different from my own. Here differences in animal and human 
forms of life, although important, are ultimately of ‘secondary consideration,’ for 
what is most important in this encounter is not this or that particular type of life, but 
an opening to the very being of life. 15 And if, as she also suggests, we can also 
imagine ourselves beyond this being of life into death, into a living death, then the 
question becomes: what is it that we understand about human and animal existence, 
when we imagine these things - when we imagine both the fullness of life, and the life 
of the dead?
Put in the terms of my previous discussion, Costello could be read as suggesting that 
our capacity to imagine the un-dead existence of figures such as Judge Schreber and 
Wittgenstein’s philosopher child bears upon our capacity to imagine the lives of beings 
very different from our own and that, furthermore, the problematic of un-dead life, and 
the search for the fullness of life, may not, as Cavell suggests, be a uniquely human 
concern. I will return to this final suggestion in the second half of my chapter. But
12 Singer points out that Costello is just one of many characters who proffer philosophical points of view 
in Coetzee’s fiction ‘The Lives of Animals.’ Norma, for example, frequently criticizes Costello for her 
poor reasoning, and lack of clear principles, so why be so sure, Singer asks, that her voice is the authorial 
voice? - the voice with the authority to speak philosophically - for the true import of the text may be 
elsewhere.
13 In this regard Singer does not agree with Nagel, for he argues that there are various things we can tell 
about animals, their degree of self awareness, their feeling of pain, etc.
14 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 45.
15 Here the very terms such as ‘shared forms of life’ or ‘shared substrate of life’ come under a certain 
pressure, for as I will argue in this chapter, what is shared is not a series o f attributes but a space of 
relation and possibilities.
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before addressing in detail the relation between humans and animals I want to describe 
how the notion of ‘sympathetic understanding’ Costello puts forward ties in with 
Wittgenstein and Cavell’s work. To do so I will look at the way their thought has 
impacted on current debates about political community and an ethics of difference 
between humans.
Forming Communities
The formation of communities often rests on acts of exclusion. In her work on political 
community Iris Marion Young, for example, has observed that the identification of 
oneself as a member of a community ‘often occurs as an oppositional differentiation 
from other groups, who are feared, despised, or at best devalued. ’ 16 In this situation an 
‘us,’ a community, is identified by distinguishing itself from a ‘them’ outside the 
community. This makes Young suspicious of the claim that one human being can 
sympathetically project themselves into the standpoint of another. In her view: ‘it is 
neither possible nor morally desirable for persons engaged in moral interaction to adopt 
one another’s standpoint. ’ 17
The whole problem with the ideal of community, Young argues, is that it presumes a 
shared sympathy, a ‘transparency’ between people that covers over actual differences 
in their life histories and viewpoints. 18 In the name of sympathetic understanding the 
values of the dominant group are often imposed on everyone, eliding the true diversity 
of perspective.
However, Young’s intent is not to deny that an ‘enlarged understanding of the world’ 
can take place across differences. 19 Instead her argument is with the ideal of community 
and with the related presumption that we can sympathetically inhabit the world of 
others. She writes:
It is necessary to distinguish between taking the perspective of others into account in 
making moral judgements, on the one hand, and reversing positions with them, on the 
other. Dialogue participants are able to take account of the perspective of others 
because they have heard those perspectives expressed. They have had to listen to those
1(1 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 
234-235.
17 Iris Marion Young, Intersecting Voices (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 39.
1X Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 231.
|y Young is drawing on Hannah Arendt’s notion of ‘enlarged thought,’ which is intended to explain how a 
person shifts from their individual perspective to a broader socially inclusive view point. See for example 
Hannah Arendt, The Human condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
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expressions with a moral humility that recognizes that they stand in relations o f  
asymmetry and irreversibility with others.20
Political theorist Chantal Mouffe puts forward a stronger claim, arguing that all 
communities inevitably define their borders by designating a ‘them’ outside the 
community. But if we up hold the democratic ideal of plurality then a paradox forces 
itself upon us, for the very thing that makes community possible (acts of exclusion) is 
also the thing that makes a fully inclusive community impossible. 21 On the basis of this 
account, Mouffe embraces the inevitability of political conflict and abandons the hope 
for full resolution, a stance she names ‘agnonistic pluralism. ’22
In support of her argument she draws on Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘form of life,’ 
which in her view amounts to the claim that ‘agreements in opinions are agreements in 
forms of life.’2’ Later I will turn in detail to this notion in Wittgenstein and argue that 
opinions and forms of life cannot be in this way conflated. However for the moment, I 
simply want to indicate that Mouffe extracts from Wittgenstein the idea that community 
agreement is not a matter of sharing definitions but sharing patterns of acting and 
speaking and this, she suggests, ‘not only indicates the nature of every consensus but 
also reveals its limits.’ Wittgenstein, for example, writes:
When two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then 
each man declares the other a fool and a heretic. I said I would ‘com bat’ the other 
man, — but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end 
of reasons comes persuasion ,24
According to Mouffe, the emphasis Wittgenstein places on reasons coming to an end in 
this passage is ‘an important starting point’ for her stance of ‘agonistic pluralism. ’ 25
20 Iris Marion Young, Intersecting Voices (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 39.
21 See Chantel Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso: 2000), 1-16 and Chantel Mouffe, 
‘Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity,’ in Rajchman ed., The Identity in Question, 33-45.
22 See Mouffe, ‘Democratic Politics,’ 39 & Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 71.
23 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 67.
24 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul & 
G. E. M. Anscombe, (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 204.
25 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 71. To further illustrate her point, Mouffe also draws on Cavell’s 
discussion of democracy in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome. Within a democracy, he insists, 
there is a ‘conversation’ about ‘how good justice is’ which must take place without there being a ‘victor’: 
‘this is not because agreement can or should always be reached but because disagreement, and 
separateness of position, is to be allowed its satisfactions, reached and expressed in particular ways.’ 
Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 24-25.
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Mouffe is correct to point out that, according to Wittgenstein, our beliefs and 
opinions rest on shared forms of life and cannot be grounded by reason and she is right 
to stress that he shows the incommensurability between certain beliefs. I also think that 
Young is right to point to the danger of appropriative claims of sympathy. However, I 
believe that both theorists presume a polarity between understanding and 
misunderstanding that it is Wittgenstein’s intent to challenge. To make my argument I 
will return to Elizabeth Costello’s account of sympathetic imagination, and then 
develop this notion with help from Wittgenstein and Cavell.
Must the sympathetic imagination conform to the logic of ‘us’ and ‘them’?
Like Young and Mouffe, Elizabeth Costello, the protagonist of Coetzee’s story, The 
Lives of Animals, is critical of communities formed through the logic of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ 
In her view, human beings define themselves as a community on the basis of various 
positive aspects (language, reason, self-awareness etc) which animals lack.26 This 
dichotomy is hierarchical, she adds, for humans justify their mastery over animals on 
the basis of things like their knowledge of ecology - a system of nature which animals 
cannot understand or describe but must simply live out. But in that case is there any real 
escape from the hierarchical logic of ‘us’ and ‘them’? When Elizabeth Costello evokes 
a community between animals and humans surely she simply reinstates this logic in a 
different form. Elizabeth Costello’s daughter in-law Norma, for example, argues that 
the ban on eating meat is no more than ‘a quick, simple way for an elite group to define 
itself. Other people’s table habits are unclean, we can’t eat or drink with them. ’ 27
Elizabeth Costello’s hope is that gestures of sympathetic imagination might allow for 
a community of being that thinks beyond the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dynamic. Her account of 
sympathy differs from Young’s in an important regard. For while Young conceives of 
sympathy as an appropriative gesture that presumes sameness, she believes that the 
sympathetic imagination works in absence of any attribute held in common or any 
underlying principle. According to Elizabeth Costello, ‘ [t]he question to ask should not 
be: Do we have something in common -  reason, self-consciousness, a souls -  with other 
animals? (With the corollary that, if we do not, then we are entitled to treat them as we
2b Given that Coetzee is speaking about human animal relations and Young and Mouffe are speaking 
about relations between humans a comparative discussion of the notion of community in these texts is 
inevitably complicated by the particular intellectual and ethical aims of their respective projects. In 
placing their work side by side my intention is not to iron over all these differences but to suggest that the 
two debates cannot be neatly kept apart and might indeed inform one another.
21 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 63.
like, imprisoning them, killing them, dishonouring their corpses.)’2S To vividly illustrate 
her view she turns to the role the sympathetic imagination can play between human 
beings. The ‘particular horror’ we feel in relation to the Nazi concentration camps, she 
suggests, is tied our sense that the citizens of the Third Reich failed in their capacity for 
sympathetic imagination.
The particular horror of the camps, the horror that convinces us that what went on 
there was a crime against humanity, is not that despite a humanity shared with their 
victims, the killers treated them like lice. That is too abstract. The horror is that the 
killers refused to think themselves into the place of their victims, as did everyone else. 
They said, ‘It is they in those cattle cars rattling past.’ They did not say, ‘How would it 
be if it were I in that cattle-car?’ They did not say, ‘It is I who am in that cattle-car.’ 
They said, ‘It must be the dead who are being burnt today, making the air stink and 
falling in ash on my cabbages.’ They did not say, ‘How would it be if I were burning?’ 
they did not say, T am burning, I am falling in ash. ’29
Far from presuming sameness, this account of thinking oneself into the place of another 
entails an ungrounded leap of the imagination. By bringing this example to bear on her 
discussion of human animal encounters, Elizabeth Costello’s suggestion is that our 
capacity and our failures to make such leaps do not pertain only to human beings. 1 will 
address the relation between humans and animals in detail later in the chapter, but firstly 
I will tie the sympathetic imagination to some of the existing terms of my argument.
The sympathetic imagination as a mode of acknowledgement
The act of sympathetic imagination that Elizabeth Costello describes can be thought of 
as a mode of Cavell’s term ‘acknowledgement.’30 In Chapter 5 I pointed out that in 
Cavell’s view, our primary way of relating is not one knowing or not knowing certain 
facts of world and mind, but of acknowledging ox failing to acknowledge the claims 
others make on me. Sympathy, in this view, is not primarily an expression of 
knowledge, but a reaction or response, which then makes assertions of knowledge 
possible.
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28 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 47.
29 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 47-48.
30 Cavell raises this term in the context of human relations.
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It is not enough that I know  (am certain) that you suffer -  I must do or reveal something 
(whatever can be done). In a word, I must acknowledge it, other wise I do not know 
what ‘(your or his) being in pain’ means. Is. . . .  A ‘failure of know’ might just mean a 
piece of ignorance, an absence of something, a blank. A ‘failure of acknowledgem ent’ 
is the presence of something a confusion, an indifference, a callousness, an exhaustion, 
a coldness. Spiritual emptiness is not a blank.31
According to Cavell, acknowledgement is not limited to expressions and refusals of 
sympathy but entails the whole range of our responses and failures to respond to others. 
In his own words, acknowledgement ‘is not a description of a given response but a 
category in terms of which a given response is evaluated. ’ 32 Nevertheless it is of 
particular interest to us that Cavell first illustrates acknowledgement in a context where 
expressions of sympathy for a being who suffers are given or withheld, for it is 
precisely such a sympathetic response which Elizabeth Costello suggests humans might 
make towards animals.
In light of Cavell’s comments we might say that Nagel’s insistence: ‘I cannot not 
know what it is to be a bat,’ may not simply mean, as its author takes it to mean, that I 
have a gap in my knowledge. Rather, as Elizabeth Costello presents it, Nagel’s claim is 
a failure of sympathetic response, a refusal to acknowledge the bat as a being with an 
‘embodied soul. ’ 33
In Cavell’s view, when we fail to see that our epistemic doubts amount to a refusal of 
acknowledgement, we assume the stance of the sceptic. But before I turn in detail to a 
discussion of the forms of acknowledgement (and failures of acknowledgement) 
possible between humans and animals, I want to say more about the way the term 
‘acknowledgement’ relates to debates about political community.
Testing the breadth of our ‘attunement’
In her article, ‘In Search of Community: Mouffe, Wittgenstein and Cavell,’ Alessandra 
Tanesini explores the implications of Wittgenstein and Cavell’s account of the sceptical 
stand point, for theories of political community.34 Drawing on Wittgenstein’s portrayal
31 Stanley Cavell, ‘Knowing and Acknowledging,’ Must We Mean What we Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), 263-264.
32 Cavell, ‘Knowing and Acknowledging,’ 263-264.
33 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 45.
34 Alessandra Tanesini, ‘In Search of Community: Mouffe, Wittgenstein and Cavell,’ Radical Philosophy 
110 (Nov/Dec 2001).
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of scepticism in Philosophical Investigations, she points out that scepticism has its 
origins in our experiences of loneliness, incomprehension and misunderstanding. These 
everyday experiences of separation, she suggests, give rise to the fantasy that the mind 
is concealed from view, and that the body is an ‘opaque screen’ that we cannot read.3" 
Fearful of separateness, we dream of overcoming it by thinking our way into the other’s 
thoughts, penetrating deep into their mind, however, this it seems ‘we cannot do 
because they are in their bodies and we are in ours. ’ 36 Scepticism, Tanesini suggests, 
results from the disappointment we feel in the face of our failure to grasp with absolute 
certainty what is going on in the other’s mind.
In Cavell’s words, the sceptic ‘begins with a full appreciation of the decisively 
significant facts that I may be suffering when no one else is, and that no one (else) may 
know (or care?); and that others may be suffering and I do not know, which is equally 
appalling. But then something happens, and instead of pursuing the significance of these 
facts, he is enmeshed—so it may seem—in questions of whether we can have the same 
suffering, one another’s suffering. ’37 As Cavell points out, the criteria Wittgenstein 
proposes in response to the sceptic are not intended as refutations of scepticism. For no 
reminder of what we do and say in particular circumstances could provide the sceptic 
with the absolute certainty she or he desires. Rather Wittgenstein’s intention is to help 
the sceptic see why in many circumstances his/her demand for knowledge is out of 
place, and this entails a shift from knowledge to acknowledgement.
In the context of political community building, Tanesini proposes that some 
expressions of sympathy, some instances of ‘we’ saying, are not assertions of 
knowledge, but rather are gestures of acknowledgement. To make this point she draws 
on both Wittgenstein and Cavell’s work on projecting words. Cavell shows us that 
Wittgenstein draws attention to the remarkableness of an everyday occurrence. Namely 
that although we learn and teach words in limited contexts, we are inevitably required, 
and we require others, to project these words into unfamiliar contexts. 38 In 
Wittgenstein’s view no general rule could explain or make possible this phenomena. 39 
When we project words in new ways we make ungrounded leaps, and this we might
35 Tanesini, ‘In Search of Community,’15.
36 Tanesini, ‘In Search of Community,’15.
37 Cavell, ‘Knowing and Acknowledging,’ 247.
3X In Wittgenstein’s view our ability to project words in new ways cannot be accounted for by general 
rules, nor can it be understood as a form of interpretation, for although we do in some cases define one 
word by appeal to another, this does not explain how, for example, children make their first projective 
leaps into language. Rather the fact that we project words in new ways and are often understood rests on 
the fact that we share forms of life. See Wittgenstein, Investigations, §84.
39 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed. G. E. M. Anscombe trans. (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1958) §84.
200
think of as the truth of scepticism. However the fact that we project words into new 
contexts and often are understood by others is, as Cavell says:
a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes o f response, senses of 
humour and of significance and of fulfilment, or what is outrageous, of what is similar to 
what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an 
appeal, when an explanation -  all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls ‘forms of life.’ 
Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing 
less, that this.40
In his book On Being With Others Simon Glendinning makes a similar point about 
projecting words, with the help of the Derridian term ‘ iterability. ’ As we saw in chapter 
3, the ‘truth of scepticism,’ in Glendinning’s view, is that words operate as ‘iterable 
traits’ which are ‘a priori possible to repeat and hence mimic.'4' This means that it is 
always ‘possible for us to imagine a doubt’ in the application of a words,42 and hence 
that words can always be ‘read’ in ways that their author never intended. When we use 
language, Wittgenstein tells us, it is almost as if ‘a new decision was needed at every 
stage.’43 Nor does it follow from fact that a ‘new decision’ is called for that we are 
always ‘in doubt’ when we employ words.44 Frequently the ‘new decision’ entailed does 
not amount to troubled deliberation but rather to an unreflective leap; a spontaneous 
occasion of ‘“Yes”-  saying.’45 According to Glendinning this leap may be nothing more 
than ‘opening one’s mouth to speak or putting the pen to paper (nothing over and above 
leaping).’46 That we do make such leaps, and that others do often accept our new 
projections of words as their own, indicates an ‘agreement,’ a ‘“Yes”-  saying,’ that 
does not amount to any rule.
Glendinning is reticent to speak, as Wittgenstein does, of this agreement as an 
agreement in forms of life, because he fears the term ‘form of life’ will be used to 
establish the total incommensurability between different types of beings.47 Nevertheless, 
by likening life’s texture to ‘the actuality of interweaving forms of iteration’ and by
40 Stanley Cavell, ‘The Availability of Wittgenstein’s later Philosophy’ Must we mean what we say?, A 
Book of Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 56.
41 Simon Glendinning, On Being With Others: Heidegger -  Derrdia -  Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 
1998),149.
42 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §84.
43 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §186.
44 See Wittgenstein, Investigations, §84.
43 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 144.
46 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 102.
47 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 70.
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describing our willingness to ‘read’ and respond to the words or behaviour of others in 
terms of a ‘familiarity’ with their ‘iterable traits,’ he evokes a notion in keeping with 
the concept ‘forms of life’ I am developing here.48
At this point in the discussion, I want to raise a problem with Mouffe’s view that 
‘agreements in opinions are agreements in forms of life.’49 In section 241 of the 
Investigations, for example, Wittgenstein writes:
‘[s]o you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and false?’ —It is what 
human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That 
is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.
As Wittgenstein stresses in the Investigations, the ‘agreement’ at stake does not amount 
to an agreement in ‘opinion’; rather our agreement in forms of life is what makes all 
agreement and disagreement in opinion possible. This is important because it suggests 
that although differences of opinion may be traced back to differences in our life 
practices, the term ‘shared form of life’ is also intended to cut across a whole range of 
possible viewpoints. Cavell uses the notion ‘attunement’ with its sense of being in 
harmony or in tune across variation, to describe our shared patterns of reaction, of 
feeling etc; our familiarity with the behaviour and responses of others.50
Drawing on these ideas, Tanesini suggests that gestures of acknowledgement might 
enable people with different outlooks and values ‘to test and realise the depth and 
breadth of’ their ‘attunement in words, emotions and reactions.’51
Consider the difference between saying, when encountering a person of a different 
race or class or culture, ‘she is just like us’ and saying ‘we are just like her.’ In the 
first case, the assertion is often employed to reinforce exclusions. The claim appears to 
state that she is our equal, when it might in fact reassert our superiority. For instance, 
the claim might imply that it is only in virtue of her similarity to us that she is granted 
a high status. If this statement implies our superiority, then it must function also as an 
act of exclusion. ... The second kind of act o f saying ‘w e’ is of a different sort. When 
we say that we are just like you, we do not imply that you have a high or a low status. 
Instead, we are saying that we share your reactions, or your emotions, your
48 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 134, 135.
49 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 67.
50 See Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Scepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), 32.
51 Tanesini, ‘In Search of Community,’ 18.
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commitments or sense o f humour. These acts o f  saying ‘w e’ do not entail exclusions. 
They are acts o f acknowledgement that you are entitled to make claims upon us.52
But by imaginatively projecting words in new ways Tanesini also believes that we can 
sometimes enlarge or alter the nature of our attunement. For example:
There is a scene in the film Torch Song Trilogy in which the gay protagonist, Arnold, 
and his mother are at the cemetery where both Arnold’s father and his lover are 
buried. Arnold’s mother is infuriated by Arnold reading the Jewish prayer o f  the dead 
at the site o f his lover’s grave. When she challenges him as to what he is doing, he 
replies that his is doing precisely what she is doing at her husband’s grave. Arnold’s 
mother, instead, claims that whilst she is reciting Kaddish for her husband, Arnold is 
blaspheming his religion. Arnold is asking his mother to engage in an act o f projective 
imagination: her doing so will allow them to be a community again.53
However, from the point of view of Mouffe’s account it may seem that Tanesini’s 
appeal to ‘shared forms of life,’ simply reinstates a community of ‘us’ and ‘them’ by 
appealing to a more fundamental quality in held common. In her article Tanesini says 
little in response to this problem. 54 But in my view, a community evoked through 
sympathetic gestures of acknowledgement need not be constructed in opposition to a 
‘them,’ since no a priori notion of ‘us’ and ‘them’ can determine community 
membership. Rather, as Glendinning puts it, on each occasion of ‘“Yes” -  saying,’ the 
notion of a we is ‘[rjisked. ’55 This is not to say, that the community evoked will include 
everybody, for there are many occasions, where we are not willing or able to risk a 
‘we.’ Our willingness or ability to take the risk on a given occasion, can be explained, to 
a certain extent, by appealing to our shared forms of life, our practical knowledge of the 
life’s ‘interweaving forms of iteration. ’ 56 This knowledge, however, is purely practical, 
for it is learned only through example. Hence our shared forms of life do not amount to 
a predetermined rule of conduct; instead they must be made and explored through actual 
instances of language use, behaviour and response.
An analogous thought underpins Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein’s account of 
criteria given in The Claim of Reason. We elicit our criteria when we describe what it is
52 Tanesini, ‘In Search of Community,’ 18.
53 Tanesini, Tn Search of Community,’ 18.
54 Given Tanesini’s article challenges the notion that all acts of community formation entail the 
construction of borders, one might speculate that the notion of ‘form of life’ she appeals to is not 
conceived as a determinate attribute held in common.
55 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 146.
56 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 135.
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we might do and say in particular circumstances. In Cavell’s view, when Wittgenstein 
posits criteria he is not proposing general rules of use, rather he puts forward what he 
says as a ‘sample,’ which others may then agree or disagree with.57 The extent of our 
willingness to respond to Wittgenstein’s sampled ‘claims to community’58 with the 
affirmation: ‘yes’ testifies to the breadth of our attunement. Our attunement, however, 
is not something that exists a priori and thus cannot be captured by any prearranged 
contract. Ultimately this means that criteria are ‘not a way of explaining or proving the 
fact of our attunement in words (hence in forms of life)’; rather they are ‘only another 
description of the same fact,’ and in this way ‘nothing is deeper than the fact, or the 
extent, of agreement itself. ’59
Acknowledging ‘attunement’ and respecting difference
In Tanesini’s view, when Young insists on the opacity between people, or when Mouffe 
insists on an opacity between groups, they both resemble the sceptic; for they mistake 
an important dimension of human experience - separateness and difference -  for an 
inescapable and all pervasive reality. The danger of such a stance, Tanesini argues, is 
that it could lead us to give up trying to understand others different from ourselves. 
Mouffe for example, argues that antagonism between groups is inevitable and that we 
should learn to live with it rather than try to resolve it.60 From Tanesini’s point of view, 
Mouffe’s stance amounts to a failure of acknowledgement.
Tanesini is right to criticise Mouffe and Young for their insistence that acts of saying 
‘we’ inevitably follow the paradigm of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and she is also right to suggest 
that some acts of acknowledgement might provide an alternative way of thinking about 
community formation. 61 But I do not think that Mouffe and Young’s work aligns with 
the sceptical position to the extent that Tanesini suggests. Neither theorist is content to 
accept the sceptical construal of the other as ‘them,’ nor do they conceive of their 
relation to others as mere blanks of knowledge.
57 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 19.
™ Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 20.
59 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 34, 32.
W) In ‘Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity,’ John Rajchman, ed., The Identity in Question 
(New York: Routledge, 1995), 44. Here Mouffe writes: ‘To believe that a final resolution of conflict is 
eventually possible -  even if it is seen as a asymptotic approaching to the regulative ideal . . .  is 
something that, far from providing the necessary horizon of the democratic project, in fact puts it at risk.’
61 For an excellent study of Wittgenstein’s thought and its bearing on pluralist political communities see 
James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). Tully draws on Young to help raise the importance of cultural diversity but also 
criticizes her work with the help of Wittgenstein, arguing that understanding resting on a dialogue 
between different points of view. See for example, pages 99-116.
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Although Mouffe, for example, insists that antagonism between different groups is 
inevitable, she also asks that we rethink the nature of the dispute as one between 
‘adversaries’ rather than friend and foe .62 Indeed, as Cavell emphasises in The Claim of 
Reason, the disagreements between us are just as important to Wittgenstein as our 
mutual agreements.63
Young’s account of our ethical relations, on the other hand, bears a close relation to 
Wittgenstein’s descriptions in ‘Lecture on Ethics’ and ‘Remarks on Religion’ of his 
encounters with people or creatures who are enigmatic to him.M Like Wittgenstein, 
Young advocates a form of moral respect akin to the attitude of wonder.65 She writes:
C ertain ly  com m unication and moral respect requires some sense o f mutual 
identification and sharing. But without also a moment of wonder, of openness to the 
newness and mystery of the other person, the creative energy of desire dissolves into 
indifference. . . .  A respectful stance of wonder toward other people is one of 
openness across, awaiting new insight about their needs, interests, perceptions, or 
values. W onder also means being able to see on e’s own position, assum ptions, 
perspectives as strange, because it has been put in relation to others.66
So on the one hand I want to support Tanesini’s claim that some acts of community 
formation explore and stretch the breadth of our attunement without enforcing a strict 
boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ But on the other hand, I want to draw attention to 
the moments when we project words into new contexts and are not understood. Here, it 
seems, there is a need to respect difference, to concede separateness. Still, it is 
important that respect for difference not be construed as a mere blank in our knowledge. 
It seems that, at a certain level, we still do turn to the enigmatic other as a fellow form 
of life. So in the following sections I will ask: what place, if any, do imaginative 
expressions of sympathy have between beings that are very different? Is Costello right 
to suggest that at some level there is a ‘substrate of life’ we share? Is it possible to think
62 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso 2000), 102-103.
63 See for example ‘Criteria and Judgment’ in Stanley Cavell, The Claim o f Reason: Wittgenstein, 
Scepticism, Morality and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 3-36.
64 As we have seen in previous chapters in ‘Lecture on Religious Belief Wittgenstein stages his attempt 
to understand the religious believer in terms of an encounter with the limits of language. In ‘Lecture on 
Ethics’ The Philosophical Review vol. 74 (1965): 10, Wittgenstein describes the wondrous event of a 
man growing a lion’s head and starting to roar. This example in particular links wonder to the crossing 
over of the human and animal world and I will return to it in detail later in the chapter.
65 Drawing on Wittgenstein, Tully also argues that a form of wonder that does not reduce ‘the other’ to an 
exotic object might help us acknowledge the strangeness of others. In his view community in its 
multiplicity, appears at once strange and homely. These ideas echo the account of the wondrous ordinary 
I have been tracing in this thesis. See for example, Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 209-213.
66 Young, Intersecting Voices, 57.
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of this shared ‘substrate of life’ in terms other than a more fundamental quality held in 
common? To help respond to these questions I will turn in detail to Wittgenstein’s 
account of forms of life.
‘Forms of life’ or ‘forms of life’
To help respond to all these questions I will turn in detail to Wittgenstein, whose 
difficult notion of ‘forms of life’ spans the relation between different patterns of being, 
and the shared being of life. In the Investigations Wittgenstein describes the life we 
share with animals in somewhat similar terms to Costello. In sections 283 -284 of the 
Investigations he observes that we only ascribe sensations to a body, or rather to ‘a soul 
which some body has.'’ ‘Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. -  One says to 
oneself: how could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing? One 
might as well ascribe it to a number! —And now look at a wriggling fly and at once 
these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a foothold here.’
But later he writes ‘one can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy 
and startled’ but not ‘hopeful,’ for hope is part of the ‘complicated form of life’ 
belonging to only to those who have ‘mastered’ a ‘language.’67 Language, Wittgenstein 
seems to be saying here, opens up a ‘complicated form of life’ that animals do not share 
with us.
In section 23 of the Investigations Wittgenstein tells us that for every type of 
language we can imagine, every language-game, there is a corresponding form of life. 
He suggests that every language user masters many forms of language and life 
practices, but also that not everyone has identical ways of speaking and living. 
However, as I pointed out previously, Wittgenstein also says that, at another level, the 
very possibility of linguistic communication rests on considerable agreement in 
‘judgements’ which, Wittgenstein stresses, is not an ‘agreement in opinions but in form 
of life.’68
There is an underlying ambiguity in the account of the term ‘forms of life’ I have just 
drawn from Wittgenstein, for it functions (whether in regard to all living beings, or in 
the context of human life) both as an affirmation of agreement, and as a mark of 
difference. Cavell describes this ambiguity when he says that in Wittgenstein’s work the
67 Wittgenstein, Investigations, 174.
68 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §242, §241.
term ‘forms of life’ can be given an ‘ethnological’ or a ‘biological’ direction.69 The 
ethnological reading of the term stresses the importance Wittgenstein gives to the 
conventional or social dimension of life as opposed to our private, inner lives. On this 
reading, Wittgenstein’s insistence, ‘[w]hat has to be accepted, the given, is -  so one 
could say -  forms of life,,7tl is taken to reinforce the social nature of humanity, for 
understanding between individuals is made possible through shared conventions. 71 
Thus, while the ethnological reading promises understanding between beings who share 
the same conventions and social practices, it also implies that, in the absence of shared 
conventions, no understanding is possible.
However, Cavell believes that Wittgenstein’s insistence that we must accept forms of 
life should also be pursued in ‘its biological direction,’ when, for example, Wittgenstein 
speaks of our natural reactions or imagines an alternative ‘fictitious natural history’ in 
place of our own. 2 Here the emphasis is placed not on ‘ forms of life’ but on ‘forms of 
life,' on life being a given that indicates ‘the limit and gives the conditions of the use of 
criteria as applied to others. ’72 ‘The criteria of pain’ for example, ‘do not apply to what 
does not exhibit a form of life. ’74 One can imagine a wriggling fly in pain, Wittgenstein 
says, but how do we even begin to imagine what it would be to think the same thing of a 
stone? We are not familiar with the criteria for a stone being in pain, and this suggests 
that we assign sensations only to ‘what behaves like a human being,’ namely to a ‘body’ 
or to a ‘soul which some body has. ' 15
If the social and the biological notion of ‘form of life’ are both possibilities 
Wittgenstein raises, then one must account for their interaction. In Cavell’s view, the 
‘mutual absorption of the natural and the social’ means that we must pay attention not
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69 Stanley Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson 
after Wittgenstein (Albuquerque: Living Batch Press, 1989), 40-43.
7(1 Wittgenstein, Investigations, 226.
71 Some readers of Wittgenstein, Cavell adds, also take this as a refutation of scepticism for ‘the very 
existence of, say, the sacrament of marriage, or of the history of private property, or of the ceremony of 
shaking hands, or I guess ultimately the existence of language, constitutes proof of the existence of 
others.’ Cavell, “Declining Decline,” 42. Cavell is referring to readers of Wittgenstein such as Norman 
Malcolm, G. P. Baker, P. M. S. Hacker, and Rogers Albritton. See for example Norman Malcolm,
“Wittgenstein’s ‘Philosophical Investigations,"' in G. Pitcher ed. Wittgenstein: the Philosophical 
Investigations (London: Macmillan, 1966), 543.
72 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §185, 230.
73 Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ 42-43.
74 Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ 43.
7<i Wittgenstein, Investigations, §283. A second feature of Cavell’s biological reading of forms of life is 
that criteria do not provide proof of states of consciousness. The presence of typical pain behavior and 
responses, for example, cannot prove to the skeptic that the creature really is in pain. Instead of refuting 
skepticism, Wittgenstein tries to help us to understand why we come to be ‘disappointed’ both by 
‘criteria,’ and ‘language as such.’ Part of this investigation draws attention to what we do when this 
disappointment consumes us, to the various ways we withdraw from our engagements with life. Cavell, 
‘Declining Decline,’ 43.
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only to differences in the social realm - ‘differences between promising and fully 
intending, or between coronations and inaugurations, or between barter and a credit 
system’- but also to differences between the human form of life and other forms of 
biological life -  ‘between, say, poking at your food, perhaps with a fork, and pawing at 
it, or pecking at it. ’76
As this passage suggests, differences between biological forms of life are also 
indicators of a certain convergence or ‘attunement’ within individual biological life 
forms. Hence the term ‘shared forms of life’ does not designate this or that convention 
or ‘opinion’ in common, but rather a whole range of possibilities opened up by certain 
facts of nature. For example, Cavell writes:
In being asked to accept this [the human form of life], or suffer it, as given for 
ourselves, we are not asked to accept, let us say, private property, but separateness; not 
a particular fact of power but the fact that I am a man, therefore of this (range or scale 
of) capacity for work for pleasure, for endurance, for appeal, for command, for 
understanding, for wish, for will, for teaching, for suffering. The precise range or scale 
is not knowable a priori, and more than the precise range or scale of a word is to be 
known a priori.11
As the above passage suggests, Cavell’s focus is mainly on the differences between 
human life and other life forms and hence also on the possibilities that comprise the 
human agreement in ‘form of life.’ In Cavell’s view, to say, as Wittgenstein says, that 
talking is a ‘complicated’ form of human life, is to say that ‘everything humans do and 
suffer is as specific to them as are hoping or promising or calculating or smiling or 
waving hello or strolling or running in place or being naked or torturing. ’ 78 By this 
Cavell means both that there are ‘patterns in the weave of our life, modifications of the 
life of us talkers,’ particular to human beings, ‘as well as patterns we share with other 
life forms but whose human variations are still specific, like eating or sniffing or 
screaming with fear. ’79 Thus the Investigations as a whole might be understood as an 
exploration of the “‘possibilities” of phenomena, ’80 opened up, or else modified by 
language; the capacity to read others and be read. In the Claim of Reason, for example, 
Cavell remarks that the “‘group’” whose authorisation Wittgenstein seeks (but may not
76 Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ 44, 41,42.
77 Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ 44.
78 Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ 48.
7y Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ 48. 
xo Wittgenstein, Investigations, §90.
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always get) when posting criteria for what we do and say, ‘is always, apparently, the 
human group as such, the human being generally.’81
Language and animals
It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. 
And this means: ‘they do not think, and that is why they do not talk.’ But -  they 
simply do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not use language — if we except the 
most primitive forms of language. -  commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, 
are as much part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing.82
This passage from section 25 of the Investigations begins with the suggestion that the 
human ability to talk separates us from other animals. But rather than interpreting 
language as a sign of the special human capacity to think, Wittgenstein leaves the nature 
of animal thoughts open, insisting that animals ‘simply do not talk.’83 But then 
Wittgenstein modifies this idea, for as he goes on to suggest even language does not 
form an absolute boundary between humans and other life forms. For in order to make 
language the dividing line between humans and animals, we would have to be willing to 
subtract from our definition of language the various ‘primitive forms of language’ used 
by animals - such as ‘commanding, questioning, recounting’ and ‘chatting’ - practices 
which human beings would have enormous difficulty doing without.84
Cavell’s discussion of forms of life is not exactly at odds with Wittgenstein’s 
passage. Cavell might simply want to add that although animals and humans share 
certain primitive language practices, humans also engage in complicated forms of 
talking that animals do not share, and they modify even the most primitive language in 
their own particular manner. In this way, Wittgenstein’s passage can feed back into an 
exploration of the human level of life, and this is certainly one viable way of reading it. 
But given that the focus of section 25 is not actually on human modifications of animal 
life but the breadth of behaviour we share with animals, then one might also question
81 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 18.
82 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §25.
83 How can we be so sure, asks Elisabeth Costello, that human minds are superior to the minds of 
animals? Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 57-67.
84 Here Wittgenstein might also be asking if the model of language, as the outward symbol of private 
thoughts, can really capture the true workings of words or thoughts? To imagine a form of language, he 
tells us, is to imagine a whole form of life, a way of acting and behaving. Glendinning makes a similar 
point about this passage in On Being With Others, 73.
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Cavell’s assurance that the biological pole of Wittgenstein’s notion ‘forms of life,’ casts 
light primarily on the human ‘level’ of life.
One of the reasons why Cavell insists that the human community is Wittgenstein’s 
focus is that he believes that the authorisation Wittgenstein seeks when he posits 
criteria, ‘is always, apparently, the human group as such, the human being generally. ’85 
This observation is certainly true in the sense that Wittgenstein writes in the knowledge 
that only beings that can understand his proposal of criteria are in a position to agree or 
disagree with these proposals. 86 But nor would Cavell really want to limit criteria to 
states that only other human beings can affirm, for, as Wittgenstein also shows, an 
agreement in criteria can simply be elicited through instances of behaviour and 
response: when, for example, somebody cries out and I comfort them, or when I watch a 
fly wriggle in pain. 87 To me this suggests that there are two ways or levels at which 
criteria operate. At one level they are linguistic samples which Wittgenstein proposes in 
the expectation that other language users may accept or refuse to accept them as their 
own, but at another level they are simply given through verbal or non-verbal behaviour 
and response.
This second view is emphasised by Glendinning in his book, On Being With Others. 
In Glendinning’s view an ‘indeterminate community’s “criteria” is Wittgenstein’s point 
of departure in his investigation of the use of psychological concepts and the language 
of personal experience,’ a community which, he emphasises, may at times include 
animals. 88 To illustrate his point he draws on the Derridian concept of ‘ iterability ’ to 
describe both language and behavioural events more broadly. As I mentioned in my 
previous discussion of Derrida, iterability entails ‘an identity which is irreducible to 
what is simply present in the present. ’ 86 By conceiving of behaviour in this way 
Glendinning does not wish to posit a fullness of meaning, which is then inadequately 
conveyed by our behaviour. Instead he says that there are no ideal instances of self­
comprehension or mutual comprehension, and that understanding occurs even though 
the identity behaviour is never fully ‘present in the present.’ In Glendinning’s view, 
‘being with others’ involves a willingness to remain open to these (less than ideal)
x5 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 18.
Xf’ We might also say that language therapy is something that must carry out in a linguistic economy. 
x71 do not want to suggest that Cavell denies that criteria can be affirmed in nonlinguistic ways. 
xx Glendinning, On Being With Others, 133. 
m Glendinning, On Being With Others, 128.
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instances of mutual understanding, but without covering over the heterogeneities that 
exist both within and between different forms of life.90
Glendinning suggests that behaviour should not understood as individually occurring 
events determined by general rules but rather as a readable or ‘iterable trait.’ In this way 
he challenges Cavell’s sense that it is a particularly human propensity to read and be 
read. Nevertheless, Glendinning’s account still resembles Cavell’s in several important 
ways. Neither author, for example, takes criteria to be the ‘outward’ behavioural basis 
for establishing with absolute certainty the incidence of something ‘inner,’ nor do they 
speak of criteria as typical conditions necessitating (by virtue of some general rule) 
typical responses. As Glendinning observes, ‘It may make sense to say that both Sophie 
and I were (in an uncanny, non-matching way) “satisfied”’ by our responses, but not to 
say that we each employed rules of some sort which either fit or do not fit the facts of 
the situation.91 In Glendinning’s view:
‘Being at hom e’ with ‘criteria of the inner’ is not to have knowledge of definite rules 
which are recognised to be satisfied or unsatisfied in particular cases. Rather, it is to 
be seen in terms of one’s familiarity with the iterable traits of living things. Thus, on 
this approach, to ‘recall criteria’ is not to recall rules of judgem ent, but, rather, 
unreflective ‘leaps,’ occasions of ‘Yes: sam e’ -  sayings. And these . . . just are: 
occasions in which the perception of a living thing does not stop short of the 
perception of a soul.92
Glendinning also usefully explicates an idea that we have already seen implied by 
Cavell’s account, namely that behavioural conditions and our responses to these 
conditions are intertwined. According to Glendinning: ‘what I recognise (for example, 
“a wince” of pain rather than “a smirk” or “a frown”) is not a blankly external feature of 
the behaviour of a living thing: the identity of an iterable trait is not something that can 
be established independently of its recognition, its reading. ’ 93 Or in Wittgenstein’s 
words, ‘my relation to the appearance here is part of my concept. ’ 94 Cavell, makes a 
similar point in ‘Knowing and Acknowledging,’ when he says that in order to be able to
90 A limitation to Glendinning’s account may be that not all life forms have reader responses to other 
beings, and to the environment around them.
91 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 142.
92 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 135.
93 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 143.
94 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), §543.
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say that we know  another’s pain we must first respond  in some way, we must 
acknowledge it.95
By conceiving of behaviour as iterable traits, Glendinning believes it becomes 
possible to ‘affirm the Wittgensteinian thesis that to see the behaviour of a living thing 
is to see its soul. ’96 He writes:
There is (what I definitely want to call) a game I used to pay with my mother’s dog 
Sophie, in which we would run around a small pond. My aim was to catch her; hers to 
avoid being caught. Sometimes we would find ourselves facing each other, on either 
side of the pond, each of us watching the other for movements indicating a direction of 
pursuit or flight. I would try faking a movement; starting to the left but running to my 
right. Sophie would sometimes be foxed, but would always correct her run when she 
saw me coming the other way.
Sophie has a lot of Collie in her and I never caught her. But one day while we (we) 
were playing this game I slipped as I tried to change direction too quickly on damp 
grass. Almost immediately Sophie ran straight up to me. I was unhurt, but she licked 
my face anyway. I do not see why this cannot be counted as a case o f ‘mutual 
intelligibility.’ The dog could see my distress and I could see her sympathy/”
However, he also emphasises that the ‘mutual intelligibility’ between himself and 
Sophie does not amount to a straightforward ‘match’ of behaviour/response. Instead, he 
suggests the experience of understanding between humans and other animals tend to 
partake of the uncanny.
In my view, or at least, in my experience, it is precisely when animals are most like 
humans that they are most uncanny. And they are so in virtue of not simply and not 
quite matching; that is, in virtue of so closely resembling humans while remaining cats 
or apes or whatever, and so, in another way, still being very distant indeed. What I 
want to say is: The human is open here to another which it simply cannot fully 
appropriate into ‘the sam e.’ And I also want to say: In their own ways many other 
animals are, in their relations with humans, ‘the same too,’ uncannily.98
93 But more broadly, as Wittgenstein shows, language imposes itself on us and we respond with images. 
Therapy can help us see that to make a picture or image of the mythology embedded in fantasy is not 
simply to be determined by that mythology but also to react and respond to it.
% Glendinning, On Being With Others, 128. Glendinning is referring to Investigations section 357.
97 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 142.
9S Glendinning, On Being With Others, 72.
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This passage illustrates an intensified version of an idea I have already located in 
Wittgenstein and Cavell. For if shared forms of life are not merely shared conventions 
or opinions, but rather a range of possibilities opened up by certain facts of nature, the 
affirmation of shared forms of life will often cross a ‘near/far’ relation. Drawing on the 
terms of my argument in the previous chapters, I would like to propose that the 
intermingling of the familiar and the strange entailed in these leaps to community is 
suggestive of the unconscious.
Therapy and community
In the discussion so far I have asked what bearing the notion ‘shared forms of life,’ 
might have on a discussion of community and difference, both in the context of 
relations between humans and in the context of relations between humans and other 
animals. My argument has been that the nuances of understanding and 
misunderstanding between beings cannot be summed up as attributes some have and 
others lack. In particular I have argued that the notion ‘shared form of life’ need not be 
thought of as a determinate state, opinion or practice, but rather as a space of possibility 
between beings, opened up by a willingness to make certain leaps of response and 
affirmation." This is because when we recall criteria we do not simply recall 
conventions; rather we investigate the possibilities opened up by our form of life. These 
possibilities cannot be determined a priori, but must be discovered through spontaneous 
leaps to a ‘we.’ A broad agreement (for example, that we both use language) may be 
shot through by various differences (for example, we use words in very different ways). 
But by thinking of shared forms of life in this way a further complication emerges, for 
as Glendinning points out, some affirmations of community cross a near/far relation, so 
that we appear to each other as familiar but not entirely familiar or somewhat strange 
but not quite.
In the sections that follow I want to relate these ideas back to the account of therapy 
that has been the main focus of the thesis. Therapy, as I have characterised it so far, is 
addressed to people who have lost sight of the possibilities opened up by language and 
life. In light of the previous discussion one might say, therapy reminds us of the various
99 As I argued previously in the chapter, when we recall criteria we do not simply recall conventions; 
rather we investigate the possibilities opened up by our form of life. These possibilities cannot be 
determined a priori, but must be discovered through spontaneous leaps to a ‘we.’ A broad agreement (for 
example, that we both use language) may be shot through by various differences (for example, we use 
words in very different ways).
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shades of disagreement and agreements entailed by our form of life, affinities and 
distinctions we miss when we mythologise a homogenous ‘us,’ distinguished from an 
alien ‘them.’ As Wittgenstein demonstrates throughout the Investigations, our ideals 
and fantasies often place us in disagreement, not just with particular individuals or 
groups but also with our community, and also to a certain extent with ourselves. Under 
the spell of fantasy we impose an order on life that severely distorts our grasp of the 
range of possibilities open to us. Indeed, as Cavell observes, the Investigations ‘conveys 
the unmistakable impression that our patterns or modifications of the human form of life 
are undermining that life, deforming it. ’ 100 Humanity, on Cavell’s view is ‘a form of 
life, or level of life, standing in need of something like transfiguration -  some radical 
change, but as it were from inside, not by anything: some say in another birth, 
symbolising a different order of natural reactions. ’ 101
How might this transformation take place? - not from outside but as if from within - 
was the question driving the previous chapter. In this context, the various criteria for 
what we say when proposed in the Investigations assume a distinctly therapeutic aspect 
for they can now be read as reminders of the multitude of agreements and 
disagreements that the ‘human’ form of life distorts or disavows. Still it is difficult to 
see how an activity that is comprised of a series of localised descriptions could, on its 
own, be capable of unbinding the restrictive fantasy order and opening up a vision of 
the possibilities of life. Cavell, for example, insists that criteria alone may not break the 
spell of fantasy, because they do provide the absolute foundation that both the 
metaphysician and sceptic desire. In addition to criteria, what is called for is an 
imaginative engagement with fantasy. To unbind the fantasy order I argued, one must 
be willing to acknowledge the nonsensicality at its very heart.
These ideas are played out in Cavell’s account of the child hero of the Investigations. 
Cavell’s suggestion is that the ‘state of derangement’ felt by the child ‘marks’ its ‘turn 
to the human,’ and the renouncement of the ‘unending circle of the animal, the realm of 
the un-talking subjects, of the repetitive cycles of need as satisfaction. ’ 102 Building on 
Cavell’s account with the help of the psychoanalytic work of Jean Laplanche and Eric 
Santner, I suggested that the child begins its life in the symbolic order thrown by the 
‘enigmatic messages’ of others. These messages are impossible to fully metabolise and
100 Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ 69.
101 Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ 44.
102 Stanley Cavell, ‘Notes and Afterthoughts On the Opening of Wittgenstein’s Investigations,’ 
Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 170. 
Cavell’s discussion draws heavily on his earlier essay ‘Declining Decline.’
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they leave behind an unconscious residue, which the child then binds into a fantasy 
order. Through a violent compulsion to repeat the fantasy order attempts to cover over 
the very unconscious residue that our life with symbols produces.
By inviting us to read the child’s tale of ‘derangement’ as an allegory for the advent 
of language and desire, Cavell, in my view, implies that we each carry with us an 
unconscious residue, an inner strangeness.103 As I previously argued, to acknowledge 
that I am strange to myself and that furthermore the ‘the other’ is not simply opaque to 
me but, in some sense, strange to his or herself, is already to convert the destructive core 
of fantasy into the enigmatic relations of everyday life. But in the context of the current 
discussion an important question emerges, for what bearing does the notion of therapy I 
have extrapolated have on the account of community laid out in the previous sections of 
this chapter, a community affirmed through spontaneous leaps to a ‘we’? Put in slightly 
different terms one might ask: what is the relation between acknowledging the 
unconscious and acknowledging the possibilities that comprise our shared form of life?
The concluding sections of chapter 5 provide a key for understanding this relation. 
There I argued that the fantasy pictures of the unconscious, by virtue of their 
nonsensicality or ambiguity, are capable of provoking not one but a whole series of 
possible contextualisations or meanings. In the context of the current discussion this 
suggests that an imaginative engagement with nonsense, in conjunction with the 
description of criteria, might be capable of inaugurating a vision, not just of this or that 
possibility but of the truly aspectival nature of the possibilities opened up by our form 
of life. But there is also a second sense in which these two modes of acknowledgement 
inform each other, for to think of ‘the other’ not simply as an opaque being but as my 
neighbour by virtue of the ‘inner strangeness’ each of us carry, is to make a spontaneous 
leap of the imagination, to risk a ‘we’ of some sort. As Santner has argued, for example, 
‘to be truly in the “midst of life’” is to ‘inhabit the proximity to our neighbour, assume 
responsibility for the claims his or her singular and uncanny presence makes on us not 
only in extreme circumstances but everyday.’104 From this space of relation, which is the 
space of the open-ended encounter with nonsense, it becomes possible to envisage a 
community that does not depend on traits held in common,105 but on a shared opening
103 Eric Santner’s use of this Lacanian term for the unconscious was discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter.
104 Eric Santner, On The Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig 
(Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 2001), 7.
105 Santner is thinking of characteristics in common such as class, gender, culture, religion etc. However a 
similar idea is also implicit in Elizabeth Costello’s insistence that the ‘horror’ o f the concentration camps 
cannot be put down to the Nazi’s denial of the attributes human beings share. Given that she uses this
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both to the strangeness of that which is most familiar, and to the familiarity of the 
strange.
But here a further question emerges, for to what extent can we imagine another with 
an unconscious? At stake is the relation between a willingness to accept the limits 
construed by differences in form of life, and an opening to ‘the other’ as a being who is 
troubled, like myself, by an ‘inner strangeness.’ At what point should the imaginative 
attempt to understand the speaker of nonsense stop and a respect for the sheer opacity of 
the other begin?
Cavell’s fable of the child’s passage into the realm of language and desire might be 
read as an effort to resolve this question. But on close inspection the answer he lays out 
is paradoxical. For on the one hand, by making nonsense a defining moment in the life 
of talkers, he seems on the brink of suggesting that humans partake in the babble of the 
beasts, and that we share with animals a certain nonsensical space of encounter. But this 
analogy is cut short when Cavell tells us that animals are driven by the repetitive cycles 
of need and satisfaction and that human subjectivity only begins through the perversion 
and distortion of these cycles. In his tale of the advent of the speaking, desiring subject, 
animals are assigned a purely instrumental mode of existence.
The difficulty with this functionalist account of animality, however, is that it clearly 
does not fit with Wittgenstein’s description of animals as body/souls; but nor does it fit 
with those moments in the Investigations where Wittgenstein presents animal life as 
unfathomable, enigmatic to us. Why does Cavell describe animals in such reductive 
terms when, at the same time he posits that we should pursue ‘forms of life,' in its 
‘biological direction,’ such that life becomes ‘the limit and gives the conditions of the 
use of criteria as applied to others’ ? 106 If we do share, to borrow Elizabeth Costello’s 
term, ‘a substrate of life’ with animals, can we be sure that the whole problematic of a 
life worth living is so firmly anchored to human existence?
example to argue that we can make the imaginative leaps of understanding towards animals regardless of 
whether we have a determinate trait in common, then it seems that the notion of community Santner is 
proposing might also have bearing on the relations between humans and other animals. 
m  Cavell, ‘Declining Decline,’ 42-43.
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The curse of the crossed out image107
In the Lives of Animals, Elizabeth Costello opens up a different way of responding to 
these questions. She begins her talk by likening herself to Franz Kafka’s Red Peter - an 
educated ape who relates the story of ‘his ascent from beast to something approaching 
man’ 108 in the short story ‘Report to an Academy.’ 109 The comparison between herself 
and Red Peter is not, Costello tells us, a little joke intended to put the audience at ease 
about the performance to come: “‘I did not intend it ironically. It means what it says. I 
say what I mean. I am an old woman. I do not have the time any longer to say things I 
do not mean. ’” 110 By affirming the literal sense of her words, also she draws attention, 
by way of contrast, to the convention of the crossed out metaphor of animality. * 111
According to Elizabeth Costello, the notion of animality resounds in our cultural 
discourse. For example, our descriptions of the Nazi concentration camps, she points 
out, draw heavily on the suffering of animals, on the metaphorics of the stockyard and 
slaughter house: ‘They went like sheep to the slaughter.’ ‘They died like animals.’ ‘The 
Nazi butchers killed them. ’ 112 But at another level, the full implications of this 
comparison are disavowed, for we condemn the citizens of the Third Reich for their 
complicity in their regime’s horrific crime, but we do not condemn ourselves for the 
degradation and violent extermination going on in factory farms or meat processing 
camps. At such points, Elizabeth Costello suggests, we refuse to take our own words 
seriously113 and the terrible fate of animals becomes a metaphor entirely in the service of
1(17 This title is borrowed from two sources. On the one hand 1 allude back to Cavell’s reading of Samuel 
Beckett, where he suggests that literalism is Beckett’s technique for undoing curses and cliche’s, but on 
the other hand I am drawing on Le Doeuff’s analysis of the crossed out image that I outlined in the 
introduction to the thesis. To recap, in her reading of the theatre image in Thomas More’s utopia she 
writes: ‘[pjhilosophy’s attitude to the theatre is always ambiguous: part acceptance, part refusal. Thomas 
More uses the image of the theatre to think something: political perfection can be perceived; but what he 
borrows from it is immediately denied, and the theatrical model is rejected through the condemnation of 
exhibitionism. Thus the theatre is diverted from its direct meaning, to become a metaphor; it is accepted 
as a model only after it has been crossed out and corrected. Michele Le Doeuff, ‘Daydream in Utopia’ in 
The Philosophical Imaginary, trans. Colin Gordon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 25.
108 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 15.
1119 Franz Kafka, ‘A Report for An Academy,’ trans. Ian Johnston (2003) 
http://www.mala.bc.ca/johnstoi/kafka/reportforacademy.htm
110 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 16.
111 This idea is also in keeping with my discussion in chapter four of Le Doeuff’s analysis of the logic of 
the ‘chiasma.’ See Michele Le Doeuff, ‘Pierre Roussel’s Chiasmas’ in The Philosophical Imaginary, 
trans. Colin Gordon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 138-170.
112 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 20.
113 Here Costello’s words tie in with Wittgenstein’s and Cavell’s for she too emphasizes the need to 
follow through the implications of what our words say.
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something beyond itself. For ultimately ‘[i]n our chosen metaphorics’ it turns out to be 
‘they,’ the citizens of the Third Reich, ‘who were the beasts. By treating fellow human 
beings, beings created in the image of God, like beasts, they had themselves become 
beasts. ’ 114
Elizabeth Costello’s critique of the crossed out metaphor resembles the techniques 
that Cavell identifies in Beckett, for she too undoes a curse or convention by taking its 
words at face value. However, the convention Elizabeth Costello exposes is the very 
convention at work in Cavell’s tale of human origins. To illustrate the child’s state of 
derangement a certain analogy between human and beast is implied, but since the state 
of derangement is also the defining moment for humanity, the boundary between human 
and beast must be re-established. Cavell does this by assigning animals a purely 
instrumental role.
So although animality is not wholly separate from humanity but functions, to borrow 
a notion from Derrida, as a ‘constitutive outside’ " 5 - an ‘outside’ internal to our very 
concept of humanity - the difficulty is that the comparison between human and animal 
is made, then immediately crossed out, and as a result the logic of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ of 
human and beast is reinstated.
In Costello’s view, what we miss when we disavow our words in this way, is not the 
scientific discovery that apes are human-like; that they possess a limited aptitude for 
language and reason and that, on this basis, they should be assigned the rights of a 
mentally retarded human.
Whatever else it may have been, [Red Peter’s] report to the academy was not a plea to 
be treated as a mentally defective human being, a simpleton. Red Peter was not an 
investigator of primate behaviour but a branded, marked wounded animal presenting 
himself as speaking testimony to a gathering of scholars. I am not a philosopher of 
mind but an animal exhibiting, yet not exhibiting, to a gathering of scholars, a wound, 
which I cover up under my clothes but touch on in every word I speak. 116
Given the perplexity and anger felt by the audience in response to Costello’s talk, 
one might conclude that by taking the analogy between people and beasts literally,
114 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 21.
115 See for example, Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, for an exploration of this term in the context of 
questions of political community.
116 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 31-32.
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Costello marks herself a hybrid and thus, like Wittgenstein’s talking lion, risks not 
being understood.
Not being understood
There is a certain analogy between the stance of Elizabeth Costello and Wittgenstein. 
Both imaginatively open themselves to the utterer of nonsense in the name of a 
community to come; both struggle to articulate their ethical vision but in doing so risk 
speaking nonsense themselves. Wittgenstein describes his anxieties about the reception 
of his work in the preface to the Investigations:
Up until a short time ago I had really given up the idea of publishing my work in my 
lifetime. It used, indeed, to be revived from time to time: mainly because I was 
obliged to learn that my results (which I had communicated in lectures, typescripts and 
discussions), variously misunderstood, more or less mangled or watered down, were in 
circulation. This stung my vanity and I had difficulty in quieting it. ... I make [my 
remarks] public with doubtful feelings. It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot 
to this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one 
brain or another—but, of course, it is not likely. 117
At the end of The Lives of Animals , Elizabeth Costello’s finds that by pressing her 
sympathetic imagination beyond the human realm she becomes disoriented, unable to 
understand those closest to her. On her way to the airport she says to her son:
T no longer know where I am. I seem to move around perfectly easily among 
people, to have perfectly normal relations with them. Is it possible, I ask myself, that 
all of them are participants in a crime of stupefying proportions? Am I fantasizing it 
all? I must be mad! Yet every day I see the evidences. The very people I suspect 
produce the evidence, exhibit it, offer it to me. Corpses. Fragments of corpses that 
they have brought for money . ..
‘Yet I’m not dreaming. I look into your eyes, into Norma’s, into the children’s, and 
I see only kindness, human-kindness. Calm down, I tell myself, you are making a 
mountain out of a molehill. This is life, everyone else comes to terms with it, why 
cant’ you? Why can’t you?
She turns on him a tearful face. What does she want, he thinks? Does she want me 
to answer her question for her?
117 Wittgenstein, ‘Preface,’ Investigations.
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They are not yet on the expressway. He pulls the car over, switches o ff the engine, 
takes his mother in his arms. He inhales the smell o f cold cream, o f old flesh. ‘There, 
there,’ he whispers in her ear. ‘There, there. It will soon be over.’118
In response her son promises an end to her crisis, as if he were comforting a suffering 
animal with the prospect of death. Is this the extent of our shared ‘substrate of life,’ the 
extent of the sympathy possible between us: between human beings, or between humans 
and animals? Is the promise that the suffering of life will soon end acknowledgement 
enough? Or is something further called for between us?
Two ways of thinking the limits of community
In response to these questions, I believe that Wittgenstein’s work might lead us along 
two different paths. For on the one hand, his work can show us that humans and 
animals share certain forms of life but not others. The limit of human animal agreement 
is reached when we move from those forms we share to those we do not. In 
Wittgenstein’s account of these limits we share with animals happiness, unhappiness, 
fear, pain and the feeling of being alive and primitive forms of language and life such as 
commanding, questioning, recounting and chatting. However, there are also other 
‘complicated’ practices and modes of speech that animals and humans do not share. 
Wittgenstein mentions hoping and pretending, but one could add to this list the capacity 
to imagine death, to evade life, to feel the limits of language and to enter into the state 
of derangement described by Cavell. Here Wittgenstein’s aphorism -  if a lion could talk 
we could not understand him -  might be taken as a reminder of the limits of our 
sympathetic understanding, even a warning not to try to step beyond these limits. " 9 At 
one level, we are reminded of the discontinuities between the lion’s life and our own, at 
another level we are directed back to those possibilities of life that we do share with 
lions, like eating and sleeping and feeling frightened or joyful. 120
Along these lines one might conclude that when animals suffer they clearly feel pain 
and this pain calls for a sympathetic response. Nevertheless, animals do not share the 
human capacity to imagine death, to distort life or to be troubled by their own inner 
strangeness so they do not suffer the loss of community and freedom in the ways that 
we do. Hence human suffering is of a different order. Wittgenstein’s attempt to
118 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 120-122.
119 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §223.
120 On the approach I am outlining here, these would probably be Wittgenstein’s suggestions, but other 
people may propose different instances of shared criteria.
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imaginatively understand the crisis felt by the speaker of nonsense, opens up a 
community between human beings, it has no bearing on the community possible 
between humans and animals. 121
The seeds of a very different response can be found in Glendinning’s interpretation 
of Wittgenstein. As I outlined earlier, Glendinning argues that occasions of mutual 
understanding between animals and humans partake of the uncanny for we appear to 
each other as the same, but not entirely the same. However, Glendinning also believes 
that a community can be risked even in circumstances when one responds to another 
being with a resolute ‘not the same! ’ 122 His somewhat brief explanation is that: ‘the 
reading-response is best conceived as a spontaneous or originary apostrophe’ to turn ‘to 
a living thing as another [body-soul] in advance of evidence or reasons which might 
ground it.’12' Although this encounter is not identical to the therapeutic engagement 
with the speaker of nonsense outlined in the Invesitgations because it is unclear whether 
there will be a wealth of shared criteria to discover, affirm or return to; Glendinning’s 
description nevertheless opens up, as with the therapeutic encounter, the possibility of 
an open-ended engagement with nonsense.
The term ‘acknowledgement,’ as I have extrapolated it in my thesis, may also be of 
help here. Acknowledgement, in Cavell’s view, is not a particular response, but rather ‘a 
category in terms of which a given response is evaluated.’ In my view, this means that 
‘acknowledgement’ not only includes leaps to agreement, instances of “‘Yes: same” 
saying,’ but also the recognition that our words fail, that at times another can may be an 
enigma to me. Adopting a non-appropriative openness to the mystery other beings is, in 
this view, not comparable to asserting a blank, a gap in my knowledge, precisely 
because in advance of all knowledge I can still respond - in terror, in perplexity, or in 
wonder. But more than that, when a ‘we’ is risked, one is still in some sense ‘at home’ 
with the iterable traits of the other. As Glendinning has pointed out, it is only in 
circumstances when we meet a ‘radical alien,’ when we are barely able recognise or 
read something as a form of life, that it is possible to say that the criteria for a body-soul
121 Investigations section 282 could be read in support of this reading. Here Wittgenstein draws attention 
to the difference between the nonsense of a language user and the nonsense of a babbling child (a child 
who, one might speculate, is still in the animal realm in the sense that the child has not yet entered into 
language or the social symbolic order). The remark suggests that for Wittgenstein the nonsense of 
language users and the nonsense of non-language users are not the same. In my view, this tells us that the 
range of possible interpretations, understandings and misunderstandings opened up by an engagement 
with nonsense in each case are not the same. But I do not take this to mean that there is an absolute break 
between linguistic and pre-linguistic nonsense.
122 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 146.
123 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 146.
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are unsatisfied.124 There is between all forms of life a far/near relation. 125 Here the lion 
who talks yet is not understood, might be read as a reminder that Wittgenstein does not 
present ‘the other’ as absolutely other, but as hybrid, part familiar, part strange, on the 
threshold between nonsense and sense.
The story of Sultan or Red Peter
In the section that follows I want to build on Glendinning’s reading of Wittgenstein by 
returning to Coetzee’s book The Lives o f Animals. In the account of the sympathetic 
imagination I will propose differences and similarities in form of life although 
important are not the primary emphasis, for the central question is whether we 
acknowledge another as a body-soul. Elizabeth Costello for example writes: “‘[t]o be 
alive is to be a living soul. An animal -  and we are all animals -  is an embodied 
soul.’” 126 In this view, to refuse to acknowledge another as a body-soul, is not merely to 
identify one’s distinguishing attributes, but to consign ‘the o ther’ to a purely 
instrumental mode of existence and to fail to respond to the crisis this existence 
produces.
These ideas turn us to Red Peter the hybrid, educated ape who Elizabeth Costello 
aligns herself with at the start of her talk. She tells the audience that in 1917, the same 
year that Kafka wrote about Red Peter in ‘Report to an Academy’ the psychologist 
Wolfgang Köhler published The Mentality o f Apes. The apes in Kohler’s book 
resemble Red Peter in the sense that they too were captured in Africa and transported to 
a research laboratory where they underwent humanisation training. Although Kohler’s 
apes did not do as well as Red Peter, they gained ‘at least a smattering of education’ and 
in Elizabeth Costello’s view the most successful of the trained apes, Sultan, might be 
thought of as Red Peter’s prototype. According to Elizabeth Costello, Kohler’s 
scientific investigation into the mentality of apes says far more than its author realised. 
Through Kohler’s account of Sultan, she hopes to tell the story that Red Peter was 
unable to communicate in his learned address to the academy.
‘Sultan is alone in his pen. He is hungry: the food that used to arrive regularly has 
unaccountably ceased coming.
124 Glendinning, On Being With Others, 146.
125 For example, there is a loud noise outside, I see a cat jump with fear, she senses my nervousness, but 
in another sense we remain quite unfathomable to each other.
126 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 45.
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‘The man who used to feed him and has now stopped feeding him stretches a wire 
over the pen three meters above ground level, and hangs a bunch of bananas from it. 
Into the pen he drags three wooden crates. Then he disappears, closing the gate behind 
him, through he is still somewhere in the vicinity, since one can smell him.
‘Sultan knows: Now one is supposed to think that is what the bananas up there are 
about. The bananas are there to make one think, to spur one to the limits of one’s 
thought. But what must one think? One thinks: why is he starving me? One thinks: 
What have I done? Why has he stopped liking me? One thinks: Why does he not want 
these crates any more? But none of these is the right thought. Even a more 
complicated thought -  for instance: What is wrong with him, what misconception does 
he have of me, that leads him to believe it is easier for me to reach a banana hanging 
from a wire that to pick up a banana from the floor? -  is wrong. The right thought to 
think is: how does one use the crates to reach the bananas?
‘Sultan drags the crates under the bananas, piles them one on top of the other, 
climbs the tower he has built, and pulls down the bananas. He thinks: Now will he 
stop punishing me?
‘The answer is: No. The next day the man hangs a fresh bunch of bananas from the 
wire but also fills the crates with stones so that they are too heavy to be dragged . ..
‘At every turn Sultan is driven to think the less interesting thought. From the purity 
of speculation (Why do men behave like this?) he is relentlessly propelled toward 
lower, practical, instrumental reason (how does one use this to get that?) and thus 
towards acceptance of himself as primarily an organism with an appetite that needs to 
be satisfied. Although his entire history, from the time his mother was shot and he was 
captured, through his voyage in a cage to imprisonment on this island prison camp and 
the sadistic games that are played around food here, leads him to ask questions about 
the justice of the universe and the place of this penal colony in it, a carefully plotted 
psychologic regimen conducts him away from ethics and metaphysics towards the 
humbler reaches of practical reason. 127
The story of Sultan might be thought of as a further re-telling of Cavell’s re-telling of 
Wittgenstein’s child. Like the child, Sultan begins his life in the symbolic order 
surrounded by ‘enigmatic messages’ that he cannot fully comprehend. Like the child, 
Sultan is thrown by the troubling question of his place in the desires of those around 
him. Like the child, the very being of Sultan’s life is left torn, perturbed; and the same 
order that produces this disturbance covers it over, by submitting Sultan to a regime of
127 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 34-37.
223
reason drives him always to the ‘less interesting thought.’ In this regard Sultan’s story is 
the story of the wound, the trauma that Red Peter brings to show the academy, and 
which Elizabeth Costello covers with her clothes but touches on in every word she 
speaks.I2X But like the child, Sultan’s true question is not, ‘what is the meaning of this 
symbol?’ But rather, ‘where is home?’ “‘In his deepest being,”’ Elizabeth Costello says, 
“‘Sultan is not interested in the banana problem. Only the experimenter’s single-minded 
regimentation forces him to concentrate on it. The question that truly occupies him, as it 
occupies the rat and the cat and every other animal trapped in the hell of the laboratory 
or the zoo, is: Where is home, and how do I get there? ” ’ 129
But whereas Cavell’s tale suggests that life’s perturbation coincides with the human 
passage beyond the ‘repetitive cycles of need and satisfaction’ characterising the 
animal; Sultan the ape begins with the troubling question of his place in the desires of 
others and his instrumental existence is gradually made, manufactured by the scientist’s 
humanisation experiments and regimes. This suggests a further way of reading Cavell’s 
tale: for when he assigns animals an instrumental role, he in fact finds in their lives the 
compulsive repetitiveness of Wittgenstein’s builders, a mode of existence that Cavell 
likens to our own, but which could also quite literally describe the life of a trained 
animal.
The nonsensical products of the sympathetic imagination
In light of these remarks I think that one can no longer say with assurance that the 
compulsion to repeat instilled in us by the symbolic order, and the distortion of this 
repetition have no bearing on animal life. For if humans are not entirely separate from 
animals but are, like Elizabeth Costello, hybrids -  part beast, part human -  then might 
not some animals, especially those who live in human institutions such as laboratories 
or factories, also be hybrids? 130 To ask such a question is to be willing to imagine, as
12x Here I am paraphrasing Elizabeth Costello in Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 31-32.
129 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 39.
130 Giorgio Agamben’s approach to animals is significantly different from the account I am developing 
here because, following Heidegger, he does not view animals as beings capable of ‘seeing-as’ (and hence 
reading others) in the way that humans do. Drawing on Jacob von Uexkiill’s work on ticks, in his essay 
‘Tick,’ Agamben points out that the tick’s whole being in comprised of no more than its relation to its 
environment -  ‘the tick is this relationship, she lives only in it and for it.’ There is however, a point of 
connection between my argument and Agamben’s. In his 1934 book Streijziige duch die Umwelten von 
Tieren und Menschen, Uexkiill observes that a tick was kept living in a laboratory for eighteen years 
without nourishment, in total isolation from its environment. In a later essay: ‘Profound Boredom’ 
Agamben goes on to say that; ‘Under particular circumstances, like those which man creates in 
laboratories, the animal can effectively suspend its immediate relationship with its environment, without, 
however, either ceasing to be an animal or becoming human. Perhaps the tick in the Rostock laboratory
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Elizabeth Costello imagines, a story where the problematic of a life worth living is not 
confined to humans.
There is, however, an important qualification that must be made. For the story of Red 
Peter or Sultan is after all a story told in words and as such it is something that an 
animal could not understand or let alone confirm as their own. This ties in with a point I 
made earlier during my discussion of Glendinning and Cavell on criteria, for while 
criteria are manifest in the intertwining of verbal and non-verbal behaviour and 
response, they are recalled in language. In this way we might say that the community 
Wittgenstein appeals to has a dual aspect. For when he observes that we only ascribe 
sensations to a body, or rather to ‘a soul which some body ha s 'nx (283 -284) he evokes 
a community of being between humans and other animals, but at the same time he 
makes a proposal that only human beings are in a position to deny or confirm. In this 
sense one effect of therapy is to press the imaginative capacity of talkers, but a second 
effect is to shift our notion of the community possible between beings.
Reflecting back on her own efforts to imagine a community of being, Elizabeth 
Costello observes that ‘when we divert the current of feeling that flows between 
ourselves and the animal into words, we abstract it forever from the animal.’132 In this 
situation, she says, ‘ [s]ympathy has everything to do with the subject and little to do 
with the object, the “another”’. We see this immediately, she goes on to say, ‘when we 
think of the object not as [an animal] but as another human being. There are people who 
have the capacity to imagine themselves as someone else, there are people who have no 
such capacity (when the lack is extreme, we call them psychopaths), and there are 
people who have the capacity but choose not to exercise it.’133
Elizabeth’s Costello’s own proposal is that sympathetic imagination has no 
determinate limits. To imagine oneself as a corpse, she tells us, is to think the 
impossible, to ‘know what a corpse cannot know: that it is extinct, that it knows nothing 
and will never know anything anymore. For an instant, before my whole structure of 
knowledge collapses in panic, I am alive inside that contradiction, dead and alive at the 
same time . . . That is the kind of thought we are capable of, we human beings, that and 
even more, if we press ourselves or are pressed.’134 And if we can press ourselves in this
guards a mystery of the ‘simply living being,’ which neither Uexkiill nor Heidegger was prepared to 
confront.’ Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, K. Attrel trans. (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2004), 47, 47, 70.
131 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §283.
132 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 86.
133 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 48.
134 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 2nd edition, 44.
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remarkable way, Costello asks, why not also think our way into the lives of animals? As 
I have argued in this chapter, Elizabeth Costello’s wager ultimately turns itself around; 
for an acknowledgement of the ‘substrate of life’ we ‘share’ may at times amount to the 
recognition that animals live as corpses and, from within this terrible living death, that 
they too feel the impulse for freedom and home.
But if by abstracting this account into words the focus shifts away from ‘the other’ to 
the capacity of humans to imaginatively inhabit the being of another, then surely it is 
this very capacity that ultimately separates us from the beasts? Coetzee’s story, The 
Lives of Animals, challenges the inevitability of this question and all other questions that 
seek a determinate dividing line between humans and other animal. In my view the 
sympathetic attempt to imagine a shared ‘substrate of life,’ goes hand in hand with a 
willingness to acknowledge the enigmatic yet open-ended encounter between beings, an 
encounter which is irreducible to attributes that one being has and another lacks. While I 
do not want to claim that Wittgenstein presses his sympathetic imagination in just the 
same ways that Coetzee does in his story, I believe that they share a sense of the open- 
ended, sometimes nonsensical conversation entailed in the leap to community.
Here one must consider the talking lion that we do not understand, along side the 
audience member who grows a lion head and begins to roar in Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture 
on Ethics. ’ 135 To imagine such a thing, Wittgenstein says in his lecture, is to open 
ourselves to something enigmatic or miraculous, without explanation or foundation. In 
my view these hybrids - the roaring human and the talking lion - are not essentially 
warnings that the limits of the sympathetic imagination has been reached (as if it were 
simply enough to admit the opacity of the other); instead they are emblems of the 
paradoxical effort of the imagination required if we are to truly open ourselves to the 
enigma of other forms of life. This means that to turn to another body-soul in wonder, is 
also to make a leap of the sympathetic imagination, to envisage the possibility of a 
community of life between us.
Attempts to imagine such communities appear paradoxical or nonsensical precisely 
because they cut across differences in form of life. For example, to imagine ourselves 
into the lives of animals we must think in language a life that takes place largely outside 
language. Hence the role of these paradoxical images is always two fold - to return us to 
the various possibilities of life we share, and to evoke a future community - the 
possibility of new possibilities. This suggests that the nonsensical space of relation I
135 Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics,’10.
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previously traced between subjects does not give rise to a self-contained form of life, 
but a community in open engagement with another.
To conclude I would like to bring my remarks back to the context of Wittgenstein’s 
work. In Wittgenstein’s writing the beings who utter nonsense are generally other 
human beings, and this seems to suggest that the open-ended encounter with nonsense 
he evokes pertains directly to the therapeutic encounter between human beings. But 
Wittgenstein’s hybrid creatures are an exception and this leads me to suggest that 
another way of wording Wittgenstein’s conviction that one cannot understand the 
talking lion is to say that the other lions do not understand their talking neighbour. But 
to imagine this is to imagine that the talking lion cannot fully understand itself, that it 
carries its own inner strangeness. Whether this creature - part human part beast - is best 
understood as Wittgenstein’s self-portrait, or his portrait of animality is a question that I 
intend to leave open.
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Conclusion
By way of conclusion I will recap the important themes of this thesis and reflect back 
on my procedure.
The thesis as a whole explores how Wittgenstein’s techniques of imagination inform 
his commentary on the imagination and his vision of language more broadly. In Chapter 
1 I found the operations of the imagination that he unmasks in his commentary are 
appropriated at a rhetorical level to become part of his own practice. By illustrating the 
philosopher’s ‘illustrated turns of speech’ and by opening to the nonsensical core of the 
fantasy-picture, Wittgenstein re-conceives philosophy as an aesthetic practice - ‘a new 
way of speaking, a new comparison . . .  a new sensation.’1 This new aesthetic, I argue, 
helps give rise to a vision of the possibilities of life, an opening to the wondrous 
everyday.
1 also argue that the rhetorical techniques Wittgenstein deploys cannot be kept 
separate from his ethical preoccupations. The tie between ethics, imagination and 
language is suggested at the very start of the Investigations where Wittgenstein observes 
that to imagine a language is to imagine a mode of being in the world. But as we have 
seen the association can also be traced back to Wittgenstein’s early writings, where he 
ties our vision of life as a whole to feelings and describes the attempts to articulate these 
feelings as nonsensical. As I have shown, his early ethical thought bears upon his later 
writing in two important ways. Firstly, his early writing suggests that an ethical 
experience is manifest through words and practice but cannot be pinned down as a 
determinate event or psychological state. Secondly, by imaginatively engaging with the 
speaker of nonsense in the Tractatus and ‘Lecture on Ethics,’ Wittgenstein draws 
attention to the open-ended space of relation between and within subjects. Hence, I have 
resisted the notion of nonsense as a defamatory gesture, emphasising it as a positive 
productive moment of encounter with the other.
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I brought my previous reading of ethics and language to bear 
on an understanding of therapy in Wittgenstein’s later writings. To explore what is at 
stake in Wittgenstein’s therapeutic procedures I refined my account of his imaginative 
techniques by tracing various continuities and discontinuities between Wittgenstein and 
Derrida. The points of contact and the moments of miscomprehension between
1 This comment is originally made in the context of ‘the visual room’ one of Wittgenstein’s pictures of 
solipsism, but as I have argued it has bearing on Wittgenstein’s practice more broadly.
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Wittgenstein’s rhetorical practice and deconstruction ultimately led me to develop my 
reading of Wittgenstein in the context of the Freudian notions of therapy and the 
unconscious.
Drawing on my previous discussion of Wittgenstein’s ethical thought, I argue that 
the crisis Wittgenstein addresses and the therapeutic conversion he promises are 
manifest in our modes of language and life, rather than simply confined to various 
individuals. At stake in this crisis is the perturbing possibility that we are not fully alive, 
but live out a mindless, repetitive existence, under the spell of the ‘un-dead.’2 In 
psychoanalytic terms, I suggest that the mindless compulsion to repeat that Wittgenstein 
evokes through his scene of the builders resembles the fantasy formation of the 
unconscious, a surplus of validity over significance. I argue that by acknowledging the 
nonsensical heart of fantasy, and by sketching and re-sketching its existential effects, 
Wittgenstein unbinds the fantasy order of the unconscious and disperses its image, 
mood and feelings across the details of life, revealing the strangeness of the ordinary, 
and the ordinariness of the strange. In the therapeutic encounter, the unconscious is re­
conceived as an open-ended space of possibility between and within subjects.
The final chapter brought this notion to bear on a much broader discussion of 
community and difference - rethinking nonsense and the unconscious in terms of the 
open-textured encounter possible between different forms of life. Here my focus shifted 
from the possibilities open to a community of language users, to the possibility of a 
community of being. My proposal has been that the imaginative attempt to think of a 
community of being entails an opening to the nonsensical space of encounter between 
beings and that this opening can not be entirely separated from the problematic of a life 
worth living addressed by therapy. To make this argument I draw on a series of key 
Wittgensteinian concepts -  ‘nonsense,’ ‘therapy’ and ‘forms of life’ -  however I pursue 
these ideas in ways that ultimately go beyond the scope of Wittgenstein’s project. As I 
suggested in Chapter 6 Wittgenstein’s ambiguous images of the roaring person and the 
talking lion, might be understood as the sites where our concerns at once come together 
and diverge.
In summary, the central argument of this thesis has been that the strategy of 
illustrated nonsense, and more broadly, the open-ended encounter with the speaker of 
nonsense, marks the space of relation and possibility between and within beings. In the 
course of the thesis these ideas are traced in three different settings -  firstly, in relation 
to our attempts to express an attitude to life as a whole, secondly, in terms of the
2 Santner, Psychotheology of Everyday Life, 25.
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therapeutic engagement with fantasy and finally, in terms of the relation between beings 
with different forms of life. While it is true that the three imaginative encounters I have 
outlined pertain to a very particular mode of understanding and must be considered 
along side the various ways we make sense of each other’s words or actions, they also 
bear on our grasp of ethics more broadly. As I have argued, the imaginative encounter 
with nonsense reminds us that the various understandings and misunderstandings 
between and within beings do not amount to the mastery or failure to master a 
determinate content, but entail a space of reaction and response; indeed the whole range 
of responses and reactions that Stanely Cavell evokes through the term 
‘acknowledgement.’ The thesis as a whole can be understood as an attempt to trace 
some of the modes of understanding and miscomprehension entailed by this open-ended 
space of ethical encounter.
To conclude I would like to propose a further way that the thesis has explored this 
space of relation. My procedure in this thesis has been to bring various ideas, images 
and readings together in conversations. At the outset I suggested that this conversation - 
part exchange, part altercation -  is inspired by Wittgenstein’s attention to changes in 
aspect. Through my particular arrangement of these voices I trace a path in the criss­
cross passage of Wittgenstein’s thought. But reflecting back I can now say that my 
thought takes shape in the space between these voices, revealed through the meeting 
and passing of thoughts and images, the nuances of understanding and 
miscomprehension that concern me.
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